Deanne M. Chrystal (2015)

3. Ms. Chrystal has no previous disciplinary history.

2005. She iscurrentlyon active status inMassachusetts. 2. Ms. Chrystal was also admitted to practice law in Massachusetts on November 28,

Pleasant Street, Lincoln, New Hampshire03251. proceeding,Ms. Chrystal operatedher law office as Chrystal Law, PLLC,18 Chrystal was admitted to practice on May 22, 2006. At all times material to this 1. Ms. Chrystalis anattorneylicensedto practicelaw in NewHampshire.Ms.

followingfactualfindingsof theHearingPanelby clearandconvincingevidence: The ProfessionalConductCommitteehasdeterminedthattheRecordsupportsthe

stipulated. clear and convincing evidence. The Committee also voted to accept the Rule violations as Having reviewed the Record, theCommitteevoted to accept the facts as stipulated, by PeterG. Beeson and Margaret R. Kerouac were absent. J. Roy, David W. Ruoff, Richard D. Sager and Martha Van Oot.HeatherE. Krans, Vice Chair, Elaine Holden, Vice Chair, Susan R. Chollet, Richard H. Darling, Mona T. Movafaghi, Georges to Pay CostsofDisciplinaryMatter. Members presentincluded David M.Rothstein,Chair, the Stipulation as to Facts, Violations and Sanction (the"Stipulation"),as well as the Agreement On January20,2015,the Professional Conduct Committee (the"Committee")deliberated

Chrystal,Deanne M. advs.AttorneyDisciplineOffice#12-032

Margaret R. Kerouac Holly B. Fazzino, Administrator RichardH. Darling* * non attorney member Susan R. Chollet* Martha Van Oot Peter G. Beeson Richard D.Sager Elaine Holden,* Vice Chair 603-224-5828 ♦ Fax 228-9511David W. Ruoff Heather E. Krans, Vice Chair Concord,New Hampshire 03301 Georges J. Roy* David M. Rothstein, Chair 4 Chenell Drive, Suite 102 Mona T. Movafaghi

29,2011,Ms. Chrystal filed a general appearance. OnSeptember 16 and October 10. On July 5,2011,Ms. Chrystal filed a limitedappearance.Later, onSeptember

Family Division,Plymouth. JosephClarkand Susan Clark, CaseNo. 669-201l-DM-00096,2nd Circuit for LegalSeparationwhich was signedby both Mr. Clark and Ms. Clark. ITMO 9. On May 18,2011, Ms. ChrystalassistedMr. Clarkinpreparinga JointPetition

billed Mr.Clarkhourlyfor herservices. enteredinto a feeagreement with Ms.Chrystalon April7,2011. Ms. Chrystal 8. In April 2011, Mr. Clarkconsultedwith Ms.Chrystalabouthisdivorce.He

and occasionallyprovidedinstructionfor hisfather'sgolfclinics. who providedinstructionto theparticipantsoftheLinwood JuniorGolf program Joseph Clark, Sr., Mr.Clark'sfather. Mr.Clarkwas one ofthegolfprofessionals Owl's Nest club.EventuallyMs. Chrystalparticipatedingolfclinics with Mr. DepartmentcoordinatingtheJuniorGolfprogram, whichoperatedoutofthe daughterworked. Ms. Chrystal was avolunteerfor theLinwood Recreation Nest Resort& Golf Club inThornton,New Hampshire, where Mr. Clark'sadult were personalfriendswho firstbecame acquaintedin2008 throughtheOwl's 7. Priortoenteringinto anattorney-clientrelationship,Ms. Chrystaland Mr. Clark

Chrystal'sopposingcounsel. client,Mr. Clark,and interviewedJohn D. Cameron (now deceased),Ms. matter.DisciplinaryCounsel also took thedepositionsofMs. Chrystaland her listenedto the audioofthe July11,2012 courthearingin theunderlyingdivorce interviewedthecomplainant(and her twoadultdaughters)multipletimes,and 6. DisciplinaryCounsel has reviewedMs. ChrystaPsfile in theunderlyingmatter,

financedtheformermaritalhome with Ms.Chrystalas aco-borrower/co-signer. the fact that Ms.Chrystaland Mr.Clarkhad formed revocabletrustsand had re essentiallythe sameallegation.Ms. Clarkalsobroughtto theADO's attention 5. On September 7,2012,Ms. Clark filed agrievancewith the ADO making

