

■■■ The trial judge stated for the record his reasons for imposing the sentence. See Douglas and Barnes, *The Unjust Sentence*, 19 JUDGES' J. 16 (Fall, 1980). Those reasons were: the defendant's age, 35, and presumed maturity, which the trial judge found to be atypical of the ordinary first offender; the defendant's failure to tell the truth on the witness stand; and, the nature of the stolen property received by the defendant, *i.e.*, firearms. Taking only the last of these, it is clear that society's legitimate concern with the public danger of thefts involving firearms increases the need for general deterrence of such offenses, and serves as an adequate justification for imposition of a more severe penalty. Thus, New Hampshire judges have generally dealt more severely with offenses involving firearms. See *State v. Leclair*, 118 N.H. 214, 221, 385 A.2d 831, 835 (1978). We find no abuse of judicial discretion.

Affirmed.

Hillsborough
No. 82-054

ISABELLE JACQUES & *a.*

v.

LOU-ANNE PAQUIN

October 12, 1982

Christy & Tessier, of Manchester (*Scott F. Innes* on the brief, and *Robert Christy* orally), for the plaintiffs.

Law Offices of Robert A. Backus, of Manchester (*Elizabeth Cazden* on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The plaintiffs appeal a verdict in favor of the defendant after

three days of jury trial in a rear-end automobile accident case. There having been no motion for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the sole issue is whether the Trial Court (*Flynn, J.*) properly denied the plaintiffs' motion to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence and motion for a new trial.

The evidence was conflicting, but the jury did have evidence before it from which it could conclude that the defendant was not following the plaintiffs' car too closely and that she was traveling at a very low and reasonable speed. Because there was evidence to support the trial judge's decision to deny the plaintiffs' motions, we will not overturn it. *Rogers v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H.*, 121 N.H. 956, 958, 437 A.2d 263, 265 (1981); *Gowen v. Brothers*, 121 N.H. 377, 381, 430 A.2d 159, 161 (1981); *Kierstead v. Betley Chevrolet-Buick, Inc.*, 118 N.H. 493, 496-97, 389 A.2d 429, 431-32 (1978).

Affirmed.

KING, C.J., did not sit.

Board of Taxation
No. 82-150

APPEAL OF STANLEY ROKETENETZ, JR.
(New Hampshire Board of Taxation)

October 12, 1982

Winer, Pillsbury & Bennett, of Nashua (*Robert W. Pillsbury* on the brief and orally), for Stanley Roketenetz, Jr.

Soule, Leslie, Bronstein & Zelin, of Salem (*Barbara F. Loughman* on the brief and orally), for the Town of Pelham.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The taxpayer received a property tax bill for his real estate in Pelham on November 21, 1980, and on February 6, 1981, he filed a