Craig N. Salomon (2019)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as Original No. LD-20 p. 9 18-0007 The PCC found the following facts. The Attorney Discipline Office (ADO) Elizabeth M. Murphy, assistant disciplinary counsel, on the brief and Upton & Hatfield, LLP, of Portsmouth (Russell F. Hilliard on the brief and DONOVAN, J. On June 5, 2018, the Supreme Court Professional I. Background A. Haase Matter THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE Opinion Issued: January 23, 2019 Argued: November 27, 2018 ___________________________ SALOMON’S CASE received two unrelated complaints regarding the respondent. The first complaint formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are Conduct Committee (PCC) filed a petition recommending that the respondent, orally, for the attorney discipline office. orally), for the respondent. (hereinafter, the Haase matter) led to an investigation of the respondent’s requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Craig N. Salomon, be disbarred. We order the respondent disbarred. representation of Deborah Fogg during and after her divorce from George Fogg. Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that The divorce was finalized in 2009 and the final divorce agreement included, inter corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported alia, the following: (1) Ms. Fogg would obtain possession of the marital property by E-mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are in Seabrook (the Fogg property); (2) she agreed that she owed Mr. Fogg $22,350; available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct (3) she would convey a first mortgage to Mr. Fogg for that amount; and (4) the address of the court's home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. p. 2 2 $22,350 was payable within eighteen months. Ms. Fogg planned to sell the Following the divorce, the respondent continued to provide assistance to After the divorce was finalized, the respondent contacted a friend and Shortly thereafter, the respondent sought a $22,350 advance from Pan The respondent’s file included a proposed assignment of the $22,350 Pan American Fund advanced the respondent the full $22,350 to buy out Ms. Fogg by helping her to find a buyer or a developer to purchase the Fogg client, Dale Wood, to advise him of the settlement. The respondent persuaded American Fund. He testified that he planned to use the money to purchase the mortgage from Ms. Fogg to the respondent. The third page of the document the mortgage even though the respondent testified that it was never his property and use the proceeds to pay Mr. Fogg. At the time the divorce was property. The respondent never billed Ms. Fogg for his efforts relating to the Wood’s company, Pan American Fund, LLC, to accept an assignment of the mortgage issued to Mr. Fogg. He then planned to have Ms. Fogg execute a contained a signature that appeared to be Ms. Fogg’s, but was never dated, intention to offer the full-face amount of the mortgage to Mr. Fogg. When finalized, Ms. Fogg also owed the respondent $12,000 in attorney’s fees and Fogg property, nor is there evidence that the respondent asked Ms. Fogg to second mortgage in exchange for a payment from Pan American Fund to the mortgage to the respondent in the amount of $22,350, and he intended to witnessed, or recorded and Ms. Fogg testified that she did not recall signing the asked what the parties intended with respect to any money earned by a granted the respondent a second mortgage on the Fogg property in the amount execute a fee agreement for his services in this regard. The respondent testified respondent. The respondent used information obtained through his assign that second mortgage to Pan American Fund, so that Pan American document nor did she recall being apprised of the respondent’s plan to buy out discounted buy-out of Mr. Fogg, the respondent testified that he did not know. of $12,000 to guarantee the payment. Both of these mortgages were recorded. that he had intended to put a future advances clause in the $12,000 mortgage representation of Ms. Fogg, including appraisals and other non-public Fund could be in the first position to foreclose on the property if Ms. Fogg was her ex-husband’s mortgage. The respondent then offered to buy out Mr. Fogg for less than the full value of instrument as security for future legal fees, but had forgotten to do so. information the respondent obtained during his representation, to negotiate the unable to sell it or otherwise failed to fulfill her obligations. the mortgage. Mr. Fogg declined to accept the offer. assignment of the second mortgage and, thus, to obtain his attorney’s fees prior to the sale of the Fogg property. p. 3 3 Thereafter, the respondent negotiated with Wood to turn the $22,350 Subsequently, Pan American Fund assigned to Irving Haase/Heirs, LLC The respondent represented Haase/Heirs, LLC in foreclosure proceedings Mr. Fogg retained an attorney who communicated with the respondent. B. Florida Matter