Joseph S. Hoppock (2025)

not consider this tautology to be significant in its decision - making. p. 13 The alleged violation of Rule 8.4(a) simply alleged a violation of the Rule by violating the Rules. The Committee did 1

Hoppock burdened a third person through intimidation. See, e.g., Robertson’s Case, purpose to embarrass, delay or burden a third person.” It was alleged that Attorney take any action if the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the action has the primary Persons,” state s, in subparagraph (a), “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not Professional Conduct 4. 4(a) and 8.4(a). Rule 4.4, “Respect for Rights of Third 1 The Notice of Charges alleged that Attorney Joseph Hoppock violated Rules of This case has had a unique procedural history which bears discussion here. Procedural History

regarding the Hearing Panel’s determination of sanction. “Committee”) heard arguments and considered written filings by the parties On February 20, 2024, the Professional Conduct Committee (the

*non - lawyer member

*Peter J. Kiriakoutsos *Everett S. Grass Trudy Renfors, Admin. Asst. Richard C. Gagliuso, Esq. Eric R. Wilson, Esq. *Ronald K. Ace Mitchell M. Simon, Esq. Caroline K. Leonard, Esq., Vice Chair. Robin D. Melone, Esq. *Kathleen M. Ames, Vice Chair Karyl R. Martin, Esq. Stephanie C. Hausman, Esq., Chair Derek Lick, Esq.

the intimidating nature of the letter was objectively obvious. The Committee thus the content of the Ma y 20, 2019 letter, the Co mmittee made the factual finding that obvious. Because that assessment did not depend on witness credibility, but only on the second variant – whether the letter ’s intimidating nature wa s objectively findings or a ruling on whether the A DO sustained its burden to show a violation of The Committee found that the first Hearing Panel had not made factual model rule by using the word ‘obvious’ to set a higher objective standard.”). C omment to Rule 4.4(a) (finding that the New Hampshire Rule “differs from the o bjective standard of obviousness. See, e.g., New Hampshire Ethics Committee 3 first variant captured a subjective mental state while the second varian t contained an h as the primary purpose to burden a third person. The Committee found that the primary purpose is to burden a third person, and 2) taking action that it is obvious 4.4(a) provided two relevant variants: 1) taking action knowing that the action’s 2 carefully considered the structure of Rule 4.4(a). It found that, as alleged here, Rule In its first order in this case, dated November 29, 2022, the Committee Panel’s finding to the Committee. violation of Rule 4.4(a) by clear and convincing evidence. The ADO appealed the Attorney Discipline Office (the “ADO”) had not met its burden to prove a knowing The first Hearing Panel, in an order dated January 4, 2 022, found that the that a $250,000 settlement demand was “generous.” assertions about the “legal consequences that would befall” her, and representing until [she] ha [d] nothing left, except assets exempt from judicial execution,” making threatening financial ruin, threatening that he and his client would “pursue [her] demand letter to an unrepresented party, Brandie Roof, that contained statements the meaning of Rule 4.4(a)). Specifically, on May 20, 2019, Attorney Hoppock sent a 137 N.H. 113, 117 - 18 (1993) (finding that intimidation constituted burdening within

Page 2 inapposite to the current stage in the litigation of this matter. p. 15 The present Committee d oes not consider Attorney Saturley’s arguments focused on reconsidering this finding, as 4

First Sanction Factors – Duty Violated

mitigating factors. Id. at 109. Once the baseline sanction is determined, we then look to aggravating and violations, and (3) the extent of the actual or potential injury cause d.” Id. at 108 - 09. duties violated by the lawyer, (2) the lawyer’s mental state at the time of the guidance. Id. To determine the “baseline” sanction, we consider: “(1) the ethical Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (the “ABA Standards”), the Court looks to them for Supreme Court has not adopted the American Bar Association’s Standards for any mitigating circumstances appearing in the record.” Id. Although the and circumstances, taking into account the severity of the attorney’s misconduct and N.H. 96, 108 (2020) (quotation omitted). Each case is to be judged “on its own facts the legal profession, and prevent similar conduct in the futur e.” Mesmer’s Case, 173 protect the public, maintain public confidence in the bar, preserve the integrity of The “purpose of attorney discipline is not to inflict punishment, but rather to law and recommendatio n of sanction de novo. Id. Rule 37A(III)(d)(2)(C). The Committee reviews the Hearing Panel’s conclusions of upholding them “unless clearly erroneous or manifestly in error.” Supreme Court Th e Committee reviews the Hearing Panel’s factual findings with deference, Sanction Analysis

