

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPERIOR COURT

COÖS, SS

OCTOBER TERM, 2025

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

V.

DUSTIN MARK DUREN

214-2024-CR-00028

STATE'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW:
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE

NOW COMES the State of New Hampshire, by and through its attorneys, the Office of the Attorney General, and respectfully submits this memorandum of law.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹

1. The defendant is charged with alternative charges of knowing second-degree murder and reckless second-degree murder, for killing Caitlyn Naffziger on February 29, 2024, in Berlin, New Hampshire. The defendant is further charged with reckless conduct with a deadly weapon and child endangerment related to his actions in the homicide.

2. The evidence put forth at trial, to date, has established that on February 29, 2024, the defendant killed Caitlyn Naffziger by shooting her in the head at his apartment in Berlin, New Hampshire. The two children shared by the defendant and Ms. Naffziger, E.D. and V.D., were present in the apartment at the time of the murder. At the time, E.D. was 4 years old and V.D. was one year old.

¹ All facts listed below are drawn from testimony and evidence introduced by the parties during the jury trial in this matter.

3. At a motions hearing on October 7, 2025, the defense argued that the defendant should be allowed to argue to the jury that his use of deadly force against Ms. Naffziger was justified because he believed she was committing or about to commit a kidnapping – specifically, a kidnapping pursuant to RSA 633:1, I-a. The State argued that the scenario described by the defendant does not constitute a kidnapping under RSA 633:1, I-a because the statute specifically excludes blood relations. The defense countered that although the defendant’s belief that Ms. Naffziger was committing a kidnapping was mistaken, it should nevertheless support a justification defense under RSA 627:4, II(c) because Ms. Naffziger’s behavior constituted kidnapping in an undefined, colloquial sense.

4. The State provides this pleading to address the defendant’s arguments and related legal issues.

ARGUMENT

5. The crime of kidnapping is defined by statute which states that “[a] person is guilty of kidnapping if he knowingly confines another under his control with a purpose to (a) [h]old him for ransom or as a hostage; or (b) [a]void apprehension by a law enforcement official; or (c) [t]errorize him or some other person; or (d) [c]ommit an offense against him. RSA 633:1, I.

6. RSA 633:1, I-a holds that a person is guilty of kidnapping “if the person knowingly takes, entices away, detains, or conceals any child under the age of 18 **and unrelated to the person by consanguinity**...with the intent to detain or conceal such child from a parent, guardian, or other person having lawful physical custody of such child” (emphasis added).

7. RSA 633:1 thus describes four specific factual scenarios by which a person can be guilty of the crime of kidnapping, and one scenario in which a person categorically **cannot** be

found guilty of kidnapping. The State agrees with the defense that the condition related to consanguinity is not present in RSA 633:1, I. A parent may, therefore, be convicted of kidnapping their own child if the evidence supports a scenario in which the parent confined the child for one of the purposes listed in RSA 633:1, I(a)-(d). A parent may not, however, be charged with kidnapping their own child for behavior consistent with that described in RSA 633:1, I-a, *i.e.* taking the child away with the intent to conceal the child from a co-parent.

8. RSA 633:4 describes the offense of interference with custody. That statute states, in relevant part, that a person is guilty of a class B felony if such person “knowingly takes from this state or entices away from this state any child under the age of 18, or causes any such child to be taken from this state or enticed away from this state, with the intent to detain or conceal such child from: (a) a parent, guardian, or other person having lawful parental rights and responsibilities.” RSA 633:4, I. A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if they engage in the same conduct, without taking away or enticing away the child out of the state of New Hampshire. RSA 633:4, II. Nothing in the statutory language of RSA 633:4 excludes parents from liability.

9. RSA 633:4 must be read in context with RSA 633:1, I-a. In enacting these statutes, the legislature signaled a clear intent to penalize the act of taking a child away for purposes of detaining or concealing the child from their rightful parent or guardian (by anyone, including a co-parent) through the crime of interference with custody, **not** kidnapping. Had the legislature intended that the crime of kidnapping include the behavior described by RSA 633:4, it would not have enacted RSA 633:1, I-a, and RSA 633:4 would not be necessary. *See Blagbrough Family Realty Trust v. A & T Forest Prods.*, 155 N.H. 29, 44 (2005) (“We do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to do so in harmony with the overall statutory scheme. When interpreting two statutes that deal with a similar subject matter, we construe them so they

do not contradict each other, and so that they will lead to reasonable results and effectuate the legislative purpose of the statutes”).

