2005-195, DALTON HYDRO LLC v. TOWN OF DALTON

property is located in Dalton (the Dalton property). the Connecticut River, and a hydroelec tric power plant. A portion of the the New Hampshire - Vermont border consisting of a paper mill, a dam across The record supports the following facts. Dalton Hydro owns property on

the appellee, Town of Dalton (town). We reverse and remand. an order of the Superior Court (Vaughan, J.) granting summary jud gment to DALIANIS, J. The appellant, Dalton Hydro LLC (Dalton Hydro), appeals

orally), for the Town of Dalton. Mitchell & Bates, P.A., of Laconia (Judith E. Whitelaw on the brief and

Dalton Hydro LLC. and Steven A. Wuthrich, of Montpelier, Idaho, on the brief and orally, for Brown, Olson & Gould, P.C., of Concord (Bryan K. Gould on the brief),

No. 2005 - 19 5 Coos

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. O pinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 Errors may be reported by E - mail at the following address: errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Hampshire, One Noble Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

responded that Dalton Hydro’s right to contest the proportionality of its tax appraisal was illegal, excessive, disproportionate, and unjust. The town market v alue of the Dalton property as of March p. 2 20, 2003, and that the town’s refund, asserting that the purchase price of $3,205,000 represented the fair Dalton Hydro then petitioned the trial court for an abatement and

application. were illegal, excessive, disproportionate, and unjust. The board denied the abatement with the town’s board of selectmen, claiming that the as sessed taxes tax in the amount of $97,5 p. 2 20. Dalton Hydro filed a timely application for an for taxation purposes. Based upon this appraisal, the town assessed a total received a tax bill from the town appraising the Dalton property at $3,833,330 Approximately eight months later, in November 2003, Dalton Hydro

the sale. town on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, sent a letter to the town notifying it of same day, the trustee, in addition to paying past due property taxes to the purchased the Dalton property from the trustee on March p. 2 21, 2003. That property under the bankruptcy court’s order to Dalton Hydro. Dalton Hydro On March 20, 2003, SRC assigned its rights to purchase the Dalton

Hydro received i nventory forms. owner of record as of that date. Neither the trustee, nor SRC, nor Dalton Paper Company/Simpson Paper Company,” the Dalton property’s corporate 74:4 -:5 ( p. 2 2003). One such inventory blank was sent to “American Pulp and the town’s property owners, as was required by New Ha mpshire law. See RSA On March 11, 2003, the town mailed taxpayer inventory blanks to all of

address and phone number. SRC’s representatives provided the clerk and the tax collector with its Utah discuss the impending purchase, as well as related tax issues. At this meeting, representatives from SRC met with the town’s clerk and its tax collector to p. 2 2003, in advance of closing. On or about February 20, 2003, two sale to SRC, whi ch assumed operating responsibility on or about February 14, the Dalton property. The bankruptcy court issued an order authorizing the corporation that manages Dalton Hydro, made a bid of $3,205,000 to purchase On February 7, 2003, the Steve Rogan Company (SRC), a Utah

appointed attorney Douglas J. Wolinsky (the trus tee) as Chapter 11 trustee. converted the filing to a Chapter 11 proceeding on September 16, p. 2 2002, and States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont. The bankruptcy court Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy filed on or about July p. 3 3, 2002, in the United of Vermont (American Paper), which became the subject of an involuntary Dalton Hydro’s immediate predecessor in title was American Paper Mills 3

the debtor holds a legal or equitable interest becomes the property of the ‘property of the estate’ by operation of law . . . .”). Thus, all property in which F. p. 3 3d 523, 528 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Virtually all property of the de btor . . . becomes also Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990); United States v. Shadduck, 112 In re Pasteurized Eggs Corp., 296 B.R. 283, 288 - 89 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2003); see commencement of the case” become “prop erty” of the bankruptcy estate. See provide that “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the LLC, 380 F.3d 523, 527 - 28 (1st Cir. 2004). Courts have interpreted § 541 to commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2005); see also In Re NTA, comprised of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the such as the one underlying the dispute now before us creates an estate Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541, the commencement of a bankruptcy case

