Michael E. Anderson (2017)

alsoin accord with the ABA Standards forImposing Lawyer Sanctions (2005). 158 N.H. 299, 303 (2009); Richmond's Case, 152 N.H. 155, 159-60 (2005). Itis isin accord with the purposes ofattorneydiscipline. See, e.g.,Conner's Case The Committee concluded thata reprimand isappropriate.The sanction

ProfessionalConduct 1.2(a)and 8.4(a). evidence. Itfurtherfound thatMr. Anderson's conduct violatedRules of The Committee approved the factsas stipulatedby clearand convincing

and Mona T. Movafaghi were absent. Krans, Vice Chair;Susan R. Chollet;Richard H. Darling;Margaret R. Kerouac; Leonard; David W. McGrath; Georges J.Roy; and Martha Van Oot. Heather E. M. Rothstein,Chair; Elaine Holden, Vice Chair;PeterG. Beeson; CarolineK. DisciplinaryMatter (attachedas ExhibitB). Members presentincluded David ("theStipulation,"attachedas ExhibitA), and theAgreement to Pay Costs of Committee") deliberatedtheStipulationas to Facts,Violationsand Sanction On June 20, 2017, the ProfessionalConduct Committee ("the

Anderson, Michael E.advs.AttorneyDisciplineOffice - #17-001

Margaret R.Kerouac BarbaraJ. Guay, LegalAssistant Richard H.Darling* * non attorneymember Susan R. Chollet* Marlha Van Oot Peler G. Deeson Georges J. Roy* ElaineHokJen,* Vice Chair 603-224-5828 ♦ Fax 228-9511 Mona T. Movafaghi Heather E. Kruns, Vice Chair Concord, New Hampshire03301 David W. McGralh David M. Rothstein,Chair 4 Chenell Drive, Suite 102 Caroline K. Leonard

File Michael E. Anderson, Esquire cc: ElizabethM. Murphy, AssistantDisciplinaryCounsel

June 21, 2017 p. 3 (March 15, 2007),attachedhereto as ExhibitA. The Rule8.4(b)

See Anderson, Michael E. advs. Attorney Discipline Office, #06-020

March 16, 2007,resultingfrom violations of Rules 8.4(b)and 8.4(a).

- month suspensionfrom the practice oflawthatbecame effectiveon

3. Mr. Anderson has a prior disciplinary history in the form of a six-

2. Mr. Anderson isnot admitted topracticein any otherjurisdiction.

October 28, 1996.

practice law inNew Hampshire. He was admitted to practice on

1. Michael E. Anderson ("Mr.Anderson") is anattorneylicensedto

as setforthbelow:

Office("ADO") stipulateto thefollowingfacts andrecommend a reprimand

Respondent Michael E. Anderson, Esq.,and the AttorneyDiscipline

p. 4 Kuchinsky("Mr.Kuchinsky").The grievancerelates toMr. Anderson's

Complainantswere theco-guardiansoftheirbrother,Daniel

Pilskaner("Complainants"),by letter dated October 4,2016. The

5. This matterwas initiatedby agrievancefiledby Wendy Hilland Kelli

resolutionofthiscurrentmatter.

the #12-038 matteron March 8,2017, pending investigationand

Committee("PCC")granted anextensionof the diversion agreement in

StipulationattachedheretoasExhibitC. The ProfessionalConduct

Docket #12-038 (January20, 2016),orderand corresponding

occurred in the fallof 2012. See Anderson, Michael E. advs. ADO,

1.1(b)(4)-(5)and 3.1.The eventsgivingrise to the Rule violations

4. Mr. Anderson alsoreceiveda diversionin 2016 forviolationsofRules

sobriety.

heretoas ExhibitB. Mr. Anderson avers thathe has maintained his

Michael E.Anderson, LD-2006-0003 (February 10, 2009), attached

New Hampshire Bar on February 10,2009. See In theMatterof

associatedwith hissixmonth suspension and was reinstatedto the

from alcoholism.Mr. Anderson complied with the conditions

criminalconvictions,Mr. Anderson admitted thathe was suffering

Breach of Bail Conditions. During the time periodassociatedwith his

ObstructingReport ofCrime or Injuryand one count of Defaultor

violationsresultedfrom criminalconvictionsfor two counts of p. 5 Anderson spoke with the Complainants regarding the impact ofMr.

Motion to Reconsider under advisement. On January 6, 2016, Mr.

vacatethe divorce ("Petition toChange Order")and a subsequent

casewas stillpending,with the familycourthavingtaken a requestto

8. On January 1, 2016,Mr. Kuchinskypassedaway. The post-divorce

objectives.

objectivesof therepresentationand themeans to achieve those

manner, but the Complainants made alldecisionsregardingthe

Mr. Kuchinsky was able toassistin thepost-divorcecasein a limited

brain injury, making him unable toindependentlymanage his affairs.

7. After the divorcecase resolved,Mr. Kuchinsky suffereda traumatic

not representedby counsel inthe divorce.

receivean equitableshareofthemaritalestate.Mr. Kuchinsky was

As a result,the Complainants believedthatMr. Kuchinsky did not

signedthe stipulationresolvingthedivorcecase (the"Stipulation").

hisformer wife or had been subjectto undue influencewhen he

Complainants believedthatMr. Kuchinsky eitherhad been trickedby

Mr. Kuchinsky's divorcecase and setasidethe propertydivision.The

Mr. Kuchinsky's co-guardians. The Complainants sought to reopen

6. Mr. Anderson was retainedby the Complainants, in theircapacityas

Counsel on March 15, 2017.

Complaint Screening Committee referredthe matterto Disciplinary p. 6 Petition("MotiontoWithdraw").Thispleadingsought towithdraw the

12. On January 25, 2016, Mr. Anderson filed a Motion toWithdraw

had retainedseparatecounsel forthatpurpose.

already begun the process of being appointed asadministratorsand

the authoritytoacton behalf oftheestate.The Complainants had

probatecourtas theadministratorsof hisestate,they did not have

Kuchinsky'sguardiansand thatuntiltheywere appointedby the

11. Mr. Anderson advised the Complainants thatthey were no longerMr.

would not have been consistentwith Mr. Kuchinsky's wishes.

includingthe Complainants. Mr. Anderson was confidentthatthis

Kuchinsky did receivein the divorcewould not pass to hisotherheirs,

occurred. Ifthiswere to happen, the limitedassetsthatMr.

ofhisassetswould pass to Ms.Jordan as ifthe divorcehad not

10. Under thesecircumstances,because Mr. Kuchinsky died intestate,all

wife, Ms. Susan Jordan,as of the date ofhisdeath.

thiswould resultin Mr. Kuchinsky being legallymarried to hisex-

courtcould enteran ordervacatingthe divorce decree. In hisopinion,

the litigation.Mr. Anderson alsobecame concerned thatthefamily

the Complainants no longerhad the authorityto directthe course of

guardianshipterminatedupon the death ofMr. Kuchinsky. As such,

9. After Mr. Anderson researchedthe issue,he determined thatthe

would researchthatissue.

