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Paul F. Coddington Jr. (2015)

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noted above. the Supreme Court ultimately vacated the disbarment and imposed the suspension moved forreconsiderationofthedisbarmentorderon November 13,2006, and failing to respond to or cooperate with the Attorney Discipline Office (ADO). He Mr. Coddingtonhad originally been disbarred on October 31, 2006, in part for

8.1(b), 8.4(a), andSupreme CourtRule 50. ofhis ethical duties under RulesofProfessionalConduct 1.15(a)(1),1.15(a)(2), Supreme Court Order dated March3,2007,for misconduct arising from breaches 2000. Mr. Coddingtonwas suspendedfrom the practiceoflaw for two years by Mr. Coddington was licensed to practice law in New Hampshire on October 30,

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

clear andconvincingevidence. The Committee voted to accept the facts as stipulated and found by the Hearing Panel, by

and MargaretR. Kerouac were absent W. Ruoff, Richard D. Sager andMartha Van Oot. Heather E. Krans, Vice Chair,PeterG. Beeson Vice Chair, Susan R. Chollet, Richard H. Darling, Mona T. Movafaghi, Georges J. Roy, David captionedmatter.Members presentincludedDavid M. Rothstein,Chair,ElaineHolden, On January20,2015, theProfessionalConduct Committee deliberatedtheabove

DISBARMENT WITH CONDITIONS FOR READMISSION RECOMMENDATION

Coddington,Paul F.,Jr.advs.AttorneyDiscipline Office#13-0]0

Margaret R. Kerouac Holly B.Fazzino,Administrator Richard H. Darling* * non attorneymember Susan R. Chollet* Martha Van Oot PeterG. Beeson Richard D. Sager ElaineHolden,* Vice Chair 603-224-5828 ♦ Fax 228-9511 David W. Ruoff HeatherE. Krans,Vice Chair Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Georges J. Roy* David M. Rothstein,Chair 4 Chenell Drive,Suite 102 Mona T. Movafaghi

a committeeofthe attorneydiscipline system ProfessionalConduct Committee New Hampshire Supreme Court Page 2of9

hearing. arranged for Mr.Coddingtontoaccompany Mr. Treadwellto theDecember 20 15. Because Ms. Ashford had kneesurgeryscheduledforDecember 14,2011, she

Mr. Treadwell'smilitarypension. address child support issues as well as Ms.Upstill'sentitlementto any portionof 14. A hearingwas scheduledforDecember 20,2011 in theTreadwellmatterto

obtain aportionofMr. Treadwell'smilitaryretirement. again represented Mr. Treadwell when his ex-wife,TheresaUpstill, sought to 13. Years later, in2011,after Mr. Treadwell retired from the army, Ms.Ashford

Treadwell during his divorce, which became final in June 2007. 12. One ofthose clients was Todd Treadwell. Ms. Ashford had represented Mr.

her clients, who would become Mr.Coddington'sclients upon his reinstatement. Coddingtonwork as her paralegal, draftpleadings,and work closelywith threeof 11. Based on Mr.Coddington'srepresentations,Ms. Ashford had agreed to let Mr.

statementsregardinghis status were true. 10. In fact, Mr. Coddington had never applied for reinstatement. Noneofhis

PCC required that hemaintainhis skills in family law. 9. Mr. Coddington further led Ms. Ashford to believe that hisagreementwith the

decisionabout whether he could be reinstated. Court, and that Mr.Coddingtonwas simplyawaitingtheSupreme Court's with a request to clarify a point, that the PCC had sent theclarificationto the Court had referred the matter to theProfessionalConduct Committee ("PCC") the ADO regardingconditionshe had to meet forreinstatement,that theSupreme 8. Mr. Coddington furtherrepresentedto Ms.Ashford thathe had anagreement with

filed apetitionforreinstatementwith theSupreme Court inSeptember 2011. 7. Sometime in the fallof2011,Mr. Coddington informed Ms. Ashford that he had

Esquire, as aparalegalat Ashford Law Office,PLLC. 6. Following his suspension, Mr. Coddington was employed by Linda L. Ashford,

