Michael T. Pearson (2016)

Maine (eligibleforreinstatement)and is oninactivestatusin Ohio. law in Maine(1992)and in Ohio(1993).He iscurrentlyadministrativelysuspendedin 2. Mr. Pearsonhas beenpracticinglaw fortwenty-threeyears. He wasadmittedto practice

topracticeon October 26, 2005. He iscurrentlya solopractitioner. 1. Mr. Pearsonis anattorneylicensedtopracticelaw inNew Hampshire. He was admitted

theStipulationby clearand convincingevidence: The Committee hasdeterminedthat the Record supports the following factual findingsof

investigation andprosecutionofthis matter. agreed-uponsanctionand theagreement toreimbursetheCommittee for allcostsof Hampshire Rules ofProfessionalConduct (the"Rules")as stipulated,and voted toapprove the and convincingevidence. The Committee thenapproved thefindingsofviolationsoftheNew Having reviewedthe Record, theCommittee approved the facts asstipulated,by clear

Richard D.Sager,and Martha Van Oot. Mona T. Movafaghi was absent. Susan R. Chollet,Richard H. Darling,ScottH. Harris,Margaret R. Kerouac, Georges J. Roy, Rothstein,Chair,Heather E. Krans, Vice Chair,ElaineHolden, Vice Chair,PeterG. Beeson, CostsofDisciplinaryMatter (collectively,the"Record"). Members presentincludedDavid M. theStipulationas toFacts,Violationsand Sanction(the"Stipulation")and theAgreement to Pay On April 19,2016, the ProfessionalConduct Committee (the"Committee") deliberated

Pearson,Michael T. advs. AttorneyDisciplineOffice- #14-032 Pearson, MichaelT. advs.AttorneyDiscipline Office -#13-026

Scott H. Harris BarbaraJ. Guay, LegalAssistant Richard H. Darling* * non attorney member Susan R. Chollet* Martha Van Oot Peter G. Beeson Richard D. Sager Elaine Holden,* ViceChair 603-224-5828 ♦ Fax 228-9511 Georges J. Roy* Heather E.Krans,Vice Chair Concord, New Hampshire03301 Mona T. Movafaghi David M. Rothstein,Chair 4 Chenell Drive, Suite 102 Margaret R. Kerouac

theadministrativesuspension. 10. The ADO docketed thismatterfollowinga referralfrom theSupreme Court arisingout of

incompliance with a legalorderofchild support. of Child Support Services that an attorney (or other professional carrying a license) is not SupremeCourt to suspend anyprofessionallicenseupon certification from the Division 3, 2013 pursuant to RSA §161-B:11.(ADM 2013-0022.) That statute empowers the Division, which resulted in his administrative suspension by theSupreme Court on June payments pursuant to a Uniform Support Order issued by Concord District Court, Family 9. The first disciplinarymatter arises outofMr. Pearson'sfailure tomake childsupport

II.Complaint #13-026 (ADM matter:suspended from

plaintiffs. discriminationcase filed by Mr. Pearson in federal districtcourton behalfoffour diligence andclientcommunication with regard todiscoveryresponsesin anemployment 8. The secondmatter(docket#14-031)presents failuresofthedutiesofcompetence,

suspensionarising outofhis inabilityto pay child support for a periodoftime. second matter from a disciplinaryperspective.It involves Mr.Pearson'sadministrative 7. As set forth furtherbelow,the first matter (docket#13-026)is not asseriousas the

issues,which were exacerbatedby his divorce andsubsequentfinancialtroubles. cause formisconduct in both cases is the same;namely, Mr. Pearson'smental health occurred during the same time frame (roughly2013-2014)and becausethe underlying 6. These matters have been consolidated by the ADO because theunderlyingevents

referredto DisciplinaryCounsel on September 28,2015. Mr. Pearsonengaged inprofessionalmisconduct(Complaint#14-032). The case was 5. On July 28, 2014,Kathleen Flax filed a letterofgrievance signed under oath alleging that

