2004-469, IN RE JUVENILE 2004-0469

2004, at which the court considered the report and recommendations of th e The final dispositional hearing was held twenty days later, on April 28,

hearing. The court ordered him to remain at the YSDU pending the dispositional April 8, 2004 adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile plead ed “true” to the petition. adjudication, he was sent to the Youth Services Detention Unit (YSDU). At the by petition with resisting detention. See RSA 642:2 (1996). While awaiting The relevant facts follow. On March 19, 2004, the juvenile was charged

sentence confinement. We affirm. Court (Carbon, J.) of his motions to dismiss and to receive credit for his pre - GALWAY, J. The juvenile appeals the denial by the Concord District

Charles A. Russell, of Concord, by brief, for the juvenile.

on the brief), for the State. Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Ann M. Rice, associate attorney general,

No. 2004 - 469 Concord District Court

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. O pinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Hampshire, One Noble Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

hearings,” In re Russell C., 1 p. 2 20 N.H. 260, 268 (1980), we have declined to infer jurisdictional li mitation when mandating time limits for holding adjudicatory 33, 36 (1985). While “[w]e have . . . found legislative intent to impose a the court of jurisdiction. See State ex. rel. McLellan v. Cavanaugh, 127 N.H. violated the time frame of RSA 169 - B:16, V, this would not necessarily deprive Moreover, even if we were to agree that by recessing the hearing the c ourt

complete the hearing in that time frame. conduct a hearing on final disposition within twenty - one days, not that it the contrar y, by its express terms, the statute merely requires the court to the hearing to find a suitable out - of - home placement for him. We disagree. To The juvenile asserts that the statute prohibited the court from recessing

adjudicatory hearing. Accordingly, we hold that it complied with the statute. court presided at a dispositional hearing within twenty - one da ys of the at.” Black’s Law Dictionary 736 (7 ed. 1999). The record shows that the trial th context, the plain meaning of the phrase “to hold” is “to conduct” or “preside and within 30 days of the adjudicatory hearin g if the minor is released.” In disposition within p. 2 21 days of the adjudicatory hearing if the minor is detained RSA 169 - B:16, V provides: “The court shall hold a hearing on final

interpretat ion de novo. Hutchins v. Peabody, 151 N.H. 8 p. 2 2, 84 (2004). further indication of legislative intent. Id. We review the trial court’s statutory statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond it for Blackthorne Group v. Pines of Newmarket, 150 N.H. 804, 806 (2004). When a where possible, ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the word s used. considered as a whole. We first examine the language of the statute, and, final arbiters of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute with the time limits of RSA 169 - B:16, V deprived it of jurisdiction. We are the On appeal, the juvenile first argues that the trial court’s failure to comply

court denied both motions. moved to receive credit for his pre - sentence confinement in the YSDU. The mandatory time limits of RSA 169 - B:16, V (Supp. p. 2 200 4). The juvenile also recessing the dispositional hearing, the court failed to comply with the interim, the juvenile moved to dismiss the proceeding, arguing that, by The court reco nvened the hearing nine days later, on May 7, 2004. In the dispositional hearing to permit the JPPO to secure a placement for the juvenile. Over the objections of the juvenile and his father, the court recessed the

placement had not been completed. shelter bed was available and that the search for a long - term residential then in a suitable residential program. The JPPO informed the court that no juvenile initially be placed into shelter care for a maximum of sixty days and juvenile probation/parole officer (JPPO). The JPPO recommended that the p. 3 3

concurred. BRODERICK, C.J., and NADEAU, DALIANIS and DUGGAN, JJ.,

Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (200 p. 3 3). because they concern issues that are not properly before us. See State v. because they too are moot or are insufficiently developed for appellate review or We further decline to address the juvenile’ s remaining arguments either

(2001). further at this time. See In the Matter of Jones and Jones, 146 N.H. 119, 121 it will necessarily evade our review, and we therefore decline to consider it review. While this issue may come before us again, we are not persuaded that not believe, that this issue is capable of repetition but likely to evade our confinement credit to juveniles in the future.” He does not argue, and we do moot by requesting that the court require trial courts “to grant pretrial and returned to his home. The juvenile impliedly concedes that the issue is issue is moot as the juvenile has been released from the shelter care facility motion for pre - trial sentence detention credit. We agree with the State that this The juvenile next argues that the trial court erroneously de nied his

124 S. Ct. 1668 (2004). consideration on appeal. State v. Ayer, 150 N.H 14, p. 3 34 (2003), cert. denied, rights, supported by neither argument nor authority, warrants no extended separate constitutional argument. His off - hand invocation of constitutional While the juvenile cites the State Constitution, he does not advance a

misplaced. upon cases concerning mandatory time limits for adjudicatory hearings thus is dispositional objective.” Cavanaugh, 127 N.H. a t p. 3 36. The juvenile’s reliance “such intent when the mandate is imposed to further a remedial or