John J. Coffey (2005)

http://www.nh.gov/judiciary/supreme/opinions/2005/coffe094.htm 8/26/2005

at over $200,000. fee of $30,000 for handling an appeal to this court. The property had been assessed consideration of $50,000, which was based in part upon the respondent's estimated property located on Ocean Boulevard in Rye. The conveyance was for a stated respondent's client, Natalie Hopkins, signed a deed conveying to the respondent The referee found, and the record supports, the following facts. On July 9, 1998, the

conduct warrants disbarment. suspension. We adopt the referee's findings, but we conclude that the respondent's l.7(b), l.8(a)(I), l.8(b), l.80), 2.1 and 8.4(a) and recommended a two-year the respondent violated New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4(b), 1.5(a), (Manias, J.) for a hearing. The referee found by clear and convincing evidence that the practice oflaw for two years. We referred the petition to a Judicial Referee Conduct (committee) filed a petition to suspend the respondent, John J. Coffey, from DUGGAN, J. On December 29,2003, the Supreme Court Committee on Professional

on the brief, and Mr Shaines orally), for the respondent. Shaines & McEachern, P.A., of Portsmouth (Robert A. Shaines and Paul McEachern

Hieber on the brief, and Mr. Stark orally), for the committee on professional conduct. Law Office of Rodney L Stark, P.A., of Manchester (Ranney L. SV'rk and Sherry M.

No. LD-2003-011

Original

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Noble Drive, formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as

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p. 2 an informed decision about conveying the Rye propert:i to the respondent on July 9, clear and convincing evidence that [Ms.] Hopkins lacked the mental capacity to make suffering from dementia because of Alzheimer's [disease]." The referee also found"by "overwhelming evidence" that she was"at best, mentally impaired, and at worst, years old and her mental condition was deteriorating. The referee found At the time Hopkins deeded the Rye property to the respondent, she was eighty-one

being conveyed was the subject matter of the pending appeal. appeal through May 27, 1998. Attorney Pelech also was unaware that the property indicate that Hopkins actually owed $5,305 for the work that had been done on the consideration for past and future legal services. The respondent's billing records owed the respondent $40,000 in past legal bills and that the conveyance would be in <-<-.... vV' ......... "" ........1...1.<.. .... 1.\..\..'-'.1...1..1. .......I........1.'-''-'.1..1. t.. ...... 0LJ.l.l.l .... U l..I..LUL iLl.'::'.liLL .1i:)LCll.l 11 e. ct..>::i UIClL nul-' 11;:) "'as alQt\ prPQPrlt I1ttrvr.,..,,,,,y D""L:" ..... 1-, +""C'+~.r.:=....:1 +t-. .... + 1.-.; .....""u~'"'e.......... +" ....... d'n- -W""''''''.j..1...~..f- TT--1K'n­n Hopkins signed the deed on July 9, 1998, in Attorney Pelech's office. The respondent

estate for Hopkins. The respondent paid Attorney Pelech for this service. conveying the property to him"largely [as] a gift, and partly for fees," subject to a life Attorney Bernard Pelech, whom the respondent contacted to prepare a warranty deed practices to draft a deed conveying the property to the respondent. Hopkins selected The respondent recommended three law firms in the Portsmouth area with real estate

property, the respondent proposed that he purchase the property. retainer. After Hopkins indicated that she was not interested in mortgaging the require a retainer of $30,000 and that his fee for the appeal could exceed that payment" and that if she was no longer interested in this alternative means, he would be"very expensive." He noted that they had discussed"an alternative means for On June 2, 1998, the respondent sent Hopkins a letter stating that the appeal would

the Rye property as payment for her legal fees. she did not want to dip into her liquid assets and he proposed to take a mortgage on her that the appeal could cost more than $30,000. Hopkins told the respondent that In May 1998, the respondent discussed the cost of the appeal with Hopkins and told

146 N.H. 151 (2001). We accepted the appeal on April 28, 1998. granted the motion and Canty appealed to this court. ~ Canty v. HQ.pkins, Hopkins' behalf, moved to dismiss the suit on res judicata grounds. The trial court 1997, claiming to have a remainder interest in the Rye property. The respondent, on Nonetheless, John Canty, Jr. continued to press his claims and sued Hopkins in

