David C. Dunn (2015)

was admittedto practicein 1990. 1. Mr. Dunn is an attorney licensed to practice law in New Hampshire. Mr. Dunn

following facts byclearand convincingevidence: The Committee accepts the facts as contained in theStipulation.This establishesthe

votedtoacceptthesanctionas stipulated. Peter G. Beeson and Margaret R. Kerouac were recused. After oralargument,theCommittee Richard H. Darling, Mona T. Movafaghi, Georges J. Roy, David W. Ruoff, and Martha Van Oot. Rothstein,Chair,HeatherE. Krans,Vice Chair,ElaineHolden,Vice Chair,Susan R. Chollet, Greene argued onbehalfoftheAttorneyDisciplineOffice.Members presentincludedDavid M. the stipulated sanction. Attorney Mitchell Simon argued onbehalfofthe Respondent; Sara S. On May 19,2015,theCommittee held oralargument on the issueofwhethertoaccept the record, the Committee then voted to accept the facts and rule violations as stipulated. and Martha Van Oot.PeterG. Beeson and MargaretR. Kerouac were recused.Having reviewed Holden, Vice Chair, Richard H. Darling, Mona T. Movafaghi, David W. Ruoff, Richard D. Sager Members presentincludedDavid M. Rothstein,Chair,Heather E. Krans, Vice Chair,Elaine theStipulationas to Facts,Violationsand Sanction(the"Stipulation")in theinstantcase. On April21,2015,theProfessionalConduct Committee (the"Committee") deliberated

Dunn, David C. advs.AttorneyDisciplineOffice#14-027

Margaret R. Kerouac BarbaraJ. Guay, LegalAssistant Richard H. Darling* * non attorney member Susan R. Chollet* Martha Van Oot PeterG. Beeson Richard D. Sager ElaineHolden,* Vice Chair 603-224-5828 ♦ Fax 228-9511 David W. Ruoff HeatherE. Krans, ViceChair Concord,New Hampshire 03301 Georges J. Roy* David M. Rothstein,Chair 4 Chenell Drive, Suite 102 Mona T. Movafaghi

administeredor overseenby theprobatecourt. 1The trustwas alivingtrust,notatestamentarytrust.As such,Ms. Osgood'strustwouldnothavebeen

originalTrustnamed Mr. Roy as Trustee and wassignedby Ms. Osgood in the 11. The originalWill was dulyexecutedand named Mr. Roy asExecutor.The

end, however, she approved the documents as drafted and executed them that day. perhaps she should only name Mr. Roy and Mr.Phillipsas beneficiaries.In the some doubts about twoofthe four beneficiaries in the original Trust, noting that documents. Mr. Roy was present during this meeting. Ms. Osgood expressed 10. On January6,2012,Mr. Dunn visited Ms.Osgood at herhome toreviewthe

Kenneth Phillips,Elaine Levesque, and Karin Weber. Osgood'sreview.1The originalTrustnamed fourbeneficiaries:HenryRoy, DanielleL. OsgoodIrrevocableTrustAgreement (the"originalTrust")for Ms. 9. Mr. Dunn drafted a Last Will andTestament(the"originalWill")and the

surgeryto takeplacein April2012. neuroma). He worked with histreatingphysiciansand was scheduledforbrain had losthearingin his right ear. He wasdiagnosedwitha braintumor (acoustic feeling unwell for aperiodofmonths. He eventuallysoughttreatmentbecausehe 8. Around thesame time thathe began torepresentMs. Osgood, Mr. Dunn had been

firstbegan handlingher taxesin the late1970s. Accountant,Henry L. Roy. Mr. Roy and Ms.Osgood had been friendssincehe Dunn, Ms. Osgood reliedon the helpofher friendand Certified Public 7. During theprocessofestablishingan estateplanand communicating with Mr.