10. Just as RSA 633:1 must be read together with RSA 633:4, so must these statutes also be read together with RSA 627:4. To do otherwise would lead to absurd results that would contravene the clear intent of the legislature.

11. The defendant argues that the use of the term “kidnapping” in RSA 627:4, II(c) does not incorporate the legal definition of kidnapping as defined by RSA 633:1, but instead merely refers to kidnapping in an undefined, colloquial sense. This approach is contrary to the law.

12. As noted above, statutes must not be read in isolation but should be read in harmony so that they will lead to reasonable results and effectuate the legislative purpose of the statutes. *Blagbrough Family Realty Trust, supra*. See also, *State v. Maxfield*, 167 N.H. 677, 679 (2015) (“We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole”) (quotations omitted).

13. The legislature clearly and unambiguously excluded blood relations, including biological parents, from the version of kidnapping defined in RSA 633:1, I-a, involving the taking away of a child for the purpose of detaining or concealing them from a parent. The legislature chose to penalize such behavior not as a form of kidnapping, but as the separate and distinct offense of interference with custody, by enacting RSA 633:4.

14. The legislature clearly intended to include kidnapping in the narrow subset of behavior that can warrant the justified use of deadly force. Had the legislature desired to also authorize the use of deadly force in situations where a person (parent or otherwise) was

committing or about to commit the offense of interference with custody, it could have done so by incorporating such behavior into RSA 627:4, II alongside kidnapping, burglary, forcible sex offenses, and felonies committed in a person's home. This court should not expand the bounds of RSA 627:4, II to include interference with custody when the legislature has chosen not to do so.

15. The defendant has not offered an alternative definition of "kidnapping" that he claims is more appropriate for a court or jury to use when analyzing a justification argument under RSA 627:4, II(c). The defendant fails to provide any guidance to the court, much less a reference to a reliable source such as a legal definition or dictionary.² In so doing, the defendant essentially asks this court to manufacture a definition from thin air, to the defendant's benefit.

16. Presumably, the defendant's preferred definition would not exclude blood relations, and would likely be identical in substance to the statutory definition of interference with custody in RSA 633:4. For this court to accept any such alternative definition, however, would be to add language to a statute that does not exist, in violation of established caselaw regarding statutory interpretation. *See Appeal of Town of Bethlehem*, 154 N.H. 314, 319 (2006) ("We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include). The legislature has clearly defined what kidnapping is **not**, by enacting RSA 633:1, I-a and RSA 633:4. To rule that the term "kidnapping" as used in RSA 627:4 holds an entirely different meaning than it does in RSA 633:1 would violate the established principles of statutory interpretation described above.

² Merriam Webster's dictionary defines "kidnap" as "to seize or carry away by unlawful force or fraud and often with a demand for ransom. *See* <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/kidnap>, viewed at 5:28 p.m. on October 22, 2025. The State notes that this definition, unlike RSA 633:1, I-a and RSA 633:4, incorporates an element of unlawful force or fraud, and/or ransom.

17. If this court were to adopt the defendant’s position, it would lead to an absurd result. *See STIHL, Inc. v. State of N.H.*, 168 N.H. 332 (2015) (“[The courts] will not interpret statutory language in a literal manner when such a reading would lead to an absurd result”).

18. The absurdity of this result would manifest itself in a number of ways. First, were this court to adopt the defendant’s preferred interpretation of the law, a person who uses deadly force against a co-parent for purportedly attempting to take away or conceal their shared child, and claims that they did so because they believed the co-parent was kidnapping their child, could seek safe harbor in RSA 627:4, II(c). The then deceased co-parent, however, could never have been charged with kidnapping under RSA 633:1-a. The very same conduct would legally qualify as a kidnapping for one purpose, but not another.³ This would amount to State-sanctioned murder during custody disputes.

19. Second, the defendant’s interpretation would undermine the clear intent of the legislature to limit the number of scenarios in which the use of deadly force against another is justified. It is self-evident and obvious that the use of deadly force should only be justified in a small number of specific, clearly defined scenarios; to find otherwise would be to sanction lethal violence and homicidal behavior. The four scenarios listed in RSA 627:4, II comport with this principle.