Canty, No. 95-874 (N.H. May 3, 1996). we summarily affirmed the probate court's decision. See In re Estate of John F. Canty, Sr.'s grandchildren. The probate court ruled in Hopkins' favor and, on appeal, these proceedings and drafted her will, which bequeathed the property to John probate court concerning his father's estate. The respondent represented Hopkins in From 1992 to 1996, the Cantys' son, John Canty, Jr., made various claims in

1986 and John Canty died in 1991. the right of survivorship. The property passed to Hopkins after Caroline Canty died in friends, John and Caroline Canty, purchased the Rye property as joint tenants with The events leading up to this conveyance began in June 1970, when Hopkins and her

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p. 3 upon these factual findings, and others set forth below, the referee found that the testimony credible "[iJn light of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary." Based mentally competent to deed her home to the respondent, the referee did not find this Although the respondent and Attorney Pelech both testified that Hopkins was

incontinence. noted that Hopkins smelled of urine and was beginning to exhibit signs of fecal causes people to repeat over and over what they have heard. By late June, a nurse exhibited confused, rambling speech, loose associations and "echolalia," which for patients with early signs of dementia. Nonetheless, her condition deteriorated. She Their records showed that in June 1998, Hopkins began taking Aricept, a medication During this time, Hopkins was also visited by the Visiting Nurses Association (VNA).

The officer did not remember making this call. the call the previous day and that the officer told him that Hopkins was"very sharp." The respondent testified that the police officer called him on April 14, 1998, regarding

checked the bedroom and found no evidence of an intruder. at her house, I~Iopkins insisted that the strangers were still there but the officer she reported that there were two intruders in her bedroom. When the officer arrived and magazines. On April 13, the officer responded to a call from Hopkins in which spring of 1998. He also said the house was cluttered with canned goods, groceries A Rye police officer responded to a number of calls at Hopkins' residence in the

bathe and became incontinent. She smelled of urine in public. some occasions, she had no lights, telephone or hot water. Hopkins also did not By spring of 1998, Hopkins was unable to use her checkbook to pay bills so that, on

did not see it as a problem. visited Hopkins in her home and observed her hoarding behavior, he testified that he was filled with junk mail, newspapers, magazines and food. Although the respondent person would have to make a path to get through it. Another neighbor said the house with things Hopkins had bought and there were so many things in the house, a almost every day. She said that the house was filled with bags, the bed was covered that, Hopkins' house was unkempt. By December 1997, Lannon visited Hopkins Connecticut College, was very sharp and well-dressed until September 1997. After Hopkins' neighbor, Mary Lou Lannon, testified that Hopkins, who formerly taught at

Alzheimer's type. judgment were poor and she was suffering from dementia, most likely of the her immediate recall and short-term memory were impaired, her insight and and confusion. On April 4, 1998, a psychiatrist examined her and determined that Soon after these examinations, Hopkins was hospitalized because of the leg ulcers She had weeping ulcers on her legs and appeared disheveled, upset and confused. and determined she suffered from "early dementia, probably Alzheimer's disease." Hopkins' primary care physician testified that he examined her twice in March 1998

Hopkins in late 1997 and the first half of 1998. as the testimony of friends, neighbors, police and nurses who had contact with 1998." In reaching this conclusion, the referee relied upon medical evidence as well

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p. 4 recommendations as limiting the issues he can subsequently raiSe v.rould create a Construing the respondent's initial acquiescence in the referee's findings and

Professional Conduct. contested the referees' findings concerning substantive violations of the Rules of however, the respondent argued only the appropriateness of the sanction and never 150 N.H. 157, 159 (2003), and Jones' Case, 137 N.H. 351,357 (1993). In both cases, be heard. In support of this argument, the committee relies upon O'Meara's Case, initially indicating that he did not challenge the referee's report and did not wish to challenge the referee's finding that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by We first address the committee's argument that the respondent waived his right to

I. Vv~iver

to create mUltiple violations out of a single fact pattern. fourth, whether the Rules of Professional Conduct were used in an improper fashion estimate of $30,000 for handling Hopkins' case on appeal was clearly excessive; and property that was the subject of the litigation; third, whether the respondent's condition; second, whether under Rule 1.80), the deed conveyed an interest in the Hopkins' deteriorating mental condition and respondent's awareness of that whether there was sufficient evidence to support the referee's finding concerning After we ordered briefing and oral argument the respondent raised four issues: First,