October of2011 todrafther estate plan. ofDanielleOsgood during2011-2013. Ms. Osgood retainedMr. Dunn around 6. The professionalmisconduct in thismatterarisesfrom Mr. Dunn's representation

Officeby way ofMr. Dunn's self-reportdatedJuly 16,2014. 5. Mr. Dunn's disciplinarymattercame to theattentionoftheAttorneyDiscipline

Wadleigh, Starr, Peters, Dunn &Chiesalaw firm foreightyears. 4'/2years atJosephF.McDowell, III,P.A. Beforethat, he waswiththe Hampshire03104. Prior to opening his own practice, Mr. Dunn practiced law for Law OfficeofDavid C. Dunn, PA, 14 Temple Court,Manchester,New 4. At all times material to this proceeding, Mr. Dunn operated his law office as the

3. Mr. Dunn has no previous disciplinary history.

2. Mr. Dunn has not been admitted to practice law in any otherjurisdiction. p. 3 Page 3 of14

intention.Mr. Dunn did not speak with Ms.Osgood directlytoconfirm she thischange relyingon Mr. Roy's representationthatitwas Ms. Osgood's beneficiaries:Henry Roy and Kenneth Phillips(the"alteredTrust").He made agreement and gave it to Mr. Roy. Thealteredtrustagreement includedonly two 17. Nonetheless,Mr. Dunn ultimatelydrafteda second,altered irrevocabletrust

narrow circumstancesnotpresentin the matter. irrevocabletrust,changes inbeneficiariescould only be made under certain thathe initiallyinformed Mr. Roy thatbecausethe originalTrustwas an changes to thebeneficiariesshe identifiedin theoriginalTrust.Mr. Dunn recalls surgery,Mr. Roy calledMr. Dunn to saythatMs. Osgood wished to make 16. In the fallof2013, duringthisperiod thatMr. Dunn continuedto recoverfrom

concentrationwere cloudedduring thisrecoveryperiod. recoveryfrom surgery.Mr. Dunn believeshisjudgment, attentiontodetail,and time and that heseverelyunderestimatedthelengthoftime needed for his 15. Inhindsight,Mr. Dunn believes that he wasextremelyoverloadedduringthis

atrophiedduringhisprolongedillness. he worked sevendays a week to try and buildback up thepracticethat had earnerfor his family,includingthree children. Thus,duringthe next year(2013), dropped significantlyin the wakeofhissurgery,and he was theprimary income caseloadfor theremainderofthatyear.However, Mr. Dunn's income had theremainderof2012. With the helpofan associate,he effectivelymanaged his 14. Given thispost-operativecondition,Mr. Dunn was unabletopracticefull-timefor

and othertreatmentsto improve hiscondition. facial"droop'Vweaknessoffacial muscles. Herequiredoutpatientspeechtherapy vocal cordparalysis,total right ear hearing loss, gait andbalancedifficulties,and fall.Post-surgery,he experienceda varietyofcomplications,includingright brainsurgeryto remove the tumor withwhich he hadbeen diagnosedtheprevious 13. Laterthesame year, in thespringof2012,Mr. Dunn underwent ninehours of

thetime. irrevocable trustfor her estate plan. No onenoticedthistypographicalerrorat typographical error, as Ms. Osgood had decided upon and executed an Osgood Revocable Trustof2012."This reference to a revocable trust was a 12. The original Will directs that all of Ms. Osgood's estate pass to the "Danielle L.

Mr. Roy's signatureon theoriginalTrust. Roy signedasTrustee.Mr. DunnnotarizedMs. Osgood'ssignatureas well as presenceof Mr. Dunn and Mr. Roy, both of whom signed the original Trust. Mr. p. 4 Page 4 of14

document based on Mr.Dunn's agreement tocreatethealteredTrust. 2Atthetimehe presentedthealteredTrusttoMr. Phillips,Mr. Roy believeditwas avalidand enforceable

administertheoriginal,valid Trust naming fourbeneficiaries. Mr. Roy didnot intendtoadministerthealteredTrustbut insteadwould acting as trustee, informed all four beneficiaries named in the original Trust that 24. Mr. Roy obtainedcounsel,and upon learningofMr. Dunn's actions,Mr. Roy,

person who alteredthedocuments. Dunn immediatelydisclosedto Mr.Phillips'counselthat Mr.Dunn had been the 23. Mr. Phillipshiredcounsel,who contactedMr. Dunn about theirregularity.Mr.

