2004-732, IN THE MATTER OF SUSAN L. FORCIER AND TODD S. MUELLER

modification of his child support obligations, but aske d that a portion of his the benefit of the parties’ children. In June 2004, the petitioner requested a support guideline obligation, see RSA ch. 458 - C, into a college trust fund for Court (Barry, J.) ordered petitio ner to pay a portion of his monthly child minor children, who are now fifteen and sixteen years old. In 2000, the Trial custody and the petitioner received residual physical custody of the parties’ two divorce i n September 1991, the respondent was awarded primary physical The record supports the following facts. After the parties obtained a

vacate and remand. amount into a college trust fund for the benefit of the parties’ children. We $626 each month out of his total child support obligation and place this Superior Court (Barry, J.) requiring the petitioner, Todd S. Mueller, to dedu ct GALWAY, J. The respondent, Susan L. Forcier, appeals an order by the

the brief and orally), for the respondent. Craig, Wenners, Craig & Capuchino, of Manchester (Linda Capuchino on

orally), for the petitioner. Divorce Law Group, of Manchester (Gregory D.H. Jones on the brief and

No. 2004 - 732 Hillsborough - nor thern judicial district

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. O pinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Hampshire, One Noble Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

court must, therefore, either apply the guidelines to determine the parties’ expenses of a natural or adopted child,” RSA 458 - C:5, I(i) ( p. 2 2004). The trial party of providing for the voluntary or court - ordered postsecondary educational certain special circumstances, such as the “economic consequences to either support guidelines only with “written findings relative to the applicability” of Under RSA 458 - C:5, I, the trial court may adjust the applicatio n of child

Barrett & Coyne, 150 N.H. 5 p. 2 20, 524 (2004). C:4, II, IV, because of “special circumstances,” RSA 458 - C:5; In the Matter of “the applic ation of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate,” RSA 458 from the guidelines when it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that (2004). The presumption may be overcome and the trial court may deviate under the guidelines is the correct amount of child support. RSA 458 - C:4, II There is a rebuttable presumption that a child support award calculated

modifying an existing support order. RSA 458 - C:4, I ( p. 2 2004). The guidelines “shall be applied in all child support cases,” including orders support awards. In the Matter of Plaisted & Plaisted, 149 N.H 522, 524 (2003). 458 - C, and establish a uniform system to determine the amount of child New Hampshire’s child support guidelines are codified in RSA chapter

discretion. Id. clea rly appears that the trial court engaged in an unsustainable exercise of respective abilities to meet them, we will overturn modification orders only if it are in the best position to determine the parties’ respective needs and their Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 N.H. 6 p. 2 26, 628 (2004). Because trial courts have broad discretion in reviewing and modifying child support orders. In the sufficiently justify the deviation from the child support guidelines. Trial courts We first address the issue of whether the trial court erred by failing to

petitioner pay for post - secondary education vio lated RSA 458:17, XI - a ( p. 2 2004). full child support payment due, and (2) the trial court’s requirement that the justify why it deviated from the child support guidelines by depriving her of the Specifically, the respondent argues that (1) the trial court failed to sufficiently that a portion of the child support payments be directed into the college fund. On appeal, the respondent argues that the trial court erred by ordering

into the college trust fund. “special circumstances” that the petition er was to deposit $6 p. 2 26 each month respondent was adjusted downward from the full guideline amount due to the court stated in the Uniform Support Order that the amount paid to the guideline s minus the monthly $626 contribution to the college fund. The trial to the respondent in an amount in accordance with the child support petitioner to pay $626 each month to the college fund, and to pay child support payment continue to go into the college fund. The trial court ordered the p. 3 3

was intended to apply to post - enactment modifications to decrees that were legislative history, we concluded that it did not make clear whether the statute Donovan, 152 N.H.,, 871 A.2d p. 3 30, 38 (2005). In reviewing the statute’s RSA 458:17, XI - a applies only prospectively. In the Matter of Donovan & completion of high school.” We addressed in Donovan the issue of whether an adult child’s college expenses or other educational expenses beyond the 458:17, XI - a, “[n]o child support order shall require a parent to contribute to a portio n of his child support payments into a college trust fund. Under RSA a, which took effect on February 2, 2004, by requiring the petitioner to deposit Next, the respondent argues that the trial court violated RSA 458:17, XI -

constituted error. See Giles, 1 p. 3 36 N.H. at 545. result, see RSA 458 - C:4, the trial court’s deviation from the guidelines the guidelines is necessary in this case to avoid an unjust or inappropriate provide for the children. Without such a finding to show why a departure from gui deline amount, which is presumptively the appropriate amount needed to decrease the current child support payment to the respondent below the result from this payment and why it is consequently appropriate and just to children” was not legally sufficient to explain what “economic consequences” of child support obligation will continue to go to th e college trust fund for the C:4, II. In other words, the trial court’s simple statement that the “remainder guideline amount to the respondent. See RSA 458 - C:5, I(i); see also RSA 458 - “unjust or inappropriate” for the petitioner to pay the full child support college fund had on either party to support a determination that it would be consequences,” if any, the petitioner’s payment of $626 each month into the Here, the trial court provided no findings as to what “economic

guidelines to avoid an unjust or inappropriate result. See RSA 458 - C:5, I. particular special circumstance justified an adjustment from the child support the trial court was required to provide written findings relative to why this college expenses may qualify as a special circumstan ce under RSA 458 - C:5, I(i), continue to go to the college trust fund for the children.” While providing for “special circumstances” that the “remainder of child support obligation will simply stated that an adjustmen t from the guidelines was warranted given the In the Uniform Support Order issued in August 2004, the trial court

agree. this case would be unjust or inappropriate due to special circumstances. We guidelines wit hout a sufficient finding as to why application of the guidelines in The respondent argues that the trial court erred by deviating from the

Giles v. Giles, 1 p. 3 36 N.H. 5 p. 4 40, 545 (1992). support guidelines to avoid an unjust or inappropriate result. RSA 458 - C:4, II; circumstance pursuant to RSA 45 8 - C:5 justifies an adjustment from the child respective support obligations or make a written finding as to why a special 4

concurred. BRODERICK, C.J., and NADEAU, DALIANIS and DUGGAN, JJ.,

argument to be without merit. support this argument and we are not aware of any. We find the petitioner’s modification of child support. The petitioner failed to cite legal authority to present issues on appeal because she did not file an answer to his petition for Finally, the petit ioner argues that the respondent cannot raise the

not here apply. 2000, prior to the change in legislation. Accordingly, RSA p. 4 458:17, XI - a does August 2004 order was a post - enactment modification to an order issued in here affi rm that we answer that question in the negative. In this case, the modifications of orders that were issued prior to the change in legislation, we the question of whether the statute was intended to apply to post - enactment To the extent that Donovan may not have clearly set forth our answer to

8 71 A.2d at 38. thereafter held that the statute must be applied prospectively only. Id. at, issued prior to the change in legislation. Id. at, 871 A.2d at 37. We