The second unrelated complaint against the respondent was received by Wood was Blackport’s asset manager representative. The respondent HPC initiated proceedings in the United States District Court for the into a personal loan, creating an obligation in that amount plus interest to Pan both the $12,000 mortgage and the respondent’s $22,350 loan. Haase believed against the Fogg property which was now owned by Mr. Fogg. In November A settlement agreement was ultimately reached that recognized that the only the ADO in October 2014 from an attorney at a law firm in Florida who filed on previously represented Wood individually and has represented companies, Southern District of Florida concerning Wood’s mismanagement of HPC’s American Fund. The record reflects that when the respondent signed the that those amounts were secured by mortgages filed against the Fogg property. 2013, the respondent sent a letter to Mr. Fogg demanding payment of principal mortgage eligible for foreclosure was the second mortgage for $12,000 that the behalf of HPC U.S. Fund 1, L.P. and HPC U.S. Fund 2, L.P. and its authorized including Blackport, of which Wood was an owner, member, or manager. Wood promissory note, he identified the Fogg property as security for the loan of In 2013, Haase contacted the respondent to have him initiate the process of and interest in the amount of $47,891.13. Mr. Fogg notified the respondent respondent had assigned to Pan American Fund. representative, Mr. Brinke. This matter involves the respondent’s and the respondent had a lengthy personal and professional relationship. $22,350. collecting on the notes, which were past due. Unbeknownst to Haase or the that he contested the amount and requested documentation supporting the representation of Blackport Investment Group, LLC, which was created and respondent, Ms. Fogg had quitclaimed the deed to her property to Mr. Fogg to demand. The respondent did not provide documentation. Formal foreclosure retained by HPC U.S. Fund 1, L.P. and HPC U.S. Fund 2, L.P. The HPC entities satisfy her debt to him. proceedings were initiated in December 2013. are holding companies of German-based investment vehicles that hold real estate interests throughout the United States. Blackport managed these interests for HPC. p. 4 4 funds, and alleged that Wood had misappropriated approximately $10,000,000. During this time frame, the respondent began to represent Blackport in Thereafter, the closing was dependent on determining who was Following the sale of the property, the proceeds were deposited in the In January 2014, HPC, through their attorneys, discovered that the the sale of property in Idaho, which was largely owned by HPC. The authorized to sign on behalf of the seller. Despite his knowledge of the respondent’s escrow account. The respondent did not notify HPC or its counsel property in Idaho had been conveyed without their knowledge. HPC initiated The federal court issued a temporary restraining order followed by a respondent contacted North Idaho Title, the company that was handling the injunction, the respondent informed North Idaho Title that Wood could sign on that he was holding funds governed by the preliminary injunction. Instead, the contempt proceedings in federal court against Wood. The proceedings were preliminary injunction, entered on September 4, 2013, against a number of purchase and sale of the Idaho property, and conducted some preliminary work behalf of Blackport, and the transaction closed in November 2013. The respondent disbursed those funds at the direction of Wood, including the ultimately broadened to include a third-party contemnor claim against the defendants, including Wood. The preliminary injunction prohibited Wood or on behalf of Blackport. Wood was one of the respondent’s contacts for respondent testified that he advised North Idaho Title that Wood had authority payment of the respondent’s attorney’s fees. Approximately two weeks after the respondent, who received notice and appeared before the court on one “any and all persons acting under Defendant’s direction or control” from taking Blackport. However, as the parties moved towards a possible closing date, because Wood had told him that Wood’s lawyer advised Wood to sign on behalf disbursement, $51,970 was returned to the respondent’s trust account and occasion. The matter was continued, and the respondent did not subsequently any action with respect to any property interests held by HPC. The prohibition Wood informed the respondent via e-mail about the injunction issued by the of Blackport, to protect the minority owner’s interest in the property. disbursed to a different entity under the direction of Wood. Wood authorized appear at any further proceedings. included transferring or secreting any property interests or liquid assets they federal court, which prohibited Wood from having any involvement in the the respondent to keep an additional $3,000 in attorney’s fees. held as a result of the transfer, sale, or conveyance of HPC’s property