2004-092, STATE OF NH v. NICHOLAS CHAMPAGNE

arguing that the court erred in: (1) denying the State’s motion to strike the tri al order of the Superior Court (Conboy, J.), see RSA 606:10, II (2001), see RSA 629:3 (Supp. 2004); RSA 637:1 (1996). The State appeals from a pre conspiracy to commit the crime of theft of property valued at over $1,000.00, theft by unauthorized taking, see RSA 637:3 (1996); and one count of counts of receiving stolen property, see RSA 637:7 (Supp. 2004); one count of 629:1 (Supp. 2004); RSA 318 - B:2, :26 (2004); RSA 597:14 - b (2001); three drug marijuana with the intent to sell, while released on cash bail, see RSA one count of att empted possession of five pounds or more of the controlled BRODERICK, C.J. The defendant, Nicholas Champagne, is charged with

the defendant. Patrick Shanley, of Tewksbury, Massachusetts, by brief and orally, for

brief, and Ms. Morrell orally), for the State. attorney general, and Jonathan V. Gallo, assistant attorney general, on the Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Susan G. Morrell, senior assistant

No. 2004 - 092 Hillsborough - nor thern judicial district

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. O pinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Hampshire, One Noble Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

search warrant. The warrant authorized the police to seize evidence of Manchester District Court approved Trooper Coraluzzo’s application for a State trooper. At approximately 1 p. 2 2:41 a.m. the next day, a judge from the a Nissan Pathfinder, and was arrested shortly thereafter on Interstate 93 by a Later that evening, the defendant left the 24 Cypress Street residence in

his surveil lance and left to complete a search warrant application. would not agree, the CI left the area. At that point, Trooper Coraluzzo ceased conduct the transaction at a nearby convenience store. When the defendant residence to conduct the transaction. The CI refused, and suggested that they house. The defendant then attempted to persuade the CI to go inside the the defendant told the CI he had the money for the drugs upstairs in the defendant met in front of the p. 2 24 Cypress Street residence on December 10, and insisted that the CI bring the m arijuana to his residence. The CI and the conduct the transaction in a public place; however, the defendant repeatedly reschedule. The State Police had directed the CI to convince the defendant to instructio ns from the State Police, contacted the defendant on December 10 to The transaction did not occur on December 7, so the CI, following

to occur, and eventually agreed on December 7, p. 2 2001. negotiated a price. They also discussed the date on which the transaction was to express interest in pu rchasing marijuana from the CI, and the two purchasing marijuana. During those conversations, the defendant continued conversations with the defendant regarding the defendant’s interest in and 10, the CI, under the trooper’s guidance, engaged in recorded Manchester, where he believed the defendant resided. Also, on December 4, 6 several surveillance operations of the residence located at 24 Cypress Street in During the course of his investigation, Trooper Coraluzzo conducted

trooper commenced an inv estigation of the defendant for drug activity. marijuana for the purpose of reselling it. Based on the CI’s information, the defendant had stated that he was interested in purchasing ten pounds of trooper that during an encounter with the defendant in Manchester, the investigation unit, spoke with a confidential informant (CI), who told the Coraluzzo, a New Hampshire State Trooper assigned to the narcotics the defendant’s motions to suppress. On November p. 2 26, 2001, Michael The trial court fo und the following facts after an evidentiary hearing on

reverse in part and remand. motion to suppress evidence seized during a second search. We affirm in part, house in which his apartment was located; and ( p. 3 3) granting the defendant’s the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from the basement of a defendant’s notice of affirmative defense of voluntary renunciation; ( p. 2 2) granting 3

showed the officer the stolen motorcycle located in the basement. The two also Moore and Officer Piotrowski then entered the house, and Sergeant Moore several motorcycles, one o f which had been confirmed as stolen. Sergeant evidence of drug activity, officers had discovered various motorcycle parts and Sergeant Moore advised Officer Piotrowski that during a search for

at 24 Cypress Street, spoke with Sergeant Moore. Manchester area. Officer Piotrowski responded to t he call and, upon his arrival Traffic Division for his suspected connection with stolen motorcycles in the Police for alleged drug activity, the defendant was under investigation by the Sergeant Moore had learned tha t in addition to being investigated by the State Cypress Street. They did so because, during Trooper Coraluzzo’s investigation, the Manchester Police Department and requested that an officer respond to 24 Before leaving the premises, the officers contacted the Traffic Division of

