David A. Young (2006)

rulings as detailed below: hearings, and Memoranda. The Professional Conduct Committee makes factual findings .and 2005 (sanction), transcript of the April 15, 2005, July 18,19; 21,. 2005, and September 2, 2005, Charges, the Answer, the Hearing Panel Reports dated July 29,2005, (merits) and September 14, . The Professional Conduct Committee thoroughly reviewed the record, including the Notice of

Thomas P. Connair. the deliberations. Those recused from the matter were: Alan J. Cronheim; David N. Cole, and Stephen B. Stepanek; Eleanor Wm. Dahar, and David N. Page. Ms. Hamel did not participate in Pizzimenti, Vice Chair; Toni M. Gray, Vice Chair; Gretchen Rule 'Hamel; James R. Martin; The Committee members hearing the matter included: Margaret H. Nelson, Chair; Benette

was also present. Discipline Office. Joseph F. Daschbach, Esquire, appeared on behalf of David A. Young, who referenced matter. Landya B. McCafferty, Disciplinary Counsel, appeared for the Attorney On October 18, 2005, the Professional Conduct Committee heard oral argument in the above­

Young, David A. advs. William P. Yonce and Jodie LaClair-Roby OO-N-044

Eleanor Wm. Dahar Holly B. Fazzino, Admin. Coordinator Alan J. Cronheim Thomas P. Connair * non attorney member David N. Cole Stephen B. Stepanek' Toni M. Gray,' Vice Chair 603-224-5828 • Fax 228-9511 David N. Page' Benette Pizzimenti, Vice Chair Concord, New Hampshire 03301 James R. Martin Margaret H. Nelson, Chair 4 Park Street, Suite 304 Gretchen Rille Hamel

second disbursement into a trust account at Claremont Savings Bank, account 7.. On January 11, p. 2 2000, Stacia Yonce, Mr. Young's then-bookkeeper, deposited the "fees earned." See Mr. Young's Response at ~ 8. Young's trust account but was deposited into his law office operating account as 6. The first disbursement on December 23, 1999, was not deposited into Mr. Young's Response at ~ 7. $70,000.00, disbursed to Mr. Young on or about January 11, 2000. See Mr. disbursed to Mr. Young on December 23, 1999, and a second in the amount of settlement was paid in two installments: one in the amount of$15,000.00, 5. The settlement amount in the Worker's Compo case was $85,000.00. The December 1999. See Mr. Young's Response at ~ 6. Compo case for Ms. LaClair. The written settlement agreement was signed in 4. In October 1999, Mr. Young reached a verbal agreement to settle the Worker's Response at ~ 5. Complaint filed with the New Hampshire Department of Labor. See Mr. Young's Compensation claim ("Worker's Compo case"), and a related Whistleblower's 3.. Mr. Young represented Ms. LaClair in the Superior Court case, a related Worker's the time of the assault, as a caregiver for DSSC. See Mr. Young's Response at ~ 4. developmentally disabled client ofDSSC ("Robert"). Ms. LaClair was employed, at 2. The sexual assault occurred on August 30, 1998. The perpetrator was a referred to simply as"Mr. Young's Response") at ~ 3. Court case"). See Mr. Young's"Response to Notice of Charges" (hereinafter "DSSC"), to recover for the injuries caused by a sexual assault ("the Superior of Sullivan County, Inc., and multiple other defendants (referred to collectively as Court (docket #98-C-064) against her former employer, Developmental Services 1. On September 28, 1998, Ms. LaClair brought suit in Sullivan County Superior

Disciplinary Counsel and Respondent stipulated to the following facts: I. FACTUAL FINDINGS p. 3 3 Stipulation. All excerpts are attached in sequential order by page number. 1 A copy of excerpts from Mr. Young's Deposition of June 8, p. 2 2005, are attached to this

-$ 7,700.00 (Mr. Young's advances to Ms. LaClair) -$17,000.00 (Mr. Young's legaHees) $85,000.00 (total settlenlent) Account. The $41,500.00 amount is computed as follows: Worker's Compo case settlement in trust for Ms. LaClair in his CSB Trust

15. As of January 18, 2000, Mr. Young was holding a total of$ p. 4 41,500.00 from the memo line of that check reads"full settlement." See Mr. Young's Response at ~ 16. 14. On that same date, Mr. Young wrote a check to Ms. LaClair for $17, p. 3 300.00. The Young's Response at ~ 15. Trust Account, presumably a settlement deposit related to Mr. Mais. See Mr. 13. On January 18, 2000, a deposit of$78,000.00 was made to Mr. Young's CSB 22-23. Ms. LaClair. See Mr. Young's Response at ~ 14; Mr. Young's Deposition at pp. this money to Mr. Mais, Mr. Young was necessarily using money belonging to Young's CSB Trust Account out-of-trust with respect to Ms. LaClair. To disburse Account to a,different client (Mark Mais). This disbursement rendered Mr. 12. On January 16, 2000, Mr. Young disbursed $54,116.99 out of the CSB Trust Young's Deposition at p. 22. LaClair, and $400.00 for other(s). See Mr. Young's Response at ~ 13; Mr. 11. As of January 12, 2000, Mr. Young was holding $70,000.00 in trust for Ms. was made into the CSB Trust Account. See Mr. Young's Response at ~ 12. 10. On January 12, 2000, an additional deposit of $200.00 for an unidentified client Mr. Young's Response at ~ 11; Mr. Young's Deposition at p. 21. 9. As of January 11, 2000, the CSB Trust Account had a balance of$70,200.00. See $7,700.00. See Mr. Young's Response at ~ 10; Mr. Young's Deposition at p. 16.1 8. Prior to the settlement disbursements, Mr. Young advanced Ms. LaClair at ~ 9. number 8218655 (hereinafter"CSB Trust Account"). See Mr. Young's Response 4

