

true construction, and that it must now be considered as settled, that an execution running against the goods and estate of a person deceased, in the hands of his executor or administrator, may be extended upon lands, and that lands must for that purpose be considered as estate in the hands of executors and administrators.

Mead et al.
vs.
Harvey.

We have not, however, come to this conclusion until after a careful examination of the remedies which the law will afford to heirs and devisees, whose lands may be thus taken. And in the first place, we entertain no doubt that heirs and devisees may redeem lands thus taken, in the same manner that debtors may redeem their lands which have been taken in execution. In the next place, if executors and administrators permit the lands of their testators and intestates to be taken in execution, when they have sufficient personal estate in their hands, it is unfaithful administration, and a breach of the condition of their bonds. This is a necessary consequence of the provision of the statute, which has made the personal estate chargeable with the debts in the first instance, and the real estate chargeable only in case of a deficiency of personal assets. 4 *Mass. Rep.* 654, *Mitchell vs. Lunt*.—4 *ditto* 354.—10 *ditto* 450.—9 *ditto* 376.



DANIEL EMERSON vs. NUTTER BROWN.

A scire facias against bail, which contains no allegation that notice was given to the bail, as required by the statute of 1818, cap. 35, is bad on demurrer.

This was a scire facias, in which *Emerson* alleged that by the consideration of the justices of the court of common pleas, holden at Portsmouth, in this county, on the third Tuesday of January, 1819, he recovered judgment against *Isaac Brown* for \$13 78 debt, and \$12 85 costs of suit, as by the record appears; that execution issued on said judgment, and was delivered to *J. B. V.*, a deputy sheriff, to be levied in due form, "who made his return *non est inventus* thereupon, and returned the same into the said court of common pleas, holden at Exeter, on the third Tuesday of August,

Emerson
vs.
Brown.

" 1819, when and where the same was returnable. And the
" said *Daniel* averred, that the said *Isaac* did, during the
" time said writ of execution was in force, avoid, &c., so
" that he could not be arrested. And whereas *Nutter Brown*,
" &c. became bail not only for the appearance of the said
" *Isaac*, but for his satisfying the judgment, &c. ; the sheriff
" was commanded to make known to said *Nutter* that he
" appear, &c. and shew cause why the plaintiff should not
" have execution against him for his said debt and costs," &c.
To this scire facias, *Brown* demurred, and the plaintiff
joined in demurrer.

Tenney, for the plaintiff.

Claggett, for the defendant.

RICHARDSON, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

By the statute of February 15, 1791, entitled " an act
" regulating bail in civil causes," sec. 1, it was enacted, " that
" where bail is given upon mesne process in any civil action
" for the appearance of the party to answer the suit and to
" abide the order or judgment of the court that shall be given
" thereon, every such surety or sureties shall be obliged to
" satisfy the judgment obtained against the principal, in
" case of the principal's avoidance and return of *non est in-*
" *ventus* upon the execution."⁽¹⁾ The statute of 1818, cap.
35, entitled " an act in addition to an act entitled an act
" regulating bail in civil causes," sec. 2, enacts, " that the
" creditor in any civil action, intending to charge the bail in
" such action, shall deliver his execution to an officer with
" the name, &c. of the person, &c. who became bail in such
" action, and the officer shall, at least fifteen days before
" the return day of such execution, deliver to at least one of
" the bail in said suit, or leave at his dwelling house or last
" and usual place of abode, a notice in writing, stating that
" such execution is in his hands, the amount of the same,
" and when returnable, &c. ; and no return of *non est inven-*
" *tis* shall be sufficient to charge the bail, unless the officer
" also certify on said execution that notice as aforesaid was
" given to the bail." 2 *N. H. Laws* 139,

(1) 1 *N. H.*
Laws 116.

It cannot be doubted that this clause in the statute has made notice to the bail essential to the maintenance of a scire facias against them, and that it has made the certificate of the officer the only evidence admissible to prove notice. It is clear, then, that this scire facias, containing no allegation that notice was given to the defendant according to the requisitions of the statute, is defective in substance, and must be adjudged insufficient, if the statute of 1818, cap. 35, can be construed to embrace this case. It does not appear by the pleadings whether the defendant became bail before or after that act became a law; nor is it in our opinion material; because it does appear that judgment was rendered against the principal four months after that statute was in force. And as the provisions of the statute do not change the nature of the contract into which bail enter, but relate merely to the remedy by which the contract is to be enforced, we entertain no doubt that the statute embraces all cases of bail where judgment was rendered against the principal after the act took effect. There must, therefore, be

Emerson
vs.
Brown.

Judgment for the defendant.

JOHN ROLLINS vs. THOMAS AMES.

It is a good cause of challenge to favor, if a juror has before the trial heard the principal witnesses of one party, and, as a magistrate, at his request taken their depositions.

But for this cause after verdict the court will not order a new trial, unless the other party and his counsel make affidavit, that they were ignorant of this cause of challenge at the time of the trial.

This was an action of trover.

In the course of the trial here, February, 1819, on the general issue, certain depositions were introduced on the part of the plaintiff, which had been taken before a magistrate by the name of *Martin*.

A verdict being found for the plaintiff, a motion was made by the defendant for a new trial, on the ground that *Martin*, who took the depositions, was also foreman of the petit jury to whom the cause was submitted.

2	349
66	503
66	525

2	349
74	321