livingtogetherduring the time that Ms. Chrystal wasrepresentingMr. Clark. Chrystaland herclient,Mr. Clark, wereengaged in asexualrelationshipand who presided over a July11,2012 hearing in which Ms. Clark alleged that Ms. upon receiptofa referraldated July13,2012 from Judge Thomas A. Rappa, Jr., AttorneyDisciplineOffice's(ADO) investigationin thismatterwas initiated 2011 to July2012, ofJoseph Clark,Jr. in hisdivorcefrom Susan Clark. The 4. This disciplinarymatterarises from Ms.Chrystal'srepresentation,from April p. 3 Page 3 of15

Retainingthe home wasimportantto Mr. Clarkbecausehe wanted hiscollegeincludingremoving Mrs. Clarkfrom the note andmortgage on the home. and honor those financialobligationsset forth in theProposed Final Decree, maritalhome on hisown. He needed to refinanceinorderto remain inthe home Community Guaranty Savings Bank("CGSB") to refinance the debt on the worked as a full-time employee at theOwl's Nest Resort, could not qualify with 16. Sometime after the settlement meeting, Ms. Chrystal learned that Mr. Clark, who

arebeing circulatedforsigning." from thecalendarbecause "thepartieshave reachedan agreement and originals 15. On May 17,2012,Ms. Chrystal asked the court toremove a statusconference

settlement. corresponded in the weeks that followed to finalize the detailsofa property Ms. Clark wouldkeep herretirementfunds. Ms.Chrystaland Mr.Cameron marital estate, the parties agreed that Mr. Clarkwould keep the marital home, and marriage wereofmajority.) In essence, andregardingtheprimaryassetsofthe propertysettlement.(Therewere noparentingissues,as both childrenofthe settlement.During thismeeting,thepartiesagreedto theessentialterms ofa 14. On March 5,2012, thepartiesand theircounselmet inpersontodiscuss

such time as sheterminatedrepresentationin oraround June 2012. he never filed anappearance,Mr. Cameron negotiatedon Ms. Clark'sbehalfuntil 13. By February2012, Ms. Clarkhad hiredJohn Cameron torepresenther. Although

so thatallinvolvedcould save money ontheirphone bills. each respectivelyused, Ms. Chrystal admits that she added Mr. Clark to the plan While each person paid their shareofthe total cellphone bill based onminutes plan. She also added Mr.Clark'sdaughters, Abby and Devon Clark, to the plan. 12. Around Januaryof2012, Respondent added Mr.ClarktoherVerizon cellphone

him. breakdown ofhismarriage,and that Ms.Chrystalbecame a "supportsystem" for frequent calls was that Mr. Clark was suicidal atvariouspointsfollowing the time. Mr.Clarkand Ms. Chrystal alsotestifiedthatone ofthereasonsfor the conversations.In any event, Ms. Chrystal did not bill Mr. Clark for anyofthis additionto matters involving their worktogetheratOwl's Nest and friendly depositions that these calls involved discussions about the divorce matter, in They often spoke to one another multiple times a day.They testifiedin their communicating daily using their cell phones as theprimarypointofcontact. 11. Beginning around September 2011,Ms. Chrystaland Mr. Clarkbegan

18,2011,the partiesparticipatedin mediation, but did not reach asettlement. p. 4 Page 4 of15

between [theparties]is tomemorialize a businesstransaction...."The The BusinessAgreement statesthat"on this date,May 23,2012, thisagreement MerrillwoodDrive, Holderness,New Hampshire" (the"BusinessAgreement"). between JosephClark, Jr. and Deanne Chrystal, Esq. for realestateinterestin51 21. By May 23, 2012, Ms. Chrystalhad begun todrafta "BusinessAgreement

so thatshe and Mr. Clark could refinancethe maritalhome. CGSB todeterminewhether she would qualifyas co-borrowerforlenderCGSB From May 15 throughMay 22, 2012, Ms. Chrystalfileddocumentation with 20. Mr. Clarkand Ms. Chrystalagreedthat Ms.Chrystalwould be aco-borrower.