March 13, 2015. Pearson's administrative suspension. The case was referred to Disciplinary Counsel on matter to the Attorney Discipline Office (Complaint#13-026),arising outofMr. 4. By letter dated June 4,2013,the Clerk of the New Hampshire Supreme Court referred a

disciplineforconduct arisingoutofhisadministrativesuspensioninMaine. 3. Mr. Pearson has a public censure, issued on September 15,2015,imposed as reciprocal p. 3 Page 3 of15 2Josephet.al v. EasterSealsofNew Hampshire, CaseNo. 1:12-cv-00459-PB. with prejudice in March2014. 1A fourthclient,Aimee Gakwaya,neverfiledagrievanceagainstMr. Pearson.She agreedtodismissherclaim

Green. 18. Easter Seals wasrepresentedby Attorney David W. McGrathofSheehan Phinney Bass +

1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981).2Mr. Pearson accepted the case on acontingencybasis. ofTitle VII (42U.S.C.§ 2000e, etseq.% N.H. R.S.A. 354-A, and the Civil Rights Actof interalia, that Easter Seals engaged in discriminatory andretaliatoryconductin violation 17. On November 29, 2012, the parties sued their former employer, Easter Seals, alleging,

discrimination lawsuit brought by Mr. Pearson in federal court on their behalf. December 2014. Allofthe complainants wereco-plaintiffs1in anemployment Jeffrey Joseph and Melody Bjorkman, also Mr.Pearson'sclients, filed grievances in 16. Mr. Pearson'sclient,Kathleen Flax, filed hergrievancewith theADO on July30, 2014.

support," the Supreme Court reinstated Mr. Pearson on July15,2013. 15. Upon notice from DCSS that Mr. Pearson was "now in compliance with the legal orderof

2015. sufficient to cover the arrearages. His youngest child turnedeighteeninSeptemberof Mr. Pearsonagreedto forego a portionofhishalfoftheequityin themaritalhome 14. Mr. Pearsonand hisex-wifesettled the issueofchildsupportarrearageson July11,2013.

47-53. during the relevant time frame that he has since come to address head-on. See infra, ffi[ 13. Inadditionto these financial troubles, Mr. Pearson wasdealingwith mentalhealth issues

generateincome. employment litigation, representing plaintiffs on a contingency basis, but he struggled to $45,000 annually). Thereafter, he attempted to start a solo practice focusing on from his last position at Backus Meyerin May of2011 (where his salary had been steady decline since January 2009, and the ADO has confirmed that he was terminated 12. Mr. Pearson has demonstrated to the satisfactionofthe ADO thathisincome has been in

Pearson wasadministrativelysuspended pursuant toRSA 161-B:l1 on June 3,2013. court found Mr.Pearsonin contemptofthe child support order. As noted above, Mr. January2013,Mr. Pearson was approximately$19,000in arrears on child support. The two children, aged fourteen andseventeen.By the time a final order was issued in 11. By way ofbackground, Mr. Pearson filed for divorce in July2011. At that time he had p. 4 Page 4of15 by which to informclientsand opposing partiesofthesuspension. 3Mr. PearsoncompliedwiththeSupremeCourt'sOrderintheADM matter,whichsetJuly2,2013asthedeadline

27. Mr. Pearsondid notproduce any discoveryby September 19.

answers to EasterSeals'discovery requests by September19 or face sanctions. 26. On September 12,then-MagistrateJudge McCaffertyorderedPlaintiffstoproduce

25. Mr. Pearsondid not respondto the motion.

procuringtherequestedrelief. produce their overdue discovery and to pay the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in agree to such extension and later that day he filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiffs to extension to answer the discovery propounded in March. Mr. McGrath declined to 24. On August 20, Mr. Pearson e-mailed Mr. McGrath requestinganotherweek-long

extensionand withheldfiling theMotion toCompel. extension to produce the overdue discovery by August19. Mr. McGrath granted the motionto compel. Mr. Pearsonrespondedby email on August12,requestingan McGrath e-mailed Mr. Pearson notifying him for a second timeofhis intent tofilea responses werereceivedin the following weeks, however, and onAugust 9, Mr. 23. On July 23, Mr. McGrath learned Mr. Pearson had been reinstated. No discovery