during this time period. See Mr. Young's Response at ~ 22. 20. Mr. Young was not safeguarding Ms. LaClair's money in any other trust fund ~ 21; Mr. Young's Deposition at pp. 50-51. was a total balfu"1.ce in that account of only $100.9 p. 4 4. See ~Y1r. _young's Response at Bank IOLTA Account. However, from March 12 through March 31, 2000, there 19. Mr. Young maintained one other trust account during this time-period, a Fleet 46,49; Mr. Young's Deposition Exh. 14 at p. 1. March 13,2000, by a total of $39,524.44. See Mr. Young's Deposition at pp. 43rendered Mr. Young's CSB Trust Account out-of-trust for Ms. LaClair as of left a balance of only $1,975.56 in Mr. Young's CSB Trust Account. This transfer Account into his other operating account, a Fleet checking account. This transfer 18. Also on March 13, 2000, Mr. Young transferred $30,000.00 out of his CSB Trust Exh. 14 at p. 1. of $9,524.44.. See Mr. Young's Deposition at pp. 43; Mr. Young's Deposition rendered Mr. Young's CSB Trust Account out-of-trust for Ms. LaClair by a total balance of only $31,975.56 in Mr. Young's CSB Trust Account. This transfer Account into one of his operating accounts, a Fleet tax account. That left a 17. On March 13,2000, Mr. Young transferred $10,000.00 out of his CSB Trust pp. 30-31, 36. Account had a total balance of only $41,932.09. See Mr. Young's Deposition at Ms. LaClair) of$41,500.00. As of February 23,2000, Mr. Young's CSB Trust CSB Trust Account should have had a minimum balance (for the benefit solely of any other trust account for her benefit. As of February 23,2000, Mr. Young's disbursements to Ms. LaClair nor any transfers from the CSB Trust Account to 16. Between January 18 and February 23,2000, Mr. Young made no further See Mr. Young's Deposition at pp. 25-30; Mr. Young's Deposition Exh. 14 atp. 1.

$ p. 4 41, p. 5 500.00 -$ 1,500.00 (Medquest expert expense) -$17,300.00 (1 st disbursement to Ms. LaClair) 5

of fact by clear and convincing evidence: The Professional Conduct Committee determined that the Record supports the following findings

-$4 p. 5 5,000.00 (disbursements on 4/13/00) -$17,300.00 (disbursement on 1/18/00) -$ 7,700.00 ("advances") -$15,000.00 (legal fees) $85,000.00 (total settlement) advances to Ms. LaClair. This computes as follows: Mr. Young had retained $15,000.00 for legal fees and $7,700.00 for prior $72,300.00 of the Worker's Compo case settlement funds. Of the total settlement,

24. In sum, as of April 13, 2000, Mr. Young had disbursed to Ms. LaClair a total of See Mr. Young's Response at ~ 2 p. 5 5; Mr. Young's Deposition at p. 56.

$10,000.00. Fleet IOLTA account, one for $3 p. 5 5,000.00, and another for • Mr. Young then wrote Ms. LaClair two checks from his

checking account into his Fleet IOLTA Account. • Mr. Young then transferred $30,800.00 out of his Fleet

on March 13,2000) into his Fleet checking account. Mr. Young had transferred out of the CSB Trust Account account (the same $10,000.00 of Ms. LaClair's money that • Mr. Young first transferred $10,000.00 out of his Fleet tax transactions occurred as follows: LaClair's money occurred on April 13, 2000. On that date, several LaClair

23. According to Mr. Young's records, the next banking transaction that involved Ms. was held in trust for Ms. LaClair. See Mr. Young's Deposition at pp. p. 5 53-55. $13, p. 6 600.00. According to Mr. Young's records, only $3,500.00 of that amount 22. As of April 12, 2000, Mr. Young's Fleet IOLTA account had a balance of Deposition Exh. 14 at p. 2. Medquest expert expense. See Mr. Young's Deposition at pp. 51-52; Mr. Young's Young was refunding Ms. LaClair $2,000.00 oflegal fees and a $1,500.00 of his Fleet checking account into his Fleet IOLTA account. In doing so, Mr. 21. On April 3, 2000, Mr. Young transferred $3,500.00 of"LaClair Trust" money out 6