20. Each of these distinct scenarios involves either the direct use of deadly force, any amount of unlawful force in combination with a serious offense such as burglary or a felony⁴ in someone’s home, or an offense which has inherent elements of violence or physical restraint,

³ A hypothetical illustration of this argument may be helpful. Had the defendant, rather than shooting Ms. Naffziger, instead called the police and reported that he believed Ms. Naffziger was kidnapping his children by attempting to take them away, Ms. Naffziger could not be charged with kidnapping. Instead, the appropriate charge (assuming sufficient evidence was developed) would be interference with custody, under RSA 633:4.

⁴ The State notes that the term “felony” similar to the word “kidnapping” is not defined in RSA 627:4, nor is there a reference to any of the numerous RSAs that relate to felony crimes. Under the defendant’s theory and argument – the term felony would be left to an individual interpretation rather than guided by statutory definition.

such as kidnapping or a forcible sex offense. The use of deadly force in these scenarios is proportionate and appropriate. Interference with custody does not have an inherent element of violence or physical restraint, and thus does not justify the use of deadly force. The defendant's request to add interference with custody to a list of scenarios that are vastly different is in violation of established law, the clear purpose of the justification statute, and common sense, and should be denied. *See State v. Maxfield, supra* at 684 ("We must interpret a statute according to its plain meaning, but we must also interpret it so as to lead to a reasonable result that comports with its purpose"); and *Blagbrough Family Realty Trust, supra*. The defendant's proposed interpretation asks this court to construe RSA 627:4 and RSA 633:1 in a way that would lead to clearly and unambiguously contradictory results, and undermine the legislative purpose of RSA 627:4.

21. Lastly, the defendant's interpretation ignores established precedent regarding mistakes of law. RSA 626:3, II states that "A person is not relieved of criminal liability because he acts under a mistaken belief that his conduct does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense unless his belief is founded upon a statement of the law contained in a statute or other enactment." *See also State v. Stratton*, 132 N.H. 451, 457 (1989) ("Ignorance of the law is no excuse").

22. A person who mistakenly believes that his conduct is justified because of an erroneous interpretation of the law cannot escape criminal liability. The legislature has clearly indicated that ignorance of the law is not an excuse. The defendant's proposed interpretation of the kidnapping and justification statutes would result in a situation where ignorance of the law is, in fact, an excuse. This is not consistent with the established statutory and legal precedents that bind this court, and should not be allowed.

23. The defendant submits that *State v. Davidson*, 163 N.H. 462 (2012) supports his proposed interpretation of the law. The defendant is incorrect. In that case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court interpreted RSA 627:8, relating to the use of force in defense of property. That statute states that a person is justified in the use of force if they believe it is necessary to prevent what reasonably appears to be an unlawful taking, or criminal mischief. *Id.* at 473. In its ruling, the Supreme Court held that the term “unlawful taking” is not limited to instances of “theft” as defined by statute, because “a taking may constitute a theft.” *Id.* at 474.

24. In *Davidson*, the term at issue was broad, and encompassed not only thefts, but other instances that could qualify as unlawful takings. The Supreme Court ruled, sensibly, that it would be wrong to interpret a term that applies broadly to one, narrow application. The situation in this case is different. Here, RSA 627:4, II(c) specifically references kidnapping. Unlike in *Davidson*, the plain language of the statute references a specific crime that is defined by statute. The words “as defined by statute” would be superfluous. The legislature could have used the term “interference with freedom,” referring to the broader class of crimes that includes kidnapping, interference with custody, and other crimes such as criminal restraint and false imprisonment. *See* RSA 633. Instead, the legislature specifically referenced kidnapping.

25. In *Davidson*, the Supreme Court held that “the legislature could have specifically limited ‘unlawful taking’ to the crime of theft, if it were so inclined.” *Id.* at 474. In the case of RSA 627:4, II(c), the legislature did just that, and employed a limited, specific reference to the crime of kidnapping. Indeed, within the very same section, the legislature included the term “forcible sex offenses” alongside kidnapping. With the guidance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Davidson*, it is clear that the proper interpretation of “forcible sex offenses” would include both felonious sexual assault and aggravated felonious sexual assault.

26. The only correct interpretation of RSA 627:4, II(c) is one that harmonizes its meaning with RSA 633:1 and RSA 633:4. The plain meaning of the statute, and the principles of statutory interpretation, establish clearly that the term “kidnapping” in RSA 627:4, II(c) incorporates the legal definition contained in RSA 633:1.