Kuchinsky's death on the post-divorceproceeding and indicatedhe p. 7 Order. After ahearingon allpending motions on September 13,2016,

counsel and obtainedthe reinstatementofthe Petitionto Change

Withdraw Petition.The Complainants subsequentlyobtainednew

15. On January 27, 2016, the familycourtgrantedthe Motion to

appointed as co-administrators.

the Complainants, as the Complainants were in the process of being

have resultedfrom a miscommunication between Mr. Anderson and

four days after theMotionto Withdraw wasfiled).Thisappearsto

appointed as co-administrators untilJanuary 29th (approximately

recordsofthe probate courtindicatethatthe Complainants were not

Complainants as theco-administratorsof Mr.Kuchinsky'sestate,the

14. In addition,while the Motion to Withdraw referencesthe

to withdraw the petition.

believedthatin doing so,he obtainedthe Complainants'acquiescence

withdraw the Petitionto Change Order. At the time,Mr. Anderson

permissionofthe Complainants,he discussedwith them the need to

Withdraw. While Mr. Anderson did not specificallyseek the

13. The Complainants deny authorizingMr. Anderson to filethe Motion to

Petitionto Change Order."

before the Probate Court, wish to WITHDRAW the February 10th

Kuchinsky, who are also Co-Administrators ofMr. Kuchinsky's estate

stated:"The Guardians over the person and estateof Daniel

post-divorceeffortto reopen the divorce. Paragraph 2 ofthe Motion was filed, Mr.Kuchinsky had passed away, resultinginthe

p. 8 decisionto withdraw. On the date the Motion to Withdraw Petition

and ata time when therewas no one with authorityto make the

Withdraw Petitionwithout the specificconsentofthe Complainants

20. Mr. Anderson violatedRule 1.2(a)when he filedthe Motion to

representation. ofthe clientas isimpliedlyauthorizedto carryout the to bepursued. A lawyer maytakesuch actionon behalf consultwith the clientas to the means by which they are representation,and, as requiredby Rule 1.4,shall by aclient'sdecisionsconcerningthe objectivesof (a)Subjecttoparagraphs (c),(d),and (e),a lawyershallabide

19. Rule 1.2 statesin pertinentpart:

reference.

18. The factssetforthin the above paragraphs are incorporatedby

Rule 1.2 (Scope ofRepresentationand AllocationofAuthority

follows:

violationsof the New Hampshire Rules of ProfessionalConduct, as

17. The partiesagreethatMr. Anderson'sconduct in thiscase involves

avoid the resultnoted in Paragraph 9.

been to filea Motion for Instruction,but atthe time he was seekingto

16. Mr. Anderson concedes thatthe bettercourse ofactionwould have

closed.

the Court denied the Petitionto Change Order and the matterisnow p. 9 Case, 152 N.H. 503, 513 (2005).

must takeintoaccount the severity ofthe misconduct." Coffey's

future." Conner's Case, 158 N.H. 299,303 (2009). "Thesanction. . .

integrityofthelegalprofession,andpreventingsimilarconductin the

public,maintainingpublicconfidencein the bar,preservingthe

25. The purpose oftheCourt'sdisciplinarypoweris"protectingthe

sanction.

ImposingLawyer Sanctions (2005) ("Standards") supportthis

24. Both case law and theAmerican Bar Association's Standards for

would servethe purposes ofattorneydiscipline.

reprimandas theappropriatesanctionin this matter.Thissanction

23. The Attorney DisciplineOfficeand Mr. Anderson jointly recommend a

herein,violatedRule 8.4(a).

and convincingevidencethatMr. Anderson'sconduct,as described

22. Having found the foregoing violation, thepartiesagreethereis clear

Petition.

Anderson violatedRule 1.2(a)when he filedthe Motion to Withdraw

21. The partiesagree thatthereisclearand convincing evidence thatMr.

estate.

been appointed as the administratorsof Mr.Kuchinsky's probate

terminationofthe guardianship. Also the Complainants had notyet p. 10 8

other heirs), he did not obtain thespecificauthoritytofiletheMotion

Kuchinsky'sestate'sbest interests in mind(i.e.the Complainants and

statewas negligent.While Mr.Anderson had the heirsof Mr.

of thesanctionanalysis, the parties agreethatMr. Anderson's mental

29. With respecttoMr. Anderson's mentalstateunder the second prong

ofthe estate.

thattheComplainantshad not yet beenappointedas administrators

without gaining thespecificassent of the Complainants and at a time

owed to hisclients,in thathe filedthe Motion toWithdraw Petition

2 p. 10 8. Under thefirstprong of the analysis, Mr.Anderson violatedduties

whether they affectthe baselinesanction. See Id.

analysis:the existence of any aggravating ormitigatingfactors and

determined,the Court then looks tothefourthand finalpartofthe

See Conner's Case, 15 p. 10 8 N.H. at303. Once the baselinesanctionis

characterizingthemisconduct and determininga baselinesanction.

27. The firstthreepartsofthe analysiscreatethe framework for

N.H. 613, 621 (2007)); Standards § 3.0.

ofaggravatingor mitigatingfactors." Id. (quoting Douglas' Case, 156

actualinjurycaused by the lawyer'smisconduct; and (d)the existence

"(a)the duty violated;(b)thelawyer'smental state;(c)the potentialor

fortha four-partanalysisforcourtsto considerinimposing sanctions:

for guidance. Conner's Case, 15 p. 10 8 N.H. at303. The Standards set

26. Although the Court has not adopted the Standards, itlooks to them p. 11 See ABA Stds.forImposing Lawyer Sanctions appx. 1 (1992)

4.42 Suspension isgenerallyappropriatewhen:

4.41 Disbarment isgenerallyappropriatewhen:

representinga client: to actwith reasonablediligenceand promptness in sanctionsare generallyappropriatein casesinvolvinga failure applicationofthefactorssetout in Standard 3.0,the following Absent aggravatingor mitigatingcircumstances,upon

Diligence)1ofthe Standards, which provides as follows:

31. Mr. Anderson's violationof Rule 1.2(a)implicatesSection4.4 (Lack of

themerits.

Change Order. In the end, the Complainants did obtaina decisionon

replacement counsel to reopen the case and reinstatethe Petitionto

a resultofMr. Anderson's action,the Complainants hired

Mr. Anderson's conduct caused actualinjuryto the Complainants. As

the actualor potentialinjurycaused by Mr. Anderson's misconduct.

30. The thirdprong of the sanctionanalysisrequiresan assessment of

to such a Motion.

and fileditata time when the Complainants legallycould not assent p. 12 10

reprimand in New Hampshire. 3The term "admonition," asused in the ABA Standards, isanalogousto a publiccensurein New Hampshire. 2The term"reprimand,"as used in the ABA Standards, isanalogousto a

involvedconductthatoccurred some time ago,and relate to Rule

Standards § 9.32. Ofnote isthatthe priordisciplinaryoffenses

todisciplinaryboardorcooperativeattitudetowardproceedings. See

absenceof adishonestor selfish motive,and fulland freedisclosure

Standards § 9.22. There arethreemitigatingfactors:remorse,

offensesand substantialexperience in thepracticeof law. See

34. In this case, there are two aggravating factors: prior disciplinary

and mitigatingfactors. E.g.,Conner'sCase, 158 N.H. at 303.

33. The baselinesanctionmust be consideredinlightofany aggravating

See Standards § 4.43.

Standard 4.43,would call for abaselinesanctionof apubliccensure.

32. Mr. Anderson's conduct in thismatter,when consideredunder

actualor potentialinjuryto aclient. diligence inrepresentinga client,and causeslittle or no lawyer is negligentand does not act withreasonable 4.44 Admonition3[Reprimand]is generallyappropriatewhen a

injuryor potentialinjuryto aclient. reasonablediligencein representinga client,and causes when a lawyer isnegligentand does not actwith 4.43 Reprimand2 [PublicCensure] isgenerallyappropriate

conditionallyacceptthe Stipulationpursuantto Rule 37A(III)(aa)(l).

recommended disposition,and thatthe PCC may accept,reject,or

37. Mr. Anderson understandsthatthisStipulationrepresentsa

Anderson.

by theADO isthe subjectof aseparateagreement signedby Mr.

