2004-254, APPEAL OF HYPERTHERM, INC.

weighed up to fifty pounds. The petitioner paid the respondent approximately varied in quantity. Some of the items the respondent was required to handle to locate and select ordered pieces for packing. The pieces ranged in size and petitioner as an order filler and warehouse packer, a position that required her voluntarily leaving her job as a nanny, the respondent began working for the The facts relevant to this appeal are undisp uted. In February 2001, after

Thatcher. We vacate and remand. treatment of a cumulative trauma injury suffered by the respondent, Hyvis by RSA 281 - A:23 (Supp. 2004) to pay medical costs associated with the of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Bo ard (board) that it is obligated BRODERICK, C.J. The petitioner, Hypertherm, Inc., appeals a decision

Schulthess on the brief and orally), for the petitioner. Getman, Stacey, Schulthess & Steere, P.A., of Bedford (Stephen J.

for t he respondent. Decato Law Office, of Lebanon (R. Peter Decato on the brief and orally),

(New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board)

No. 2004 - 254 Compensation Appeals Board

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@co urts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Hampshire, One Noble Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as

the respondent’s medical expenses because a cumulative trauma injury is not The petitioner argues that the board erred in ruling that it is liable for

reconsideration, and this a ppeal followed. medical expenses. The board denied the petitioner’s motion for hearing, the board concluded that the petitioner was responsible for the respondent’s expenses. The petitioner appealed and, following a second hearing, a DOL hearing officer concluded that Travelers was responsible for the responsible for the outstanding $4,593 in medical expenses. Following a Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL) seeking a ruling that the petitioner was On January p. 2 22, 20 03, the respondent filed a claim with the New

period beginning July 30, p. 2 2002, and ending in January 2003. occupational therapy treatments and incurred expenses totaling $4,593 for the or October 2001 and July 2002. The respondent then began a course of for hand and wrist pain, which she claimed had increased between September that date. On July 30, 2002, the respondent again sought medical treatment Company (Travelers), covered all of the respondent’s medical expenses up to exercise. Either the petitioner or its insurance carrier, Travelers Insurance On June 21, 2001, the respondent was released from treatment to home

benefits. working as a nanny at the rate of approximately $30,000 per year, plus modified duties at Hypertherm. Shortly thereafter, the respondent began no indication in the record that the respondent was unable to perf orm her that she was resigning because she was offered a position as a nanny. There is for which she was hired, due to the problems with her wrists. She also stated primarily because she could not perform her earlier duties filling orders, the job During her exit interview, the respondent explained that she was resigning a modified capacity for the petitioner until April p. 2 2001, when she resigned. The respondent contin ued to obtain treatment for her wrists, and work in

same and she did not lose time from employment as a result of her condition. respondent’s duties to accommodate her condition, but her pay remained the with modifications and wear wrist splints. The petitioner modified the treatment, perform home exercises, take anti - inflammatory medications, work instructions from her medical provider that she continue with medical right and left wrist flexor extensors. The respondent returned to work with diagnosed as a ganglion cyst, and the p ain was attributed to tendonitis in her petitioner, she sought medical treatment for the problem. The lump was lump on the back of her hand and, after reporting the condition to the experienced soreness in her hands. Eventually she noticed a bruise and a After working for the petitioner for only a few weeks, the respondent

$10 per hour. p. 3 3

with the respondent. resp ondent argues that such cases should be analyzed differently. We agree foregoing analysis should apply to cases that involve medical bills, the Briggs, 1 p. 3 38 N.H. 623, 631 (1994). While the petitioner contends that the 320 (2002); Appeal of Wausau Ins. Co., 143 N.H. 478, 480 - 81 (1999); Appeal of diminished earning capacity. See, e.g., Appeal of C NA Ins. Co., 148 N.H. 317, compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law, when a claimant suffers a numerous occasions, stated that cumulative trauma injuries occur, and are In the context o f workers’ compensation disability claims, we have, on

a compensable injury. cumulative trauma injury, it correctly determined that the respondent suffered although the board erred in concluding that the respondent suffered a attribu table to the work she performed for the petitioner. We find that injury was compensable because she was treated for a condition that was respondent’s injury as a cumulative trauma injury and as concluding that the We interpret the board’s decision as characterizing the nature of the