Peerless Ins. Co., 151 N.H. p. 3 395, 397 (2004). review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Marikar v. judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the trial court’s decision. Id. We reveal any genuine is sue of material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to Ski Resort, 152 N.H. 399, 401 (2000). If our review of the evidence does not in the light most favorable to the non - moving party. Soraghan v. Mt. Cranmore th e affidavits and other evidence, and all inferences properly drawn from them, When reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we consider

Constitutions. the Due Process Clauses of the United States and New Hampshire interpretation and application of the relevant statute by the trial court violated having actual knowledge that those records were in correct; and (4) the relied solely upon county land records to establish property ownership, despite town failed to meet its statutory obligations as to Dalton Hydro because it to American Paper to defeat D alton Hydro’s right to seek an abatement; ( p. 3 3) the inventory forms, and, thus, could not rely upon its mailing of an inventory form the owner of the property prior to the statutory cutoff date for the mailing of fact exist ed; (2) the town had actual notice that Dalton Hydro would become granting the town’s motion for summary judgment because material issues of On appeal, Dalton Hydro raises four issues: (1) the trial court erred in

Hydro, granted the town’s motion. trial court, finding t hat the town had met its statutory obligations as to Dalton Hydro’s right to appeal the board’s denial of its request for abatement. The failure to return a completed inventory form to the town terminated Dalton Dalton” by mailing a form to Dalton Hydro’s predecessor - in - interest, and that that it fulfilled its duty to mail an inventory form to “all owners of property in In December 2004, the town moved for summary judgment, asserting

interest had filed the required inventory form with the town. burden for 200 p. 3 3 had been forfeit ed because neither it nor its predecessor - in - p. 4 4

concurred. BRODERICK, C.J., and NADEAU, DUGGAN and GALWAY, JJ.,

Hydro’s remaining three arguments. judgment to the town was error. We, therefore, need not address Dalton In light of our conclu sion, we hold that the trial court’s grant of summary

3, 2002. See 11 U.S.C. § 5 p. 4 41. the bankruptcy estate, which owned the property by operation of law as of July required to mail a taxpayer inventory blank to the trustee, as representative of that estate. We conclude, therefore, that, pursuant to RSA 74:5, the town was March 11, 2003, and it did not dispute the inclusion of the taxable land within cognizant of the bankruptcy estate before it mailed the inventory forms on which the tru stee later remitted payment in full. The town, therefore, was bankruptcy estate seeking $226,266.47 in taxes owed on the property, for On February 12, 2003, the town filed a proof of claim with the

nor add words that it did not see fit to include. Id. modification. Id. We will neit her consider what the legislature might have said the language of a statute is clear on its face, its meaning is not subject to statute suggests otherwise. State v. Hofland, 151 N.H. 322, 32 p. 4 4 (2004). When stat utory words and phrases their usual and common meaning, unless the 25 of each year. See RSA 74:5. When interpreting statutes, we ascribe to known or believed to own taxable property in their towns” on or before March inventory blanks to “the last known address of all persons or corporations RSA 74:5 requires a town’s “selectmen or ass essors” to mail taxpayer

1981). B.R. 6 p. 4 43, 646 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982); In re Koch, 14 B.R. 64, 65 (Bankr. D. Kan. D.N.H. 1998); see also In re Shore Air Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc., 18 estate has some right. In re A & J Auto Sales, Inc., 223 B.R. 839, 842 (Bankr. the bankruptcy estate is defined broadly to include any property to which the Development, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 33 F.3d 106, 112 - 13 (1st Cir. 1994). Property of Sk orich, 332 B.R. 77, 88 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005); see also Sunshine bankruptcy estate on the date the bankruptcy petition is filed. See In re