27. The defendant points to one incident in which the parents of a child were charged and convicted for kidnapping. Specifically, the defendant references *State of New Hampshire v. Erika Wallace* (216-2017-CR-01169) and *State of New Hampshire v. Joshua Wallace* (216-2017-CR-01270). That incident and those charges do not provide support for the defendant’s assertion in this case.

28. According to a contemporaneous news article, Erika and Joshua Wallace were charged with kidnapping their biological child in a situation where neither of them had lawful custody. In that case, the Division of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) had legal custody of the child. During a supervised visit, the parents removed the child from State custody. Specifically, Erika Wallace walked the child out of the visit location at the Mall of New Hampshire and Joshua Wallace drove to the mall in a minivan which the couple used to take the child out of the State of New Hampshire. They were recovered in Tewksbury, Massachusetts.⁵ Here, the defendant and Caitlyn Naffziger both had lawful custody rights to their children and there was no court order in place related to child custody.

29. A case summary for Erika Wallace (attached as Exhibit A) shows that she was originally charged with one count of kidnapping under RSA 633:1, and one count of interference with custody under RSA 633:4. While Ms. Wallace plead guilty to kidnapping on January 24, 2018, that plea was later vacated. On January 29, 2018, as part of an amended sentence, Ms.

⁵ See <https://www.wmur.com/article/couple-accused-of-triggering-amber-alert-sentenced/14765097>. (Last reviewed October 22, 2024).

Wallace's plea to the kidnapping charge was nolle prosequere. In its place, Ms. Wallace pled guilty to the interference with custody charge.

30. Although the defendant claims that Ms. Wallace's case supports its interpretation of the law, in reality, it is conclusive evidence that the defendant's preferred interpretation is wrong. Rather than provide evidence that parents can be appropriately charged and convicted of kidnapping under RSA 633:1, the case shows that the court recognized that the correct charge in this situation is interference with custody, rather than kidnapping.

Respectfully submitted,

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

JOHN M. FORMELLA
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Date: October 23, 2025

/s/ Bethany J. Durand
Bethany J. Durand, Bar #273943
Assistant Attorney General
New Hampshire Attorney General's Office
1 Granite Place, South
Concord, NH 03301
Bethany.J.Durand@doj.nh.gov

/s/ Joshua L. Speicher
Joshua L. Speicher, Bar #273020
Senior Assistant Attorney General
New Hampshire Attorney General's Office
1 Granite Place, South
Concord, NH 03301
Joshua.L.Speicher@doj.nh.gov

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of this pleading was filed through the Court's electronic filing system and will be electronically served by the e-Filing system on counsel for the defendant on the date listed above.

/s/ Joshua L. Speicher
Joshua L. Speicher, Bar #273020
Senior Assistant Attorney General

EXHIBIT A

Hillsborough North

Case Summary

Case No. 216-2017-CR-01169

State v. Erika Wallace

§
§
§

Location: Hillsborough North
Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C
Filed on: 09/06/2017

Case Information

Offense	Statute	Degree	Offense Date	Filed Date	Case Type: Criminal	Case Status: 07/28/2018 Closed
Jurisdiction: Manchester						
1. Kidnapping	633:1	FELA	04/28/2017	08/21/2017		
Arrest Date: 04/28/2017 Control #: 007025J171399009001 Agency: MANC - Manchester Police Department ChargeID: 1399009C						
2. Interference w/Custody - cross state line	633:4,I	FELB	04/28/2017	09/06/2017		
Arrest Control #: 007025J171461609002 ChargeID: 1461609C						

Assignment Information

Current Case Assignment
Case Number 216-2017-CR-01169
Court Hillsborough North
Date Assigned 09/06/2017
Judicial Officer Brown, Kenneth C

Party Information

Defendant Wallace, Erika
Female
Height: 5' 7" Weight: 187
DOB: 12/07/1990

Prosecutor Hillsborough County Attorney's Office Gill, Leslie M. ESQ
Retained
855-645-2971(W)

Jail Facility Offender Records

Plaintiff Hillsborough County Attorney's Office Gill, Leslie M. ESQ
Retained
855-645-2971(W)