[respondent’ s] cumulative trauma injury. by RSA 281 - A:2 p. 3 3 to pay the costs of the treatment of the panel has unanimously concluded that the [petitioner] is obligated [respondent’s] medical problem attributable to her work. The submitted a bill for the reasonable and necessary treatment of the the work the [respondent] performed for the [petitioner] and has [respondent’s] pain, has concluded that the cause of the pain was In the matter before the panel, a medical provider has treated the

seeks paym ent by the [petitioner].” The board explained: required the medical treatment beginning on July p. 3 31, 2002[,] for which she [petitioner] that caused her bilateral wrist pain the amelioration of which respondent “did suffer a repetitive trauma injury while in the employ of the In its written decision, the board concluded, in releva nt part, that the

unreasonable. RSA 541:1 p. 3 3 (1997); Appeal of Fay, 150 N.H. 321, 324 (2003). the board’s decision, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, was unjust or decision demonstrates either tha t the board erred as a matter of law, or that We will not disturb the board’s decision unless the party appealing the

so without medical assistance. when the employee either can no longer perform her regular job or cannot do issue is for payment of medical bills, a n employer is responsible for the bills that we should uphold the board’s decision because, when the only claim at to the petitioner, no cognizable injury has occurred. The respondent contends claimant suffers a diminished earning capacity. Until that happens, according compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law unless and until the p. 4 4

causally related to employment regardless of whether they arose from trauma are payable for medical treatment a claimant receives for a condition that is practice, we hold that, for purposes of claims for medical bills alone, such bills Appeal of CNA Ins. Cos., 1 p. 4 43 N.H. 270, 273 (1998). Consistent with that compensating injured employees. A ppeal of Weaver, 150 N.H. 254, 256 (2003); the broadest reasonable effect to the statute’s remedial purpose of resolving all reasonable doubts in statutory construction in favor of providing It is our practice to liberally construe the Workers’ Compensation Law,

becomes aware of defect and its relationship to job). assessing liability or establishing rate of compensation is date claimant and continuing medical treatment, noting that date of injury for purposes of 1995), cert. denied (Okla. April 11, 1996) (in case involving disability benefits lost time or wages); cf. Centrilift v. Evans, 915 P.2d 391, 39 p. 4 4 (Okla. Ct. App. (N.Y. 1962) (rejecting notion that medical expense claimant not injured until he conclusions. Se e Ryciak v. Eastern Precision Resistor, 186 N.E.2d 408, 409 - 10 Courts in other jurisdictions have, with equal persuasiveness, reached similar

cumulative trauma injuries. responsibility to pay medical bills necessary to the amelioration of sought and not to insulate injuring employers from the analysis applies only to cases in which indemnity benefit s are believes that properly comprehended[,] the Briggs [/] Wausau medically possible following a work limiting injury. The panel continue to be able to work and are returned to work as soon as meaning of a statute intended to assure that injure d employees intended by the statute. This cannot be the conclusion as to the to pay for until they are not able to secure the benefit of the care continue working and to forego medical treatment they are not able their injury by working until they are too broken by that work to require employees experiencing repetitive trauma to compound as it is not cognizable under the statute. Such a conclusion would that t he claimant’s repetitive trauma injury is not compensible [sic] the legislature through RSA 281 - A can be achieved by a conclusion It cannot be that the policy of the statutory regime established by

bills: why the respondent suffered a compensable injury for purposes of medical respondent’s injury as a cumulative or repetiti ve trauma injury, aptly explained issuing its decision, the board, although erroneously referring to the bills alone, however, need not arise from a cumulative trauma injury. In causally relat ed medical bills. A compensable injury for purposes of medical capacity, they trigger a claimant's right to indemnity payments as well as Because cumulative trauma injuries adversely affect a claimant’s earning p. 5 5

NADEAU, DALIA NIS, DUGGAN and GALWAY, JJ., concurred.

be held responsible for the bills. experienced as a result of working for the petitioner, the petitioner should not such that it was no longer simply a continuation of the problem she responsible for payment of the bills. If, however, her condition was aggravated employment with the petitioner. If it was, the petitioner should be held 2002 was a continuation of the condition she suffered as a result of her the respondent’s condition upon her resumption of medical treatment in July To make that determination on remand, the board must decide whether

payment of the bills at issue. the board to determine, in the first instance, whether the petitioner is liable for condition arose from a cu mulative trauma injury. Accordingly, we remand to petitioner was responsible for such bills under the erroneous premise that her from July 2002 to January 2003. The board may have concluded that the 2001. Accordingly, the only bills at issue are those the respondent incurred the respondent incurred from the date of her resignation through June 2 1, incurred after she resigned. The petitioner does not challenge the medical bills petitioner should be held responsible for certain medical bills the respondent However, we are unable, on this record, t o determine whether the

expenses for the period of time during which she was employed at Hypertherm. petitioner or its insurance carrier properly covered the respondent’s medical found such a d iagnosis occurred while she was employed there. Thus, the being causally related to her duties at Hypertherm, it is clear that the board upon which the respondent’s medical provider diagnosed her condition as Specifically, although it is unclear from the board’s decision the precise date respondent suffered a compensable injury while employed by the pe titioner. Applying our holding to the facts of this case, we conclude that the

or cumulative trauma.