reported as stolen. the VIN numbers of the two motorcycles in the garage, but neither had been of motorcycle parts and a pneumatic paint sprayer. Sergeant Mosely checked obs erved two motorcycles that appeared to have been repainted, an assortment After searching the basement, the officers entered the garage. They

and learned that the motorcycle had been reported as stolen. the other officers in the basement. Sergeant Mosely checked the VIN number and observed its vehicle identif ication number (VIN), which he read aloud to seemed to be missing parts. Trooper Coraluzzo walked closer to the motorcycle workspace, and observed, among other things, a Honda motorcycle that ba sement. They entered an area of the basement that appeared to be used as a through the basement. Nevertheless, the officers proceeded downstairs to the have to exit the front door to access the garage from the outside instead of mother replied that they could search the garage, but stated that they would asked the defendant’s mother if they could search the gar age. The defendant’s The officers searched the defendant’s second - floor apartment and then

apartment. lived in the first floor apartment and the defendant lived in the second floor police that the house was divided into two ap artments. She explained that she residence, the defendant’s mother reviewed the warrant and informed the Department, executed the search warrant. Upon the officers’ arrival at the and S ergeant Mosely of the patrol division of the Manchester Police the Manchester Police Department, in charge of the special investigations unit; Police Field Supervisor in the narcotics investigation unit; Sergeant Moore of Trooper Coraluzzo, along with Sergeant Quinn, New Hampshire State

drug paraphernalia. ownership of the premises at 2 p. 4 4 Cypress Street and drug trafficking, as well a s 4

its r uling was “without prejudice to any trial motions regarding the asserted may raise the affirmative defense of renunciation at the trial” but specified that defendant’s notice of affirmative defense, the court ruled that “the defendant which it issued a written order. As to the State’s motion to strike the suppress and one day of argument on these and other pending motions, after The trial court held a two - day evidentiary hearing on the motions to

thereto” should be suppressed. motorcycle parts, evidence of working on motorcycles and any evidence related consequently, “any evidence taken from the premises involving a ny motorcycle, consent to search the area where the items were found. He argued that, authorize the police to search for such items, and the police did not have relating to motorcycle theft on th e basis that the first search warrant did not warrant. In a separate motion, the defendant sought to suppress items things, that certain items were not found within the area described in the du ring the first search for evidence of drug activity, asserting, among other with the intent to sell. He also moved to suppress certain items obtained renunciation in relation to the charge of attempted possession of marijuana Thereafter, the defendant filed a notice of the affirmative defense of

same and disp os[e] of the stolen parts.” defendant agreed with another to “steel [sic] motorcycles, strip the parts off of of theft of property valued at over $1,000.00, based on allegations that the garage at 2 p. 4 4 Cypress Street, and one count of conspiracy to commit the crime count of theft by unauthorized taking pertaining to a motorcycle found in the motorcycle and motorcycle parts found in the garage at 24 Cypress Street, one 24 Cypress Street, two counts of receiving stolen property relating to a relating to a gun that was discovered in his b edroom during the first search of the CI. He was also charged with one count of receiving stolen property intent to sell, while released on cash bail, as a result of his interactions with possession of five po unds or more of the controlled drug marijuana with the The defendant was subsequently charged with one count of attempted

motorcycles. motorcycles, various motorcycle parts and paperwork pertaining to Cypress Street. As a result of the second search, officers seized three Police Department executed a second search of the residence l ocated at 2 p. 4 4 approved and, thereafter, he and several other officers from the Manchester Later that day, Officer Piotrowski’s application for a search warrant was

motorcyc les, motorcycle parts and related items. search warrant application seeking authorization to search for and seize search. Officer Piotrowski then returned to the police department to prepare a motorcycle parts and other motorcycles the officers had observed during their went into the garage, where Sergeant Moore showed Office r Piotrowski the p. 5 5