noticedthedifferencebetween theoriginalTrustand thealteredTrust. Phillips,who had found a copyoftheoriginalTrustin Ms.Osgood's home, underthealteredTrust)withacopyofthealteredTrustand alteredWill.2Mr. 22. In earlyJune 2014, Mr. Roy presentedMr. Phillips(theonly otherbeneficiary

opened and closedon July 9, 2014, and has notbeen re-opened. July 9,2014. Because the original Will did not need to beprobated,the Estate Mr. Dunn filedthe original Willwiththe9thCircuitCourt,ProbateDivision,on originalTrust,meaning theoriginalWilldoes not need to beprobated.Indeed, 21. Allpropertythatwould have otherwisepassedby theoriginalWill is in the

gave a copy ofit to Mr. Roy. 6,2012. Mr. Dunn never filed thisalteredWill with theprobatecourt.Rather,he Will had theoriginalWill'slast pageattachedto it, andshowed a dateofJanuary revocabletrustto referencetheirrevocabletrust(the"alteredWill").The altered correctinga singleword - hechanged theincorrectreferenceto Ms.Osgood's 20. Sometime shortlyafterMs. Osgood's death,Mr. Dunn alteredtheoriginalWill by

"revocable"Trustinsteadofthe"irrevocable"Trustshe actuallyexecuted. executedinJanuaryof2012, which erroneouslyreferencedMs. Osgood's broughtto Mr.Dunn's attentionthetypographicalerrorin theoriginalWill 19. Ms. Osgood died on May 21, 2014 at the ageof92. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Roy

Mr. Dunn did notnotarizeanyone'ssignatureon thealteredTrust. 2012." The first pageofthe altered Trust is also falsely dated January 6, 2012. thesignaturepage,and isfalselydated(typewritten)the"6thday ofJanuary, Osgoodand they both signedit. The last pageofthe altered Trust contains only 18. Sometime thereafter,in the fallof2013, Mr. Roy took thealteredTrustto Ms.

desiredthesechanges. p. 5 Page 5 of14

Phillips v. Roy, CaseNo. 316-2014-EQ-01537,9thCircuitProbateDivision,Nashua.

4.1. 30. Mr. Dunn's conductin altering the original Trustconstitutesa violationofRule

unlessdisclosureisprohibitedby Rule1.6. necessaryto avoidassistinga criminalor fraudulentact by aclient, (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person whendisclosureis (a) make a false statementofmaterial fact or law to a third person; or In the courseofrepresenting a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:

29. Rule 4.1 statesas follows

ProfessionalConduct: establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated the following Rulesof The Committee accepts the Stipulation as to the disciplinary rules violated. This

Stipulationatffl|1-28.

fine tocontinuethepracticeoflaw based uponrecenttestshe hasundergone." repeatingisextremelylow." Dr. Hsu alsoopinesthatMr. Dunn is"medically judgment and thelikelycontributingfactors, Iexpectthatthepossibilityof judgment [in thisdisciplinarymatter]....now thathe isaware ofthelapseof practicaldifficultiesfollowingthesurgerycontributedto David'slapseof 28. Dr. Hsu's medicalopinionis that"David'scranialsurgeryand thephysicaland

has treatedMr. Dunn since2011 when he was diagnosedwith thebraintumor. Outpatient Rehabilitation program and isChiefofAdult Medicine at CMC. He Dr. Powen Hsu, servesas directorofthe CatholicMedical Center ("CMC") 27. The physician who directed Mr.Dunn's out-patient,post-operativerehabilitation,