Supreme Court Rule37(19).His agreement to pay thecostsincurred

investigationand enforcementofthisdisciplinarymatter. See

Anderson agrees to pay the costsincurredby theADO inthe

36. Subjectto the PCC's approvalof Mr.Anderson's Stipulation,Mr.

thiscase.

servesthe purposes of disciplineand isan appropriatesanctionin

warrant a downward departure.The partiesagree thata reprimand

35. The partiesagree thatthe mitigatingfactorsevidentin thiscase

situation.

and the issuehere arosefrom negligencein assessingtheparties'

These issuesdo not appear to have caused thiscurrentRule violation

experiencinga number ofpersonaland officemanagement issues.

problems with sobrietyand in the #12-038 matter,Mr. Anderson was

Additionally,in the #06-020 Matter,Mr. Anderson was experiencing

violationsthatare differentfrom the Rule violatedin thiscase. p. 14 12

Dated: & ( l> 2017

hearing.

39. Mr. Anderson knowingly and intelligentlywaives hisrightto a

Stipulation.

Stipulation;and thathe is fullyaware ofthe consequences ofthe

understandsthathe has a rightto obtaincounsel regardingthis

promises or inducements not setforthin the Stipulation;thathe

Stipulationas a resultof anythreats,coercion, orduress,or ofany

knowingly,and voluntarilysubmitted;thathe isnot enteringthis

theproposeddispositioncontained in thisStipulationarefreely,

38. Mr. Anderson acknowledges thatthe admissions ofmisconduct and p. 15 Hampshire,03234. Hampshire,03301.Hiscurrentmailingaddressis28 MartellRoad,Chichester,New Mr. AndersonworkedattheRunge Law Office,P.C.,141 AirportRoad,Concord,New was admittedtopracticeon October28,1996.At alltimesmaterialtothisproceeding, 1. Mr. Andersonisan attorneylicensedtopracticelaw inNew Hampshire.Mr. Anderson

facts,by clearand convincingevidence,and supportedby stipulations: The ProfessionalConductCommitteedeterminedthattherecordsupportsthefollowing

revisedStipulationastoSanctionon January17,2007.JamesR. Martinwas absent. On February20,2007,theCommitteeagaintookup thismatter,havingreceivedthe

modifytheStipulationastoSanctionand toresubmititfortheCommittee'sconsideration. accountabilityintheeventoffuturecriminalproceedings.The matterwas tabledforcounselto thelanguageintheStipulationastoSanctionfortheCommitteetoaddressissuesof Andersonwas alsoinattendance.Afteraperiodofquestioning,Ms. McCaffertyagreedtorevise AttorneyDisciplineOffice.EugeneSullivan,III,Esquire,appearedfortheRespondent.Mr. OralArgumentwas heard.LandyaB. McCafferty,DisciplinaryCounsel,appearedforthe

present. relateddocuments.Allmembers of theCommittee,withtheexceptionofAlanJ.Cronheim,were JointlySubmittedExhibitsaddressingtheincidentsleadingup totheNoticeofChargesand other SanctiondatedOctober16,2006.Inaddition,eachmember oftheCommitteereviewedthe Stipulationastofactsand therulesviolateddatedSeptember11,2006,and theStipulationasto referencedmatter.The Committeereviewedthe NoticeofChargesdated August 3,2006,the On January16,2007,theProfessionalConductCommitteeconsideredtheabove

Anderson,MichaelE. advs.AttorneyDisciplineOffice # 06-020

Alan J. Cronheim Holly B. Fazzino,Admin. Coordinator Thomas P. Connair * non attorneymember David N. Cole David N. Page* Ellen L. Arnold James R. Martin Toni M. Gray,* Vice Chair 603-224-5828♦Fax 228-9511 Gretchen Rule Hamel BenettePizzimenti,Vice Chair Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Richard H. Darling* MargaretH. Nelson, Chair 4 Park Street,Suite 304 Gerald A. Daley*

p. 16 10. On April11,2006,Mr. Andersonwas convictedinConcordDistrictCourtofthe bailorderthatsame date. orBreachofBailConditionsforhavinghad contactwithMs. Murphy inviolationofhis 9. Laterthatdayon February10,2006,Mr. Andersonwas arrestedon achargeofDefault Thereafter,Mr. Andersontookataxicabtothehome wherehe and Ms. Murphy resided. Murphy at4:29a.m.,4:30a.m.,4:31a.m.,4:35a.m.,4:47a.m.,4:59a.m.,and 5:00a.m. 8. On February10,2006,Mr. Andersonattemptedtomake telephonecontactwithMs. yardsofMs. Murphy. Ms. Murphy for96 hoursby mail,telephoneorotherwise,andthathe notgo within100 $500.00personalrecognizancebailon conditionthat,interaha,he haveno contactwith 7. On February10,2006,at3:00a.m.,Mr. Andersonwas releasedon thosechargeson while Intoxicated. EndangeringtheWelfareofaChild,AggravatedDrivingwhileIntoxicated,andDriving chargedwithfivemisdemeanors:ObstructingReportofCrimeorInjury,SimpleAssault, 6. On February10,2006,atapproximately3:00a.m.,Mr. Andersonwas arrestedand $1,200.00personal recognizancebail. chargedwithone countofDrivingWhileIntoxicated.Mr. Andersonwas releasedon 5. On January19,2006,atapproximately10:43a.m.,Mr. Andersonwas arrestedand

• Successfulcompletionofdomesticviolencecounseling. • $ 1,200.00fine,allsuspendedonconditionofgood behaviorforoneyear;

4. On that charge,Mr. Andersonreceivedthefollowingsentence: Misdemeanor.

policeduringadomesticdisturbance,theaforesaidoffence[sic]constitutinga removingthephoneaway fromPatriciaMurphy whilesheattemptedtocallthe knowinglycommitthecrimeofobstructingthereportof acrimeorinjuryby 2004, at 12:00 p.m., Mr. Anderson did number of the case is04-CR-07936.The bodyofthe complaint states that, on August14, countofObstructingReportofCrimeorInjury,a ClassB Misdemeanor.The docket

3. On November 24,2004,Mr. Andersonwas convictedin ConcordDistrict Court of one and their5 children. 2. At all relevant times, Mr. Anderson residedwith his long-time partner, Patricia Murphy, terms:

p. 17 12. Mr. Anderson'ssentenceon theApril11,2006,convictionsincludedthefollowing charges. Assault,AggravatedDrivingwhileIntoxicated,andEndangeringtheWelfareofaChild 11. Pursuanttothetermsofanegotiatedpleaagreement,theStatedroppedtheSimple theconditionsofhisbail.

returnedto28 MartelRd. andhad contactwithPatriciaMurphy violating withPatriciaMurphy for96 hours,thesaidMichaelAndersonknowingly a Stateor Localcrimeand be of goodbehaviorand to have no contact KimberlyFredericksonon 2/10/2006on theconditionsthathe notcommit havingbeenreleasedon $500 personalrecognizancebailconditionsby

Allegingthat,on February10,2006,at8:40a.m.,Mr. Anderson,

Defaultor Breach ofBailConditions

MichaelAndersonwas undertheinfluenceof anintoxicatingliquor way,to-wit,MartelRd. inthesaidtownofChichester,N.H. whilethesaid drivea1997 Chevy CavalierbeingN.H. registration197880upon apublic

Allegingthat,on February9,2006,at1:30a.m.,Mr. Andersondid

-Drivingwhile Intoxicated

crimeofendangeringthewelfareof aminorpursuant[sic] from herhandwhilePatriciawas attemptingto call thepoliceto reportthe a rail on an outside deck at the residence, and attempted to take the phone thathe purposelyusedphysicalforce,by pinningPatriciaMurphy against committhecrimeofattemptedobstructingreportof acrimeorinjuryin

AllegingthatonFebruary9,2006,at9:35p.m.,Mr. Andersondid

ObstructingReport ofCrime or Injury

intoxicatingliquor. a way in theStateof NewHampshire,whileundertheinfluenceof Registrationnumber 1978807upon Main Streetin theTown ofPittsfield, drivea goldcoloredfourdoorChevroletCavalierbearingNew Hampshire