defendant’s alleged renunciation was neither voluntary nor complete.” On affirmative defense, arguing that based upon the above finding, “the reconsider the ruling on the State’s motion to strike the defendant’s notice of location to conduct the transaction.” The State unsuccessfully moved to occur because the [defendant and the CI] were not able to agree upon a to suppress, including a finding that “[t]he [controlled drug] transaction did not contained factual findings based upon the evidentiary hearing on the mot ions In addition to containing rulings on various pending motions, the order

notice “sufficiently apprised” the State of “the facts supporting the defense.” despite the late notice, see Super. Ct. R. 101. The co urt further ruled that the the State’s motion and allowed the defendant to raise his defense at trial he did so voluntarily as required by [RSA] 629:1 (III).” The trial court denied evidence that he made a complet e withdrawal of his criminal purpose or that upon which he could meet his burden to establish by a preponderance of the forth the grounds of the defense, the defendant’s notice “set[ ] forth no facts that con trary to the requirement in Superior Court Rule 101 that a notice set moved to strike it on two grounds: (1) that the notice was untimely; and (2) After the defendant filed his notice of affirmative defense, the State

disagree. strike the defendant’s notice of affirmative defense of renunciation. We The State first argues that the trial court erred in denying it s motion to

This appeal followed.

obtained during the execution of the second warrant. is GRANTED to the extent it seeks to suppress items the police second warrant. Accordingl y, the defendant’s Motion to Suppress of the basement – there is insufficient evidence to support the excluding the evidence obtained from the unauthorized first search

court ruled, in pertinent part, that search for motor cycles, motorcycle parts and evidence relating thereto, the the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during the second therefore be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.” Finally, with respect to warrant requirement,” the “results of the search of the basement must prove “that the search was valid pursuant to any other e xception to the the defendant’s mother did not consent to the search and the State failed to search warrant did not authorize the search of the basement” and that because obtained during the drug search, the court ruled, in relevant part, that “the defense).” With respect to the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence affirmative defense (e.g., whether the jury will be instructed concerning the p. 6 6

further participation. negotiations were complete. He walked away and renounced any defendant withdrew from any further negotiations before any No money exchanged hands. No drugs exchanged hands. The

purchasing controlled drugs from the [S]tate’s informant. verbal discussions concerning the possibility of the defendant The evidence based on the [S]t ate’s investigative file indicates only

actions. away and renouncing any further discussions, negotiations or withdrew from any participation in the potential action by walking any transaction. The evidence demonstrates that the defendant house the defendant voluntarily refused to proceed forward with that when the confidential informant arrived at the defendant’s The evidence based upon the [S]tate’s investigative file indicates

The defendant’s notice of affirmative defense stated, in pertinent part:

Rules of Professional Conduct de novo). Callum, 14 p. 6 6 N.H. 779, 781 (2001) (reviewing trial court’s interpretation of court’s interpretation of the Superior Court Rules de novo. Cf. Franklin v. (Emphasis added.) As with any other question of law, we review the trial

other order as the interest of justice requires. may exclude any testimony relating to such defense or make such shown. If the defendant fails to comply with this rule, the Court or within such further time as the Court may order for good cause the prosecution, in accordance with the time limitations in Rule 98 therefor shall be filed with the Court, with a copy of same going to Criminal Code, a notice of such intention setting forth the grounds If a defendant intends to claim any defense specified by the

affirmative defenses: Rule 101 sets forth the notice requirement for renunciation and other defense to “attempt” crimes. See RSA p. 6 629:1, III(a), (b) (1996). Superior Court The Criminal Code specifies voluntary renunciation as an affirmative

of la w.” defense of voluntary renunciation was unavailable to the defendant as a matter did not support the defendant’s claim [of renunciation]” and, therefore, “the reconsideration; namely, that “[t]he facts adduced at the evidentiary hearing appeal, the State presents the same argument contained in its motion for p. 7 7

cases “limit[s] the risk of violating one person’s privacy on th e authority of a different people.” Id. at 523 - 24. The general rule emerging from the first line of based upon the premise that “separate dwelling units are usually occupied by dwelling unit has been held to limit the permissibl e search to that unit alone,” We explained that in the first line of cases, the “language identifying one