paragraphs, setting forth the basis for his fraud lawsuit against Ms. LaClair. See id. her part. See JS Exh. 8 at pp. 415-41 p. 7 7. In that letter, Mr. Young included nine numbered file a lawsuit against Ms. LaClair on the basis of what Mr. YOung claimed was"fraud" on 34. In a letter dated November 21, 2001, Mr. Young informed Mr. Mulligan that he intended to on Ms. LaClair's money. documentation (invoices, or the like) to support Mr. Young's claim of a $45,000.00 lien 33. Despite numerous requests from Mr. Mulligan, Mr. Young failed to supply him with any Court case. See JS Exh. 1 at p. 1 p. 6 69. LaClair in the amount of $45,000.00 against Jodie LaClair's interest" in the Superior Mulligan that he"intend[ed] to hold a lien on the interests of [his] former client Jodie 32. Approximately one year later, on or about Apri116, 2001, Mr. Young gave notice to Mr. 31. On Apri117, 2000, Ms. LaClair filed the instant PCC complaint against Mr. Young. Young. Thereafter, she hired David N. Cole and James 1. Mulligan as successor co-counsel. 30. On or about Apri113, 2000, Ms. LaClair terminated her attorney-client relationship with Mr. filed with the New Hampshire Department of Labor (except Whistleblower Complaint). Compensation claim ("Worker's Compo case"), and a related Whistleblower's Complaint 29. Mr. Young represented Ms. LaClair in the Superior Court case, a related Worker's as a caregiver for DSSC. disabled client ofDSSC ("Robert"). Ms. LaClair was employed, at the till1e of the assault, 28. The sexual assault occurred on August 30, 1998. The perpetrator was a developmentally recover for the injuries caused by a sexual assault ("the Superior Court case"). County, Inc., and multiple other defendants (referred to collectively as"DSSC"), to (docket #98-C-064) against her former employer, Developmental Services of Sullivan 27. On September 28, 1998,]VIs. LaClair brought suit in Sullivan County Superior Court LaClair") has asserted allegations of professional misconduct against David A. Young. 26. By letter dated April 17, 2000, and supplemental letters thereafter, Jodie LaClair-Roby ("Ms. the Attorney Discipline Office issued aN otice of Charges in this matter. 25. On February 4,2005, pursuant to New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 37 A(III)(b)(2), 7

Mr. Young's Objection, he wrote: truthful about the sexual assault which formed the basis of her lawsuits against DSSC. In 40. In Mr. Young's Objection, he also included allegations that Ms. LaClair had not been See JS Exh. 2 at pp. 1 p. 7 74-175.

between LaClair and respondent. under the terms of the fee agreement which was signed being replaced. These costs were specifically permitted from Attorney Mulligan indicating that respondent was representation of Ms. LaClair prior to receiving a letter specifically intended to recover costs associated with his asserting a lien dated April 16, 2001. This lien was 2. Respondent did notice Attorney Mulligan that he was

39. With respect to Mr. Young's attorney lien, he wrote: to Rule 5 p. 7 7 & 59" (hereinafter"Mr. Young's Objection"). See JS Exh. 2 at pp. 174-180. Plaintiff Jodie LaClair's Motion to Determine Attorney Lien and for Attorneys Fees Pursuant 38. On December 14, 2001, Mr. Young responded by filing a pleading entitled"Objection to Court case entitled"Motion to Determine Attorney Lien." See JS Exh. lat pp. 169-173. 37. On December 6, 2001, Mr. Mulligan filed a pleading in the Sullivan County Superior See JS Exh. 8 at p. 416. aJury.

knowing and willful participation in a fraud will be determined by The issues of LaClair's truthfulness about the attack and her need to take one, obviously leading me to doubt her truthfulness. polygraph test to refute any allegation but soon after said she didn't truthful, I and Julia Sci otto spoke with LaClair. LaClair agreed to a Gordon's statements that he did not believe LaClair was being believed LaClair had made up the sexual attack, combined with part of the causes of action. Upon learning from Hohn that he discussions with Gordon did sexual acts all of a sudden become myself of any sexual overtones of the Collins attack. Ouly after management, Chris Hohn, Heather Bressette, Cecilia Sardina or LaClair, at no time, informed Deb Dow, DSSC

36. In paragraph 3 of Mr. Young's letter, he wrote: Worker's Compo and Superior Court cases. about the sexual assault on her by"Robert," which assault formed the basis for her 35. Mr. Young's central allegation against Ms. LaClair was that she had not been truthful p. 8 8

See JS Exh. 3. atpp.1 p. 8 81-217. See JS Exh. 3 at pp. 181-198. Along with that pleading, DSSC attached eight exhibits. "Defendant's Motion to Rescind Settlement with Ms. LaClair and for Attomey's Fees." December 27, 2001, DSSC filed a pleading in the Superior Court case entitled, 41. As a result of the allegations of fraud Mr. Young asserted against Ms. LaClair, on See JS Exh. 2 at pp. ·175-176.

sworn statements in his recent objection: (who were clients of Attorney Young) or Attorney Young's signed by Attorney Young, sworn testimony of witnesses 6. The following facts are drawn from either court documents

request: 43. In paragraph 6 ofDSSC's pleading, DSSC summarized the factual basis for its rescission and the settlement agreement should be rescinded." See JS Exh. 3 at p. 182. LaClair and/or [Mr. Young] have likely committed a felony under RSA 638:20, II & ill, conclude that [Mr. Young's fraud allegations against Ms. LaClair] are true, then Ms. 42. In that pleading, DSSC asserted that"if either the court or the Attorney General's office p. 10 10

See JS Exh. 3 at pp. 182-184.

concerns with her prescription medication and asked Sciotto to After a requested polygraph test pnrely for the fIle, LaClair raised investigation did we determine that LaClair was not being truthful. dealt with LaClair's fIle. At no time in my or Julia Sciotto's R.N. spoke with several witnesses, LaClair and staff members who had investigated the claims as fIiled [sic] in the complaint. Ipersonally LaClair. This was approx. March 2000 [ sic] at this timeI re­ LaClair's former fIance made unsubstantiated allegations about After a romantic break up between LaClair and her then fIance, found her testimony to be untruthful or intentionally misstated. At no time during or after my representation of LaClair have I

I David Young do hereby swear and affirm.