26. Mr. Dunn did not benefit personally in any way from altering the trust document.

isongoing. hiscapacityastrustee,forequitablereformationand otherrelief.3Thatlitigation 25. Nonetheless,on August19,2014,Mr.Phillipssued Mr. Roy,individuallyand in p. 6 Page 6 of14

would neverreceivenotice that they werebeneficiariesunder theoriginalTrust. beneficiaries(Levesque and Weber) who were omittedunder thealteredTrust capacityas Trustee,attemptedtoadministerthealteredTrust,the two 38. Mr. Dunn engaged inmisrepresentationbecause he knew thatifMr. Roy, in his

turnwould relyon thealteredTrustas avaliddocument. validdocument and presentit to Ms.Osgood forher signature,and thatshe in he presentedMr. Roy with thealteredTrustknowing Mr. Roy would utilizeit as a was notvalidand not thecontrollingTrustdocument ofMs. Osgood's estate,yet 37. Mr. Dunn engaged inmisrepresentationbecause he knew thatthe alteredTrust

draftedor executed untilthe fallof2013. dateofexecutionconstituteda misrepresentation,since thealteredTrustwas not 36. Mr. Dunn's conduct indraftingthealteredTrustwith "January6,2012" as the

8.4(c). 35. Mr. Dunn's conduct indraftingthealteredTrustconstitutesa violationofRule

misrepresentation; (c) engage inconductinvolvingdishonesty,fraud,deceitor It isprofessionalmisconductfor a lawyer to:

34. Rule 8.4(c)statesas follows:

StipulationatTffl31-35.

Prof.Conduct 4.1. 33. Under thesecircumstances,there isclearand convincingevidenceofN.H. R.

Dunn knowingly made a false statementofmaterial fact or law to a third person. knowing Mr. Roy intended to present it to Ms. Osgood for her signature, Mr. 32. By altering the Trust document and presenting it to Mr. Roy as a valid instrument,

Ms. Osgood's estate. reasonablyrely on thealteredTrustas thecontrollingand valid Trustdocumentof He furtherknew or should have known thatunder the circumstancesotherswould 31. Mr. Dunn knew thathe backdated the alteredTrustand thatitwas unenforceable. p. 7 Page 7 of14

looks to the fourth and final partoftheanalysis:the existenceofany aggravating or mitigating identify theappropriatesanction").Once the baselinesanctionisdetermined,theCourtthen that "[i]n applying these factors, the first step is to categorize therespondent'smisconduct and misconductand determininga baselinesanction. SeeConner'sCase, 158 N.H. at 303 (stating The first three partsofthe analysis create the framework forcharacterizingthe or mitigating factors." Id. (quoting Douglas'Case, 156N.H. 613,621 (2007)); Standards § 3.0. potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer'smisconduct;and (d) the existenceofaggravating consider in imposing sanctions: "(a) the duty violated; (b) thelawyer'smental state; (c) the Conner'sCase, 158 N.H. at 303. The Standards set forth a four part analysis for courts to Although the Court has not adopted the Standards, it looks to them for guidance. take into account the severityofthe misconduct." Coffey'sCase, 152 N.H. 503,513 (2005). similar conduct in the future." Conner'sCase, 158 N.H. 299, 303 (2009)."The sanction...must public confidence in the bar, preserving the integrityofthe legal profession, and preventing The purposeoftheCourt'sdisciplinary power is"protectingthe public, maintaining ("Standards") supportthissanction. case law and the American BarAssociation's StandardsforImposingLawyer Sanctions (2005) matter is a public censure. This sanction would serve the purposesofattorney discipline. Both that although thebaselinesanctionin this matter is asuspension,theappropriatesanctionin this The AttorneyDisciplineOffice and Mr. Dunnjointlyagree, and theCommittee accepts,

Stipulationat143.

Mr. Dunn's conduct,as describedherein,violatedN.H. R. Prof.Conduct 8.4(a). 40. Having found theforegoingviolations,thereisclearand convincingevidencethat

Stipulationat1fl|37-42.