Allegingthat,on January19,2006,at10:43p.m.,Mr. Andersondid

Driving while Intoxicated intoxication.He lateradmitteddrinking. p. 18 defendantblew.187 on aPBT testwhichrepresentsovertwicethelegallimitfor Rule#10,12G: Failuretoabstainfromtheuseofalcohol.On June15,2006,the follows: ofProbationallegingthatMr. Andersonhadviolatedcertainrulesofhisprobationas

16. On thatsame date,Mr. Anderson'sprobationofficer,JamesJ.Sullivan,filedaViolation constitute"seriouscrimes"under Rule 37(9)(b). DefaultorBreachof BailConditionsandObstructingReportofCrimeorInjury 15. InitsJune20 Order,theCourtalsoexpresslyheldthatMr. Anderson'sconvictionsfor ADO for additionalevidenceofhiscompliance. showinghiscompliancewiththeseconditionsand complywithanyrequestmade by the counselor'srecommendedtreatmentplan,submitevidenceto theADO on aregularbasis drugcounselingwithacertifiedalcoholanddrugabusecounselor,complywithsuch suspensionon theconditionthatMr. Andersonmeaningfullyparticipateinalcoholand/or interimbasispendingfinaldispositionofdisciplinaryproceedings,butstayedthe 14. On June20,2006,theCourtsuspendedMr. Andersonfrom thepracticeof lawon an him pendingfinaldispositionofthedisciplinaryproceedings. drugs.He requestedthat,intheexerciseofitsdiscretion,theCourtdeclinetosuspend was onprobationforone year,andthathewas beingrandomlytestedforalcoholand hisresponse,Mr. Andersonstatedthathewas receivingtreatmentforalcoholism,thathe recommendedthat thesuspensionbestayedifMr. Andersonmet certainconditions.In thedisciplinaryhearing.The ADO requestedthatMr. Andersonbesuspended,but whether it believed that Mr. Anderson should be suspended pending final dispositionof tocommence disciplinaryproceedings againstMr.Anderson,and to advise the Court The Court also directed the Attorney Discipline Office(hereinafterreferred to as "ADO") causewhyhe shouldnot besuspendedpendingdispositionof adisciplinaryproceeding. 13. On April25,2006,the NewHampshireSupremeCourt orderedMr. Andersonto show

• 1 year ofprobation sentencingorder; and on Mr.Anderson'sgood behavior andcompliancewith the termsofhis • 6 months in theHouse ofCorrections,all 6months suspended for 2 years p. 19 Conditions. ObstructingReportofCrime or Injuryand one countofDefault or Breach of Bail

20. As describedinmore detailabove,Mr. Anderson has been convictedoftwo countsof

clear andconvincingevidence, and supportedby astipulation: The Committee found the following violationsofthe RulesofProfessionalConduct by II RULINGS OF LAW:

disciplinary proceeding. the immediatesuspensionofMr. Anderson'slaw licensepending finaldispositionofthis New Hampshire Supreme Courtlifted the stayofMr. Anderson'ssuspension,resulting in 19. Upon learningoftheallegedprobationviolation, and by OrderdatedJuly7,2006,the hearing on theprobationviolationis currently scheduled forSeptember 14, 2006. conceded to hisprobationofficer, Mr. Sullivan, that the charges are true. Mr.Anderson's 18. While there has been no findingof"true" on the probationviolation,Mr. Anderson has obtain anappointment. a batterer's evaluation and follow anyrecommended treatment. He has yet to Rule #12C: Due to the natureofthe offense, the defendant was required to obtain

defendantreadily admitteddrinking.Priorto that he had four monthssobriety. In a telephone conversationon June16 and in a personal interview on June19,the intoxication.Oneof therespondingofficersnotedheinitiallyliedaboutdrinking. PBT test thatregistereda .187.Thisis overtwo timesthe legal limit for placedonprobation.He was peacefuland cooperativewithpolice,submittingto a drinking.Alcohol was involved in theoffense/incidentthatcausedhim to be On June 15,2006, police were called to his residencebecausethe defendant was

when signing the rulesofprobation. such, he was required to refrain totallyfrom the useofalcohol He did so The defendantis anacknowledgedalcoholicand the offense isalcoholrelated.As

17. Mr. Sullivan'sSupportingSummary forViolationofProbationReportstates:

despite being required to do so. hasfailedto obtainanevaluationorappointmentfor anevaluation Rule #12C: Failuretoobtaina batterer'sevaluation.Defendant suspension, (a) he has complied with the termsofhisprobationin the matterofState v. p. 20 must provideDisciplinaryCounsel with satisfactoryproofthat, during the periodofhis

27. Prior to Mr.Anderson'sreinstatementto the practiceoflaw, Mr.Anderson agrees that he months. The Committee ordersthatMr. Anderson be suspendedfrom thepracticeoflaw for six IV. STIPULATION AS TO SANCTION:

Committee in theinvestigationand prosecutionofthis matter. Mr. Andersonagreesto pay the expenses incurred by theProfessionalConduct

ofa violationofN.H. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(a). 26. Becauseof the Rule 8.4(b)violation,there isnecessarilyclear andconvincingevidence

violationofN.H. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b). 25. Mr. Anderson'sconductin thisregardconstitutesclearandconvincingevidencea hisindifferenceto the law. 24. Mr. Anderson'sotherviolationsofthe law and court orders as set forth herein also reflect trustworthinessandfitnessas alawyer.SeeRule37(9)(b). theadministrationofjustice,and therebyreflectadverselyon Mr. Anderson's Breachof BailConditionsinvolveafailuretoabideby courtordersandinterferencewith 23. Mr. Anderson'sconvictionsforObstructingReportofCrimeorInjuryand Defaultor commit a "seriouscrime." misappropriation,theft,or anattemptor aconspiracyorsolicitationofanotherto falseswearing,misrepresentation,fraud,deceit,bribery,extortion, definitionofsuchcrime,involvesinterferencewiththeadministrationofjustice, necessaryelementofwhich,asdeterminedbythestatutoryorcommon law The term"seriouscrime"shallincludeanyfelonyand anylessercrimea 22. Rule 37(9)(b) provides: 'seriouscrimes'underRule37(9)(b) " breachofbailconditionsand obstructingthereportofacrimeorinjuryconstitute 21. By OrderdatedJune20,2006,theSupremeCourtheldthat"[t]heoffensesofdefaultor p. 21 File EugeneSullivan,III,Esquire LandyaB.McCafferty,DisciplinaryCounsel Distribution:

Courtastoapplicationforreinstatementtothepracticeoflaw. At theconclusionofhissuspension,Mr. AndersonshallcomplywithallRulesoftheSupreme ProfessionalConductcitedabove.Thisordershalltakeeffectasofthe16thday ofMarch,2007. AndersonfromthepracticeoflawforaperiodofsixmonthsfortheviolationsoftheRulesof Foralloftheabovereasons,The ProfessionalConductCommitteesuspendsMichaelE.