(quotation omitted). reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.” Id. at 523 that may be searched . . . such that the officer w ith a search warrant can with applicable to searches: “that warrants describe with particularity the places explaining two lines of cases that had evolved from the general standard Cote, 126 N.H. 514, 518 (1985) (quotation omitted). We began our analysis by Rosie’s Rusty Nail, situated on the first floor of a three story building.” State v. as “ p. 7 72 1/2 West Hollis Street, Nashua, New Hampshire doing business as the search of a basement where the warrant described the place to be searched State v. Cote to the facts of this case. In Cote, we considered the lawfulness of basement was unlawful, the State contends that the trial court misapplied In arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that the search of the

N.H. 606, 60 p. 7 7 (2002). findings of fact but review its conclusions of law de novo. State v. Litvin, 147 When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to its federal authority for guidance only. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231 - 33 (1983). consider the State’s arguments first under the State Constitutio n, citing to Cypress Street in connection with the drug investigation was unlawful. We will challenges the trial court’s ruling that the search of the basement at 24 Next, under both the State and Federal Constitutions, the State

defense. court’s denial of the State’s motion to strike the defendant’s affirmative any authority that convinces us otherwise. Accordingly, we affirm the trial rule is not susceptible of such an interpretation, and the State does not refer to course of pretrial proceedings. We decline to do so. The clear language of the test the validity of such grounds against any factual findings it makes in the defendant “s et forth the grounds therefor” the added proviso that the trial court The State essentially asks us to read into the requirement that a

which is precisely what the notice in this case did. requires that a notice of affirmative defense “set[ ] forth the grounds therefor,” We conclude that the defendant’s notice sa tisfied Rule 101. Rule 101 expressly

affirmative defense to the defendant. These and other facts as would be presented at trial provide an p. 8 8

the defend ant had the exclusive use of any particular area of the defendant’s use of the basement nor has the State established that The State has not established the extent or frequency of the apartment to the basement or through a stairway [to] the garage. apartment to gain access to a stairway that extends from her into the basement, the defendant must go inside [his mother’s] direct access to the basement from his apartment. In order to get appurtenant to the defendant’s apartment. The defendant has no baseme nt at the time of the search and the basement is not Cote because the defendant was not the only one who used the The situation in this case is markedly different from that in

24 Cypress Street from the search of the basement in Cote: In this case, the trial court distinguished the search of the basement at

those premises.” Id. premises and authorized the search of the basement that was appurtenant to description of the first floor premises of the Rusty Nail identified the core used the basement area.” Id. Consequently, we held that “the warrant’s opening on the basement stairs, and there [was] no indication that anyone else Specifically, we noted that the defendant “had control of a padlocked door facts of the case brought the search within the second line of cases. Id. court’s ruling that the search of the basement was lawful, concluding that the With these complementary general rules in mind, we upheld the trial

525. appurtenant spaces or buildings the description is merely identifying.” Id. at description is limiting language, but as between a given unit and its own place to be searched. As between different dwelling or commercial units, the complementary general rules for interpreting a warrant’s description of the Id. at 5 24 - 25. We characterized these lines of cases as containing “two

terms. not, therefore, demand a narrow construction of the warrant’s secondary areas in question. The privacy interests of others do occupy both the premises as described in the warrant and the units. In such instances, the same person will very probably the areas in question were not separate dwelling or commercial The common feature of the cases in this second group is that

expressly limiting language.” Id. We noted: that are exclusively appurtenant to that unit, at least in the absence of any commercial unit extends the scope of the warrant to structures and spaces we explained that they held “that the description in a warrant of a dwelling or warrant directed against another.” Id. at 524. As to the second line of cases, p. 9 9

the southerly side which leads to the attach ed garage. There is one with an attached garage. There is a paved driveway positioned on Champagne, is described as a brown two story, wooden structure 24 Cypress Street, Manchester, N.H., the residence of Nicholas