47. Mr. Young's Affidavit states: dated January 7, 2002. representation of her. See JS Exh. 8 at pp. 359-360. Both Affidavits are sworn to and precise question of their views of Ms. LaClair's truthfulness during Mr. Young's 46. As part of that settlement, Mr. Young and Ms. Sciotto drafted Affidavits addressing the attorney lien aspect of the litigation. See 1S Exh. 8 at pp. 350-358. 2002, Mr. Young and Ms. LaClair entered into a settlement agreement to resolve the 45. While the litigation related to DSSC's Motion to Rescind was pending, on January 6, See JS Exh. 3 at p. 187.

time, expense and personal anguish upon the defendants. frivolous claim, forcing the expenditure of considerable attorney's fees pursuant to RSA 507:17, as this was a rescinded and the defendant is entitled to the recovery of its affidavit, if it is believed, the settlement should be RSA 417:28. Given the nature of Attorney Young's action, particularly in light of the reporting requirements of 20. The defense has little option but to pursue this course of

of course renders the fee issue moot. grounds upon which to rescind the settlement itself, which exposing each of them to criminal liability, and disclosing regarding the conduct of his former client and himself, fee, Attorney Young had made startling revelations for the defendants. In his attempt to collect all or part of his 19. This is likely a case of fIrst impression for the court, as it is

44. In its concluding paragraphs, DSSC wrote: p. 12 12

and Gordon in withholding information from Young that LaClair possessed specific to the actions of the Y onces ANSWER: The terms included good and valuable information,

54. Mr. Young's answer to Question #32 was as follows:

See JS Exh. 8 at p. 273.

agreement. affirmative, please describe in detail the nature of that defendants' Motion to Rescind. If your answer is in the informally, to assist Ms. LaClair in her efforts to object to also state whether you made any promise, formally or extent to which you compromised your claim of lien. Please all documents relating to this agreement. Please state the answering this question, please provide a copy of any and the proceeds of her settlement with these defendants. In LaClair to resolve your claim or assertion of a lien against 32. Please describe the terms of your agreement with Ms.

53., Question 32 of the Interrogatories asked Mr. Young: that he deemed responsive to those Interrogatories. See JS Exh. 8. a sworn"Addendum" and seven exhibits containing information within his possession 52. On March 26, 2002, Mr. Mulligan felt the need to supplement Mr. Young's answers with JS Exh. 8 atpp. 260-274. 51. Mr. Young submitted his sworn answers to those Interrogatories on March 25, 2002. See defendants' requests." JS Exh. 7 at p. 253 (emphasis added). know of no other documents and records that could be considered pertinent to Both shall certify under oath that they made a diligent and thorough search and that they answers to those interrogatories and originals of all the requested documents and records. 50. The Court's Order specifically instructed the parties to provide"complete and detailed Young by DSSC. the issues raised therein. This discovery included Interrogatories propounded on Mr. 49. Following DSSC's "Motion to Rescind," the Court (Morrill, l) permitted discovery on 48. Mr. Young did not file any subsequent pleading to correct these misrepresentations. See JS Exh. 8 at p. 360.

payment oflitigation costs LaClair changed counsel. look into the drugs. Shortly after that due to discussions on p. 13 13

what Mr. Young claimed were Ms. LaClair's delayed disclosures to Ms. Dow and Ms. 60.. Several items in the record prove the falsity of Mr. Young's assertions with respect to statement was false at the time he wrote his Objection. false. As Ms. LaClair's attorney during the early stages of her cases, Mr. Young knew this "therapist," and the incident reports, Mr. Young's assertion of delayed disclosure was 59. With respect to Deborah Dow (Ms. LaClair's supervisor at DSSC), Ms. LaClair's See JS Exh. 2 at p. 175. resident ofDSSC, only physical abuse .... secondary incident reports failed to mention any sexual abuse by a Gordon), about any instance of sexual abuse. LaClair's initial and Deborah Dow, and her therapist (until after her conversation with Bressette, Chris Hohn, her boyfriend and soon to be fiance, Prior to that meeting, LaClair had not told her good friend, Heather 58. In paragraph #6 of Mr. Young's Objection, he wrote: and Mr. Young knew it was false at the time Mr. Young wrote his Objection. sexual aspect of Ms. LaClair's assault was a result of Mr. Gordon's influence was false, and Mr. Young blamed him for many of his problems.Mr. Young's suggestion that the 57. At the time Mr. Young drafted his Objection, Mr. Young was at odds with Mr. Gordon, meeting she had with Attorney Kenneth Gordon, Mr. Young's co-counsel in the case. falsely implied that Ms. LaClair first disclosed the sexual aspect of the assault only after a in disclosing the sexual aspect of the assault on her. See JS Exh. 2 at p. 175. Mr. Young 56. In Mr. Young's Objection, at paragraphs 5-6, Mr. Young states that Ms. LaClair delayed See JS Exh. 8 at pp. 359-360. (Except as to Mr. Young's answer being misleading.) included in Exhibit 6 both Mr. Young's and Ms. Sciotto's January 7,2002, Affidavits. Ms. LaClair together with related docwnents. See JS Exh. 8(b) at pp. 350-372. Mr. Mulligan "Exhibit 6") a complete copy of Mr. Young's January 6, 2001, settlement agreement with answer to Question #32. See JS Exh. 8(b). Mr. Mulligan attached to his Addendwn (as 55. In his Addendwn, Mr. Mulligan corrected the record with respectto Mr. Young's misleading See JS Exh. 8 at p. 273.