Events and Orders of the Court

08/21/2017 Boundover - Probable Cause Found/Waived

Hillsborough North

Case Summary

Case No. 216-2017-CR-01169

Charges:
1. Kidnapping (6331)

08/31/2017 Motion for Bail Hearing Index # 3
Party: Attorney Albert, Gregory M. ESQ

09/06/2017 Complaint Index # 1
Charges:
1. Kidnapping (6331)

09/07/2017 Notice of Boundover Index # 2
Charges:
1. Kidnapping (6331)

09/13/2017 **Bail Hearing** (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Abramson, Gillian L)
Hearing Held
Charges: 1

09/13/2017 Bail Order (Judicial Officer: Abramson, Gillian L) Index # 4
\$100,000/cash only

10/26/2017 Motion to Extend Index # 5
Time to indict
Party: Plaintiff, Prosecutor Hillsborough County Attorney's Office
Time to indict

10/27/2017 Sealed Document Index # 6
Exparte Motion for Services

10/27/2017 Sealed Document Index # 7
Exparte 604-A

11/07/2017 Granted (Judicial Officer: Abramson, Gillian L)

11/07/2017 Approved (Judicial Officer: Abramson, Gillian L)

11/07/2017 Granted (Judicial Officer: Abramson, Gillian L)
"After review, motion granted. No further extensions."

11/27/2017 Sealed Document Index # 8
Exparte and Amended Motion for Services

11/27/2017 Sealed Document Index # 9
Exparte 604-A

11/27/2017 Sealed Document Index # 10
State's Settlement Conference Memorandum

11/28/2017 Sealed Document Index # 11
Defendant's Settlement Conference Memorandum

11/29/2017 **Settlement Conference** (1:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Garfunkel, David A)
Hearing Held
Charges: 1

11/30/2017 Agreement Index # 12
Re: Production fo DCYF Records
Party: Attorney Albert, Gregory M. ESQ;
Attorney Triffon, Katherine A. ESQ
Re: Production fo DCYF Records

12/12/2017 Approved (Judicial Officer: Nicolosi, Diane M)

12/12/2017 Granted (Judicial Officer: Nicolosi, Diane M)

12/12/2017 Approved (Judicial Officer: Abramson, Gillian L)

12/20/2017 **Status Conference** (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Abramson, Gillian L)
Hearing Held
Charges: 1

12/26/2017 Notice of Intent to Plead Guilty Index # 13

Hillsborough North

Case Summary

Case No. 216-2017-CR-01169

12/27/2017	Waiver of Indictment Party: Attorney Triffon, Katherine A. ESQ Charges: 1. Kidnapping (6331)	Index # 14
01/05/2018	Plea and Sentencing Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C) <i>Plea Taken</i> Charges: 1	
01/05/2018	Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C) Party: Attorney Albert, Gregory M. ESQ Charges: 1. Kidnapping (6331)	Index # 15
01/05/2018	Sentence Sheet (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C) Charges: 1. Kidnapping (6331)	Index # 16
01/05/2018	Waiver of Sentence Review (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C) Party: Attorney Albert, Gregory M. ESQ	Index # 17
01/05/2018	Plea (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C) Wallace, Erika 1. Kidnapping Guilty ChargeID: 1399009C Sequence:	
01/05/2018	Disposition (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C) 1. Kidnapping Guilty by Court ChargeID: 1399009C	
01/24/2018	Sentence (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C) 1. Kidnapping NH State Prison Condition - Adult: 1. 03 Drug and Alcohol Treatment and Counseling, 01/24/2018, Active 01/24/2018 2. 05 Other, Defendant will complete substance abuse treatment, parenting classes and mental health treatment as directed by Department of Corrections, 01/24/2018, Active 01/24/2018 3. 09 Counseling, Treatment or Educational Programs, 01/24/2018, Active 01/24/2018 4. 13 Good Behavior, 01/24/2018, Active 01/24/2018 Confinement Effective Date: 01/05/2018 Agency: State Prison - Concord Maximum Term: 4 Years Mandatory Minimum Term: 1 Year, 6 Months Credit for Time Served Credit Term: 253 Days Comment: commencing 1/5/18 Restitution Amount: \$2,583.91 Payable to Department of Corrections Joint and Several Co-Defendant: Joshua Wallace, Sr. Comment: to Manchester Police CDepartment	
01/24/2018	Mittimus Charges: 1. Kidnapping (6331)	Index # 18
01/26/2018	Transport Order Charges: 1. Kidnapping (6331)	Index # 19