before resuming the practiceoflaw. alcoholismand desiresa continuedsuspensioninordertofocuson hisrehabilitation seriousandjustifiesasignificantsanction.Inaddition,Mr. Andersonsuffersfrom 29. WhileMr. Andersonhasno priordisciplinaryhistory,heconcedesthathismisconductis furtherconditionsprecedentto Mr.Anderson'sreinstatement. to the immediate attention of theProfessionalConduct Committee for theimpositionof attributabletoalcoholabuse,DisciplinaryCounselhas theauthorityto bringthismatter personalinteractionwiththecriminaljusticesystem,orhasengagedinmisconduct termofhissuspension,Mr. Andersonhasviolatedatermofprobation,hashad further 28. Mr. Andersonfurtheragreesthat,in theeventDisciplinaryCounsellearnsthat,duringthe byMr. AndersonpriortoMr. Anderson'sreinstatementto thepracticeoflaw. theProfessionalConduct Committee forfurtherordersand conditionswhich must be met Mr. Andersonagrees thatDisciplinaryCounselmaybringthe matterto theattentionof compliancewith theprovisions(a), (b), and (c)aboveby clear andconvincingevidence, participatedin treatment foralcoholism.In the event that Mr. Anderson is unable to show furtherpersonal interactions with thecriminaljustice system, and (c) he hassuccessfully Michael Anderson, (docket numbers06-CR-l005-661C and 663C), (b) he has had no p. 21 p. 22 File SherriKluesener, Supreme Court NH Bar Associationx5 Attorney General Dawnangela Minton, Esquire Mr. Michael Anderson Eugene F. Sullivan,III,Esquire Landya B. McCafferty, Esquire James L. DeHart, Esquire Distribution:

Broderick,C.J.,and Dalianis,Duggan and Hicks, JJ.,concurred.

is granted. Michael E. Anderson's motion for reinstatementto the New Hampshire bar

order: Anderson, the court on February 10, 2009, issuedthe following IIICase No. LD-2006-0003, In the Matter nfMiehael R.

Sandra A. Kuhn, Esq. cc: ElizabethM. Murphy,AssistantDisciplinaryCounsel

DisciplinaryMatter. toFacts,Violationsand Diversion,theDiversionAgreementand theAgreementtoPay Costsof Afteroralargumentand deliberationthereon,theCommitteeapprovestheStipulationas

and his law partner, Michael Bedard, were alsopresent. SandraA. Kuhn presentedargumenton behalfofMichaelE. Anderson.MichaelE. Anderson ElizabethM. Murphy presentedargumenton behalfoftheAttorneyDisciplineOffice.

Beesondid not participate in the oral argument ordeliberations. werepresent.RichardH. Darling,Mona T.Movafaghiand MarthaVan Ootwereabsent.Peter SusanR.Chollet,ScottH.Harris,MargaretR.Kerouac,GeorgesJ. Roy and Richard D. Sager argumentintheabove-captionedmatter.DavidM. Rothstein,HeatherE.Krans,ElaineHolden, On January19,2016,theProfessionalConductCommittee("theCommittee")heldoral

Anderson,Michael E. advs.AttorneyDiscipline Office -#12-038

ScottH. Harris BarbaraJ. Guay, LegalAssistant Richard H. Darling* * non attorneymember Susan R. Chollet* Martha Van Oot PeterG. Beeson Richard D. Sager ElaineHolden,* Vice Chair 603-224-5828 ♦Fax 228-9511 Georges J. Roy* Heather E. Krans, Vice Chair Concord, New Hampshire033C1 Mona T. Movafaghi David M. Rothstein,Chair 4 Chenell Drive,Suite 102 MargaretR. Kerouac

disciplinein New Hampshire. He has not appliedfor reinstatementin

15, 1997, butwas suspended on May 29, 2007 arisingout ofreciprocal

2. Mr. Anderson was alsoadmitted to the Massachusetts Bar on December

Mr. Anderson was admitted to practiceon October 28, 1996. 1. Mr. Anderson isan attorneylicensedto practicelaw in New Hampshire.

(ADO) stipulateasfollows: Respondent Michael E. Anderson, Esq. and theAttorney DisciplineOffice

NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT p. 25 The referralarose as a resultofrepresentationsthatMr. Anderson made

County Superior Court Clerk James M. Warren on October 22, 2012. This complaint was initiatedby way ofa letterofreferralfrom Belknap complaint.

includingduring the underlyingeventsassociatedwith thecurrent

hissobrietysince2006, with one minor relapse forone day in 2010,

attachedheretoas ExhibitB. Mr. Anderson avers thathe has maintained

Matter ofMichael B. Anderson, LD-2006-0003 (February 10, 2009),

reinstatedtothe New Hampshire Bar on February 10, 2009. See In the

with the conditionsassociatedwith hissixmonth suspension and was

admitted thathe was sufferingfrom alcoholism.Mr. Anderson complied

time period associatedwith hiscriminalconvictions,Mr. Anderson

Injuryand one count ofDefaultor Breach ofBailConditions. During the

criminalconvictionsfor two counts ofObstructingReport ofCrime or

attached hereto as ExhibitA. The Rule 8.4(b)violationsresultedfrom

Michael E. advs. Attorney DisciplineOffice, #06-020 (March 15, 2007),

2007, resultingfrom violationsofRules 8.4(b)and 8.4(a). See Anderson,

suspension from the practiceoflaw thatbecame effectiveon March 16,

Mr. Anderson has a priordisciplinaryhistoryin the form ofa six-month

Street,Suite317, Concord, New Hampshire 03301. practiced law at The LegalConnection,PC, (thefirm)locatedat 10 Ferry

During the time period relevantto thiscomplaint,Mr. Anderson p. 26 Continue.

executed Waiver of Speedy Trialin supportofthe pending Motion to inevitablyheaded to Trial."Subsequently, Mr. Anderson filedan matterappeared forsome time to be most likelyto settle,but itisnow

2012 in the Robidoux matter.In the motion, Mr. Anderson stated:"That had a jurytrialin Hillsborough County, alsoscheduled for October 9,

scheduled forjuryselectionon October 9, 2012 on thegrounds thathe

Continue ("Motion to Continue") the trialintheAlexis matter,which was

9. On September 28, 2012, Mr. Anderson filedan Assented-To Motion to

which hisclientpled guiltybeforeJudge GillianAbramson.

HillsboroughCounty SuperiorCourt in the Robidoux matterduring 8. On September 27, 2012, Mr. Anderson attendeda pleahearingin the

7. At one point,both matterswere scheduled fortrialon October 9, 2012.

unrelatedcriminalmatters.

00157, SuperiorCourt, Belknap County) ("Alexismatter")in two ("Robidoux matter")and Walter Alexis (State v.Alexis, 211-2012-CR-

216-2012-CR-00293, SuperiorCourt, HillsboroughCounty, North)

representeddefendantsNicholasRobidoux (State v. NicholasRobidoux,

6. By way offurtherbackground, in the earlyfallof2012, Mr. Anderson

motions to continue thatMr. Anderson filedin the same case.

atan October 5, 2012 hearingbeforeJudge James D. O'Neilland in p. 27 Hillsborough County case (Statev.Nicholas Robidoux, 216-2012-00293), been scheduled first.In checking the Odyssey docketing system forthe asked Deputy Clerk JanelleHughes to check to see which jurytrialhad referralletter:"Pursuant to Superior Court Rule 49-A, Judge O'Neill

matter,the followingeventsoccurred, as explained in Clerk Warren's

13. Upon receiptofMr. Anderson's firstMotion to Continue in the Alexis

calendars than removing them when theywere canceled or rescheduled.

were betterabout adding scheduled appointments/courtdates to their

12. Mr. Anderson admits that,at the time,he and the members ofhisoffice

sentencinghearing in the Robidoux matter to the calendar.

afterthe September 27th plea hearing. He did add an October 29, 2012

remove the Robidoux October 9thtrialdate from the on-linecalendar,

was synced with an on-linecalendar in hisoffice.Mr. Boyd did not

phone to keep trackofwhere he needed to be. The electroniccalendar

11. At thattime,Mr. Anderson reliedon an electroniccalendar on hiscell

with the Court on September 28th.

or check hisfilesbefore signingthe motion which was dated and filed

recallssigningthe motion but admits thathe did not carefullyreview it

Anderson asked Mr. Boyd to drafta motion to continue.Mr. Anderson

between trialsscheduled in both the Robidoux and Alexismatters. Mr.

had schedulingconflicts,includingwhat he thought was a conflict

talkedwith hisassistant,Mr. Adam Boyd, about severalmattersthat

10. Mr. Anderson recallsthaton September 27th,while he was in the car,he forward beforeJudge O'Neilon the motions to continueand the request p. 28 17. AfterMr. Anderson filedthe second motion to continue,a hearingwent motion.

thathe did not verifythe statusof the Robidoux matterbeforewritingthe 16. Mr. Anderson draftedthe second motion to continuehimselfand admits

intendedto filea Notice of Intentto Plead within seven days.

terms,opposing counsel had assentedto themotion and thatcounsel

plead,thatcounselwas working with the County Attorney'sofficeon plea 15. The motion went on to furtherexplainthatthedefendantintended to

placesatthe same time."(Emphasis in original).