interests. conveyance of any property interests of HPC. In fact, Wood explicitly informed the respondent that, because of the injunction, Wood was not authorized to sign on behalf of Blackport for the sale of the property. p. 5 5 II. Analysis The respondent argues that there is insufficient evidence to support a In attorney discipline cases, we defer to the PCC’s factual findings if A. Rules Violations: Haase Matter Regarding the Haase matter, the PCC found that the respondent violated As an initial matter, the respondent justifies his actions relating to nearly The federal court found that the respondent had violated the preliminary After receiving these two complaints ― regarding the Haase and Florida finding by clear and convincing evidence that he violated the Rules of supported by the record, but retain ultimate authority to determine whether, Rules 1.7, 3.1, 4.1, and 8.4. all of the rule violations in this matter on the basis that, during the time of the injunction. In a September 2014 order, the magistrate found that Wood and matters ― the ADO requested that the chair of the hearing committee appoint a Professional Conduct in either matter. Furthermore, the respondent contends on the facts found, a violation of the rules governing attorney conduct has alleged misconduct, he mistakenly believed that the $12,000 mortgage on the the respondent “were aware of the injunction and had the ability to comply with hearing panel. See Sup. Ct. R. 37A(III)(b)(4). Following a hearing, the panel that if we agree with the PCC that he violated several Rules, we should impose occurred and, if so, the sanction. O’Meara’s Case, 164 N.H. 170, 176 (2012). Fogg property had a future advances clause that entitled him to the amount it, but chose not to do so.” After the federal court adopted the magistrate’s found that the respondent violated numerous rules of the New Hampshire an alternative sanction to disbarment, which would allow the respondent to We first consider whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support equal to that secured by both mortgages on the property. He acknowledges report, HPC filed a motion for judgment and an award of attorney’s fees. The Rules of Professional Conduct in both matters. The PCC agreed with the continue practicing law at a private law firm with oversight with an agreement the PCC’s findings by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent that the mortgage had no future advances clause, but nonetheless claims that respondent filed an objection. In June 2015, the court ordered that Wood and hearing panel and recommended that the respondent be disbarred. to retire from the practice of law in 2020. violated the Rules. Sup. Ct. R. 37A(III)(d)(2)(C). the $12,000 mortgage on the property was supposed to include a future the respondent were jointly and severally liable to HPC for $301,874.70 in contempt damages, $135,739.50 in attorney’s fees, and $4,672.70 in costs. p. 6 6 advances clause, which he contends would have obligated Ms. Fogg to pay up Ms. Fogg testified that she did not agree to a mortgage for more than 1. Rule 1.7 Rule 1.7 provides, in relevant part, that: [A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or The PCC found that the respondent violated this rule when he $12,000. The evidence presented to the PCC supports her testimony because represented both Ms. Fogg, who had an interest to sell the marital property, to $22,350 for legal services he allegedly provided researching the sale and a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest another client; or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s there is no evidence that the respondent invoiced Ms. Fogg for his post-divorce and Pan American Fund, an entity interested in purchasing the property. The potential development of the property. The respondent implicitly maintains exists if: responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third work relating to the property and there is no written fee agreement defining the evidence supporting this finding is clear and convincing. The respondent that this mistaken belief explains why he signed a promissory note and listed person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. terms of the respondent’s representation. Although the respondent’s testimony contends that there was no conflict because his clients had parallel interests. the Fogg property as the security for the loan of $22,350 by Pan American conflicted with the other evidence presented, “as a fact-finding tribunal, the We disagree. Based upon the record, we agree with the PCC’s inference that Fund. The PCC did not find the respondent’s explanation credible. PCC was at liberty to resolve any conflict in the evidence and to accept or reject Ms. Fogg wanted to sell her property at a maximum value ― she had to pay Mr. such portions of the testimony as it saw fit.” O’Meara, 164 N.H. at 178 Fogg within eighteen months and would have wanted to retain any excess (quotation and brackets omitted). We defer to