The Court subsequently granted the motion continuing the deadlines for 60 days. filed a motion to continue all existing litigation deadlines for not less than 90 days. discovery responses, Mr. McGrath withheld filing a motion to compel and instead 22. That same day, in lightofthe newly discovered information and the overdue

administrative suspension.3 2013 pursuant toRSA 161-B:11.This was the first Mr. McGrath had heardofthe that he had beentemporarilysuspendedfrom thepracticeoflaw effectiveJune 3, 21. On July1,2013,Mr. PearsoncontactedMr.McGrath by telephoneandnotifiedhim

compel requestingsanctions. Mr. McGrath notifiedMr. Pearson on June 26 thathe intendedto filea motion to Pearson failed torespondto another email inquiry from Mr.McGrath on June 21, planned to produce their overdue responses. Mr. Pearson did not respond. When Mr. 20. On May 27, 2013,Mr. McGrath sent Mr. Pearson an e-mailinquiringwhen Plaintiffs

extension. obligatedtorespond within30 daysofservice. Mr.Pearson obtaineda thirty-day each named Plaintiffintheaction. Pursuantto Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, Plaintiffswere 19. On March 20,2013, EasterSealspropounded interrogatoriesand document requests to p. 5 Page 5 of15 told Mr. Pearson he would request, as suggested by the Court at the January hearing, some (but not all)overdue discovery, when furtherdeadlinespassed,Mr. McGrath 37. Although Mr. McGrath agreed to one extension, andalthoughMr. Pearsonproduced

responses. particular, he still had not been able to produce Ms.Gakwaya's interrogatory Pearson told Mr. McGrath he was having trouble"corralling"his clients; in 36. During January and February 2014, further discovery delays developed and Mr.

timely with regard to discovery. Request for Fees.During the hearing, the Courtadmonished Mr. Pearsonto be 35. On January 3, 2014, the Court held a hearing on EasterSeals'Motion to Dismiss and

34. On January2,2014, Mr. Pearsonsent Mr.McGrath some additionaldocuments.

However, thediscoveryresponseswere not entirelycomplete. on December 2, Mr. Pearson submitted discoveryresponsesto Mr.McGrath. 33. Mr. Pearson,on behalfofPlaintiffs, filed a Response toOrder toShow Cause, and

imposed. unlessPlaintiffsshowed cause within 14 days why a lessersanctionshould be with prejudice for failure to comply with the MagistrateJudge'sSeptember 12 order 32. On November 14, Judge Barbadoro issued an order proposing to dismiss the case

preventedhim from effectivelyrepresentinghisclients. violatestherules,but stateshe was sufferingfrom acutemental healthproblems that infra atffl[55-72, Mr.Pearsonacknowledgesthis wasunacceptableconductthat 31. Mr. Pearson filed noresponseto thisdispositiveMotion. As set forthfurtherbelow,

for Fees forFailureto Produce Discoveryand Comply with Court Order. 30. On October21, Mr.McGrath filed aMotion toDismiss(withPrejudice)and Request

opposing counselwhich might prejudicetheircase. hisclientsas theycame in,includinginparticularany actualmotions filed by should have been morethoroughand prompt in sharingthosecommunications with hisclientshow "upset"Mr. McGrath was becoming, butacknowledges thathe counsel'sdiscovery-relatedcommunicationsand motions. Mr.Pearsonrecalls telling 29. Mr. Pearson'sclients state that he did not keep them up-to-date onopposing

Joseph fromMarch throughOctober2013 with little success. non-communicative. Mr. Pearsonstates herequestedvariousdocuments from Mr. cooperative,Ms. Gakwaya was nearly impossible to reach and hadbecome largely thediscoveryinformationfrom his clients. While Ms. Flax was the mostprompt and 28. Throughout this time period, Mr. Pearson was experiencingdifficultyinobtainingall p. 6 Page 6 of15

toproduce her overdue discovery. that Ms.Gakwaya had given Mr.Pearsonauthority to dismiss her case withprejudice,thusobviatingthe need 4On March 26,inthelobbyareaofthecourtbeforethestatusconference,Mr. PearsonadvisedMr. McGrath

forthfurtherbelow. 46. Mr. Pearsonhas been diligentlyaddressinghis mentalhealthissuessince2014 as set

sooner from the Flax matter given the challenges he was facing. stress-inducingevents. He believes in hindsight that he should havewithdrawn healthchallengesthat caused him to have an avoidantreactiontoconflictand/orany hisdivorceproceedingsbegan,thorough2014,he was dealingwith significantmental in the case and his failure to keep his clientsreasonablyinformed. From 2011, when 45. Mr. Pearsonsincerelyregretshis failures with regard tohandlingthediscoveryissues