Hillsborough County SuperiorCourt thatday. Counsel cannot be in two

The basisfor the Motion was thatcounselwas scheduled for Trialin

Assented-to Motion to Continue Trialon or about September 28, 2012.

relevantpart,themotion stated:"Undersigned counsel filedan

Revised/Modified Motion To Continue Trialand Schedule Plea. In

motion to continuetheAlexis matter,entitledAssented-To

Alexis matter,Mr. Anderson hand-deliveredthatsame day a second

14. Upon learningthatthe Court denied the firstMotion to Continue in the

October 5, 2012 denied the motion to continue."

GillianAbramson. As a resultofthisinformation,Judge O'Neillon

she confirmed thisby phone with JulieFindley,the monitor forJudge

Janellelearned thatthe defendant pled guiltyon September 27, 2012; p. 29 Court reviewed thefactthata plea was taken on September 27th in the 20. A colloquy then ensued between theCourt and Mr. Anderson wherein the

withdraw hisplea. members to bepresent.There was also achance thatMr. Robidoux may discussionofpushing itout to October 29th for Mr.Robidoux'sfamily October 9th fora schedulinghearing,but therehad been some

statedthathe believedthe Robidoux matterwas stillon thedocket for

the Court asked when sentencingwas scheduled for, Mr.Anderson admitted hismotion may have been based on "oldinformation."When

pleahad been taken alreadyin the Robidoux matter,Mr. Anderson

had been narrowed down to 5felonies.Afterthe Court indicatedthata

Anderson responded thatthecase had startedout with 15 feloniesand

19. The Court then inquiredas tothe statusoftheRobidoux matter. Mr.

were stilltalkingabout a pleaand hisclientwas stillundecided. matter it was50/50 whether theywould goforwardwith trial,thatthey

placesatthe same time." Mr. Anderson explained thatin the Robidoux

Court inquiredas towhat Mr. Anderson had meant by "can'tbe in two

no reason to trythe case. Afterhearingfurtherfrom Ms. Karnis, the plead guilty.While the partieswere stillworking on the terms,therewas

because he had a schedulingconflictand now hisclientintended to

18. At the hearingMr. Anderson began to explainthathe filedthe Motions

counsel,AssistantCounty Attorney Roni M. Karnis,were present. to schedule a plea in the Alexismatter. Mr. Anderson and hisopposing for October 29th.

p. 30 explainedthathiscalendar also showed thatsentencingwas scheduled matterremained scheduled forOctober 9th,although he eventually advised the court thathiscalendar stillreflectedthatthe Robidoux 22. Mr. Anderson also checked hisonlinecalendar on hiscellphone and

2012.

appeared atthe plea hearing in the Robidoux matter on September 27,

when conflictsarose. However, itwas, in fact,Mr. Anderson who Esq.,and Mr. Anderson oftencovered court appearances foreach other

a busy trialpractice.The otherattorneyin the firm,Michael Bedard,

someone elsefrom hisoffice.During thistime period,Mr. Anderson had

thought the pleahearing in Robidoux had been covered forhim by

21. During the colloquy,Mr. Anderson twice statedto theCourt thathe

October 9th. October 5th,stillindicatedthatRobidoux was scheduled for trialon

in the Robidoux matter,and thatthe second motion to continue,filedon

had not been fileduntilSeptember 28th,the day afterthe plea was taken

Alexismatterwith respectto the factthatthe firstmotion to continue

sentencingfor 30 days. The Court also reviewed the timelinein the

Judge Abramson had issueda courtorder thatday continuing acknowledgement and waiver ofrightsand a waiver ofsentencingreview.

Robidoux matter before Judge Abramson along with an regard,I have been diligentlyendeavoring to returnmy p. 31 coverage for certainhearingsin the underlyingcases. In this cases thatposed a conflict.I was alsomistaken regarding mislead theCourt. I was mistaken regardingthe underlying Hearing on October 5, 2012. Itwas never my intentionto 28, 2012, and October 5, 2012, as well as during the my representationsto theCourt in Motions dated September for the confusion and inaccuraciesthathave resultedfrom First,pleasecommunicate toJudge O'Neil thatI apologize

Belknap SuperiorCourt which statedin relevantpart:

27. On January 7, 2013, Mr. Anderson wrote a letterto Clerk Warren atthe

matterfrom happening again.

manageable levelsand to preventthe type ofissuethatarosein this

ofnew clientsand mattershe took on, to keep hiscase load atmore

26. Beginning in December 2012, Mr. Anderson began to reduce the number

October 19, 2012 in the Alexis matter.

25. Ultimately,a plea,dispositionand sentencinghearingwent forward on

agreement. juryselectionon October 9, 2012, unlessthe partiescould reach a plea

requestto schedule a plea. The Alexis matterremained scheduled for

24. At thecloseof the hearing,the Court denied the motion to continueand

October 9th.

Anderson agreed with the Court thathe did not have a conflicton

hearing.Ittook approximately fiveminutes ofdiscussionbefore Mr.

Robidoux case and was not clearon whether he was the one atthe plea

23. In summary, Mr. Anderson sounded confused as to the statusofthe and calendar management to keep bettertrackofhisown schedule. He

p. 32 attorney'scellulartelephone. Mr. Anderson now does hisown data entry hearings as necessary from the calendar and have itsynchronizeto the

assistedthe officein betterformulatinga way to trackhearings,remove

professionalcomputer programmer sometime in 2013. The programmer

itscalendaring systems. The calendaring system was redone by a

30. Since the courtappearance on October 5, 2012, the firm has improved

and submitteda Uniform CertificateofAttendance to theADO.

Lawyers (Part One): Gettingand StayingOrganized" on May 10, 2013

29. Mr. Anderson attended an onlineCLE entitled"Time Management for

two to threemonths afterthe stroke.

extensivephysicaltherapy and returned to work part-timefor the first

matterswhile he was out ofwork in 2013. Mr. Anderson underwent

warning sign priorto a stroke.Mr. Bedard covered Mr. Anderson's

thatthe February 2, 2012 eventwas a TIA which oftenoccurs as a

with numbness on February 2, 2012. Itappeared as ofMarch 4, 2013

afterthe stroke.Mr. Anderson had previouslypresentedto hisdoctor

physicallyimpaired and withoutthe abilityto speak for the first24 hours

28. On March 4, 2013, Mr. Anderson suffereda strokethatlefthim

certainlyshould have chosen my words more prudently. atthe same time.'I meant no disrespectto the Court, but I apparently flippantremark thatI could 'notbe in two places situationbefore filingtheseMotions. I also apologize forthe I should have more carefullyreviewed and researched the

efficiencyand reliability. practiceto a more manageable levelofadministrative p. 33 10

motions on hisbehalfand to prepareforany hearingsatcourtthat 34. Mr. Anderson owed a duty to hisclient,Mr. Alexis,to fileappropriate to assurecompetent representation. anotherlawyer whopossessestheskilland knowledge required effectivemanner including,where appropriate,associatingwith (4)undertakeactionson theclient'sbehalf in a timelyand the legalproblems of theclient;and (3)developa strategy, in consultation with the client, forsolving law and identifyalternativelegalresponses; (2)formulate the materialissuesraised, determine applicable client,and from otherrelevantsources; (1)gather sufficient facts regarding the client's problemfrom the minimum: (c)In the performance of client service, a lawyershallata to the client'sinterest. thematterundertaken iscompleted with no avoidableharm (5)attentiontodetailsand schedulesnecessarytoassurethat (4)proper preparation;and bringingthose areasto the client'sattention; (3)identificationofareasbeyond the lawyer'scompetence and (2)performance ofthe techniquesofpracticewith skill; lawyer practices; (1) specificknowledge about the fields of law inwhich the (b) Legalcompetence requiresata minimum: (a) Alawyer shallprovidecompetent representationto aclient. 33. Rule 1.1 statesas follows:

32. The factssetforthat ^ l-30above are incorporatedby reference.

follows:

violationsof the New Hampshire Rules ofProfessionalConduct, as

31. The partiesagree thatMr. Anderson's conduct in thiscasesinvolves

can access readilyto avoid issuessuch as thisone in thefuture.

alsoscans allofhisOrders and Court noticesto hiscomputer thathe p. 34 11

filedthe second motion to continuewithout reviewing hisfilesor from filing frivolous motions. Mr. Andersonbreachedthatduty when he

39. Mr. Anderson owed a duty to thecourtand toopposing counsel to refrain

everyelement ofthe case be established. neverthelessso defend the proceeding as to requirethat could resultinincarcerationor institutionalization,may criminalproceeding,or therespondentin aproceeding that reversalofexistinglaw. A lawyer forthe defendant in a good faithargument foran extension,modificationor and factfordoing so thatisnot frivolous,which includesa controvertan issuetherein,unlessthereisa basisin law A lawyer shallnot bringor defend a proceeding,or assertor

38. Rule 3.1 statesas follows:

37. The factssetforthatIffl1-30 above are incorporatedby reference.

Rule 3.1;MeritoriousClaims and Contentions

describedherein,constitutesofa violationofRule 1.1.

36. There isclearand convincing evidence thatMr. Anderson's conduct,as l.l(b)(4)-(5).

35. Mr. Anderson's failureto properlyprepareconstitutesa violationofRule

continueshould not have been filed.

hiscase was not affected,Mr. Anderson agrees thatthemotions to

Alexis was not harmed by Mr. Anderson's conduct and the outcome in

to detailsand schedulesnecessaryto avoid harm to hisclient.While Mr.

breached his duty to properlypreparefor thehearingand pay attention

filingthe motions and attendingthe hearingon October 5, 2012

review hisfiles,in particularthe statusof the Robidoux matter,priorto

would affectthe outcome of Mr. Alexis'scase.Mr. Anderson's failureto p. 35 12

(2005).

the severityofthe misconduct." Coffey's Case, 152 N.H. 503, 513

Case, 158 N.H. 299, 303 (2009). "The sanction...musttake intoaccount

legalprofession,and preventingsimilarconduct in the future." Conner's

maintaining public confidence in the bar,preservingthe integrityof the

44. The purpose ofthe Court'sdisciplinarypower is"protectingthe public,

(2005) ("Standards") supportsthissanction.

43. The American Bar Association's Standards forImposing Lawyer Sanctions

would serve the purposes of attorneydiscipline.

diversionas the appropriatesanctionin thismatter. This sanction

42. The Attorney DisciplineOfficeand Mr. Anderson jointlyrecommend a

C. SanctionAnalysis and Reasons forA Diversion

R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(a).

evidence thatMr. Anderson's conduct, as described herein,violatedN.H.

41. Having found the foregoingviolations,thereisclearand convincing

violationof Rule 3.1.

Mr. Anderson filedin the Alexis matterwere frivolousand constitutea

40. There isclearand convincing evidence thatthe motions to continue that tiieRobidoux matter.

verifyingwhether a hearing remained scheduled for October 9, 20 p. 35 12 in p. 36 13

Anderson breached the duty he owed to the legalsystem when he failed

failedto properlyprepare for a hearing on hisclient'sbehalf. Mr. Specifically,Mr. Anderson breached hisdutiesto hisclientwhen he

to hisclientand to the legalsystem. See Standards §§ 4.5 and 6.2. 47. Under the firstprong of the analysis,Mr. Anderson violateddutiesowed

mitigatingfactorson the ultimatesanction").

sanction,(theCourt] considers]the effectof any aggravatingor

the baselinesanction. See id. (statingthat"(a]fterdetermining the

existenceof any aggravatingor mitigatingfactorsand whether they affect

the Court then looks to the fourthand finalpartofthe analysis:the

the appropriatesanction").Once the baselinesanctionisdetermined,

the firststepis tocategorizethe respondent'smisconduct and identify

Conner's Case, 158 N.H. at303 (statingthat"[i]napplying thesefactors,

characterizingthe misconduct and determining a baselinesanction. See

46. The firstthreepartsof the analysiscreatethe framework for

6 p. 36 13, 621 (2007)); Standards § 3.0. aggravatingor mitigatingfactors." Id. (quoting Douglas' Case, 156 N.H.

injurycaused by the lawyer'smisconduct; and (d)the existenceof

duty violated;(b)the lawyer'smental state;(c)the potentialor actual fourpartanalysisforcourtsto considerinimposing sanctions: "(a)the

guidance. Conner's Case, 158 N.H. at303. The Standards setfortha

45. Although the Court has not adopted the Standards, itlooks to them for p. 37 14

competent,and causes injuryor potentialinjuryto aclient. areaofpracticeinwhich thelawyer knows he or she isnot 4.52 Suspension isgenerallyappropriatewhen a lawyer engages in an conduct causes injuryor potentialinjuryto aclient. most fundamental legaldoctrinesor procedures,and thelawyer's conduct demonstratesthatthe lawyer does not understandthe 4.51 Disbarment isgenerallyappropriatewhen a lawyer'scourse of Standards, which provides,inpertinentpart:

51. Mr. Anderson's violationof Rule 1.1 implicatesSection4.5 ofthe

sentencinghearingoccurred on October 19, 2012.

Ultimately,Mr. Alexiswas not harmed in thatthe plea,dispositionand

prosecutorhad an interestin schedulinga dateforthepleahearing.

hisclient'sinterests,particularlybecause Mr. Anderson and the

to continue and to schedule a plea.Such a denialmay have prejudiced

potentialto harm hisclient,Walter Alexis.The Court denied themotion

and proceeded to be heard on the motion. Mr. Anderson's conduct had

opposing counsel when Mr. Anderson filedthe second motion to continue

causing an unnecessary use oftime and resourcesofthe courtand

50. Mr. Anderson's conduct caused injuryto the Court system, specifically

actualor potentialinjurycaused by Mr. Anderson's misconduct.