5. Mr. Coddington'scurrent address is 34 Perley Street, Concord, New Hampshire.

4. Mr. Coddington has not been admitted to practice law in any otherjurisdiction.

suspended. 3. Mr. Coddington has not been reinstated to the New Hampshire Bar and is still Page 3of9

arguments,"Mr. TreadwellreasonablybelievedMr. Coddington could act on and would have "representation"and that Mr.Coddington could "make the (onwhich Mr. Coddingtonwas copied), whichassuredMr. Treadwellthat he to thehearing.Moreover, based on theNovember 2011 emailsfrom Ms. Ashford theycontinuedto tell Mr. Treadwell that Mr.Coddington couldaccompany him would not have his license in time for theDecember 20,2011 hearing.However, 23. Mr. Coddingtonand Ms. Ashford informed Mr.Treadwellthat Mr.Coddington

Ashford at that time that he had in fact never applied for reinstatement. admittedby December 20,2011. Again,however,he did notadmitto Ms. December 20,2011 hearing.Mr. Coddington statedthathe would not be processofreinstatementwas going, andifhe would be reinstatedin time for the 22. Sometime in December 2011,Ms. Ashford inquiredofMr. Coddington how his

had never in fact applied for reinstatement. never rectified his previous lie to his employer, Ms. Ashford, by admitting that he Treadwell'sunderstandingthat Mr.Coddingtonwas "awaitinghislicense."He factthathe hadbeen suspended from thepracticeoflaw, nor did hecorrectMr. 21. Mr. Coddington never offered any information to Mr. Treadwell regarding the

duringthehearing. 20. Mr. Treadwellthusreasonablybelievedthat hewould have legalrepresentation

theCourt." forward, he maypresentit from a different sidewhich will bebetteracceptedby argument so heunderstands.It mightjustbe agood thingthat he istakingthis to Mr.Treadwell:"I have forwarded your email to Paul, I will go over your 19. More email exchanges followed,and onNovember 17,2011, Ms. Ashford wrote

18. Mr. Coddington did notcorrectany ofMs. Ashford'sstatements.

getscopiesofallofthem. you have furtherquestions.I'llmake surePaul Coddington either way, he can argue thismatter....Keep emailingif awaitinghis license and may actually have it by then but and make thearguments.He isactuallyan attorney representationfor you. My currentparalegalwillassistyou [T]his is a legal argument, and yes, I havesecured

pension.She added: her theory regarding Ms. Upstill's entitlement to Mr.Treadwells military 17. Ms. Ashford responded to Mr. Treadwell, copying Mr. Coddington, and set forth

able to have representation for this [December 20]hearing?" Ms. Ashford could not be present due to her knee surgery, he asked: "will I be 16. On November 7,2011,Mr. Treadwellemailed Ms. Ashford. Having heardthat Page 4of9

issue; rather, he allowed Ms. Ashford ten days to respond in writing to the issues 31. Judge McLeod decided that he would not have further hearings on the pension

but was unable to describe them fully, adding"that'swhy I need representation." mentioned two Supreme Court cases that (he presumed) supported his position Treadwell did his best to representhimselfand argue the merits. Mr. Treadwell 30. Judge McLeod thenasked Mr. Treadwellifhe wanted to beheard,and Mr.

pension. counsel to argue Ms.Upstill'spotential rights to Mr.Treadwell'smilitary the hearing. He continuedthe child support issue, but did allow Ms. Upstill's 29. Judge McLeod noted that there were "fairly complicated issues" to be discussed at

representme." assistant would be representing me, and nowit'smy understanding that he cannot that Ms. Ashford was recovering from surgery, then stated: "I was told that her 2011,he asked Mr. Treadwell where his attorney was. Mr. Treadwell responded 28. When Judge McLeod began the hearing on thepensionissue on December 20,

opportunityto inform hisemployerthat he hadneverappliedforreinstatement. no effort tobecome reinstated. He likewise failed at thisjunctureto take the volunteerto Mr.Treadwellthat he was asuspendedattorneyand that he had made sufficientlyalarmingfor her to halt theproceeding,Mr. Coddington did not Even in the faceofthe hearingofficer'sserious doubts andconcerns,which were Coddington steppedoutsideto call Ms.Ashford and updateher on theevents. 27. After the hearingofficerhalted the childsupporthearing, Mr.Treadwelland Mr.