Ms. Chrystalcontributeto anaccountfor themaintenance and repairofthe home. an obligorunder the note andmortgage securedby thefamilyhome; and (4) have (3) fulfill hisobligationunder theProposed FinalDecree toremove Mrs. Clarkas propertytaxes,creditcard debt, a loan from hismother,and anautomobileloan, reasonssetforthabove, (2)satisfya number ofoutstandingdebtsincluding was beneficialto Mr.Clark becausehe could: (1)retainthefamilyhome for investingsignificantfunds toacquireand maintainsuch propertyon her own. It investin realproperty,enjoyingfutureequityin thehome withoutthenecessityof refinancing,becauseMr. Clarklacked the funds to paythem otherwise;and (3) pay offoutstandingdebt; (2) bepaidher legal fees from theequityupon i.e. hecould continueto live in hishome with affordable,monthlypayments and beneficialto Ms.Chrystalbecause she could:(1)help Mr. Clark achievea goal, 19. Ms. Chrystaland Mr. Clark believedthatthisarrangementwas reasonable.It was

pay out offunds from therefinancing. was substantialequityin the home. Mr.Clarkalso hadotherdebts hewished to refinancing,the legal fees Mr.Clarkowed Ms. Chrystalcould be paid,as there termsthat Ms.Chrystalwould be aco-borrowerand would co-sign,and upon loan on themaritalhome so thatitcouldbe refinanced.They agreed ingeneral familymembers, theydiscussedthepossibilityofMs. Chrystalco-signingfor the for the loan.Afterconsideringthepossibilityofseekinghelp fromotherClark 18. Sometime inMay 2012, Ms. Chrystaland Mr. Clark discussedpossibleco-signors

willing to co-sign on the loan. Mr. Clark'screditscorewould preventhim from refinancingunlesssomeone was a refinancingofthemaritalhome. The loanofficerinformed Ms. Chrystalthat from CGSB todeterminewhether and on what terms Mr. Clark could qualifyfor 17. On May 8, 2012, Ms. Chrystal,on behalfofMr. Clark,spoke with a loanofficer

from school. age daughtersto be able to return to theirchildhoodhome during theirbreaks p. 5 Page 5of15

AttorneyCameron had ceasedrepresentingMs. Clark by this time.

to report thematter"tothe PCC." the July11 hearing, Judge Rappa suggested that hebelievedhe had an obligation the parties'agreement,"Ms. Clark'smotion was deemed moot. At thecloseof proposed decree.The final decree wasenteredon July11,2012, and "inlightof Ms. Clarkultimatelydeterminedthat shewanted theCourt toapprove the parties' final decreegiventhe issues raised in hermotion. Afterconsideringthe issue, 28. Judge Rappa inquired ofMs. Clark whether shewished towithdraw the proposed

with him inthemaritalhome. not engaged in a sexualrelationshipand that she wasnot and had notbeen living Ms. Clark inthemaritalhome. Ms. Chrystaltestifiedthatshe and Mr.Clark were 27. Judge Rappa heard the evidenceand admittedintoevidencethephotostakenby

July11 hearing. proceeding. Shethusentered a general appearance onbehalfofMr. Clark at the Rappa indicatedsome discomfortwith Ms. Chrystal'sprecise role in the Clarkconferredwith Ms. Chrystal sofrequentlyduring thehearingthat Judge Clarkwere pro se. Ms. Chrystalattendedthe hearing. Although pro se, Mr. 26. The Court helda hearing on Ms.Clark'smotion on July11,2012. Mr. and Ms.

25. On June 21,2012, Ms. Chrystal filed amotion towithdraw.

refinanceclosed. would includethe maritalhome once Ms. Clarksigneda quitclaimdeed and the eventuallyhold allpropertytransferred to theTrustees(i.e. the trustestate),which "ChrystalTrust"and the"ClarkTrust").The purpose ofthetrustswas to (Deanne Chrystal,Trustee)and one for Mr. Clark(JosephClark, Jr.,Trustee)(the 24. On June 20, 2012, Ms. Chrystal drafted two revocable trusts - one forherself

motion was heard. and seekingto delayany ruling on theproposed final decree untilsuch time as her filedan exparte motion1alleging"anaffair"betweenMs. Chrystaland Mr. Clark that Ms. Chrystal waslivingin the marital home. On June15,2012, Ms. Clark marital home. During that visit, shetookvarious photos that shebelievedproved 23. On June 11,2012, Ms. Clark,with both ofher daughterspresent,visitedthe

both parties and their counsel, to thePlymouth Family Division. 22. On May 29, 2012, Ms. Chrystal transmitted the Proposed Final Decree, signed by