cases. relating to approximately $900,000.00 in contingent fee p. 14 14 Developmental Services group home where she works last night. Client reported that she was assaulted by one of the clients in the

1998, the day after the assault on Ms. LaClair, her therapist wrote: health records to his Addendum"(at "Exhibit 5"). Those records reveal that on August 31, 63. With respect to Ms. LaClair's therapist, Mr. Mulligan attached MS.LaClair's mental See JS Exh. 3 at p. 208 (emphasis added). 4 arid it took some time to get the whole story.... 3 believe it was later on. We had many discussions 2 A. I don't believe it was the next morning. I 1 vaginally penetrated her with his hands? [Page 0342]

23 morning, Ms. LaClair did not tell you that Robert 22 Q. SO it's your belief that, at least as of the next 21 believe. 20 And so it took a total of about three days, I 19 hands up her shorts and -- to touch her vagina. 18 she informed me that he had actually got his 17 three days or so to get the entire story where 16 shorts. And I believe it took me approximately 15 at that point, he tried to put his hand up her p. 14 14 attack and the fact that he tried -- she told me, 13 A. She was a little bit more descriptive in Robert's 12 Q. What additional details? 11 A. She filled me in on a few. 10 told you the previous evening? 9 details that morning above and beyond what she 8 that Ms. LaClair filled you in on additional 7 Q. Now, I am gathering, from what you said earlier,

[Page 0341] follows:

62.. Specifically, at pages 341-42 of her April 11, 2000, deposition, Ms. Dow testified as LaClair disclosed to her the sexual nature of the assault. See JS Exh. 3 at pp. 208-209. deposition. Those excerpts reveal that within three days after the date of the assault, Ms. 61. With respect to Ms. Dow, DSSC attached to its Motion to Rescind relevant excerpts from her report. (Except as to Young's claim re: incident report.) LaClair's therapist, as well as what Mr. Young claimed with respect to the incident p. 15 15

a different client (Mark Mais) and, on other occasions, for the benefit of himself.. Mr. withdrew monies belonging to Ms. LaClair from his CSB Trust Account for the benefit of 68. Mr. Young's bank records further reveal, as explained more fully above, that Mr. Young disbursements to her. continuing basis from March 13 through April 13, 2000, the date of Mr. Young's final out-of-trust with respect to Ms. LaClair's Workers Compo case settlement funds on a 67. Mr. Young's bank records reveal, as explained more fully above, that Mr. Young was Rule 1. p. 15 15(a)(1) and Sup. Ct. R. 50(2)(C): Failure to Safeguard Client Property

Disciplinary Counsel and Respondent stipulated to the following Rule violations: II. RULINGS OF LAW

See JS Exh. 9 at p. 257. believed and knew to be the truth. with respect to Deborah Dow misrepresents what he actually Attorney Young's representation in paragraph 6 of his objection Judge Morrill concluded: Ms. LaClair had not spoken of the sexual nature of the assault to Ms. Dow and others, 66. With respect to paragraph 6 of Mr. Young's Objection, wherein Mr. Young asserted that See JS Exh. 9 at p. 256. it raises is not supported by the evidence. either intentionally or accidentally misleading, but the suggest[ion 1 I believe that Attorney Young's representation in paragraph 5 is Mr. Gordon, Judge Morrill found: that Ms. LaClair first mentioned her sexual assault allegations only after speaking with 65. With respect to paragraph 5 of Mr. Young's Objection, wherein Mr. Young suggested of Mr. Young's allegations concerning Ms. LaClair to be without nierit. 64. Ultimately, Judge Morrill denied DSSC's Motion to Rescind Settlement, fmding several See JS Exh. 8 at 278 (actual note at p. 346). was able to fend the man off after an hour long struggle.. Client talked about the events of the attempted rape, and said she p. 16 16

