2004-132, STATE OF NH v. KEVIN M. ARMSTRONG

pled gu ilty to the charge of escape on October 26, 2001, and as part of that and was injured when he tripped and fell down a flight of stairs. The defendant arraignment the defendant ran from the court room. A police officer gave chase arraignment at the Derry District Court on July 3, 1998. During his The relevant facts follow. The defendant was in offic ial custody for an

apprehend him during commission of the escape. We affirm. expenses incurred by a police officer, who was injured while attempting to Superior Court (T. Nadeau, J.) requiring him to pay restitution for medical count of escape. See RSA 642:6 (1996). He appeals from an order of the DALIANIS, J. The defendant, Kevin M. Armstrong, pled guilty to one

and orally, for the defendant. Chris McLaughlin, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief

attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State. Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Stephen D. Fuller, senior assistant

No. 2 004 - 132 Rockingham

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. O pinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Hampshire, One Noble Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

chased the defendant and was injured during the chase. We hold, therefore, was in official custody at the Derry District Court when he fled. The officer case, was, a direct result of flight from official custody, because the defendant one must escape from official custody. RSA 64 p. 2 2:6. Pursuit can be, and in this The defendant pled guilty to the crime of escape. To commit this crime,

statute itself suggests otherwise. Stat e v. McCarthy, 150 N.H. 389, 390 ( p. 2 2003). statutory words and phrases their usual and common meaning unless the expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. We ascribe to ordering restitution. We are the final arbiter of the legislature’s intent as result of his criminal offense, and that, therefore, the trial court erred by The defendant argues that the police officer’s injury was not the direct

conduct covered by the conviction. See State v. Eno, 143 N.H. 465, 470 (1999). economic losses directly resulting from the factual allegations that support the We simply note, as we have in the past, that a defendant may be held liable for a test to ascertain at what point an event is no longer a direct result of a crime. scope of the plain meaning of the statutory language, w e need not today adopt 651:6 p. 2 2, III. However, because the facts in this case fall so clearly within the us to adopt a test to clarify the meaning of the phrase “direct result” in RSA as a direct result of a criminal offense . . ..” RSA 651:62, III. Both parties urge 2004). Economic loss is defined as “out - of - pocket or other expenses incurred offender to compensate a victim for economic loss . . . .” RSA 651:62, V (Supp. RSA 651:62, V define s restitution as “money or service provided by the

the State’s argument. was correct in ordering the defendant to pay restitution, we need not address agreed to pay restitution in his guilty plea. Since we find that the trial court p. 2 2004). The State ar gues that the defendant waived this argument when he was not a “direct result” of the crime as required by RSA 651:62, III (Supp. The defendant appeals this order, arguing that the injury to the officer

expenses. the defendant to pay $13,070.10 in restitution for reasonable medical challenge the reasonableness of the medical bills. The resulting order requ ired motion was granted. An evidentiary hearing was held so the defendant could had eliminated the restitution provision of the defendant’s sentence. This bills totaled $13,37 p. 2 2.35. Thereafter, the State sough t to vacate the order which granted; however, the State later received information that the officer’s medical seeking restitution for medical costs on April 16, 2003. This motion was medical bills, and moved to amend the sentence to remove the provision The State was unable to determine the amount owed for the officer’s

bills. plea agreed, as part of his sentence, to pay restitution for the officer’s medical p. 3 3

BRODERICK, C.J.