44. Mr. King settledthematteron behalfofhis clients inOctober2014.

43. The Court allowed Mr. Pearson towithdraw on August 29,2014.

Appearance. ultimatelyreferredhisclientstoAttorneyBenjamin King, who filed aNotice of Pearsontake steps toassisthisclientsinobtainingsuccessorcounsel.Mr. Pearson 42. On June 24, 2014,Judge Barbadoro denied all pendingmotions butrequiredthat Mr.

counsel. 41. On June 10,2014,Mr. Pearson notifiedthe Court ofhisintentto withdraw as

thepending motions under advisement. clientsstatingtheywished to remain with him as theirattorney,Judge Barbadoro took wife) represented Mr. Pearson and submitted affidavits from Mr.Pearson'sfour 40. After the May 1 hearing, during which Attorney Tracy Bernson (now Mr.Pearson's

represent the interestsofhis clients."4 as to"whether he should not be removed as counsel based on hisinabilityto ultimately conducted on May 1, 2014, during which Mr. Pearson was to show cause 39. At the statusconference,theCourt scheduleda show cause hearingwhich was

38. The Court scheduled the statusconference forMarch 26, 2014.

a statusconferencewith theCourt to deal with thediscoverydelays. p. 7 Page 7 of15

ProfessionalConduct: and convincingevidencethatMichael T. Pearson hasviolatedthefollowingRules of The Committee concludes,based on thestipulatedfacts set forthabove,that there is clear

legal workthathe feels he can handle, now that hischildsupportobligationshave ended. (Bernson)Pearson,inDover, NH. He crediblyreportsthathe does only thatamount of 53. As for Mr. Pearson'scurrentwork environment,he works with his wife,Tracy A.

differentmedicationsthat Mr. Pearson finds more effectively treats his symptoms. 52. Mr. Pearson'scurrentproviderformedicationis Dr.George Hilton.He prescribed

Dr. Ceglia), Mr.Pearsonhas continuedto see Mr.Cegliaweekly since early 2014. with Dr.Ceglia(whileMr. Pearsonwas uninsuredand working out a payment planwith LAP, David Ceglia,around Februaryof2014. Other than a recent,brieflapseintherapy 51. With the helpofLAP, Mr. Pearsonbegan seeinga new psychologistrecommended by

closest to him that he needed additional help and perhaps achange inmedication. ADD medicationand anti-depressants.However, it wasclearto Mr.Pearsonand those Nowack, a psychiatristinPortsmouth.Dr.Nowack had been prescribingMr. Pearson Lawyers' AssistanceProgram ("LAP"). At thattime, he wasbeing treatedby Dr.George 50. In the summer of2013, atthe urgingofhisnow wife,Mr. Pearson made contactwith the

an acutedeclinewhich resultedindebilitatingclinicaldepression. for divorce) through2013,Mr. Pearson'smental health deteriorated and he experienced 49. In the year or so leading up to his divorce,and certainly from July2011 (when he filed

therapytoaddresshisanxiety. Pearson hastakenmedicationfor ADD and hasreceivedcounselingin the formoftalk anxietydisorderin theearly2000s when he was living in Ohio.From thatpointon, Mr. 48. Mr. Pearson was diagnosedwith adult attention deficitdisorder("ADD") as well as an

acutelydepressed. resolvedthatissue. The cumulativeeffectoftheseevents,however, leftMr. Pearson administrativelysuspended in2013 for being unable to pay child support, but ultimately career path that left him in very difficult financialcircumstances.He was 47. As noted above, Mr.Pearson'smarriage fell apart in2011,on the heelsofa deteriorating p. 8 Page 8of15