Professional Conduct, the only issue before this court is the appropriate sanction. respondent initially did not contest the referee's finding that he violated the Rules of request for assessment of expenses. The committee argues that because the not desire to be heard thereon." The respondent, however, objected to the committee's the respondent indicated he"does not challenge the report of the referee and he does investigation and prosecution of the petition. In his initial reply to the referee's report, address its request that the respondent be assessed the expenses incurred in the The committee accepted the referee's report but noted that the referee had failed to

the evidence presented. rd. determine whether a reasonable person could reach the same conclusion based upon s. Ct. 97 (2004) (quotation omitted). We review the findings made by the referee to if so, the appropriate sanction." Kersey's Case, 150 N.H. 585,586, cert. denied, 125 the facts found, a violation of the rules governing attorney conduct has occurred and, supported by the record, we retain the ultimate authority to determine whether, on In a lawyer discipline case,"although we defer to the referee's factual findings if

two years. referee recommends that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for cooperation with the committee's investigation and his character and reputation. The factors, the referee found the respondent's unblemished disciplinary record, his selfish motive and his substantial experience in the practice of law. As mitigating The referee found as aggravating factors Hopkins' vulnerability, the respondent's

that his conduct caused injury or potential injury to [Ms.] Hopkins." that the respondent violated these rules"knowingly, as opposed to negligently and respondent had violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct. The referee found

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p. 5 attorney for her. He knew Hopkins to be bright, strong-willed and meticulous in her years and represented her for eight years, had drafted her will and had a power of that at the time of the transaction, the respondent had known Hopkins for twenty are trained to perform legal services not psychological services." The referee found argues that no one informed him of Hopkins' mental deterioration and that "[l]awyers With respect to the respondent's knowledge of Hopkins' condition, the respondent

convey the Rye property to him as a gift is not compelled by the record. purchase the Rye property. Thus, the respondent's claim that Hopkins intended to journal on May 12, 1998, noting that Hopkins told her that the respondent wanted to to buy her home. Lannon's testimony was corroborated by an entry in her personal for payment. Second, Lannon testified that Hopkins told her the respondent wanted notes concerning their discussions of the cost of the appeal and alternative methods unlike many other conversations with Hopkins, the respondent had no handwritten him as a gift, the referee found this testimony"not credible" for two reasons. First, Although the respondent testified that Hopkins proposed to convey the property to

the transaction. Services, and Attorney Pelech's assessment that Hopkins understood the nature of elderly protection worker at the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human mental capacity to make this gift based upon the testimony of Donna Williams, an intended to convey the Rye property to him as a gift. He argues that Hopkins had the The respondent also argues that there was "substantial evidence" that Hopkins

Case, 150 N.H. at 586. the respondent. We thus defer to the referee's finding on this issue. See Kersey's mental capacity to make an informed decision about conveying the Rye property to substantial evidence to support the referee's conclusion u~at Hopkins lacked the there is some evidence to support the respondent's contention, there is also Hopkins was able to execute two powers of attorney in February 1999. Although executed a will on July 9 in the respondent's office and another attorney testified that oriented. The respondent's secretary testified that Hopkins was competent when she July 9, the day she signed the deed, her mental status was recorded as alert and orientation to time and date improved, secondary to Aricept therapy" and that on relies upon, for example, a VNA notation on July 8, 1998, that Hopkins' "overall early stage and that Hopkins was responding positively to Aricept. The respondent condition. He points to evidence suggesting that any mental impairment was at an The respondent first challenges the referee's findings concerning Hopkins' mental

II. Hopkins' mental condition

Conduct as well as the recommended sanction. may challenge the referee's findings concerning violations of the Rules of Professional because we ordered further briefing and oral argument in this case, the respondent attorneys from accepting the referee's findings in future cases. We thus conclude that decision. To penalize the respondent for this tactical decision would discourage other attorney's decision to accept the substantive violations is part of this tactical briefing and oral argument and would not consider a harsher sanction. The accepted the referee's report in hopes that we would also accept the report without procedural trap in attorney discipline cases. It may be that the respondent initially