document was not actuallyexecuted,however, untilJuly25,2012. p. 6 Page 6 of15

oftheDeanne M. ChrystalRevocable Trustof2012." The warrantydeed was Joseph L. Clark,Jr.Revocable Trustof2012," and "Deanne M. Chrystal,Trustee propertyfrom himself(individually)to"Joseph L. Clark,Jr.,Trusteeofthe 33. Also on July25,2012, Mr. Clarkexecuteda warrantydeed conveying themarital

representedhim with regardto thetransaction. was fair, Mr.Clarkalsotestifiedthathe did notknow whether Ms. Chrystal While testifyingin hisdepositionthathe believedthattheBusinessAgreement Chrystaldid not representMr. Clarkwithregardto theBusinessAgreement. includingtherequirementthat she stateexplicitlyinwritingto Mr.Clarkthat Ms. BusinessAgreement as that term isdefinedin Rule1.8(a)(3)and Rule 1.0(e), 32. Ms. Chrystaldid notobtain,however, Mr. Clark's"informed consent"to the

transactions. protectiverequirementsset forth inRule 1.8governing attorney/client BusinessAgreement becauseshe believedthatsuch languagewould meet the attorney/clientbusinesstransaction."Ms. Chrystalincludedthislanguagein the duressand that[sic] Joe isknowingly and intelligentlyenteringinto an agreement is a fairagreement for Joe. Joe is notactingunder undue influence,or agreement reviewed by anindependentattorneytoensurethistransactionand 31. The BusinessAgreement alsoprovidedthat:"Joe isadvisedto havethis

from therefinancewas "consideredJoe'sequityindividually." costs held by Joe at hisdiscretion."The parties agreed that the$36,000obtained [Clark] to payoffthecurrentmortgage ...and otherindividualdebtand closing to "use her credit score to help refinance the home for $125,000 which allows Joe for aslong as heoccupiedtheproperty.Ms. Chrystalagreedtoallow Mr. Clark pay mortgage payments,town taxes,house insurance,and generalmaintenance forwardfrom thisappraisal."The BusinessAgreement obligatedMr. Clark to inJune 2012, and that"futureequity"meant "any equityin thehome moving mortgage." The BusinessAgreement notedthatthepropertyhad been appraised split any future equity in the property inexchange forDeanne co-signingthe attorney'sfees from the"equityin thepropertyupon refinance,and in addition, The BusinessAgreement providedthat Mr.Clark would pay Ms. Chrystal's 30. On July 25, 2012, Ms. Chrystal and Mr. ClarkexecutedtheBusinessAgreement.

decree. settlementagreement reachedinMarch 2012 and thenegotiatedtermsofthe final granting allofher interest in the marital home to Mr. Clark,consistentwith the 29. Afterthehearing,while still at thecourthouse,Ms. Clark signeda quitclaimdeed p. 7 Page 7 of15

StipulationatUK 1-39.

confidentialityto Mr. Clark. demonstrates that Ms. Chrystal failed in her dutiesofcompetence,diligence,or theunderlyingdivorce matter does not reveal anyinformationwhich debts, and stay in thehome inwhich he raised his family.The ADO's reviewof qualifyfor refinancing,which in turn allowedhim to access the equity, payoff allowedhim to dosomethingcrucial that he could not have done on hisown, i.e. divorcefrom Ms. Clark. Hemaintainsthat theBusinessAgreement is fair and representation wasexcellentand that she wasextremelydiligentinnavigatinghis 39. Mr. Clark has maintained throughout thisinvestigationthat Ms.Chrystal'slegal

September 2012,after the representation wasconcludedon July11,2012. oftheADO that she did notmove inwith Mr. Clarkuntilapproximatelylate maritalhome. Ms. Chrystal producedevidencedemonstratingto thesatisfaction 38. Ms. Chrystal and Mr. Clark are currentlylivingtogetheras acouplein the former

engage in similarbehaviorfor the remainderoftherepresentation. representingMr. Clark. Mr. Clarktestifiedthat heunderstood,and he did not feelings, nor enter into a romantic or sexualrelationship,while she was card, Ms. Chrystalinformedher client that shecouldneitherreciprocate any such romantic feelings for Ms. Chrystal.Both partiestestifiedthatupon receivingthe Clarktestifiedin his deposition that this card was the firsttimehe hadexpressed by a June 2012 birthday card to Ms. Chrystalexpressinghis love for her. Mr. 37. Mr. Clark'sfeelings for Ms. Chrystaleventuallybecame romantic, asevidenced