In this case, the warrant described the area t o be searched as:

to distinguish this case from Cote. cases discussed in Cote, but because we disagree with the trial court’s attempt believe that the trial court erred in analyzing the search under the wrong line of court’s ruling on the lawfulness of the search of the basement, not because we [were] not particularly described as being within the unit.” We reverse the trial analyzed the search under the law relating to “area[s] within a single unit that described in the warrant.” The State posits that the trial c ourt should have area “as if [the basement] were located in a separate unit or structure not other than the defendant used the basement and had a privacy interest in the court’s incorrect analysis is evi denced by its concern over whether anyone pertains to searches of separate dwelling units. The State argues that the trial Cote by analyzing the search of the basement under the line of cases that The S tate contends that the trial court misapplied the law as stated in

basement. that the search warrant did not authorize the search of the Nissan Pathfinder. See Cote, 126 N.H. at 523 - 25. The court finds like structures on the property, and the defendant’s 1 p. 9 999 red authorization to search, namely the garage, outbuildings and shed the other areas that the warrant gave the police explicit defendant’s privacy would be affected, namely his apartment, and allow the police to search only in those areas in which the the t erms of the search warrant must be narrowly construed to interest in the basement at the time of the search. Consequently, who uses the basement and [his mother] also had a privacy from that in Cote because the defendant is not the only individual during th eir visit. The court finds this situation distinguishable providing a place for her daughter and her grandchildren to stay mother] was using the basement as additional living space, indicates that, at the time the search took place, [the defendant’s thin gs, including laundry and storage. The testimony also property, indicated that she uses the basement at times for various basement. [The defendant’s mother], the title owner of the situation in Cote, the defendant did not have exclusive use of the interests wo uld be impacted by the search. In this case, unlike the appears that the Court focused on the issue of whose privacy considered an occupant’s frequency of use as a factor. Instead, it basement. However, the Cote Court does not appear to have p. 10 10

a back room immediately adjacent to the tavern area.” United States v. front tavern area which contains a bar, pool table, and related equipment, and Wisconsin,” and specified it as being “a single story brick structure, housing a searched as “[t]he premises known as 346 North Broadway, Milwaukee, search of a basement pursuant to a warrant that identified the area to be In United States v. Palmisano, the court considered the lawfulness of the

as recognized by State v. Serrato, 424 So. 2d 214 (La. 1982). State v. Roach, 322 So. 2d 222, 226 (La. 1975), superseded on other grounds normally associates with and includes within th e word ‘house’ or ‘premises.’” any other outbuildings within close proximity of the house proper that one references and descriptions include “the dwelling house proper, the garage, and Brochu, 237 A. 2d at 422 - 23; Fine, 207 F.2d at 324 - 25. Rather, such thereon, does not limit the scope of the search to the dwelling structure. See particular address, followed by a description of the entire dwelling structure These courts reasoned that the identification of the area to be searched as a story white frame dwelling with green shingle roof . . . of about four rooms”). searched as “the premises known as the Harve Fine residence and being a one (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954) (warrant specified area to be [the defendant]”) and a shed, see Fine v. United States, 207 F.2d 324, 324 - 25 searched as “premises . . . at 20 Forest Street” and “known as the dwelling of Brochu, 237 A.2d 418, 422 - 23 (Me. 1967) (warrant specified area to be that the area police are permitted to search includes a garage, see State v. includes the entire dwelling structure located at that address, courts have held and is followed by a description thereof that either expressly or impliedly W here the area to be searched is identified as being a particular address,

residential or commercial structure located at a particular address. case, the warrant in Cote did not specify the area to be searched as the entire on “the first floor of a three story building.” Thus, unlike the warrant in this “72 1/2 Hollis Street,” and was specified as being “Rosie’s Rusty Nail,” located attached garage.” In Cote, however, the area to be searched was identified as located at 24 Cypress Street: “a brown two story, wooden structure with an of Nicholas Champagne” and speci fied that to be the entire dwelling house in Cote. Here, the warrant identified the area to be searched as “the residence highlights the key distinction between the search warrant in this case and that at 518 (quotation omitted; emphasis added). The emphasized language Rusty Nail, situated on the first floor of a three story building.” Cote, 126 N.H. “72 1/2 West Hollis Street, Nashua, New Hampshire doing business as Rosie’s (Emphasis added.) In Cote, the warrant described the area to be searched as

registration 138924[,] 1999 Red Nissan P athfinder. known to be operated by Champagne[:] New Hampshire dealer shed - like structures on the property as well as the following vehicle front entrance. This attachment includes any outbuildings or p. 11 11