Both parties have asked the Committee to review this decision. sanction was a six - month suspension, stayed for two years on cert ain conditions. factual findings on factors relevant to sanction. It determined that the appropriate The second Hearing Panel, in a n order dated October 25, 2023, made detailed evidence and remanded for a Hearing Panel determination of sanction. 4 found a violation of the “obvious” variant of Rule 4.4(a) by clear and convincing

Page 3 ways and relate s to different subjects for purposes of a Rule violation and the p. 16 she] is violating a court . . . rule”). Because “knowledge” is defined in different sanction when lawyer “knowingly violates a court. . . rule” or “knows that he [or court rule. See ABA Standard 6.2 (disbarment and suspension are appropriate know ledge requirement to knowledge of whether the action was a violation of a (“Definitions”). Moreover, the ABA Standard applicable to this case attaches the objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” ABA Standards, Sec. III the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious the Committee need only find that Attorney Hoppock wa s “conscious [ly] aware [] of However, t o find a knowing mental state for purposes of the sanction analysis, finding in this regard in this case. letter ’s primary purpose was to intimidate the unrepresented party. There is no At torn e y Hoppock had “actual knowledge of the fact in question,” id., i.e., that his by Rule 1.0(f). For purposes of the Rule violation, the ADO had to prove that violation of Rule 4.4(a) by clear and convincing evidence, that finding is controlled While the first Hearing Panel found that the ADO did not prove a knowing knowingly for purposes of the sanctions analysis. The Comm ittee agrees. As to the second factor, t he Panel found that Attorney Hoppock acted Second Sanction Factor – Mental State

accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct. R ule 4.4(a) entails a violation of a lawyer’s duty to the legal system, to practice in the public who is protected by the prohibitions of Rule 4.4. In addition, a violation of third person.” The demand letter was sent to an unrepr esented party, a member of lawyer knows or it is obvious that the action has the pr imary purpose to . . . burden a addresses the “rights of third persons” and prohibits, inter alia, actions that “the some actions in pursuit of the client’s goals that imp act others. Thus, Rule 4.4 lawyer’s primary duty is to the client, the Rules of Professional Conduct proscribe duties owed to the public and the legal system. The Committee agrees. While a As to the first factor, t he Hearing Panel found that Attorney Hoppock violated

Page 4 p. 17 N.H. 113 (1993), which signifies to the Committee that this is not a common Rule violation. There are only two published cases involving Rule 4.4 violations, Kalil’s Case, 146 N.H. 466 (2001); Robertson’s Case, 137 5

element of an offense when he is aware of and consciously A person acts recklessly with respect to a material

criminal law. Rule 4.4(a)’s objectively o bvious mental state a s akin to a reckless mental state in determinative of the mental state used in the sanc tion analysis, the Committee reads Finally, should the Court find that the mental state of the rule violation is Attorney Hoppock acted knowingly in that regard. Committee agrees with the Hearing Panel that the evidence here showed that looks to the lawyer’s knowledge “that he [or she] is violating a court . . . rule,” the he was now “well - educated on New Hampshire’s Rule 4.4.” Given that the standard admitted that his conduct violated Rule 4.4(a) and he asserted in that proceeding that opposing counsel in a way that potentially damaged his clients’ interests. He productive, and agreed that he personally attacked the opposing party and the friction between the parties, acknowledged that his choice of words was counter factor. In the prior case, Attorney Hoppock admitted that his comments increased this case the evidence of prior disciplinary history bears directly on the state of mind consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, in the unique circumstances of disciplinary history is not usually relevant in the sanction s analysis until the viola ting Rule 4.4(a) not quite two years prior to sending the letter. While prior 5 man y attorneys would not have shared. Attorney Hoppock previously admitted to heightened knowledge of the context of his actions and Rule 4.4(a), to an extent that In addition, as the Hearing Panel emphasized, Attorney Hoppock had a (“Definitions”). . attendant circumstances” surrounding the letter. See ABA Standards, Sec. III knew that Ms. Roof was unrepresented. Thus, he had “conscious awareness of the. . Attorney Hoppock was well aware of the words he used in the l e tter and he purposes of the sanction analysis. purpose of the letter does not prevent a finding of a knowing mental state for appropriate sanction, the lack of finding of a knowing mental state related to the