the PCC’s finding that the proceeds earned by the sale. In contrast, Pan American Fund was considering respondent’s testimony was not credible and we agree that the record does not purchasing the property, and the PCC reasonably inferred that it would seek support the respondent’s assertion that he believed that the $12,000 mortgage included a future advances clause. p. 7 7 the lowest possible purchase price. Thus, the interests of Ms. Fogg and Pan 2. Rule 3.1 Rule 3.1 provides that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, The record supports the PCC’s finding by clear and convincing evidence The respondent knew that neither he nor Pan American Fund held the or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact that, when the respondent brought the foreclosure action against Mr. Fogg $22,350 mortgage on the Fogg property. He had failed to purchase Mr. Fogg’s American Fund were in conflict. See Boyle’s Case, 136 N.H. 21, 24 (1992) for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an demanding a sum of money, he knew that he had no legal or factual basis to do interest in the property and his reliance on an unwritten future advances (finding a violation of Rule 1.7 where a fundamental conflict existed between extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” so. The respondent initiated a foreclosure action against Mr. Fogg demanding clause was unreasonable. Thus, the evidence in the record supports the PCC’s the respondent’s role as guardian ad litem for the children and his role as $47,891.13. The respondent testified that he did not conduct a title search of finding by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent’s initiation of advocate for their father in a criminal matter). The respondent’s representation the property or review the mortgage he received from Ms. Fogg prior to foreclosure proceedings against Mr. Fogg, demanding an excessive payoff, with of his clients was also limited by his personal interest to obtain the $22,350 executing the foreclosure notice. When Mr. Fogg inquired further about the no foundation, was in violation of Rule 3.1. amount he purportedly believed he had earned. Thus, there is ample evidence basis for the foreclosure demand, the respondent did not provide any in the record that supports the PCC’s finding by clear and convincing evidence documentation. Mr. Fogg retained an attorney who communicated with the that the respondent violated Rule 1.7. respondent. The respondent testified that at some point he realized that there was no future advances clause and that the only mortgage eligible for foreclosure was the $12,000 second mortgage. The respondent claims that because he understood the $12,000 mortgage to include a future advances clause, he had a “good faith” basis for initiating the foreclosure proceeding. As discussed above, the PCC was at liberty to resolve any conflict in the evidence and we defer to its finding that the respondent has not demonstrated that, an attorney with forty years of experience, forgot to include a future advances clause and misunderstood the state of the various loans and mortgages held on the property. See O’Meara, 164 N.H. at 178. p. 8 8 3. Rule 4.1 Similarly, there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when The respondent knowingly sent a demand letter, followed by a foreclosure 4. Rule 8.4 Rule 8.4(a) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to B. Rules Violations: Florida Matter As to the Florida matter, the PCC found that the respondent violated the PCC’s finding that the respondent violated Rule 4.1, which provides that: notice, to Mr. Fogg demanding $47,891.13 when he knew that he had borrowed “violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Rule 8.4(c) Rules 1.2, 1.4, 1.15, 3.4, 8.4(a), and 8.4(c). person; or disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or $22,350 from Pan American Fund, signed a promissory note for that amount further provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by plus interest, and had no mortgage on the property securing any debt relating conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” Because we Rule 1.6. to the $22,350 loan. The only debt that the Fogg property secured was the have concluded that the evidence in the record supports the PCC’s $12,000 mortgage the respondent had assigned to Pan American Fund. The determination that the respondent violated several Rules, including Rule 4.1 PCC was not persuaded by the respondent’s claim that he believed that the involving false statements, we necessarily also conclude that there is clear and mortgage he drafted included a future advances clause, and that is why he convincing evidence in the record to support its ruling that he violated Rule 8.4. accepted the advance from Pan American Fund. His representations to Haase that such a mortgage existed and his representations to Mr. Fogg in issuing the $47,891.13 foreclosure demand were false statements of material fact. Thus, the evidence in the record supports the PCC’s determination that the respondent violated Rule 4.1. 