2003-0604 IN RE JUVENILE 2003-604-A & a.

father was abusing the boys. As part of his investigation of that allegation, In August 2002, the mother again contacted DCYF alleging that the

allegation and concluded it wa s unfounded. father had primary physical custody of all three boys. Spencer investigated the father was abusing them. The mother and the father were divorced and the Hampsh ire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) alleging that the In the spring of 2002, the mother of the three boys contacted the New

children. We affirm. worker, to testify about the content of interviews he conducted with the Superior Court (Brennan, J.) erred in allowing Scott Spencer, a child protective his three sons. See RSA 169 - C:3, II(d) (2002). On appeal, he argues that the DUGGAN, J. Following a hearing, the father was found to have abused

for the father. Ruddock & Innes, P.A., of Bedford (Scott F. Innes on the brief and orally),

attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the Sta te. Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Laura E. B. Lombardi, assistant

No. 2003 - 604 Hillsborough - nor thern judicial district

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. O pinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Hampshire, One Noble Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

The State argues that: (1) the father lacks standing to challenge the grant

protection r equire the exclusion of Spencer’s testimony. that the interviews be excluded from evidence; and (4) due process and equal school; (3) under the statutory scheme, a violation of RSA 169:38, V requires 169:38, V apply to interviews conducted at a privately owned and operated only available in criminal proceedings; ( p. 2 2) the recording requi rements of RSA On appeal, the father argues that: (1) immunity under RSA 516:34 is

punishment of the children is justified under his discipline policy.” father ’s own testimony “made it clear that he believes that his bruising physical fear had caused physical symptoms and emotional problems and that the had abused the children, that the children were afraid of the father, that their Based upon the evidence at the hearing, the court found that the father

available remedy for a violation of the statute. about the interviews. The court ruled that exclusion of evidence was not an violated RSA 169 - C:38, V, the court should exclude all of Spencer’s testimony (1997). The father then fi led a motion in limine arguing that because Spencer County Attorney granted Spencer immunity from prosecution. See RSA 516:34 to testify against himself.” Prior to the hearing, however, the Hillsborough (1987), “to determine whether the witness’ testimony would violate his right not court scheduled a Richards hearing, see State v. Richards, 1 p. 2 29 N.H. 669 boys without videotaping them. See RSA 169 - C:38, V (2002), :39 (2002). The Spencer might be criminally liable for conducting the interviews of the three Prior to the superior court hearing, an is sue arose about whether

for a de novo hearing in superior court. district court found that the father had abused his sons. The father appealed adjudicatory hearing, see RSA 169 - C:18 ( p. 2 2002) (amended 2002, 2004), the Spencer filed abuse petitions in the Milford Distri ct Court. After an

showed Spencer photographs of bruises on the oldest boy’s arm. a week; and that they did not feel safe at home. Later, the boys’ mother would strike the m in the leg with his fist; that this happened two or three times The younger two boys told Spencer that when they misbehaved, their father fist. The boy said that he had bruises in the past and did not feel safe at home. o ne of his father’s rules at home, his father would strike him in the leg with his During the interviews, the oldest child told Spencer that when he broke

to record them. Spencer agreed. the school, the principal agreed to allow the interviews, but asked Spencer not interview the children. He brought a video camera to record the interviews. At Spencer went to the Tabernacle Baptist School, a private school in Litchfield, to p. 3 3

C: p. 3 38, V. private school, we reject the father ’s argument that Spencer violated RSA 169 we hold that RSA 169 - C:38, IV does not apply to interviews conducted in a The father concedes that the school here was a private school. Because

other public places”). White remarking that the amendment “allows access to the public schools and public places. N.H.H.R. Jou r. 524 (1988); N.H.S. Jour. 987 (1988) (Senator places, but it was amended in the House of Representatives to cover only As originally introduced in 1988, the legislation covered both public and private schools, we note that the legislative history supports our reading of the statute. Although it is clear on its face that the statute does not apply to private our task to expand it to cover private schools. See Crowley, 147 N.H. at p. 3 389. statute is specifically limited to “public places.” RSA 169 - C:38, IV. It is not The father ’s argument would have us read words into the statute. The

encompass both public and private schools. both private and public agencies, the definition of schools must also RSA 170 - E:25, II (2002), to argue that because “child care agency” includes any “organization . . . established for profit or otherwise,” see RSA 169 - C: p. 3 3, VI; schools. He relies upon the definition of “child care agency” which includes only to “any public place,” the word “schools” includes both public and private The father argues that, even though RSA 169 - C:38, IV on its face applies

recording of the entire interview shall be made.” its entirety. If the interview cannot be videotaped in its entirety, an audio videotaped if possible. If the interview is videotaped, it shall be videotaped in conducted pursuant to paragraph IV, the interview with the child shall be interview with a child.” RSA 169 - C: p. 3 38, V provides that “[f]or any interview limited to schools and child care agencies, for the purpose of conducting an allegations of abuse have “the right to enter any public place, incl uding but not RSA 169 - C:38, IV provides that DCYF caseworkers investigating

Id. legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include. Crowley v. Frazier, 147 N.H. p. 3 387, 389 (2001). We will not consider what the point in any statutory interpretation case is the language of the statute. novo. Remington Invs. v. Howard, 150 N.H. 653, 654 (2004). The starting The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de

the interviews did not violate due process or equal protection. conducted in violation of that statute; and (5) the failure to exclude evidence of in public places; ( p. 4 4) RSA chapter 169 - C does not require exclusion of interviews recording requirements of RSA 169 - C: p. 3 38, V, only apply to i nterviews conducted of immunity; (2) immunity is not limited to criminal proceedings; (3) the 4

concurred. BRODERICK, C.J., and NADEAU, DALIANIS and GALWAY, JJ.,

arguments which assume that Spencer violated RSA 169 - C:38, V. conducted in public places, we need not address the father ’s remaining Because we hold that RSA 169 - C:38, V only applies to interviews

123 (1993). briefed and, therefore, decline to address it. See In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, violates equal protection. We conclude that this argument was not adequately that the statute applies only to public schools and not to private schools The father next argues that to accept the argument, as we did above,