Prof.Conduct 8.4(c). 39. Under thesecircumstances,there isclearand convincingevidenceofN.H. R. p. 8 Page 8 of14

particularresult." state of mind,defined in the ABA Standards as actingwith"aconsciousobjectiveor purposetoaccomplisha pressuresthat couldpotentiallyhave hinderedhisjudgment."). Anintentionalstate of mind is the most culpable misconduct and stating "[w]hat isrelevant...is the volitional nature of the respondent's acts, and not the external ("Definitions"). See also InReWyatt 'sCase, 159N.H.285, 307, 982 A.2d396,413(2009)(discussing"knowing" withoutthe consciousobjective or purpose toaccomplisha particularresult." ABA Standards, Sec.Ill Standards define"knowledge" as"consciousawarenessofthe nature orattendantcircumstancesoftheconductbut knowledgeofthefactfs]in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." The ABA intentionalmisconduct.Rule 1.0(f)of theN.H.R.Prof.Conductdefines"knowingly"as"denoting]actual state of mindand anintentionalstate of mind.Knowing misconductrepresentsa less culpablemental state than 4 The ABA Standards, aswellasNew Hampshire'sRulesofProfessionalConduct,differentiatebetweenaknowing

baseline sanction. Connor'sCase, 158 N.H. at 303. The Standards are not designed to fit the own facts andcircumstances,however,lookingto the Standards for guidance in determininga In this case, no single Standard is squarely on point. The Courtconsiderseach case on its administerthealteredTrust,which was not valid. by a probate court, absent any objection by Mr. Phillips, Mr. Roy would haveproceededto ifit was thecontrollingtrustdocument). Because living trusts are notadministratedoroverseen discovery, the altered Trust could have been given effect (since Mr. Roy, as trustee, proceeded as caused potential injury to the two beneficiaries Weber and Levesque. But for Mr.Phillips' agreed toadministertheoriginalTrustas soon as Mr.Dunn disclosedhismisconduct,Mr. Dunn between the original and altered Trusts were discovered by Mr. Phillips, and although Mr. Roy Mr. Dunn failed toproperlyattempttoeffectuatesuch a change.Although thediscrepancies her finalintentionas thesettloroftheirrevocabletrust was to only have twobeneficiaries,then injury caused by Mr.Dunn's misconduct.Mr. Dunn's conductcaused injury to Ms. Osgood.If The thirdprong ofthesanctionanalysisrequiresan assessmentoftheactualor potential thepartiesagreethatMr. Dunn'smentalstatewas knowing.4 With respectto Mr.Dunn's mental state tinder thesecond prong ofthesanctionanalysis, and 6.1. Osgood, as well as duties owed to the public and to the legal system. See Standards §§ 4.6, 5.1, Under the firstprong ofthe analysis, Mr. Dunnviolateddutiesowed to hisclientMs. ultimatesanction"). the sanction, [the Court]considers]the effectofany aggravating or mitigating factors on the factors,and whether they affect the baseline sanction. See id. (stating that "[a]fter determining p. 9 Page 9 of14

A reprimandin the Standards is analogousto a public censure in New Hampshire.

suspension. The parties agree thatunder Standards § 4.62, as outlined above, thebaselinesanctionis a

deceit,or misrepresentationdirectedtoward a client: generallyappropriatein caseswhere thelawyer engages in fraud, ofthe factors set out in Standard 3.0, thefollowingsanctionsare Absent aggravatingormitigatingcircumstances,upon application

provides(emphasisadded): Section4.6ofthe Standards, dealingwith Lack ofCandor toward a client.That Section alteredTrusttoher forsignature)thatthealteredTrustwas a validTrustdocument implicates Mr. Dunn's knowing misrepresentationto Ms.Osgood (viaMr. Roy, who took the suspension. See Standards §§ 4.62,5.12, 5.13, 6.12. The parties agree, and the Committee accepts, that the baseline sanction in this matter is a Standards, I,Preface). Therouxadvs. Attorney DisciplineOffice, PCC Docket No. 09-035(August22, 2014) (citing flexibilityand creativityindeterminingsanctionsin casesoflawyermisconduct. LindaA. specificsofeverycase;theyare toserveas amodel forimposingsanctions,withroom for p. 10 Page 10 of14

baselinesanctionofpubliccensure. Mr. Dunn's conduct inthismatter,when considered under Standard 5.1,would call for a

involvingdishonesty, fraud, deceit, ormisrepresentation: or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, or in cases withconduct actthatreflectsadverselyon thelawyer'shonesty,trustworthiness, generally appropriate in cases involvingcommission ofa criminal ofthefactorsset out inStandard3.0, thefollowingsanctionsare Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application