not an attorneyand could not act assuch on behalfofMr. Treadwell. proceed.Mr. Coddington representsthat he told thehearingofficerthathe was Judge McLeod (who was to hear thepensionissue on thesame day) abouthow to aboutMr. Coddington'sstatus andindicatedthat shewould need tocheck with 26. The hearingofficerhaltedthechildsupportproceeding.She expressedconcern

not anattorneyingood standing. conferenceroom with a hearing officer, it came to light that Mr.Coddington was 25. Immediatelybefore the hearing onDecember 20,2011,duringa meetingin a

could not do on Mr.Treadwell'sbehalfduringthehearing. did not discuss, in any way, any limitations that might bear on what he could or not in fact represent Mr. Treadwell in court or make arguments on his behalf. He meeting,Mr. Coddingtondid not tell Mr.Treadwellthat Mr.Coddingtoncould the upcoming hearing and what argumentswere going to be made. During this over coffee for approximately 30 to 45 minutes, during which time they discussed 24. On the morning ofDecember 20,2011,Mr. Coddington met with Mr. Treadwell

speak on hisbehalfat the hearing. Page 5 of9

his anticipated reinstatement as the basis for allowing him to accompany Mr. 39. Mr. Coddington'sstatus was a material fact because Ms. Ashford was relying on

proceduralpostureofhis application,constitutea violationofRule 4.1. reinstatementto the New Hampshire Bar,includinghisdetailedaccountofthe 38. Mr. Coddington'srepresentations to Ms. Ashford that he had applied for

(a) make a false statementofmaterial fact or law to a third person; In the courseofrepresenting a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:

37. Rule ofProfessional Conduct 4.1 states, in pertinent part, as follows:

Rule 4.1:Truthfulnessin Statementsto Others

II.RULINGS OF LAW

Hearing Panel, by clear andconvincingevidence. The Committee voted to accept the Rules violations as stipulated and found by the

Hearing Panel Report at pp. 4-8; Stipulation atfl[1-36.

attorney. 36. Mr. Coddington no longer works as a paralegal for Ms. Ashford or any other

portionofMr. Treadwell'sU.S. military retired pay. Ultimately,on February3,2012,the Court found that Ms. Upstill wasentitledto a 35. Ms. Ashford and Mr.Coddington continuedtowork on Mr. Treadwell'smatter.

for thehearingwithoutgivingnoticeto thecourt." attorney'sfees"incurredas aresultofthepetitioner'scounsel'sfailuretoappear 34. By orderdatedJanuary18,2012,Judge McLeod awarded Ms. Upstillher

pay Ms. Upstill'sattorney'sfees. suspended attorney. He added that he would be issuing an order that Ms. Ashford found it"disturbing"that Ms. Ashford would send as herreplacementa 33. At the end ofthehearingon December 20,2011,Judge McLeod stated that he

a laterdate. hearing and was forced to incur more expense and fly back to New Hampshire at hearing, Mr. Treadwell was deprivedofrepresentationat theDecember 20 December 20 hearing. As a resultofMr. Coddington having appeared at the 32. Mr. Treadwell had flown in to New Hampshire from Georgia to attend the

raised at the hearing, after which he would issue a decision. Page 6of9

Stipulationat149.

violatedRule 8.4(a). Rules 4.1, and 8.4(c), there is necessarily clear andconvincingevidence that he 46. Because there exists clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Coddington violated

Rule 8.4(a): General Rule

Stipulationatffl[44-48.

violationofRule 8.4(c). 45. Mr. Coddington'sconduct constitutes clear and convincing evidenceofa