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p. 6 IV. Rule 1.5(a)

the scope of Rule 1.8(j). We therefore reject his argument. no applicability. Moreover, to adopt such an exception would create uncertainty as to no authority for his argument that if the cause of action is frivolous, Rule 1.8(j) has Hopkins deeded an interest in that property to the respondent. The respondent cites for a client ...." Here, the subject matter of the litigation was the Rye property and interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting Rule 1.80) provides, in pertinent part:"A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary

claims. We agree. does not apply. The referee ruled that Rule 1.8(j) has no exception for frivolous apparently asks us to conclude that because Cal1ty's claim was frivolous, Rule 1.8(j) been dismissed on res judicata grounds by the superior court. The respondent property to the respondent, John Canty, Jr.'s claim against the property had already the outcome of the litigation in any way" because at the time Hopkins deeded the The respondent argues that his interest in the Rye property was"not dependent on interest" in the litigation he was conducting for Hopkins as prohibited by Rule 1.80). The second issue raised by the respondent is whether he acquired"a proprietary

IlLRule 1.8(ll

factual one. The evidence detailed above supports the referee's finding on this issue. the issue of Hopkins' mental state, the issue of the respondent's knowledge is a need for a case conference for Hopkins and that he was Hopkins' only support. Like spoke with Ms. Weibold, a social worker from the VNA, he told her that he saw no the mental capacity to make informed decisions. For example, when the respondent opportunities to do so, the respondent made no effort to ascertain whether she had Natalie Hopkins, there was no way for me to know it." Although he had many someone took it upon themselves to tell me that there was something wrong with towards Hopkins' mental condition. Indeed, the respondent testified,"[UJnless evidence that this was by choice and that the respondent turned a"blind eye" Hopkins' deteriorating mental condition, the referee found by clear and convincing To the extent that the respondent asserts that he was"absolutely unaware" of

the deed in Attorney Pe!ech's office. that Hopkins was not paying her bills and that she smelled of urine when she signed 1998, that she was in a car accident on June 29, 1998, that Lannon was concerned that, at a minimum, he knew that Hopkins was admitted to the hospital in April of informed specifically that Hopkins suffered from dementia, the evidence establishes Moreover, although there is no documentation showing that the respondent was

she failed to pay her bills. Hopkins could not manage her checkbook and her utilities were turned off because anything at that meeting. Lannon also testified that she informed the respondent that respondent took her to meet Attorney Pelech in July 1998 or whether she had signed disheveled and dirty, Lannon testified that Hopkins could not recall why the 1998, she had mentally deteriorated to a significant degree. In addition to appearing had known and represented Hopkins for this long did not notice that, by the spring of appearance. The referee found, and we agree, that it is not credible that someone who

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p. 7 testified about a $30,000 fee, which was only the estimated fee and retainer in this Neither of the respondent's witnesses squarely addressed the actual fee. McGee

compromise of a claim to prove its amount). reasonableness of a fee. See N,H. R. Ev. 408 (making inadmissible into evidence the fundamentally, the amount of a settlement is of little probative value on the included not only the fee for the appeal but other services as well, More for"the value of services to the decedent during her lifetime." Thus, the settlement With respect to the probative value of the settlement, we note that the settlement was

estate owed to him. upon the fact that he received $33,000 in 2001 as a settlement of the fees Hopkins' another firm had quoted the same client a fee of $35,000. The respondent also relies considerably and that in one case, he charged a client $12,000 for an appeal when $30,000 was not unreasonable, Pelech testified that fees for appeals vary expert, Attorney John McGee. McGee testified that in his opinion, the estimated fee of respondent instead relies upon the testimony of Attorney Pelech and the respondent's The respondent's brief completely ignores Attorney Cazden's testimony. The

excessive, $30,000 and the actual fee of $64,242.89 charged for the appeal were clearly the rate of $175 per hour. Attorney Cazden concluded that both the estimated fee of hours and his paralegal's and secretary's time and that all of the time was billed at facilities, The respondent admitted that his billing records reflect a combination of his cited in the appellant's brief while he was out of town without access to research in July 1998, the respondent billed forty-nine hours reviewing twenty-four cases and eighty-five hours to prepare for the oral argument. During his two-week vacation the brief, including"day after day after day of anywhere from ten to eighteen hours," Review of the respondent's billing records showed that he billed 225 hours to write

require between thirty and seventy-five hours of work by the attorney. Attorney Cazden also testified that a typical State supreme court appeal would represented the appellee, he only had to respond to the appellant's arguments. purely legal, the respondent was already familiar with the case and, because he level was under $3,000, there was no transcript to review because the issue was opinion on several factors including that the respondent's fee at the superior court "five to ten thousand dollar range" but could be as much as $12,000, She based this Attorney Cazden testified that a reasonable fee for the Canty appeal would be in the Cazden, who has handled numerous appeals, including fifty-four reported decisions, The referee relied upon the testimony of the committee's expert, Attorney Elizabeth