Page 5 below. p. 18 which is more culpable than a negligent mental state, and the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors considered Hoppock’s mental state is more appropriately categorized as a “reckless” or “rea sonably should know” mental state, Committee would find that, in that scenario, an upward departure from the baseline was warranted, given that Attorney Section 6.2 3 and N ew Hampshire law. However, given the weig ht of aggravating and mitigat ing factors in the case, the the mental state analysis, this would result in a lower baseline sanction of a public censure under the ABA Standards, If this is an error and Attorney Hoppoc k should have been found to meet only the negligent standard for purposes of 6

Third Sanction Factor - Injury

purposes of the sanction analysis. 6 equivalent to a knowing mental state to justify using the knowing mental state for N.H. at 108, t he Committee finds the objectively obvious mental state is sufficiently attorney discipline system but are used instead as guidance, Mesmer’s Case, 173 Hampshire Rule and that the ABA Standards do not control the New Hampshire Given that the ABA Standards do not address the mental state used in the New “intent,” “knowledge,” and “negligence”). determining lawyer sanctions. See ABA Standards, Sec. III (“Definitions”) (defining Standards neither use the term “reckless,” nor use a ny related concept s in obvious standard as equ ally culpable as a knowing standard. However, t he ABA Hampshire Rules appear to treat the rea so nably should have known/objectively comparable to an objectively obvious standard. In bo th Rule s 4.3 and 4.4, the New the matter in question”). The “reasonably should have known” standard is capturing when “a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain known” standard), Rule 1.0(j) (defining “reasonably should know” standard as known” standard in a related context. See Rule 4.3 (using “reasonably should have New Hampshire’s Rules of Professional Conduct employ a “should have and negligent mental state in terms of culpability. RSA 626:2. RSA 626:2, II(c). In criminal law, the reckless mental state falls betw een a knowing

ab i ding person would observe in the situation. constitutes a gross deviation from the conduct that a law considering the circumstances known to h i m, its disregard The risk must be of such a natu re and degree that, material element exists or will result from his conduct. disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the

Page 6 with you and your entitled client.” This tone continued in later communications, p. 19 Hoppock wrote to opposing counsel that he “look[ed] forward to protracted warfare “scorched earth” terminology Attorney Hoppock used. In the prior c ase, Attorney oranges,” the Committee disagrees and instead finds striking similarity in the Attorney Hoppoc k has characterized the two incidents as being like “apples and same rule less than two years prior to him compos ing the letter to Ms. Roof. While prior disciplinary history, which includes a stipulation to a similar violation of the factual findings. First and most significant is the aggravator of Attorney Hoppock’s The Committee f i nd s three aggravating factors based on the Hearing Panel’s nonetheless be helpful. not exhaustive). The Committee found the listed factors in the ABA Standard to 391 (2020) (legislature’s use of the work “including” indicates tha t items listed are “include [d]” as aggravators and mitigators. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 173 N.H. 386, appropriate considerations to those listed; instead, they only list fact or s that are by the factors listed in the ABA Standards. T he Standards, however, do not limit the In considering aggravating and mitigating factors, the Committee is guided Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

or a party, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.” she is violating a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client suspension: “Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that he or the appropriate baseline sanction, as guided by Section 6.22 of the ABA Standards, is Given these three findings, t he Committee agree s with the Hearing Panel that Baseline Sanction

fear out of proportion to a more typical demand letter. Hoppock’s misconduct caused actual injury to the complainant in that it caused he r profession.” The Committee agrees with this finding and, in particular, that Attorney injury to the complainant, the legal system, and the reputation and standing of the The Hearing Panel found that Attorney Hoppock caused “actual and potent ial

Page 7 p. 20 Rule 8.1(b). attorneys have a professional responsibility to cooperate with ADO investigations. and free disclosure, which was credi ted) as separately mitigating because all Committee also d oes not find Attorney Hoppock’s cooperation (apart from his full Hoppock has continued to practice during the pendency of this matter. The does not find that the de lay in this case should affect the sanction. Of note, Attorney a ttorney d iscipline system strives to resolve cases more quickly, the Committee the preference for an in - person hearing during the Covid pandemic. While the delay has been the result of scheduling preferences, seeking appellate review, and ADO. While this case has been pending for most of the last five years, much of that the delay in the processing of this case and Attorney Hoppock’s cooperation with the Two factors that the Committee found neither aggravating nor mitigating are full and free disclosure to the ADO. The Committee f i nd s one mitigating factor – that Attorney Hoppock made a than thirty - five years ago. the practice of law. He was admitted to practice in New Hampshire in 1988, more The last aggravating factor is Attorney Hoppock’s substantial experience in t his is a devastating finding to which the Committee pays great deference. similar conduct in the future,” Mesmer’s Case, 173 N.H. at 108 (quotation omitted), confidence in the bar, preserve the integrity of the legal profession, and prevent “purpose of attorney discipline is. . . to protect the public, maintain public not engage in similar professional misconduct in the future.” Given that the led the Hearing Panel to find that it had “no confidence that [Attorney] Hoppock will Attorney Hoppock’s refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. This Relatedly and s econdarily, the Committee finds as an aggravating factor t hat the difference between the two cases were “one of degree and not of kind.” further communications, he personally attacked Ms. Roof. The Hearing Panel found Here, Attorney Hoppock threatened an unrepresented party with financial ruin. In w a s found by a court to have “exacerbated” the “friction” between the parties. including comparing the opposing party’s actio ns to tactics used by the Nazis, and