Coddingtonhad beensuspendedfrom thepracticeoflaw due tomisconduct. license"and by failing to everaffirmativelystate to Mr.Treadwellthat Mr. statementto Mr.Treadwellthat Mr.Coddingtonwas "an attorneyawaitinghis 44. Mr. Coddington furtherviolatedthis rule by failing tocorrectMs. Ashford's

this [matter]forward." and hisabilityto"make thearguments"in court,"arguethematter,"and "tak[e] representationstoherclient,Mr. Treadwell,regardingMr. Coddington'sstatus 43. Mr. Coddington furtherviolatedthis rule byfailingto correctMs. Ashford's

application,constitutea violationofRule 8.4(c). reinstatement, including his detailed accountofthe procedural postureofhis 42. Mr. Coddington'srepresentations to Ms. Ashford that he had applied for

misrepresentation; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or It isprofessionalmisconductfor a lawyer to:

41. Rule ofProfessional Conduct 8.4(c) states, in pertinent part, as follows:

Rule 8.4(c):Deceit

Stipulationatfll39-42.

violationofRule 4.1. 40. Mr. Coddington'sconductconstitutesclearandconvincingevidenceof a

matters. matters with the goal of Mr.Coddingtoneventuallytaking over those client Treadwell to court and to begin to allow Mr. Coddington to handleclient's Page 7of9

Committee denied the request. The Respondent submitted no additional information. 1The Respondentfiledan untimelyrequestfororalargumentbeforetheCommittee.Afterdiscussion,the

profession. litigationmatters- are the kindofmisstatementsthatstrikeat thecoreofthe misstatementsatissueinthiscase - thosemade to clientsinthecourse of and what is expectedofall membersofthe bar." The Committee agrees. The system. It found those duties "to be at the heartofwhat it means to be an attorney the Respondentviolated duties owed to the client, to the public, and to the legal 53. The Hearings Panel found that with respect to the first prong, the duty owed, that

reprimand.1 DisbarmentwithConditions.At the hearing,the respondent had argued for a 52. After the July18,2014 hearing on sanctions, the Hearings Panel recommended

misconduct." Id. (citing Richmond'sCase, 152 N.H.155,160(2005)). and generallyshouldbe greaterthan thesanctionfor themost serious serious instanceofmisconduct among a numberofviolations; it might well be sanctionimposed "shouldat least beconsistentwith thesanctionfor themost 51. In the caseofmore than one findingofmisconduct,theABA recommends that the

they affectthebaselinesanction. See id. theanalysis:theexistenceofany aggravatingor mitigatingfactorsand whether baselinesanctionis determined, the court then looks to the fourth and final partof respondent'smisconductand identify theappropriatesanction").Once the 303 (statingthat"[i]napplyingthese factors, the first step is tocategorizethe misconductand determininga baseline sanction. See Conner'sCase, 158 N.H. at 50. The first threepartsoftheanalysiscreatetheframework forcharacterizingthe

621 (2007)); Standards § 3.0. aggravatingormitigatingfactors." Id. (quoting Douglas 'Case, 156 N.H. 613, actual injury caused by thelawyer'smisconduct; and (d) the existenceof sanctions: "(a) the duty violated; (b) thelawyer'smental state; (c) the potential or 49. The Standards set forth a four-part analysis for courts to consider in imposing

503,513(2005). must take intoaccountthe severityofthemisconduct." Coffey'sCase, 152 N.H. profession, and preventing similar conduct in the future." Id."The sanction ... maintaining public confidence in the bar, preserving the integrityofthe legal 48. The purpose of the Court'sdisciplinarypower is "protecting the public,

299, 303 (2009). adopted the Standards, it looks to them forguidance. Conner'sCase, 158N.H. determining the appropriate sanction. Although the Supreme Court has not 47. The parties do not appear to dispute that the Standards provide guidance in