funds and intentional misappropriation of settlement funds with the intent to deceive his 2004, after having been charged with cocmingling trust funds with personal or business 77. Mr. Yonce was disbarred by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on January 20, entered for lvll. Y oun~ in the amount of $212,550.00. 76. The case against Mr. Yonce was terminated when Mr. Yonce defaulted. Judgment was bankruptcy in Vermont. . 75. The case against Ms. Yonce was terminated when Ms. Yonce filed for personal fraudulent conspiracy based upon facts related to these pending charges. 74. Mr. Young sued both Ms. Yonce and Mr. Yonce in the Vermont Superior Court alleging Mr. Young of that fact, nor that they had discussed this matter with Ms. LaClair. 73. From March 13,2000, through April 13, 2000, neither Mr. Yonce nor Ms. Yonce advised funds being held for her benefit. bookkeeping and accounting responsibilities for Mr. Young, that there were insufficient Yonce, a lawyer affiliated with Mr. Young, and by Stacia Yonce, his wife who had 72. Between March 13,2000, and April 13,2000, Ms. LaClair was informed by William disbursed these funds to Ms. LaClair, the funds were not spent by Mr. Young. Young's operating and tax accounts until April 13, 2000, the date when Mr. Young 71. Between March 13,2000, when the checks totaling $40,000.00 were deposited in Mr. and properly maintaining his trust accounting system, this error. would not have occurred .. properly reconciling his trust account bank statements with his ledger on a monthly basis, 2000, he relied upon a"false surplus" of that amount in his ledger. Had Mr. Young been 70. Mr. Young claims that when he wrote the two checks (totaling $40,000.00) on March 13, Rule 1.lS(a)(2) aud Sup. Ct. R. SO(2)(A) & (F): Failure to Maintain Proper Records

as Sup. ct. R. 50(2)(C). safeguard Ms. LaClair's property in violation of N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a)(1), as well 69. The aforementioned constitutes clear and convincing evidence of Mr. Young's failure to without proper authorizations. Young transferred Ms. LaClair's funds to himself prior to earning those funds and p. 17 17

evidem~e through his affidavits that he knew to be false.") (emphasis added). knowingly made a false statement of material fact or law to the district court and offered events. The circumstances of this case amply support the finding that the respondent district court concern, and chose to distort the tru.e natnre of t..he material underlying matters. Thus, he was familiar with the triggering language which would likely cause the practiced law for two decades and handled numerous mental health and abuse and neglect incapacity are serious allegations that should not have been made lightly. The respondent perverting the truth. Claiming Buck had abandoned her children and suffered a mental omitted material detail regarding the events underlying his allegations to a point of supported by a record that reveals that the respondent knowingly exaggerated facts and Bruzga's Case, 145 N.H. 62, 69-70 (2000) ("These findings [under Rule 3.3] are Objection. This statement was material because it impugned Ms. LaClair's veracity. See came to light." Mr. Young knew this statement was false at the time he included it in his only after a meeting attended by LaClair and Gordon [that] the instance of sexual abuse 81. First, in paragraph 5 of Mr. Young's Objection, Mr. Young falsely stated that"[i]t was and material statements impugning Ms. LaClair's veracity. 80. lr). Mr. Young's Objection, and as explained in more detail above, Mr. Young made false of law by clear and convincing evidence: The Professional Conduct Committee determined that the Record supports the following rulings

of N.H. R. Prof Conduct 8.4(a). 79. In light of the above violations, there exists clear and convincing evidence of a violation

as Sup. Ct. R. 50(2)(A) & (F). keep proper accounting records in violation ofN.H. R. Prof Conduct 1.15(a)(2), as well 78. The aforementioned constitutes clear and convincing evidence of Mr. Young's failure to Massachusetts disbarment. client. Mr. Yonce was subsequently disbarred in New Hampshire as a result of the p. 18 18

sexual attack,"which assault served as the factual basis of her Workers Compo and participation in a fraud" based on what Mr. Young described as her having"made up the 88. In that letter, Mr. Young also falsely accused Ms. LaClair of"knowing and willful statement was false at the timehe wrote this letter. did sexual acts all of a sudden become part of the causes of action." Mr. Young knew this Young] of any sexual overtones of the Collins attack. Only after discussions with Gordon Deb Dow, DSSC management, Chris Hohn, Heather Bressette, Cecilia Sardina or [Mr. LaClair. Mr. Young falsely stated in that letter that Ms. LaClair ·"at no time, informed dated November 21, 2001, contained false and misleading allegations against Ms. 87. As explained in more detail above, Mr. Young's"threat to sue" letter to Mr. Mulligan participation in a fraud ...." Ms. LaClair's truthfulness and accused Ms. LaClair of a"knowing and willful November 21, 2001, letter to Mr. Mulligan, in which Mr. Young asserted that he doubted Robert. Mr. Young's statements in this respect are consistent with Mr. Young's Ms. LaClair's veracity with respect to her claim of having been sexually assaulted by 86. Mr. Young's Objection contains numerous statements,as detailed above, that impugn and convincing evidence of a violation ofN.H. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3 (a)(3). Young's failure to take remedial measures under these circumstances constitutes clear 85. Mr. Young knew these statements were false but he took no action to correct them. Mr. false statements of material fact to a tribunal in violation of N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 3 .3 (a)(1 ). 84. Mr. Young's false statements in his Objection constitute clear and convincing evidence of a violation of N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c). 83. Mr. Young's false statements in his Objection constitute clear and convincing evidence of Bruzga's Case, 145 N.H. at 69. Objection. This statement was material because it impugned Ms. LaClair's veracity. See abuse." Mr. Young knew this statement was false at the time he included it in his to Deborah Dow"any instance of sexual abuse by a resident of DSSC, only physical Ms. LaClair's meeting with Mr. Gordon, Ms. LaClair had not disclosed to her therapist or 82. Second, in paragraph 6 of Mr. Young's Objection, Mr. Young falsely stated that prior to p. 19 19