Maintain Personal Integrity. That Section provides (emphasis added): a levelofcriminal conduct, implicates Section 5.1ofthe Standards, dealing with Failure to Mr. Dunn'sknowingmisrepresentationinalteringthe Trustdocument,while not rising to p. 11 Page 11 of14

involving breachesofRules 4.1, and 8.4(c) where significantmitigation is present. For example, A public censure is proportional to discipline imposed in other New Hampshire cases Consistent with the above, a downward departure to public censure is appropriate. Timothy G. Sheedyadvs.Nicholas &AstridPishon, PCC Docket No. 05-089 (October 25, 2007). case is more compelling and should be given greater weight in the final sanction analysis. See Despite Mr.Dunn's substantial experience in the practiceoflaw, the mitigation in this benefitpersonallyin any way from altering the trust document. re-build his practice and maintain his ability to support his family. Mr. Dunn did not self-deal or situation and law practice. At the timeofhismisconduct,Mr. Dunn was working extensively to suffering from post-surgery complications. Mr. Dunn's recovery greatly affected his financial problems at the timeofthe misconduct. Mr. Dunn had recently undergone brain surgery and was Particularly significant in mitigation in this case is Mr.Dunn's personal and emotional See Standards § 9.32. Mr.Dunn self-reportedhisconductto theADO. disciplinaryproceedings,good characterand reputation,and full and freedisclosureto the ADO. timelygood faithefforttorectifytheconsequencesofmisconduct,a cooperativeattitudeduring compellingmitigationpresent,includingan absenceofa priordisciplinaryrecord,remorse, Dunn's substantialexperiencein thepracticeoflaw. See Standards § 9.22. Incontrast,thereis Conner's Case, 158 N.H. at 303. In this case, only oneaggravatingfactorispresent:Mr. baselinesanctionmust be consideredin lightofany aggravatingand mitigatingfactors. E.g., thebaselinesanctionfor Mr.Dunn's conductis asuspension. See Standards §§ 4.62,6.12.The Under the totalityofthe circumstances, the parties agree, and theCommittee accepts, that opposing party, eventhough such release was notpresentedto court). where attorney altered and expanded the scopeofmedical release after it was executed by 035 (PCC Order dated August 22, 2014, at pp. 19-20) (looking to Standard § 6.12 for guidance, benefits. Those issues eventually became the subject of litigation. See Theroux v. ADO, No. 09directly toa court, Mr. Dunn knewthatthealteredTrustcouldbe usedtoconferrightsand suspension.AlthoughMr. Dunn did notknowinglysubmita falsestatementordocument Standard § 6.12providessome guidancein thismatterandcontemplatesa baselinesanctionof Finally,thepartiesagree,andtheCommitteeaccepts,thatwhilenotdirectlyon point, p. 12 Page 12 of14