Clark came to rely on Ms. Chrystal foremotionalsupport. personal -but notromanticor physical —and thatbecauseofhismental state, Mr. alltimesthat Ms. ChrystalrepresentedMr. Clark,theirrelationshipbecame such communications,Mr. Clark and Ms. Chrystalhave both testifiedthat during callofthenightand first callofthenextmorning would be to Mr. Clark.Despite practicallyevery day, often many times a day. Frequently, Ms. Chrystal's last through the endofthe representation, she and Mr. Clarkspoke with one another 36. Phone records produced by Ms. Chrystal indicate that fromSeptember 2011

withtheGraftonCounty RegistryofDeeds. 35. On August 2, 2012,CGSB recorded the mortgage on the former maritalhome

and Ms. Chrystal asTrusteeofher Trust. themortgagorspursuant to the mortgage were Mr. Clark asTrusteeofhisTrust 34. The refinanceclosedon or around July 25, 2012.The borrowerson the loan and

recordedwiththe GraftonCounty RegistryofDeeds on July27,2012. p. 8 Page 8 of15

analysisofwhether theconflictofinterestwas waivable. therepresentation.For thatreason,she did notseek to withdraw or undertakean Chrystal failed toevaluatethe Rule1.7conflictofinterestas itemerged during 45. Although therewas no conflictofinterestat theinceptionofrepresentation,Ms.

thus,constituteda conflictofinterestunder Rule 1.7(a)(2). reasonablyhave affectedherabilitytoprovidetrulyindependentcounsel,and with Mr. Clark. These personalinterestscreateda significantriskthatcould and beforethedivorcewas final, as well asherintenselypersonalrelationship maritalhome, which she and Mr.Clarknegotiatedbeforetherepresentationended by herpersonalinterests.Those interestsincludedherfinancialinterestin the significantrisk that herrepresentationofMr. Clarkwould be materiallylimited 44. Ms. Chrystalbreachedthatduty when herown personalinterestscreateda

Chrystal'spersonalinterests. riskthatherrepresentationofMr. Clarkwould be materiallylimitedby Ms. interest.Specifically,she could notrepresentMr. Clarkiftherewas a significant representMr. Clark undercircumstancesinvolvinga concurrent conflictof 43. PursuanttoRule ofProfessionalConduct 1.7(a)(2),Ms. Chrystalhad a duty not to

ProfessionalConduct by clearand convincingevidence: convincingevidencethatDeanne M. Chrystalhas violatedthefollowingRules of facts andstipulationofthe parties, theCommittee concludesthatthereisclearand 42. In light ofthe abovestipulatedfacts, and based upon its ownexaminationofthe

Stipulationat % 41.

detailbelow. violationsoftheNew Hampshire RulesofProfessionalConduct,as set forth in 41. The partiesagree,however,that Ms.Chrystal'sconduct in this caseinvolves

Stipulationat140.

relationship"duringthe timeoftherepresentationasprohibitedby Rule 1.8(j). convincingevidencethat Ms. Chrystal and Mr.Clarkwere engaged in a"sexual 40. Afterinvestigatingthis matter, the ADO hasconcludedthereis notclearand

II. RULINGS OF LAW p. 9 Page 9 of15

Stipulationatfl48-56.

ofRule ofProfessionalConduct 1.8(i). 55. Under thesecircumstances,there is clear andconvincingevidenceofa violation

Clarkexecutedand pursuanttowhich she gainedfutureequityrightsin the home. was final,an "interest"which culminatedinthe Business Agreement her and Mr. obtainan interestin themaritalhome as earlyas May 2012, beforethedivorce 54. Ms. Chrystalbreachedthatduty when she and Mr.Clark agreedthatshe would

Clark'scauseofactionor in thesubjectmatterofthedivorcelitigation. 53. Ms. Chrystalfurtherhad a duty toavoidacquiringany proprietaryinterestin Mr.