LaClair-Roby. Spring of2000, before the case was resolved, Mr. Young was replaced as counsel by Ms. Mr. Young made specific allegations concerning the sexual assault.-(Tab 16, p. p. 19 192) In the developmentally disabled man ror whom Ms. LaClair was assisting as a caretaker. In that action, Services of Sullivan County (DSSC) in connection with a sexual assault on Ms. LaClair by a Mr. Young represented Ms. LaClair in the suit against the Department of Developmental

substantial harm on his former client Ms. LaClair. Conduct Committee investigating this matter. His actions were intended to, and did in fact, inflict Mr. Young made numerous intentional misrepresentations to the Court and to the Professional III. ANALYSIS

Tab 16); 8.4(c); 3.3(a)(1), and 3.3(a)(3). Ct R. 50(2)(A) and (F); N.H. R. Prof. Conduct: 8.4(a) (all by Stipulation dated July 12, 200S, N.H. R. Prof Conduct 1.1S(a)(1); Sup. Ct. R. SO(2)(C); N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 1.lS(a)(2); Sup.

violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct and Supreme Court Rules: Conduct Committee concludes that there is clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Young has Rulings of Law, also having been found by clear and convincing evidence, the Professional The above-listed Facts, having been found by clear and convincing evidence, and based on the

Rules, there is necessarily clear and convincing evidence of a violation of Rule 8.4(a). 90. Because there exists clear and convincing evidence of violation of the aforementioned N.H. at 69. misrepresentation in violation of N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c). Cf. Bruzga's Case, 14S constitutes clear and convincing evidence of conduct involving dishonesty, deceit and 89. The false statements made in Mr. Young's November 21, p. 20 2001, letter to Mr. Mulligan this letter. Superior Court cases. Mr. Young knew these statements were false at the time he wrote 20

characterized his written order of April 1, p. 20 2002 (Tab 16, p. 257) and (Tab 28, pp. 104-116). 2, 2005, and, over the objection by Disciplinary Counsel, Judge Morrill interpreted and , Counsel for Mr. Young called Judge Morrill as a witness as the Sanction Hearing on September

an.d knew to be the truth" (Tab 16, p. 257). with respect to Deborah Dow [Ms. LaClair' s supervisor] misrepresents what he actually believed Young to lack credibility."Attorney Young's representation in paragraph 6 of his [O]bjection Young's assertions with respect to Ms. LaClair's credibility were without merit, but he found Mr. interrogatories and the full record before DSSC. Judge Morrill not only concluded that Mr. Judge Morrill reviewed all of the evidence, including Mr. Young's deposition, answers to

assault" in the DSSC complaint, he did not mean"sexual assault" but"digital penetration." of Ms. LaClair, there had never been a"sexual assault" and that when he used the words"sexual constructed a"house of cards" argument to the effect that while there had been"digital penetration" LaClair had not reported a sexual assault to her supervisor, Ms. Deborah Dow. Mr. Young then Specifically, Mr. Young alleged that there had, in fact, been, no"sexual assault" and that Ms. support for Mr. Young's allegation that Ms. LaClair had committed any fraud (Tab 16, p. 255). On April I, p. 20 2002, Judge Morrill denied DSSC's Motion to Rescind, fmding that there was no

Having received Mr. Young's Objection, DSSC filed a Motion to Rescind the Settlement (Tab 16).

16,p.175). been untruthful about the sexual assault which fonned the basis of her suit against DSSC (Tab 16). Mr. Young filed a detailed objection to that motion and again alleged that Ms. LaClair had Mr. Mulligan, Ms. LaClair's new attorney, filed a Motion to Detennine Attorney's Lien (Tab

LaClair's alleged fraud. concerning the assault (Tab 16, p. 416). Mr. Young made detailed allegations concerning Ms. threatened to sue Ms. LaClair for fraud and alleged thatMs. LaClair had been untruthful On November p. 21 21, p. 20 2001, while settlement of the DSSC action was pending, Mr. Young 21 Objections filed before the DSSC, were found to be false (Tab 18, findings 67, 69 and 70). letter of November 21, 2001, threatening to sue his former client, Ms. LaClair, and in his misrepresentations continued throughout the hearings. The factual assertions in Mr. Young's DSSC, claiming that when he wrote"sexual assault," he did not mean that. His lilisrepresent L1.e facts and intentionally mischaracterized t.he complaint he had filed before the When the matter came before the Professional Conduct Committee, Mr. Young continued to

testimony of a judge or juror of what he had in mind at the time of the decision." 195 US 307. should not lightly be disturbed, and ought never to be overthrown or limited by the oral to evidence on both sides. A judgment is a solemn record. Parties have a right to rely upon it. It testimony should be received except of open and tangible facts, -- matters which are susceptible respect to the matters he considered and passed upon, was obviously incompetent .... [N]o laid down the testimony of the trial judge, given six years after the case had been disposed of, in In Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 US 276, 306, 07 (1904), the Court held:"Tested by the rule thus