Hillsborough North

Case Summary

Case No. 216-2017-CR-01169

01/26/2018 Waiver of Indictment Index # 20
Party: Attorney Triffon, Katherine A. ESQ
Charges:
2. Interference w/Custody - cross state line (6334I)

01/29/2018 **Plea and Sentencing Hearing** (1:00 PM)
Plea Taken
Charges: 1

01/29/2018 Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C) Index # 21
Party: Attorney Albert, Gregory M. ESQ
Charges:
2. Interference w/Custody - cross state line (6334I)

01/29/2018 Sentence Sheet (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C) Index # 22
Charges:
2. Interference w/Custody - cross state line (6334I)

01/29/2018 Return Index # 23
Charges:
1. Kidnapping (6331)

01/29/2018 **Amended Sentence** Reason: Vacated
1. Kidnapping
Non-HOC/State Prison Sentence
Condition - Adult:
1. 05 Other, Nol Pros per plea to alternate charge filed 1/29/18 (Leslile Gill, ACA), 01/29/2018, Active 01/29/2018

01/29/2018 **Plea** (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C)
Wallace, Erika
2. Interference w/Custody - cross state line
Guilty
ChargeID: 1461609C Sequence:

01/29/2018 **Disposition** (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C)
.
2. Interference w/Custody - cross state line
Guilty by Court
ChargeID: 1461609C

01/29/2018 **Sentence** (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C)
2. Interference w/Custody - cross state line
NH State Prison
Condition - Adult:
1. 03 Drug and Alcohol Treatment and Counseling, 01/29/2018, Active 01/29/2018
2. 05 Other, Court recommends to Dept. of Corrections: Parenting classes and mental health treatment as directed by Dept. of Corrections, 01/29/2018, Active 01/29/2018
3. 09 Counseling, Treatment or Educational Programs, 01/29/2018, Active 01/29/2018
4. 13 Good Behavior, 01/29/2018, Active 01/29/2018
5. Law Enforcement may Return Evidence to Rightful Owner, 01/29/2018, Active 01/29/2018
6. Law Enforcement may Destroy Evidence, 01/29/2018, Active 01/29/2018
7. DOC May Award Earned Time Reductions RSA-651-A:22-a, 01/29/2018, Active 01/29/2018
8. 02 Work Release, (KCB) Amended to Include, 06/21/2018, Active 01/29/2018
Confinement
Effective Date: 01/29/2018
Agency: State Prison - Concord
Maximum
Term: 4 Years
Mandatory Minimum
Term: 1 Year, 6 Months
Credit for Time Served
Credit Term: 277 Days
Comment: Stand committed commencing 1/29/18
Restitution
Amount: \$2,583.91

Hillsborough North

Case Summary

Case No. 216-2017-CR-01169

Payable to Department of Corrections
Joint and Several
Co-Defendant: Joshua Wallace, Sr.
Comment: to Manchester Police Department

03/05/2018	Mittimus Charges: 2. Interference w/Custody - cross state line (6334I)	Index # 24
03/05/2018	Return Charges: 1. Kidnapping (6331)	Index # 25
03/08/2018	Sheriff's Return on Mittimus Charges: 2. Interference w/Custody - cross state line (6334I)	Index # 26
06/04/2018	Motion to Amend Sentence <i>to Include "Work Release"</i> Party: Defendant Wallace, Erika <i>to Include "Work Release"</i>	Index # 27
06/13/2018	Supplemental Motion <i>Re: Amend Sentence to Include Immediate "Work Release"</i> Party: Defendant Wallace, Erika <i>Re: Amend Sentence to Include Immediate "Work Release"</i>	Index # 28
06/19/2018	Non-Objection to Motion <i>to Work Release</i> Party: Attorney Gill, Leslie M. ESQ <i>to Work Release</i>	Index # 29
06/21/2018	Granted (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C)	
06/21/2018	Granted (Judicial Officer: Brown, Kenneth C)	
06/27/2018	Other <i>Work Release</i> Party: Jail Facility Offender Records <i>Work Release</i>	Index # 30
07/11/2018	Order Made (Judicial Officer: Abramson, Gillian L) <i>"So noted, as per Court order of 6/21/18."</i>	