ofProfessionalConduct 1.4. 62. Under these circumstances, there is clear and convincing evidenceofa violationofRule

dismiss withprejudice. EasterSeals'ultimatefilingofmotions tocompel as well as adispositivemotion to EasterSeals'demands forproductionofdiscovery, threats to filemotions tocompel,and 61. Mr. Pearson violatedRule 1.4when he failed to keep hisclientsreasonablyinformed of

objectiveswere to beaccomplished. statusoftheir matter and to reasonably consult with them about the means by which their 60. Mr. Pearson had a duty under Rule1.4to keep his clients reasonably informed about the

ofProfessionalConduct 1.3. 59. Under these circumstances, there is clear and convincing evidenceofa violationofRule

seekingtocompel production. EasterSeals'propounded discovery andsubsequentcommunications and motions 58. Mr. PearsonviolatedRule 1.3 when he failed toappropriatelyand timelyrespondto

representinghisclients. 57. Mr. Pearson had a duty under Rule1.3to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in

ofProfessionalConduct 1.1. 56. Under thesecircumstances,there isclearand convincingevidenceofa violationofRule

seekingtocompel production. Easter Seals' propounded discovery and subsequent communications and motions 55. Mr. Pearson violated Rule1.1when he failed to appropriately and timely respond to

theirbehalfin atimelyand effectivemanner. matter wasmanaged with no avoidable harm to their interests, andundertakeaction on prepareproperly,attendto details and schedulessufficientlyto assure that hisclients' 54. Mr. Pearsonhad a duty under Rule1.1to perform thetechniquesofpracticewith skill, p. 9 Page 9 of15

well as duties owed to the legal system. SeeABA Standards §§ 4.4 and 6.2. Under the firstprong ofthe analysis, Mr. Pearsonviolateddutiesowed to his clients, as

Sanctions("Sanctions"). accordancewith the fourprong analyticalframework ofthe ABA Standardsfor Imposing Lawyer an order to pay costsofinvestigation and prosecution. The discussion below is set forth in with and accepts the recommended sanctionofa six month suspension stayed for one year and ofRules 1.1; 1.3; 1.4; 3.4(c); and 8.4(a). For the reasons set forthbelow,theCommittee agrees The Stipulationincludes an agreement on recommendedsanctionsbased on the violations

Pearson'sconduct,as describedherein,violatedRule ofProfessionalConduct 8.4(a). 67. Having found the foregoingviolations, there is clear andconvincingevidencethat Mr.

ofProfessionalConduct 3.4(c). 66. Under these circumstances, there is clear and convincing evidenceofa violationofRule

approximatelyseventeenmonths and was held incontemptby the court for such failure. 65. Mr. Pearsonbreachedthis duty when he failed to pay childsupportovera periodof

hisdivorcematter. 64. Mr. Pearson had a duty under Rule 3.4(c) to pay child support as ordered by the court in

open refusalbased on an assertion that no validobligationexists; (c)knowingly disobeyan obligationunder the rulesofa tribunalexceptfor an A lawyer shallnot:

63. Rule 3.4(c)statesas follows:

Rule 3.4(c):Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel (#13-026) p. 10 Page 10 of15 Standards as acting with "a conscious objective or purpose to accomplish aparticularresult." a particularresult." ABAStandards, Sec.Ill("Definitions").An intentionalstateofmind isdefinedin the ABA ofthe nature or attendantcircumstancesofthe conduct but without the consciousobjectiveor purpose to accomplish knowledge may be inferredfrom circumstances."The ABA Standards define"knowledge" as"consciousawareness Conduct 1.0(f)defines"knowingly" as"denoting]actualknowledge ofthe fact[s] inquestion.A person's 5 Knowing misconductrepresentsa lessculpablemental state thanintentionalmisconduct. Rule ofProfessional

causesinjuryor potentialinjury to aclient. does not act withreasonablediligenceinrepresentinga client,and 4.43 Reprimand is generally appropriate when alawyerisnegligentand