1 9 All of these rule violations stem from the fact that the federal court in 1. Rule 1.2 Rule 1.2(d) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage,. . . .” Despite Wood’s reminders to the respondent that he could not perform 2. Rule 1.4 The record further supports the PCC’s finding by clear and convincing The respondent argues that he could not afford to defend against the contempt proceedings in Florida and, therefore, a judgment was entered against him without any hearing on the merits at Florida issued an injunction prohibiting Wood or “any and all persons acting or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent evidence that the respondent also violated Rule 1.4, which provides that a certain actions in light of the federal court’s injunction, the respondent which he appeared. The respondent further contends that the contempt order issued in the under Defendant’s direction or control” from taking any action regarding HPC’s lawyer shall “consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the ultimately assisted Wood to violate the court’s order. The respondent testified federal court is not binding on this court. Because we conclude that there is evidence in the property interests, and that, despite knowing about the court order, the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not that Wood represented to the respondent that Wood had received legal advice record to support a finding that the respondent violated the injunction, we need not base our respondent facilitated the sale of property in Idaho and distributed the sale permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.” N.H. R. Prof. that he could sign on behalf of Blackport in the sale of the Idaho property. decision solely on the fact that a contempt order was issued. proceeds at the direction of Wood. The respondent asserts that during and Conduct 1.4(a)(5). Notwithstanding the respondent’s knowledge of the However, the respondent testified that he did not attempt to contact Wood’s after the sale he proceeded in accordance with instructions he received from counsel about this matter. The PCC found the respondent’s alleged reliance on Blackport and, therefore, he did not believe he was violating the court order. Wood’s representation unreasonable. We agree. Thus, when Wood signed on Specifically, he contends that even though he knew about the injunction, he behalf of Blackport, after the respondent had been informed of the injunction, was uncertain whether Wood had been removed as manager of Blackport and the respondent assisted Wood to engage in fraudulent conduct by knowingly 1 whether Blackport was part of the preliminary injunction. He further asserts violating the federal court injunction. Therefore, clear and convincing that he was not aware of an attempt to remove Blackport as the manager of evidence in the record supports the PCC’s determination that the respondent HPC. violated Rule 1.2. p. 10 10 injunction, he did not consult with Wood or others who worked for Blackport 3. Rule 1.15 The record also supports the PCC’s finding by clear and convincing HPC held title to the Idaho property and was therefore entitled to the 4. Rule 3.4 Rule 3.4(c) states that a lawyer shall not “knowingly disobey an evidence that the respondent violated Rule 1.15. Rule 1.15(e) provides that proceeds of its sale. When the respondent received funds from the sale of the obligation under the rules of a tribunal . . . .” The record supports the PCC’s about any relevant limitation that the injunction could have on his conduct. “[u]pon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has Idaho property, in which he knew that HPC held an interest, he neither notified finding by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated this rule The PCC was not persuaded by the respondent’s argument that he relied on an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.” Rule HPC or its attorneys upon receipt of those funds, nor did he keep the proceeds when he knew of the preliminary injunction and chose to assist Wood to violate other people from Blackport, or other unidentified attorneys advising Wood, 1.15(f) provides that “[w]hen in the course of representation a lawyer is in of the sale in his escrow account until it was determined who was entitled to it, prompting the federal court to find the respondent and Wood in contempt. when moving forward with the Idaho transaction and therefore he did not possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the the funds. Instead, he disbursed the funds at Wood’s direction, while the violate Rule 1.4 with respect to his communication with Blackport. We lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until respondent knew that Wood was enjoined by the federal court from taking any conclude that the evidence in the record supports the PCC’s ruling that the the dispute is resolved.” action regarding HPC’s property. The respondent also knew that Wood