49. The thirdprong of the sanctionanalysisrequiresan assessment of the

negligentwith respectto the ruleviolations. sanctionanalysis,thepartiesagree thatMr. Anderson's mental statewas

48. With respectMr. Anderson's mental stateunder the second prong of the

motion to continuein the Alexis case.

to review hisfilesand calendars,particularlywhen he filedthe second p. 38 15

Standards, isanalogous to apubliccensure in New Hampshire. reprimandinNew Hampshire. The term "reprimand," asused in the ABA 1The term "admonition,"as used in the ABA Standards, isanalogous to a

interferencewith a legalproceeding. injuryto aparty,orcauseslittle or noactualor potential courtorderorrule,and causeslittleor no actualor potential in an isolatedinstanceofnegligencein complying with a 6.24 Admonition isgenerallyappropriatewhen a lawyer engages proceeding. causes interferenceor potentialinterferencewith a legal causes injuryor potentialinjuryto aclientor otherparty,or negligentlyfails to comply with acourtorderor rule,and 6.23 Reprimand isgenerallyappropriatewhen a lawyer

interferenceor potentialinterferencewith a legalproceeding. injuryor potentialinjuryto aclientor a party,or causes thathe or she isviolatinga courtorderor rule,and causes 6.22 Suspension isgenerallyappropriatewhen a lawyer knows proceeding. causes seriousor potentiallyseriousinterferencewith a legal seriousinjuryor potentiallyseriousinjuryto a partyor obtaina benefitfor thelawyer or another,and causes knowingly violatesa courtorderor rulewith theintentto 6.21 Disbarment isgenerallyappropriatewhen a lawyer

Standards, which provides,in pertinentpart:

52. Mr. Anderson's violationof Rule 3.1 implicatesSection6.2 ofthe

or potentialinjuryto a client. competent to handle a legalmatter,and causes littleor no actual isolatedinstanceof negligencein determiningwhether he or she is 4.54 Admonition1 isgenerallyappropriatewhen a lawyer engages in an

4.53 Reprimand isgenerallyappropriatewhen a lawyer: p. 39 16

preventsuch problems from occurringagain;and attendinga CLE

(includingan apology letterto the Court; a reductionofhiscaseloadto TIA);a good faitheffortto rectifytheconsequences ofmisconduct

involvinghisown healthissuesas evidenced by the February 2, 2012 Mr. Anderson's mother and grandmother had recentlypassed away) and

anotherson was dealingwith neurologicalissuesand tests;additionally

and as a resulthad multiplemedical appointments/procedures;and

was diagnosed with autism,gastrointestinalissues,and kidney reflux

wife was facing;healthproblems with two ofhisfive sons in thatone son

issuesatthe time ofhisactions(includinga seriousheartconditionhis

dishonestor selfishmotive;personalproblems involvingseriousfamily

56. Severalmitigatingfactorsarealsopresent,includingthe absence ofa

presentedin thiscomplaint. alcoholism,and were not similarto thecaseloadmanagement problems

disciplinaryhistoryaroseout ofproblems in hispersonallife,including

See Standards § 9.22. However, the partiesnote thatMr. Anderson's

disciplinaryhistoryand hissubstantialexperiencein thepracticeof law.

55. In thiscase,two aggravatingfactorsare present:Mr. Anderson'sprior

mitigatingfactors. E.g.,Conner's Case, 158 N.H. at303. 54. The baseline sanction must be considered in light of anyaggravatingand

4.54 and 6.24. sanctionforMr. Anderson'sconduct is areprimand.See Standards §§

53. Under the foregoingcircumstances,thepartiesagreethatthebaseline p. 40 17

simultaneouslyand in conjunctionwith thisStipulation.The Diversion 61. Mr. Anderson submits hisDiversion Agreement (the"Agreement")

37A(c)(Definitionof Minor Misconduct). suspension and does not involve conduct of the same nature. See Rule conduct occurred more than fiveyears afterhispriordisciplinary

60. Additionally,thismatterqualifiesfor diversionbecause Mr. Anderson's

and preventsimilarconduct in the future. ofadditionalContinuing Legal Education ("CLE") willfurthereducate him

thusa reasonablelikelihoodthatMr. Anderson's successfulcompletion

hour CLE. Because he could in thefutureincreasehiscaseload,thereis

voluntarilyworked toimprove hispractice,includingtakinga 1.5 credit

between Mr. Anderson and hisassistantatthetime. Mr. Anderson has

failureto review a filepriortofilinga motion, and miscommunication

because the misconduct in thismatterwas the resultofnegligence,

59. The partiesagree thatthismatterqualifiesfordiscretionarydiversion

N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 37A(I)(g)(3). 58. The partiesjointlyrecommend discretionarydiversionin thismatter.

downward departurefrom the baselinereprimand iswarranted.

thiscase,combined with the baselinesanctionanalysis,indicatethata

57. The partiesagreethatthe aggravating and mitigating factors evident in

skills). See Standards § 9.3. StayingOrganized"on May 10,2013 toimprovehistimemanagement

programentitled"Time Management forLawyers(PartOne):Gettingand p. 41 18

Rule 37A (III)(aa). may accept,reject,or conditionallyaccept the stipulationpursuantto

recommended disposition,and thatthe ProfessionalConduct Committee

65. Mr. Anderson understandsthatthisstipulationrepresentsa

isthe subjectof aseparateagreement signedby Mr.Anderson. CourtRule37(19).His agreement to pay the costsincurredby theADO

investigationand enforcementofthisdisciplinarymatter. See Supreme

Anderson agreestopay thecostsincurredby theADO in the

64. Subject to the PCC's approval ofMr. Anderson's Stipulation,Mr.

recommend a discretionarydiversion. 63. For all ofthesereasons,thepartiesrequestthatthe Committee

(b) Not engage in any professionalmisconduct.

theAgreement; requiredby the New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 53,as setforth in

(a)Complete six(6)additionalcreditsof CLE beyondtheminimum

year from thedatethatthe Committee approves the Agreement: 62. In short, theDiversionAgreementrequiresthatMr. Anderson,within one

diverted. with which Mr.Anderson must comply inorderto havethismatter Agreementisattachedto this Stipulation and sets forth theconditions p. 42 19

Dated: 2015

67. Mr. Andersonknowinglyandintelligentlywaiveshisrighttoa hearing.

stipulation. representedby counseland isfullyaware of theconsequencesof the inducements not setforth in thestipulation;and, thathe has been

result ofanythreats,coercion,or duress, or of any promises or and voluntarilysubmitted;that he is not entering thisstipulationas a

proposeddispositioncontainedinthisstipulationarefreely,knowingly,

66. Mr. Andersonacknowledgesthat theadmissionsofmisconductand the p. 43 Committee willconsiderthedisputeditem andissuea writtendecision. If

writingwithin thirtydaysofmy receiptofthebill.I understandthatthe

bill,IwillnotifytheCommitteeof thespecificnatureof the dispute in

understand thatthe Committee will bill me forthese costs.If Idisputethe

$39.25. Should further costs accrue in this disposition of thismatter,I

As ofJune 5, 2017, I have beeninformedthat the costs areapproximately

publication.

stenographers, transcripts,copying,inventory,audit expenses and

Ct.R. 37(19)(b).Costs can include,but are not limited to: mileage,

theinvestigationand enforcement ofthisdisciplinarymatter. See Sup.

above matter,I agree to pay the expensesincurredby the Committee in

Stipulationof Facts, RuleViolations,and Sanction:Reprimand in the

Subjecttothe ProfessionalConduct Committee'sapprovalofthe

NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT p. 44 Respondent Midhael E. Anderson, Esquire Dated: VuM, Iff 2017

Attorney DisciplineOffice'scollectionefforts.

6. I alsoagree to be responsiblefor allcostsincurredas a resultofthe

enforcement remedies and procedures. See Sup. Ct. R. 37(19)(c).

judgment and shallbe subjectto alllegally-availablepost-judgment

Court inany county in the state,where itshallbe docketed as a final

5. The Committee may filea copy ofthe finalassessment with the Superior

be enforced inany SuperiorCourt in New Hampshire.

shallhave the fullforceand effectofa civiljudgment. As a result,itmay

4. I understand and agree thattheassessment ofcostsisdeemed finaland

formal demand forpayment.

furtherdetailofthe natureand amount ofeach expense, and I alsowaive

3. I waive the provisionsof Supreme Court Rule 37(19)(b)regardingany

upon itsreceipt.

I do not notifythe Committee thatI disputethe bill,payment willbe due