ofRule ofProfessionalConduct 1.8(e). 52. Under thesecircumstances,thereisclearand convincingevidenceofa violation

obligatesherto pay the noteifMr. Clarkdoes not. refinancingofthemaritalhome. Ms. Chrystalis aguarantoron thenote,which and when she agreed,in May of2012,to be aco-signeron Mr. Clark'sloanin the 51. Ms. Chrystalbreachedthat duty when sheadded Mr. Clarktohercellphone plan

expensesas set forth in Rule1.8(e)(1)& (2). Clarkinconnection withthelitigation,otherthantoadvance courtcostsand 50. Ms. Chrystal had a further duty to avoidprovidingany financialassistanceto Mr.

ofRule ofProfessionalConduct 1.8(a). 49. Under these circumstances,there is clear andconvincingevidenceofa violation

Clarkin thetransaction,as requiredunder Rule 1.8(a)(3). Mr. Clarkas to her role in thetransaction,includingwhether she representedMr. 48. Ms. Chrystal breachedthat duty when she failed toobtaininformedconsentfrom

Clark,unlessallconditionsset forthunder Rule 1.8(a)(l)-(3)were met. 47. Ms. Chrystal had a duty to avoid any businesstransactionswith her client, Mr.

Stipulationatffil43-46.

ofRule ofProfessionalConduct 1.7(a)(2). 46. Under these circumstances,there is clear andconvincingevidenceofa violation p. 10 Page 10 of15

matters outside the usualattorney-clientrelationship,which assistancein turn relationship with Mr. Clark eventually precipitated Ms. Chrystal assisting him in to heed thesubstantialrisk that a conflictofinteresthad emerged. Her personal Clarkpresentedno conflictofinterestunder Rule 1.7.Later, Ms.Chrystalfailed with respectto the ruleviolations.For example,the initialrepresentationofMr. sanctionanalysis, the parties agree that Ms.Chrystal'smental state wasnegligent 61. With respectto Ms.Chrystal'smental stateunder thesecond prong ofthe

to herclient,Mr. Clark. See Standards § 4.3. 60. Under the first prongofthe analysis, Ms. Chrystalviolateddutiesofloyalty owed

factors on theultimatesanction"). sanction,[theCourt]considers]theeffectofany aggravatingor mitigating theyaffectthebaselinesanction. See id. (statingthat"[a]fterdeterminingthe oftheanalysis:theexistenceofany aggravatingor mitigatingfactorsand whether baselinesanctionisdetermined,the Court then looks to the fourth and final part respondent'smisconductand identify theappropriatesanction").Once the 303 (stating that"[i]napplying these factors, the first step is tocategorizethe misconductand determininga baselinesanction. See Conner's Case, 158 N.H. at 59. The first three partsoftheanalysiscreatetheframework forcharacterizingthe

Case, 156 N.H. 613, 621 (2007)); Standards § 3.0. and (d) theexistenceofaggravatingor mitigatingfactors." Id. (quoting Douglas' mental state; (c) thepotentialor actualinjurycaused by thelawyer'smisconduct; courts toconsiderin imposing sanctions: "(a) the dutyviolated;(b) thelawyer's Conner'sCase, 158 N.H. at 303. The Standards set forth a four partanalysisfor 58. Although theCourt has notadoptedthe Standards, itlookstothem forguidance.

themisconduct." Coffey's Case, 152 N.H. 503, 513 (2005). N.H. 299, 303(2009)."The sanction...must takeintoaccounttheseverityof profession,and preventingsimilarconductin thefuture." Conner's Case, 158 maintainingpublicconfidencein the bar,preservingtheintegrityofthelegal 57. The purposeoftheCourt'sdisciplinarypower is"protectingthepublic,

Stipulationat157.

Conduct 8.4(a). Ms. Chrystal'sconduct, as described herein,violatedRule ofProfessional 56. Having found the foregoing violations, there isclearand convincingevidencethat

65. As noted above,Mr. Clark would testifytherehas been no actualinjuryto him.

Agreement as well aspayment ofherattorney'sfees. maritalhome, Ms. Chrystalherselfstood to lose thebenefitstoherin theBusiness givetrulyindependentadvice,becauseifMr. Clark surrenderedinterestsin the retirement.In thisrespect,there was asignificantriskthatMs. Chrystalcouldnot fullinterestin the marital home inexchange for someportionofhisex-wife's was approved(July2012),such that it was in Mr.Clark'sbestinterestto forego a dispositionofthe home (March 2012) and the date that theProposedFinal Decree changed between the date that Mr. and Mrs. Clarkreachedagreementon the for Mr. Clark not seeking anyportionofherretirement,circumstancescould have although Susan Clark agreed Mr. Clark could keep the marital home in exchange 64. Ms. Chrystal'sconductcaused potential injury to Mr. Clark. Forexample,