review de novo whether the fee was clearly excessive. reasonable fee to determine whether the fee charged violated Rule 1.5(a)." rd. We thus referee's findings, will be able to measure the allegedly excessive fee against the reasonable fee has been determined, the referee, and this court upon review of the for the services in question." Kelley's Case, 137 N,H. 314, 320 (1993)."Once a committee"must present evidence establishing a generally accepted, reasonable fee was"clearly excessive" under Rule 1.5(a), To prove a violation of Rule 1.5(a), the support the referee's finding that his estimated and actual fee for handling the appeal The third issue raised by the respondent is whether there was sufficient evidence to

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p. 8 above, we next consider the appropriate sanction. In exercising our authority, we are Having found that the respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct noted

VI. Sanction

(8) Rule 8.4(a) by violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.

judgment in rendering advice to his client; and (7) Rule 2.1 by failing to exercise independent professional

matter of litigation in which he was representing his client; (6) Rule 1.80) by acquiring a proprietary interest in the subject

consent; of his client to her disadvantage and without her informed (5) Rule 1.8(b) by using information related to the representation

terms of which were unreasonable to her; his client and entering into a transaction with his client, the (4) Rule 1.8(a)(1) by knowingly acquiring an interest adverse to

materially limited by his own interests; (3) Rule 1. 7(b) by allowing his representation of his client to be

(2) Rule 1.5(a) by charging his client a clearly excessive fee;

practical aspects of a matter and alternative courses of action; (1) Rule l.4(b) by failing to explain to his client the legal and

findings that the respondent violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: condition had deteriorated at the time of the conveyance. We adopt the referee's deed the Rye property to him as a gift and that he did not know that her mental We thus reject the respondent's contention that Hopkins had the mental capacity to

reference to the attorney's behavior." Flint's Case, 133 N.H. 685, 689 (1990). rules broken or by the particular rules violated, but is determined largely with "[t]he gravity of unprofessional conduct is not determined solely by the number of livelihoods and reputations." We need not address this argument, however, because lawyer to violate any of the other Rules, is duplicitous and"destroys professional pattern," and that Rule 8.4(a), which states that it is professional misconduct for a be used in a prosecutorial fashion to create multiple violations out of a single fact Finally, the respondent argues that"[t]he rules of [professional] conduct should not

V Rllle 8.4(a)

was clearly excessive. testimony was more persuasive and we adopt his finding that the respondent's fee was of little probative value. We thus agree with the referee that Attorney Cazden's case. Pelech's comparison of his fee in one case to tlie fee charged by another firm

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p. 9 Thus, we find that the respondent knowingly engaged in conduct that violated his legal services was worth substantially more than the amount that Hopkins owed. Hopkins were clearly excessive and the real estate he received in exchange for his 7.1. As discussed above, the respondent's actual and estimated fees for representing and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client ...." Standards, supra § owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty a lawyer charges a client unreasonable or improper fees."Disbarment is generally Section 7.0 of the Standards addresses the appropriate sanction to be imposed when

mental condition. See N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8 ABA Model Code Comments. who was fully informed of the circumstances and could independently assess her the respondent failed to ensure that Hopkins obtained detached advice from a lawyer the respondent's contention that Hopkins intended to transfer the property as a gift, less than the fair market value of the property. Even if there was evidence to support resulted in his acquisition of an interest in Hopkins' real property for substantially Here, the respondent knowingly entered into a transaction with his client that

4.32. possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client." Id. § when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the Standards, supra § 4.31(a). Suspension, on the other hand,"is generally appropriate

causes serious or potentially serious injury to the client. client's with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and a client knowing that the lawyer's interests are adverse to the informed consent of [the client] ... engages in representation of Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, without the

to the Standards, resulted in a breach of the respondent's duty to avoid conflicts of interest. According acquiring a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the litigation. These actions information related to the representation of Hopkins to her disadvantage and to his client, entering into an unreasonable transaction with his client, using to be materially limited by his own interests, knowingly acquiring an interest adverse The respondent violated Rules 1.7 and 1.8 by allowing his representation of Hopkins