III. ANALYSIS Page 8 of9

lawyer'sfitness to practice." intentionalconductinvolvingdishonesty,fraud,deceit,ormisrepresentationthatseriouslyadverselyreflectson the Standards § 5.11(b)providesthatDisbarmentisgenerallyappropriatewhen:"alawyerengagesinany other withtheintenttobenefitthelawyeroranother,and causesseriousinjuryorpotentialseriousinjuryto aclient." 3 Standards § 4.61provides:"Disbarmentisgenerallyappropriatewhen alawyerknowinglydeceivesaclient butwithouttheconsciousobjectiveor purposetoaccomplisha particularresult."Standards,IIIDefinitions. particular result."Knowledge" is the conscious awarenessofthe nature or attendantcircumstancesofthe conduct The Standards providethefollowingdefinitions:"Intent"is theconsciousobjectiveorpurposetoaccomplisha

rule violations; that the Respondent, based on the record before the Committee, suspension;that theRespondentdoes not appeartounderstandtheseverityof his theRespondenthas notcompliedwithanyof theconditionsoutlinedin his prior misrepresentation for a significant periodoftime, to their ultimate detriment; that RespondentallowedAttorneyAshford and the client to rely on his respondenthas a priordisciplinarycase that resulted in a suspension; that the 57. The Committeeconsidersthefollowingfactorsto beaggravating:that the

legal profession droppedsignificantly. one who had been suspendedbecause ofmisconduct,the client's perceptionofthe learned that the Respondent was not merely a "lawyer awaiting his license" but trial, the client could have been irreparably harmed. Moreover, when the client concern about theclient'sstatusofcounsel, and subsequent postponementofthe legalargument in thecourseofa contestedmaritalcase. But for theCourt's travelled from Georgia to attend the hearing. The hearing required a complicated 56. In this case, the potential for injury was significant. TheRespondent'sclient

disbarment.3 Committee notesthatthebaselinesanctionunder both thosesectionsis candorwith client)and 5.11(b)(failuretomaintainpersonalintegrity).The definitionof"intentional"or"knowing" conductunder Standards § 4.61(lackof misrepresentationswere made in furtheranceofthat objective. Such is the AttorneyAshford'sabsence. That was his ultimate objective, and his lawyer who was going to act as"representation"for a client at a court hearing in demonstratesthat he was a party to emailcorrespondencethatidentifiedhim as a The Respondent has stipulated to the ruleviolations,and theevidence "negligent." However, the factsofthis case vitiate theRespondent'sargument. 55. Before the Hearings Panel, the Respondent argued that his stateofmind was

law because ofhismisconduct. license" as opposed to an attorneythat had been suspended from the practiceof decisions while under the misimpression that he was "an attorney awaiting his to appear in court with the client. He then allowed the client to make important the client in order to obtain a particular result: to"placate"Attorney Ashford and intentional. He made material misrepresentations toAttorneyAshford as well as Hearing Panel, this Committeeconcludesthat the Respondent's conduct was commission ofthe rule violation, also weighs against the Respondent. Like the 54. The secondprong of theanalysis,theRespondent'smentalstateduringthe Page 9 of9

File Paul F.Coddington,Jr. cc: Sara S. Greene, DisciplinaryCounsel

Chair )avid M.Rothstein,Esquire

March-^,2015

4.1;8.4(a)and 8.4(c). Respondent'sdisbarmentfrom thepracticeoflaw forviolatingRules ofProfessionalConduct For allofthe above reasons,the ProfessionalConduct Committee Recommends the VI CONCLUSION

theinvestigationand prosecutionofthis matter. Mr. Coddington stipulated,and theCommittee voted toassessallcostsassociatedwith V. COSTS

finalorderin thismatter,he did notengage in any work in the legal field in anycapacity. forreadmission,Mr. Coddington shallpresentan affidavitcertifyingthatsincethetime ofthe and hispreviousdisciplinarymatter(PCC 04-095/LD-2005-009). At thetime ofan application applicationforreadmission,Mr. Coddington shall pay all costsassociatedwith thisproceeding made sooner than five yearsfollowinga final order in this matter. As aconditionofsuch prohibition period is required. The Conditions are that no application or readmission may be ConditionsforReadmission. However, theCommittee finds that alongerre-application The Committee acceptstheHearing Panel'sRecommendation ofDisbarment with

IV. SANCTION

mitigatingfactorspresentin this case. 58. The Committee, upon review ofthe record, finds that there are no meritorious

conduct.SanctionHearing at 39, 43, 44-45, 46. does notdemonstratecontrition;and that theRespondent attemptedto minimize is

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