potentialinjurycaused by Ms. Chrystal'smisconduct. 63. The third prong ofthesanctionanalysisrequiresan assessmentofthe actual or

oremergency. obligation to pay any mortgage, taxes, etc., exceptcontributionsfor a major repair equityin thehome from the dateoftheBusinessAgreement with no concomitant from thisBusinessAgreement. She may alsoobtain50% ofany increasein thatover a periodofyears,it ispossibleshe willobtainmore thanjustherfees thepayment ofher fees akin to Rule1.8(i)(l).However, Ms. Chrystalrealizes that heracquisitionofan interestin themaritalhome was chieflydone toprotect matter, no longer the"subjectmatteroflitigation."She alsoincorrectlybelieved dispositionofthe martial home, and that as a result, the home was, as apractical thatMr. and Mrs.Clarkhad reacheda final andbindingagreement on the pay costs and expenses on their behalf. Ms. Chrystal also incorrectly believed only allows lawyers to advance court costs andexpensesor, forindigentclients, Chrystal understands now that such assistance is prohibited by Rule 1.8(e), which responsible for this"share"ofminutes used on the plan. See Rule1.8(e).Ms. litigation," as it related to a personal expenseofMr. Clark and he remained believed at the time that such assistance was not"inconnectionwithpending and his daughters to a cell phone plan through her service provider, Ms. Chrystal disclosures required under Rule1.8(a)(l)-(3).When she agreed to add Mr. Clark agreementreviewed..."),butnegligentlyfailed toadequatelyprovide allofthe through the language she drafted (Ex. A, page 2, "Joe is advised to have this comply with those formalitiesgoverningattorney-client business transactions formalities. TheCommittee finds that Ms.Chrystal,in good faith,attemptedto in her Business Agreement, but was negligent in failing to comply with allofits 62. As to the Rule1.8violations, Ms. Chrystal attempted to comply with Rule1.8(a)

violatedRule 1.8 as setforthabove. p. 12 Page 12 of15

term "admonition,"as used in the ABA Standards, is analogous to areprimandin New Hampshire. 2The term"reprimand,"asusedinthe ABA Standards, isanalogousto apubliccensureinNew Hampshire.The

67. The baselinesanctionmust be consideredin lightofany aggravatingand

no actualor potentialinjuryto aclient. therepresentationwilladverselyaffectanotherclient,and causes littleor clientmay be materiallyaffectedby thelawyer'sown interests,or whether instanceofnegligenceindeterminingwhether therepresentationofa 4:34 Admonition is generallyappropriatewhen a lawyerengages in an isolated

client. adverselyaffectanotherclient, andcausesinjuryor potentialinjury to a affectedby thelawyer'sown interests, orwhethertherepresentationwill determiningwhether therepresentationofa clientmay be materially 4.33 Reprimand is generallyappropriatewhen a lawyerisnegligentin

conflict,and causesinjury orpotentialinjuryto aclient. interestand does not fullydiscloseto aclientthepossible effectofthat 4.32 Suspensionis generallyappropriatewhen a lawyerknows ofa conflictof

consentofclient(s): 4.31 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, without the informed

Standards, entitled"Failureto AvoidConflictsofInterest,"which provides: 66. Ms. Chrystal's failure to avoid conflictsofinterest implicates Section 4.3ofthe

representationand that the BusinessAgreement was fair to him. He stateshe would have receivedfar less in hisdivorcewithoutMs. Chrystal's p. 13 Page 13 of15

1 Shillen'sCase was decidedundera priorversionofRule 1.7.

#07-034, Order dated April27, 2009). representedtheincapacitatedpersonindraftingtwo wills {Howie v. ADO, person(deemed by courtorderto lackcapacityto make a will)and also Order datedMarch 16,2011);and (3)representedtheguardianofan incapacitated abusivepleadingsbeingfiled by thelawyer (Brouillardv. Moynihan, #10-003, 2010);(2)representedhisgirlfriendin hercontentiousdivorcematter,resultingin husband and wife in adivorce (Hogan v. ADO, #09-016,Order datedApril25, publiccensuresfor Rule 1.7violationswhere thelawyer: (1)representedboth casespresentingRule 1.7violations. Forexample,theCommittee has imposed 72. Orders issuedby theCommittee have likewiseimposed publiccensuresinvarious