5.13(baselinepubliccensurewhere respondentknowingly engages in anyotherconduct [i.e. not publiccensureafterfindingthat thepubliccensurewas thebaselinesanctionunder Standard by altering a document and presenting it as valid to a third person. TheHearingPanel imposed a Theroux, PCC Docket No. 09-035. Like Mr. Dunn, Ms. TherouxviolatedRules 4.1 and 8.4(c) Theroux is a morerecent4.1/8.4(c)case andcontainsa fullanalysisunder the Standards. problems,and lackofa personalgain- ispresent. significantmitigation- inparticularlackofa disciplinaryhistory,personaland emotional public censure can be an appropriate sanction, even for casesinvolving misrepresentation,where sanctionby firstidentifyinga baselinesanction.Nonetheless,thosecasesdemonstratethata Standards exceptwithrespecttoaggravatingand mitigatingfactors;neitheranalyzedthe Neither Welt'sCase nor O 'Meara's Case analyzedthe fourprongs under the ABA censurewas thepropersanction"). over anextendedperiodoftime,'and becauseofthepresenceofmitigatingfactors,public 'engaging]in aconcertedcourseofunethicalconductthatinvolvedmultipleincidentsoccurring 8.4(c), butdeciding"thatin theabsenceoffactors thatjustifiedimposing suspension,such as O'Meara's Case, 150 N.H. 157, 160(2003)(findingRespondent violatedRules 3.1,3.3and stemming from asingleepisodeand presentssimilarsignificantmitigatingfactors. See also Similarto the facts in Welt's Case, Mr. Dunn's conduct involvesmisrepresentation includingrespondents'failuretocooperatewith theprofessionalconduct committee." Id. at 592. disbarment,notingthatsuch casesusually"involvedadditionaland repeatedmisconduct, courseofconduct." Id. The Court distinguishedothermisrepresentationcasesresultingin history,"didnot act forpersonalgain," and theviolations"flow[ed]essentiallyfrom anisolated particular, Respondent was experiencing personal and emotional problems, had no disciplinary "substantial"violation, the Respondent had made a"persuasivecase formitigation." Id. In the suspensionrecommended by the Committee, noting thatalthoughmisrepresentationis a when he had not. See Welts'Case, 136 N.H. 588,592-93 (1993). The Court declinedto impose 1.1,1.3,1.4and 8.4(c) by falsely informing his clients that he had filed a lawsuit on theirbehalf in Welt'sCase, the Supreme Court imposed a public censure where Respondent violated Rules p. 13 Page 13 of14

regardto theinvestigationand prosecutionofthismatter. The Committee acceptsMr. Dunn's Agreement to PayCostsofDisciplinaryMatterwith

("Standards"). sanction is also in accord with the ABA StandardsforImposingLawyer Sanctions (2005) e.g., Conner's Case 158 N.H. at 303; Richmond's Case, 152 N.H. 155, 159-60 (2005). This Committee'srecommended sanction is in accord with the purposesofattorney discipline. See in the future." Grew's Case, 156 N.H. 361, 365 (2007)(quotationand citationomitted).The confidence in the bar, preserve the integrityofthe legal profession, andpreventsimilar conduct disciplinary power "is not to inflict punishment but rather toprotectthe public,maintainpublic theappropriatedisciplinein this matter is a public censure. ThepurposeoftheCourt's Having acceptedtheaforementionedfindingsand rulings,theCommittee concludesthat

is theappropriatesanctioninthismatter. In lightofthe ABA Standards and thefactorsand case law noted above,a publiccensure departureto apubliccensurebased on significantmitigatingfactors. Standards, determinedthatthebaselinesanctionwas a suspension,but upheld thedownward Dunn's case. As in this case, in Theroux theCommittee tookguidancefrom threeofthe ABA Ms. Theroux'smitigationwas lesscompellingthan themitigatingfactorspresentin Mr. misconductwas knowing as opposingtonegligent. Theroux at18-21. and noting that the Standards almostuniformlyprovide abaselinesanctionwhere thelawyer's Standards §§ 4.62(candorto client) and 6.12(candorto the court) inadditionto Standard 5.1, On review,theCommittee found that thebaselinesanctionwas a suspension,lookingto topractice). criminal] that involves dishonesty or misrepresentation and reflects adversely onlawyer'sfitness p. 14 Page 14 of14

File MitchellM. Simon, Esquire cc: Sara S. Greene, DisciplinaryCounsel

Dated: June 4, 2015

censure to David C. Dunn forviolatingRules ofProfessionalConduct 4.1;8.4(c),and 8.4(a). For alloftheabove reasons,theProfessionalConduct Committee issuesthispublic