Page 8 p. 21 It is unclear from the opinion in Robertson’s Case whether the respondent had a prior disciplinary history. 7

suspension from the practice of law, two months of which are imposed and four The Committee thus concludes that the appropriate sanction is a six - month Sanction

and their distinctions from this case in crafting its sanction determination. recently admitt ed violat i ng the same Rule. The Committee considered these cases an unrepresented party, with less aggressive language than in Kalil but after having Attorney Hoppock violated Rule 4.4(a) with a single, c onsidered communication to In comparison with these cases, t he Committee f i nd s it significant that, here, 19. 7 counsel. 137 N.H. at 117 - 18. The respondent was given a public censure. Id. at 118 have used intimidating language in his attempts to settle the case with opposing opposing counsel of committing serious crimes and violating court orders and to In Robertson’s Case, the respondent was found to have repeatedly accused m ost of the Court’s analysis focuse d. Id. Also, that case involved a dditional Rule violation s involving dishonesty, upon which violate a court order, and the respondent had no disciplinary history. Id. at 466 - 67. in the heat of the moment, after the unrepresented party indicated his intent to suspended for three months. Id. at 468. In that case, the respondent made the threat to the judge about having done so. 146 N.H. at 46 6 - 67. The respondent was threatening to “rip [the] face o ff” an unrepresented party and then immediately lied appropriate sanction. In Kalil’s Case, the respondent attorney violated Rule 4.4(a) by The Committee also look s to New Hampshire caselaw in determining the Caselaw

mitigator in this case. On balance, the Committee f i nd s that the aggravators overwhelmed the

Page 9 p. 22 Stephanie C. Hausman DATED: March 1 2, 2024 _ /s/ Stephanie Hausman

affidavit to the ADO. he has fully complied with Rule 37(13). Attorney Hoppock shall sen d a copy of the with the Supreme Court within 30 days of the suspension taking effect showing that into effect, Attorney Hoppock shall comply with Rule 37(13) and shall file an affidavit case it will be stayed. Supreme Court Rule 37A (III)(d)(4)(B). If the suspension goes not business days) after the issuance of this order unless he files an appeal, in which following the 3 0th day (or the second business day if both the 30 and 31 days are th st Attorney Hoppock’s two - month suspension shall begin on the first business day alleged. bring this matter back before the Committee if any violation of t hese conditions is law (or later for any alleged later - occurring events), the ADO may file a motion to No later than t wenty - two months after Attorney Hoppock resumes the practice of investigation and prosecution of this matter. • Attorney Hoppock shall pay all expenses incurred by the ADO in the ten hours o f ethics training in addition to his annual ethics CLE requirement. • Atto rney Hoppock shall, prior to or within the two - year period of stay, attend any treatment recommendations, and work with a LAP - approved mentor. work with LAP to engage in an evaluation by a LAP - approved provider, follow • Attorney Hoppock shall meet with the Lawyers Assistance Program (LAP), the two - year stay, the matter s hall come back before the Committee. violations occurring on or after the date of this order and before expiration of tolled until resolution of the new matter. If a finding is made of additional Rule filed prior to the expiration of the two - year period of stay, the stay will be Conduct until the expiration of the two - year stay. If a grievance or referral is • Attorney Hoppock must commit no new violations of the Rules of Professional the following conditions: months of which are stayed. The four - mont h suspension is stayed for two years on

Page 10 p. 23 Joseph S. Hoppock, Esq. Supreme Court Attorney Discipline Office and William C. Saturley, Esq., counsel for March 11, 2024, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Assistant Discipline Counsel of the NH I hereby certify that a copy of the aforesaid Order is being sent on this date,

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