speedingcouldhavecontributedtowife'sinjuries).3 Respondent representedhusband and wifeagainstautoinsurerwhere husband's censureasbaselinesanctionfornegligentlyviolatingconflictruleswhere to aclient. See Shillen 's Case, 149 N.H. 132, 140(2003)(imposingpublic toappreciatethe riskofa conflictofinterestand causesinjuryor potentialinjury that a public censure is the baseline sanction where aRespondent negligentlyfails breachesoftheconflictofinterestrules.New Hampshire caseshave recognized 71. A public censure is proportional to discipline imposed in other cases involving

case do not merit anydeviationfrom thebaselinesanctionofpublic censure. 70. The Committee finds that theaggravatingand mitigatingfactorsevidentin this

thehome. Mr. Clark has retainedcounseltoconsidertheproposal. event, to surrender her right under the BusinessAgreement to any future equity in accomplished without prejudice or adverse consequences to Mr. Clark, and in any offered to rescind the Business AgreementifMr. Clark deems it can be and freedisclosureto the ADO. See Standards § 9.32. Ms.Chrystalhas also record, remorse, a cooperative attitude during disciplinary proceedings, and full 69. Mitigating factors are also present, including an absenceofa prior disciplinary

on Ms. Chrystal not only as an attorney but also as an emotional support system. who battled suicidal thoughts during the periodofrepresentation and came to rely situations. See Standards § 9.22. In addition, Mr. Clark was a vulnerable client, withoutcomplyingwith theethicalrulesdesignedto protect clients in such Mr. Clark, Ms. Chrystal inserted her personal financial interest into the litigation the marital home. Although the Business Agreement was not objectively unfair to motive in seeking to benefit personallyfrom the subject matteroflitigation, i.e. 68. In this case, the following aggravating factors are present: Ms.Chrystal'sselfish

mitigating factors. Conner'sCase, 158 N.H. at 303. p. 14 Page 14 of15

1.7(a)(2),1.8(a),(e), and (i), and8.4(a). Public Censure to Deanne Chrystal for violating RulesofProfessionalConduct 77. For allofthe above reasons,the ProfessionalConduct Committee issuesthis

Matterwith regardto theinvestigationand prosecutionofthismatter. 76. The Committee accepts Ms.Chrystal'sAgreement to Pay CostsofDisciplinary

Standardsfor Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2005) ("Standards"). 152 N.H. 155, 159-60 (2005). This sanctionisalsoinaccord with the ABA attorneydiscipline. See e.g., Conner's Case 158 N.H. at 303; Richmond's Case, The Committee's recommended sanctionis inaccordwith thepurposesof future." Grew's Case, 156 N.H. 361, 365(2007)(quotationand citationomitted). preservetheintegrityofthe legalprofession,and preventsimilarconduct in the punishment butrathertoprotectthepublic,maintainpublicconfidencein the bar, Censure. The purpose oftheCourt'sdisciplinarypower "isnotto inflict Committee concludesthat theappropriatedisciplinein thismatteris aPublic 75. Having made theaforementionedfindingsand rulings,theProfessionalConduct

sanctioninthismatter. finds byclearand convincingevidencethata publiccensureis theappropriate Standardsand themitigatingfactors and case lawnotedabove,theCommittee 74. None ofthesefactorsarepresentin Ms.Chrystal'smatter.In lightoftheABA

failing toavoidconflictsofinterest. Mr. Clausonhad previouslybeen disciplinedfor theexactsame misconduct, i.e. judgeat the arraignment specifically brought theconflictto his attention. Finally, matter. Second, Mr. Clausoncontinuedtorepresentthe twoclientseven after a conflictofinterestin which Mr. Clausonrepresentedadverseparties in the same The mattermeriteda suspensionforseveralreasons.First, it was anobvious domesticsimple assault case as well as thedefendant(thevictim'shusband). Case, 165 N.H. 183 (2012),Mr. Clauson representedboth theallegedvictimin a although only where serious aggravators are present. For example, in Clauson's 73. The Supreme Court has imposed suspensions for violating the conflict rules, p. 15 Page 15 of15

File Richard Y. Uchida, Esquire cc: Sara S. Greene, DisciplinaryCounsel

right to appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. 78. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule37(A)(III)(d)(2)(D)(4)(A),Ms. Chrystal has the