examination of a judge would be destructive of judicial responsibility." 313 US at 4 p. 21 21. held in the context of examining the deliberative process of a member of the Executive:"Such an The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Morgan, (Morgan IV), 313 US 409 (1941)

these questions to Judge Morrill. process, and specifically, the deliberative process must be protected. It was improper to propound in collateral matters as they do on the bench. More importantly, the integrity of the judicial decisions or the judicial process would come to a stop. They would spend as much time testifying deliberative process privilege. Judges cannot be subject to examination concerning their the Professional Conduct Committee holds that the testimony is inadmissible under the Whatever little probative value Judge Morrill's observations three years after the fact may have,

that Mr. Young was"overstating and exaggerating." the proceedings before Judge Morrill to be reported to the Professional Conduct Committee and Counsel for Mr. Young relies on this testimony for the proposition that there was no offense in p. 22 22 adopted.these Standards, the Court has considered them when imposing sanctions). Shill(m's Case, 149 N.H. 132, 139 (2003) (noting that, although the Court has never formally for Professional Responsibility, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991). See e.g., e.g., Feld's Case, 149 N.H. 19,28 (2002). This sanction is also in accord with the ABA Center with the purposes of attorney discipline as described by the New Hampshire Supreme Court. See, concludes that the appropriate discipline in this matter is Disbarment. This sariction is in accord Having made the aforementioned findings and rulings, the Professional Conduct Committee IV. SANCTION

and 8.4(a». violation of Rules l.5(a) and 8.4(c», and 00-N-I06 (Reprimand, for the violation of Rules 1.5 1.1(a); 1.1(b)(4); 1.1(b)(5); 1.1(c)(1); 1.1(c)(4); 1.5(f), and 7.1); 00-N-048 (Reprimand, for the professional misconduct against Mr. Young: 99-049 (Reprimand, for the violation of Rules The Committee finds no mitigating factors. Aggravating factors include three prior [mdings of

incredible interpretations of the words he had written in his original complaint against DSSC. the Professional Conduct Committee. To the contrary, he continued to concoct new and equally Mr. Young showed no remorse at any time, either in the matter before Judge Morrill or before

the purpose of selfish gain. for the former client." 141 N.H. at 484. Mr. Young breached that duty by his dishonest acts for prevents that attorney from attacking, or interpreting, work the attorney performed, as supervised, Acworth, 141 N.H. 479 (1996):"[A]n attorney owes a duty ofloyalty to a former client that which he had recently represented her. Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal District v. (Tab 27). Mr. Young had a duty ofloyalty to his former client with respect to the matter on woman whom he knew to be vulnerable, thus inflicting additional economic and emotional harm only made accusations found by Judge Morrill to be false, but he attacked his former client, a himself, and in an effort to revoke the settlement between Ms. LaClair and DSSC, Mr. Young not When Mr. Young threatened to sue Ms. LaClair in a: selfish effort to secure attorney's fees for p. 23 23

costs associated with the investigation and prosecution of this matter. 50(2)(C). The Professional Conduct Committee also recommends that Mr. Young be assessed all 1.15(a)(2); 3.3(a)(1); 3.3(a)(3); 8.4(a), and 8.4(c), and Sup. Ct. R.: 50(2)(A); 50(2)(F), and Young be disbarred from the practice oflaw for violating N.H. R. Prof. Conduct: 1.15(a)(I); For all of the above reasons, the Professional Conduct Committee recommends that David A. V. CONCLUSION

thus aggravating his prior offenses. continued to repeat and reinforce his false assertions before the Professional Conduct Committee with the purpose of obtaining a financial benefit for himself, require disbannent. Mr. Young false, and in causing the DSSC to move to rescind the settlement based on his false assertions, all Mr. Young's behavior in attacking his former client, Ms. LaClair, with statements he knew to be

lawyer and causes serious actual or potential injury to a client, the public or the legal system. conduct that violates a duty owed to the profession with the intent to obtain a benefit for the party or seriously interferes with a legal proceeding; when a lawyer, knowingly engages in with the intent to obtain benefit for the lawyer and causes serious actual or potential injury to a statement and causes serious or potential injury to a party; when a lawyer violates a court rule lawyer's fitness to practice; when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court, makes a false in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that seriously reflects on the 5.1,6.11,6.21,7.1, provide that disbannent is the appropriate sanction where a lawyer engages Hampshire Supreme Court, are instructive in determining the appropriate sanction. Standards The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, although not formally adopted by the New

880 A:2d 403, 414 (2005); Wolterbeek's Case, 152 N.H. _,886 A2d 990 (October 21,2005). Dishonest and selfish conduct by Mr. Young justify disbannent. Coffey's Case, 152 N.H. --' Prior discipline is an aggravating factor. Richmond's Case, 152 N.H. 155 at 161 (2005). p. 24 24

File Joseph F. Daschbach, Esquire Landya B. McCafferty, Disciplinary Counsel Distribution:

the disbarment of Attorney David A. Young. directs Disciplinary Counsel to file a Petition with the New Hampshire Supreme Court seeking After consideration of the appropriate sanction, the Professional Conduct Committee hereby VI. PETITION FOR DISBARMENT