supra § 3.0; see Kersey's Case, 150 N.H. at 587. misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." Standards, lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's factors for courts to consider in imposing sanctions:"(a) the duty violated; (b) the (2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 815 (2003). The Standards set forth the following (1992) (Standards), we look to them for guidance. Feld's Case, 149 N.H. 19,28 Although we have not adopted the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

sanction we impose must take into account the severity of the misconduct. Id. profession, and prevent similar conduct in the future." rd. (quotation omitted). The public, maintain public confidence in the bar, preserve the integrity of the legal offense. O'Meara's Case, 150 N.H. at 159. Rather, its purpose"is to protect the mindful that discipline is not intended as a mode of inflicting punishment for an

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p. 10 protection of the public and the preservation of the integrity of the legal profession. is an adequate sanction. Rather, we conclude that disbarment is necessary for the factors present in this case, we disagree with the referee that a two-year suspension In light of the serious injury suffered by Hopkins and the significant aggravating

recommended. important aggravating factors justify an increase in the level of sanction property to him as a gift. See Standards, supra § 9.22(g). We find that these that he followed the proper procedure in arranging for Hopkins to deed the Rye has not accepted responsibility for his ethical violations, but has instead maintained Richmond's Case, 152 N.H. at _, 872 A.2d at 1030. Furthermore, the respondent additional aggravating factor. Standards, supra §§ 9.22(d), 9.22(i); see also agree with the referee that substantial experience in the practice of law is an egregious in light of Hopkins' vulnerability due to her declining mental health. We which were unreasonable to her. The respondent's conduct was particularly charging excessive fees and entering into a transaction with his client, the terms of With regard to aggravating factors, we agree that the respondent acted selfishly by

.lv=', I),aUl':::' va.;::;c, .L"-tv n.n.'TUU,'-tu l.L;VV.lj. lc:O.T.7 .... 1~1''"'0.... ~.... 1/1Cl\.TTT ACe. AC7'rlAr'l1\ that we have found to be mitigating in other cases. Cf. O'Meara's Case, 150 N.H. at acknowledge the wrongfulness of his actions and has not shown the level of remorse her deteriorating health was not credible. Third, the respondent has failed to respondent's testimony concerning Hopkins' mental condition and his knowledge of 872 A.2d 1023, 1030 (2005). Second, the referee found, and we agree, that the to cooperate with the committee's investigation." Richmond's Case, 152 N.H. _, _, cooperation is a mitigating factor in this case. First,"a lawyer has a professional duty We disagree, however, with the referee's finding that the respondent's level of

360. does not dispense with the necessity for disciplinary action." Jones' Case, 137 N.H. at addition, "[a]bsence of a prior disciplinary record is an acknowledged mitigator, but it character and reputation are mitigating factors. See Standards, supra § 9.32(g). In however, we do not ascribe them significant weight. We acknowledge that good We agree with the referee that there are two mitigating factors present in this case;

Standards, supra §§ 9.22, 9.32. selfish motive; and (3) his substantial experience in the practice oflaw." See following aggravating factors:"(1) [Ms.] Hopkins'vulnerability; (2) the respondent's investigation; and (3) his character and reputation." The referee also found the unblemished disciplinary record; (2) his cooperation with the [c]ommittee's mitigating factors. As mitigating factors, the referee found: "(1) the respondent's prior Before we determine the appropriate sanction, we must also consider aggravating and

order to recover the property. provided. Hopkins and her estate then engaged in a protracted series of lawsuits in $200,000 in consideration for a fee that was clearly excessive for the legal services result of the conveyance, the respondent received property that was worth over We also find that the respondent's actions caused serious injury to Hopkins. As a

duties as a professional with the intent to benefit himself.

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p. 11 assigned under RSA 490:3, concurred. BRODERICK, C.J., and GALWAY, J., concurred; HORTON, J., retired, specially

So Ordered.

2003). investigating and prosecuting this matter. s.e.e Sup. Ct. R. 37(16) (2003; amended reimburse the committee for all of its expenses, including legal fees, incurred in disbarment. Accordingly, the respondent is hereby disbarred and is ordered to then relies upon less than forthright testimony to defend his conduct requires takes advantage of an elderly, mentally ill client by charging an exorbitant fee and See Sup. Ct. R. 37(13)(f) (2003; amended 2003). The conduct of a lawyer who selfishly

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