4.42 Suspension isgenerallyappropriatewhen:

the Standards, which provides,inpertinentpart: to diligently work with them to ensure timely productionofdiscovery,implicatesSection4.4of disputeescalated.Mr. Pearson'sfailuretoproperlycommunicate with hisclients,and hisfailure Mr. Pearson did not,moreover, keep hisclientssufficientlyinformed as thediscovery

representationand secureda settlementfor them. dismissed,however, and Mr. Pearson referredhisclientsto anattorneywho took over the Pearson'sconduct resultedinthe threateneddismissalofhisclients'claims.The claims were not extraordinaryrelieffrom the Court with regard to thediscoverydisputes.In addition,Mr. opposingparty and thecourtin that it delayedproceedingsand forcedEasterSeals to seek injurycaused by Mr. Pearson'smisconduct. Mr. Pearson'sconduct caused injuryto the The thirdprong ofthesanctionanalysisrequiresan assessmentoftheactualor potential

circumstances, and hampered by his own mental health and personal issues. effort to obtain discovery from his clients. Rather, his efforts wereinsufficientunder the is noevidence,however, thatMr. Pearson intendedtoobstructtheprocessor thathe made no failure toinform hisclientsofsuch motions withina reasonabletime afterthey were filed.There deadline withoutproductionofdiscovery,his failure to respond tocertainmotions,and his attendantcircumstances,"such as the dateofa given discoverydeadline,thepassageofsuch analysis,the parties agree that Mr. Pearson'smentalstate wasknowing5in that he was "aware of With respect to Mr. Pearson's mental state under the second prongofthe sanction

baselinesanctionofsuspension.Courtsimposing suspensions,however, do sowhere the case jurisdictionsfindthatfailureto paycourt-orderedchildsupportviolatestheRule and meritsa appropriate when anattorneyviolatesRule 3.4(c) by failing to pay child support.Other With regard to the Rule 3.4(c) violation, NewHampshire has notaddressedthediscipline

preventsimilarlapsesin the future, is anappropriatesanction. indicate that asix-monthsuspensionstayed for one year,combined with conditionsdesignedto agreed that theaggravatingand mitigatingfactors,combined with thebaselinesanctionanalysis, remorse,and impositionofotherpenaltiesor sanctions. See Standards § 9.32.The parties personal andemotionalproblems,hiscooperativeattitudetowardsdisciplinaryproceedings, However, fivemitigatingfactors are present,includingabsence ofa dishonestmotive,

(reciprocal)and hissubstantialexperiencein thepracticeoflaw. See Standards § 9.22. In this case, twoaggravatingfactors are present: Mr.Pearson'spreviousdiscipline

elementofaggravatingand mitigatingfactors. circumstancesset forth in thestipulation,is suspension. This leaves for theCommittee only the The generallyappropriatesanctionfor Mr.Pearson'svariousviolations,underthe

proceeding. causeslittle or no actual or potentialinterferencewith a legal rule, andcauseslittle or no actual orpotentialinjuryto aparty,or isolatedinstanceofnegligenceincomplying with a courtorderor 6.23 Admonition isgenerallyappropriatewhen a lawyer engages in an interferencewith a legalproceeding. injury to a client or other party, or causesinterferenceor potential tocomply with a court order or rule, andcausesinjuryor potential 6.22 Reprimand is generally appropriate when alawyernegligentlyfails potentialinterferencewith a legalproceeding. potentialinjuryto aclientor a party, orcausesinterferenceor or she isviolatinga courtorderor rule,and causes injuryor 6.21 Suspensionis generally appropriate when alawyerknows that he

provides,inpertinentpart: Mr. Pearson'sviolationofRule 3.4(c) implicates Section 6.2ofthe Standards, which

and causes littleor noactualor potentialinjuryto aclient. and does not act withreasonablediligenceinrepresentinga client, 4.44 Admonition6 is generallyappropriatewhen a lawyer isnegligent p. 12 Page 12 of15 the child support issue, and hisconductdid not involve any dishonesty,self-dealing,or understatingincome. 8As notedinthefactsection,Mr. Pearson'ssuspensionwas briefand was liftedbecauseheand hisex-wifesettled