was in injunction limited the respondent’s conduct, and by not consulting with his an ongoing dispute with HPC as to whether or not Wood had been removed as client, or any of its representatives, about how the injunction impacted his a manager. HPC did not even discover that their Idaho property had been assistance and prohibited certain actions, he violated Rule 1.4. conveyed to third parties until January 2014. Thus, the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the PCC’s finding that the respondent violated Rule 1.15. p. 11 11 5. Rule 8.4 There is ample evidence in the record that clearly and convincingly III. Sanction Having concluded that the respondent violated numerous Rules of Although we have not adopted the American Bar Association’s Standards We first review the duties the respondent violated. According to the PCC, supports the PCC’s finding that the respondent violated Rule 8.4(a) and (c) Professional Conduct, we turn next to the appropriate sanction. We retain the for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2013), we look to them for guidance. Id. The the respondent violated duties to his clients, the legal system, and the public. because he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and engaged in conduct ultimate authority to determine the sanction for a violation of the Rules. Standards list the following factors for consideration in imposing sanctions: (a) We agree. In the Haase matter, the respondent violated his duty of loyalty by involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. In addition to the O’Meara, 164 N.H. at 179. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that the the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury representing both the seller and an interested purchaser of the Fogg property. evidence of violations discussed above, the respondent failed to advise North purpose of attorney discipline is not to inflict punishment, but rather to protect caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or As to the Florida matter, the respondent violated his duty to Blackport by Idaho Title that a federal court had issued the preliminary injunction. The the public, maintain public confidence in the bar, preserve the integrity of the mitigating factors. Standards, supra § 3.0; Young, 154 N.H. at 368. We first failing to advise Wood and Blackport of his limitations in representing them respondent also disbursed funds from the sale of the property to third parties legal profession, and prevent similar conduct in the future. Young’s Case, 154 categorize the respondent’s misconduct and identify the baseline sanction. other than HPC, including himself, despite knowing that HPC had an interest N.H. 359, 368 (2006). We judge each attorney discipline case upon its own O’Meara, 164 N.H. at 179. After determining the sanction, we then consider in the property. facts and circumstances, taking into account the severity of the misconduct the effect of any aggravating or mitigating factors on the ultimate sanction. Id. and any mitigating circumstances appearing in the record. Id. When there are multiple misconduct charges, “the sanction imposed should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct among a number of violations; it might well be and generally should be greater than the sanction for the most serious misconduct.” Id. at 179-80 (quotation omitted). p. 12 12 while the injunction was in place and by facilitating the sale of the Idaho Next, we consider the respondent’s mental state at the time of his Next, we consider the actual or potential injury caused by the The respondent’s failure to comply with the federal injunction inflicted violations, which may be one of intent, knowledge, or negligence. Id. at 180. respondent’s misconduct. Id. The Standards define “injury” as harm to a injury on the legal system and on his client. Disbursing the funds from the property in violation of the injunction. Furthermore, by violating the The volitional nature of the acts, and not the external pressure that could client, the public, the legal system, or the profession which results from a sale of the Idaho property under the direction of Wood, without informing HPC, injunction, the respondent violated his duty to obey court orders, an obligation potentially have hindered the judgment, is relevant. Id. The PCC determined lawyer’s misconduct. Conner’s Case, 158 N.H. 299, 304 (2009). The PCC inflicted injury on third parties, namely, HPC and its investors, who had title to that he owes to the legal system. His conduct during the Florida matter also that he acted knowingly and that the evidence supported an inference that the determined that the respondent caused serious injury to his client and third the property and should have been informed about the transfer of the property. violated the duties of candor and honesty that he owes to the public. respondent “acted intentionally, that is, with a conscious objective to achieve a parties in the Florida matter and in the Haase matter. We