specified exact bedroom of other occupant where c ontraband transactions though various others occupied premises and affidavit in support of warrant to search “entire premises and residence of 3803 Manamana Road” even (search of defe ndant’s bedroom lawful where search warrant authorized police brackets omitted)), with State v. Woolsey, 802 P.2d 478, 479 (Haw. 1990) floor premises and had no connection to second floor dwelling (quotation and Street,” search of balcony lawful because balcony was directly adjacent to first shoe shine parlor formerly known as Hollywood Hosiery at 1414 W est Vliet 1976) (where search warrant authorized search of “entire first floor premises of building had use of attic), and Rainey v. State, 246 N.W.2d 529, 533 - 36 (Wis. was directly adjacent to second floor apa rtment and no other apartments in apartment located on the second floor” included third floor attic where attic Scala, 404 N.E.2d 83, 89 (Mass. 1980) (warrant authorizing search of “entire particular area w here the defendant resides is unnecessary. Compare Com. v. searched is in a defendant’s exclusive control or directly appurtenant to the areas. In such instances, the additional analysis of whether the area to be privacy interests of others who may inhabit the dwelling and use its common determination that probable cause exists to justify the search prote cts the certain “premises,” specified as being an entire dwelling unit, the underlying When a search warrant authorizes the search of a “residence” or a

than specifying “the residence” as being the second floor apartment. specified as being the entire dwelling unit located at 24 Cypress Street, rather search warrant authorized police to search “the residence” of the defendant, apartme nt. However, these matters are not dispositive where, as here, the the basement, and the basement was not directly appurtenant to his search of the basement was unlawful because he did not have exclusive use of The defendant maintains that the trial court correctly ruled that the

the word “residence.” See Roach, 322 So. 2d at 226. reality that one typically associates a basement with, and includes it within, floor apartment and the garage. To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the the area to be searched from the entire premises to the defendant’s second a search of the entire premises located at 24 Cypress Street and did not red uce Id. at 599 - 600. Here, as in Palmisano, a fair reading of the warrant authorized

intended to reduce the area to be searched. purpo se of more fully identifying the premises and was not areas in the search warrant and in the Hunt affidavit was for the limited to the front and back rooms; specific reference to those premises at 346 North Broadway was authorized and was not to be a fair readin g of this warrant indicates that a search of the entire

court ruled that the search was lawful, reasoning that Palmisano, 386 F. Supp. 599, 599 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (quotation omitted). The p. 12 12

NA DEAU, DALIANIS, DUGGAN and GALWAY, JJ., concurred.

court’s ruling as to evidence seized pursuant to the second search warrant. probable cause for the second search existed. Accordingly, we reverse the trial entire affidavit in support of the secon d search warrant to determine whether basement was lawful, however, the trial court should have considered the search warrant established probable cause. Because the search of the the basement” in determining whether the affidavit in support of the second relating to the information [officers] obtained as a result of the initial search of basement was illegal,” it could not consider “those portions of the affidavit Specifically, the trial court noted that because it “found that the search of the basement during the execution of the first search warrant was unl awful. The trial court based its ruling upon its conclusion that the search of the seized pursuant to the second search warrant must be suppressed. We agree. Finally, the State argues that the t rial court erred in ruling that items

authorize police to search the basement. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s ruling that the search warrant did not Brochu” included garage under Fourth Amendment (quotation omitted)). authorizing search of “the premises known as the d welling of Armand A. particularity the place to be searched); Brochu, 237 A.2d at 420, 422 (warrant case under State constitutional requirement that warrants describe with under the State Constitu tion. See Cote, p. 12 126 N.H. at 521 - 22, 523 - 25 (analyzing context, we reach the same conclusion under the Federal Constitution as we do Because the Federal Constitution affords no greater protection in this

denied, 474 U.S. 865, 888 (1985). room in house because defendant had access to all other rooms in house), cert. where it authorized search of entire house even though defendant rented one See Poyner v. Com., 329 S.E.2d 815, 824 (Va.) (search warrant not defective no indica tion that defendant’s bedroom was inaccessible to other occupants). where search warrant authorized search of “2101 South Grand” and there was defendant’s locked bedroom in dwelling occupied by several others lawful occurred), and State v. Hymer, 400 So. 2d 637, 638 - 39 (La. 1981) (search of