in his namealone inSaintMaarten in theNetherlandsAntilles). and transferredover $400,000 inmaritalassets, the day afterreceivingnoticeofwife'sdivorcefiling, to anaccount where attorney hadabilityto pay but refused, refused to pay court-orderedattorneys'fees incurred by his ex-wife, N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1998) (three monthsuspensionfor attorney held incontempt on seven separateadjudications, oath he resigned from gainfulemployment specifically to avoid making payment to his ex-wife); Inre Ring, 692 1990) (indefinite suspension for attorney who never made a single paymentofchildsupportand who admitted under continued to be incontempt ofcourt at the timeoffinal orderofdiscipline); In re Anderson, 795 P.2d 64 (Kan. discipline, was $76,000 in arrears, failed to appear at a hearing for a motion for sanction in his divorce, and 7See,e.g.,In reVanderbilt, 253 P.3d774 (Kan.2011)(indefinitesuspensionforattorney,who had seriousprevious

underlyingmental healthproblems. appropriate toresolveboth, but rather note the case law asillustrativeofthemitigatingeffectof Stipulationpresentstwo consolidatedcases, the parties are notsuggestinga censureis neglect,and notingonly actualinjurytoclientwas anxietyand frustration).Given thatthis successfullyaddress[ed]his mental healthproblems,"notwithstandingrepeatedinstancesof (publicreprimandratherthansuspensionwarrantedforlawyerwho "aggressivelyand underlyingattentiondeficitdisorderofrespondent); In re Cohen, 8 P.3d 953, 964 (Or. 2000) 2011) (imposingpubliccensure"inlightofnonvenal natureofrespondent'smisconduct"and issues and did notpresentself-dealing. See, e.g., In reYoung, 84 A.D.3d 29, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. other courts haveimposed censureswhere alawyer'slackofdiligencewas due to mental health With regardto theFlax matter, case law fromotherjurisdictionsisinstructivein that

to astayedsuspension. presented in the Flaxmattercompound Mr. Pearson'smisconduct,hence theparties'stipulation would have served thepurposesofdisciplineifconsidered in isolation. However, the facts as noted above, and the similar mitigating facts present in the child supportcase,8a public censure Here, Mr.Pearsonalreadyhas a previous public censure.Even so,giventheauthority

motive;lawyersettledwith wife andcourtdismissedthecontempt citations). where attorney was in contemptoforder to pay child support but had no dishonest or selfish respondent ultimately paid in full); In reCantrell, 900 P.2d 126 (Colo.1995)(imposingcensure sanctions wereimposed,respondentcooperatedthroughoutthedisciplinaryprocess,and appropriate because attorney did not have a selfish or dishonest motive, other penalties and ordinarily a periodofsuspensionwould be appropriate in suchcircumstancesbut censure with historyofsix"admonitions,"held in contempt for failure to pay child support; noting that history. See, e.g., In re Primavera, 904 P.2d 883 (Colo.1995)(imposingcensureon attorney, departed from asuspensionto a censure, even in cases where an attorney had adisciplinary not purposelyunderstatedincome or otherwise engaged in deceit orself-dealing,courts have Where an attorney fails to pay child support, but ultimately cures such failure, and has

presentselementsof bad faith,dishonesty,orself-servingconduct.7 p. 13 Page 13 of15

paragraphsV-l(a-c)above,thefollowingshall apply: 2. Ifit isallegedthatMr. Pearsonviolatedany oftheconditionsenumerated at sub

suspension. d. Respondent will engage in no professional misconduct during the periodofthe stayed

sum, shallagreetosome form ofpayment planwith thePCC. inconnectionwith thisinvestigationand prosecution,and ifunableto pay in lump c. Respondent shall pay theexpensesincurredby theProfessionalConduct Committee

be submitteddirectlyfrom Mr. CegliatoDisciplinaryCounsel. The reports shalldemonstratecompliancewithsub-paragraphV-l(a),above,and shall days ofthe date that theProfessionalConduct Committee acceptstheStipulation. than quarterly, with the first report to be provided to Disciplinary Counsel within 60 b. Mr. Ceglia shall supply Disciplinary Counsel with periodic reports, no less frequently

and progress. Ceglia and will sign such release as to Dr. HiltonregardingRespondent'streatment Respondent has signed a release authorizingDisciplinaryCounsel to speak with Mr. required by Mr.Ceglia(includingany medicationprescribedby Dr.Hilton). Ceglia,includingcompliance with and meaningfulparticipationin any regimen a. Respondent shall continue to seek care and counseling with his psychologist, Mr.