agree. With respect to the Haase matter, representing both Ms. Fogg and Pan result.” We agree. The respondent knowingly violated the federal injunction American Fund while issuing a promissory note and improperly representing when he sought to consummate the sale of the Idaho property and disburse the the Fogg property as security, inflicted injury on both of the respondent’s funds at the direction of Wood. In addition, as to the Haase matter, the clients. Moreover, the respondent made a false statement when he represented respondent knowingly brought a foreclosure action against Mr. Fogg for an to Haase that a $22,350 mortgage existed on the Fogg property and issued a amount exceeding what was owed to him. foreclosure notice to Mr. Fogg demanding $47,891.13, without any legal or factual basis for doing so. “The privilege of practicing law does not come without the concomitant responsibility of truth, candor and honesty. Because no single transgression reflects more negatively on the legal profession than a lie, attorney misconduct involving dishonesty justifies disbarment.” Young, 154 N.H. at 369 (quotation omitted). Considering the duties violated, the respondent’s mental state, and the harm and potential harm caused, we conclude, as did the PCC, that the proper baseline sanction is disbarment. See Standards, supra §§ 4.11, 4.61, 5.11, and 6.21. p. 13 13 We next consider the effect of mitigating and aggravating factors upon The respondent argues that the sanction should be proportional to the So ordered. LYNN, C.J., and HICKS and BASSETT, JJ., concurred. the baseline sanction of disbarment. See Standards, supra § 9.1. The various transgressions and, if we determine that the rule violations did occur, respondent asserts that there are numerous mitigating factors that we should then a lesser sanction than disbarment should be imposed. We are not consider, such as his public service to the legal community, his personal and persuaded. Given the lack of mitigating factors, and the presence of numerous financial issues, and his contention that his prior discipline offenses do not aggravating factors, we conclude that disbarment is the proper sanction. involve similar activity. The PCC found only one mitigating factor; the Disbarment is necessary to protect the public and preserve the integrity of the respondent’s cooperation during the proceedings and throughout the ADO’s legal profession when, as in this case, an attorney allows his personal interests investigation. Nonetheless, the PCC identified numerous aggravating factors: to take precedence over his duty of loyalty to his clients. We further order the (1) the respondent acted dishonestly and selfishly when he misrepresented the respondent to reimburse the attorney discipline system for all expenses status of the injunction to North Idaho Title by not disclosing its existence, and incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter. Sup. Ct. R. when he disbursed the proceeds from the sale of the Idaho property to parties 37(19). other than HPC without informing HPC or seeking its assent; (2) the respondent committed multiple offenses involving serious violations; (3) Ms. Fogg was a vulnerable victim as she was recently divorced and pressed to sell the property within eighteen months to satisfy her debt to her ex-husband; (4) the Florida district court found the respondent jointly and severally liable for over $400,000 and he has not paid any portion of that judgment; (5) the respondent had substantial experience in the practice of law ― over 40 years ― when he was found in contempt of court in Florida, in 2014; (6) the respondent has not accepted responsibility for his actions, maintaining that they were unintentional mistakes, which the PCC found not credible; and (7) the respondent has a previous disciplinary record, including three public censures and a six-month suspension that was imposed in November 2017. These aggravating circumstances are in accord with those to consider under the Standards. Standards, supra § 9.2. The aggravating factors far outweigh the mitigating factors. p. 14 File

Allison Cook, Supreme Court Mr. C raig N. Salomon David M. Rothstein, Esquire Elizabeth M. Murphy, Esquire Russell F. Hilliard, Esquire Professional Conduct Committee; 14 - 0379, 14 - 039 Distribution:

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

our January 23, 2019 decision and deny the relief requested in the motion. misapprehended in our decision. Accordingly, upon reconsideration, we affirm reconsideration and conclude that no points of law or fact were overlooked or We have reviewed the claims made in the respondent’s motion for

fact that he claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended. rehearing or reconsideration shall state with particularity the points of law or Supreme Court Rule 22(2) provides that a party filing a motion for

following order: Salomon, Esquire, the court on February 2 0, 201 9, issued the In Case No. LD - 2018 - 0007, In the Matter of Craig N.