suspension, which shall begin on the date the Committee accepts this Stipulation: 1. Mr. Pearson agrees to comply with the following conditions during the yearofstayed

Conditions ofStaved Suspension and Procedures For

N.H. 361, 365(2007)(quotationand citationomitted). the integrityofthe legal profession, and prevent similar conduct in the future." Grew's Case, 156 inflict punishment but rather to protect the public, maintain public confidence in the bar, preserve is also in accord with the Standards. The purposeoftheCourt'sdisciplinarypower "is not to Conner's Case, 158 N.H. at 303; Richmond's Case, 152 N.H. 155,159-60 (2005).This sanction The Committee'srecommended sanction is in accord with thepurposesofattorneydiscipline. with conditions imposed to minimize the possibilitythat similar lapses will occur in the future. appropriatediscipline in this matter is a six monthsuspension,stayed for one year, combined Having made the aforementioned findings and rulings, the Committee concludes that the

IV. SANCTION p. 14 Page 14of15

stay. referralinvolvingconduct ofRespondent occurringduring the one year periodof (e)Nothing hereinshall beconstruedto limitprosecutionofany new grievanceor

thetermsand conditionsofthisStipulation. (d) TheRespondentshall bear all costs associated withcomplianceand enforcementof

continuetocomply with thoseprovisionswhilethesubsequentproceedingispending. (c)IftheconditionsofParagraphV-l(a-c)have been met, Mr.Pearson will nothave to

Stipulationshallnot beclosed. (b) Pending the final resolutionofthe subsequent proceeding, the matter underlying this

proceeding,even ifsuch finding occurs beyond theone-yearperiodofthe stay. imposed atsuch time as thereis afindingofmisconduct in thesubsequent theone-yearperiodofthe stay, the stay can be lifted and thesix-monthsuspension subsequentproceeding"),and the allegedmisconduct occurred,atleastin part,during (a) So long as agrievanceor referral is filed within theone-yearperiodofthe stay ("the

shall apply: the stay, thus implicating the condition at sub-paragraphV-l(d)above, the following If a new grievance or referral is filed against Mr. Pearson during the one-year periodof

decisionoftheHearing Panel. continuein force and effectpursuantto its terms. The PCC shall review the that noconditionofthe Stipulation has been violated, theStipulationshall lift the stay and impose a six-month suspension.Ifthe Hearing Panel determines c. If a Hearing Panel determines that a condition has been violated, the Panel shall

conditionlisted insub-paragraphsV-l(a-c)has beenviolated. DisciplinaryCounsel todemonstrateby apreponderanceofevidencethat a Stipulationhas been violated. During such hearing, it shall be the burdenof decidethe sole issueofwhethera conditionunder sub-paragraphsV-l(a-c)ofthis matter to the Hearings Committee so that a Hearing Panel may be appointed to b. Respondent may request that the Professional Conduct Committee remand the

Stipulationshallcontinuein force and effectpursuantto its terms. Committee determinesthat noconditionofthisStipulationhas beenviolated,the Committee shall lift the stay and impose the six-month suspension. If the have been violated.Ifitdetermines thata conditionhas been violated,the determinewhether any ofthe conditionsenumeratedatsub-paragraphsV-l(a-c) a. Upon motion by Disciplinary Counsel, the Professional Conduct Committee may p. 15 Page 15 of 15

File Michael T. Pearson,Esquire cc: Sara S. Greene, DisciplinaryCounsel

May 4, 2016

entiretyand issuesthissixmonth suspension,stayedfor oneyear with conditions. For alloftheabove reasons,theCommittee approves thestipulationand conditionsin its

responsible for allcostsassociatedwith theinvestigationand prosecutionofthis matter. thisdisciplinarymatter. TheCommittee approves thisagreement. Mr. Pearsonshall be Mr. Pearson has signed an agreement to pay costsoftheinvestigationand prosecutionof