2004-595, STATE OF NH v. MICHAEL J. SMITH

The defendant, Michael J. Smith, appeals his conviction of

the brief and orally), for the defendant. Douglas, Leonard & Garvey, P.C., of Concord (Richard J. Lehmann on

memorandum of law and orally), for the State. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Edith L. Pacillo, attorney, on the

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. v.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2004-595 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Carroll Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as p. 2 Constitution. of the United States Constitution, and Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire

counts of possession of a controlled substance. This appeal followed. of illegal possession of a controlled drug in violation of RSA 318-B:2.

the seizure violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

agreement with the Town of Madison.” The defendant was found guilty of five 2 possession of prescription medications. He was indicted on five felony counts stop of the defendant’s vehicle even though they did not have a mutual aid “were authorized under the exigent circumstances exception to effectuate a

violates RSA 105:4. unauthorized, extraterritorial seizure. In addition, the defendant contends that suppress because the exclusionary rule should apply when a police officer

driving while intoxicated. During booking on that charge he was found to be in been stopped. The state trooper subsequently arrested the defendant for subsequent motion to reconsider. The trial court determined that the officers arrived. A state trooper arrived about five to ten minutes after the vehicle had

statutory law in failing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. See id. clearly erroneous. See State v. Johnston, 150 N.H. 448, 451 (2004). We review the trial court’s factual findings unless they are unsupported by the record or When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept

from the stop. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress and a defendant and then asked him to wait until a sheriff’s deputy or state trooper mutual aid agreement, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence resulting police department has mutual aid agreement). Based upon the lack of a

mutual aid agreement with the Town of Madison. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred as a matter of vehicle.

he had known for many years. Shackford had a brief conversation with the (granting police officers authority to render assistance in town with which their

At the time of the incident, the Ossipee Police Department did not have a head-on collision. At that point, King activated his blue lights and stopped the and an oncoming car was forced to swerve out of its way in order to avoid a continued weaving all over the road. It then crossed the centerline of Route 41

Shackford approached the vehicle and recognized the defendant, whom

the middle of the road before turning right onto Route 41. The vehicle Route 113 and Route 41, the driver drove through the stop sign and stopped in by town police officers. We disagree. p. 3 signifies legislative intent that suppression should be required for its violation

guidance.

claim under the State Constitution, relying upon federal case law only for objectives of the legislation.

we affirm the trial court’s statutory construction analysis. result when a town officer acts outside of his jurisdictional limit. Accordingly, concluding that the legislature intended by its silence to provide for a different

jurisdictional limits of the statute, so long as the trooper acted in good faith. be suppressed or excluded when a state trooper fails to comply with State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983). New Hampshire State Police, provides that evidence in a criminal case shall not Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution. We first examine this construing an ambiguous statute, we look to legislative intent and the the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Next, the defendant contends that the seizure violated his rights under

that it did not see fit to include. acting in good faith. We have been presented with no good reason for statute we will not consider what the legislature might have said, or add words situation of a state trooper’s failure to comply with jurisdictional limits while provided that suppression should not be an available remedy in the analogous while the legislature was silent as to remedies under RSA 105:4, it expressly points out that RSA 106-B:15 (2001), a statute defining the jurisdiction of the whether the legislature intended to authorize such a remedy. Flynn, 123 N.H. at 464. As the defendant notes, statute is an appropriate remedy, we first analyze the statute to determine creates an ambiguity as to whether suppression is the remedy. When intended to authorize suppression as a remedy. Arguably, the statute’s silence There is no language in RSA chapter 105 to indicate that the legislature Hudson, 148 N.H. 769, 771 (2002). The defendant asks us to do just that.

N.H. 541, 543 (1999). Moreover, it is well established that when interpreting a the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute. State v. Sullivan, 144 Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 463-65 (1983). We are the final arbiter of the intent of

To determine whether suppression of evidence obtained in violation of a State We will assume, without deciding, that a violation of RSA 105:4 occurred. of order on public or special occasions.

The defendant argues that RSA 105:4 is part of a statutory scheme

and the prevention of crime in their town, and in the preservation employ police officers in the detection and conviction of criminals The selectmen, or superintendent under their direction, may

RSA 105: p. 4 4 (2001) provides: cause existed.

searches and seizures, and that an arrest was constitutionally valid if probable

the jurisdiction statute did not automatically require exclusion of evidence. lasted no longer than necessary when judged in terms of its purpose. and King detained the defendant until the state trooper arrived. Thus, the stop Shackford testified that no more than ten minutes elapsed from the time he defendant’s motion, and he subsequently appealed his conviction. evidence obtained as a result of the arrest. The trial court denied the the officer’s territorial jurisdiction, and the defendant moved to suppress all

to this one. For instance, in inapplicable because probable cause existed. Id.; see also State v. Melvin, 281

Id. The court concluded that the exclusionary rule was

The court ruled that the Fourth Amendment protected against unreasonable

appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a technical violation of

App. 1976), the defendant was arrested approximately three miles outside of

Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions in cases analogous

long enough to preserve status quo). warrant was needed and the stop was constitutionally valid. Maya, 126 N.H. at 595 (officer had reasonable suspicion and detained suspect the stop was a valid investigatory stop. A review of the record reveals that no See exception applied to this case. We affirm on alternate grounds, concluding that

traffic stop. not violated. Here, the Ossipee police officers made a constitutionally valid that the officers witnessed the defendant cross the yellow line, drive completely suspicion for the stop or that they lacked probable cause. The record reveals The defendant does not argue that the officers lacked reasonable

Maya, 126 N.H. at 595. narrowly tailored and last no longer than necessary to effectuate its purpose. v. Szczerbiak, 1 p. 4 48 N.H. 352, 355 (2002). An investigatory stop must be articulable facts that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity. State stop when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific have obtained a warrant. The trial court found that the exigent circumstance Schneider, 124 N.H. 242, 243 (1983). An officer may make an investigatory

See State v. Maya, 126 N.H. 590, 595 (1985); see also State v.

Suppression is not mandated, however, when one’s constitutional rights are were constitutionalized. State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 386 (1995). purposes for which prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures The exclusionary rule is a logical and necessary corollary to achieve the

because the officers were acting outside of their jurisdiction, they could not pursuant to Part I, Article 19, only a civil officer may obtain a warrant, and Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Specifically, he claims that The defendant argues that the seizure violated his rights under Part I, p. 5 5

Fourth Amendment sense if it is based on probable cause.” by state officers acting beyond the scope of their authority is reasonable in “the the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. was no violation of the Federal Constitution. Accordingly, we find no error in

concurred. BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, DUGGAN and GALWAY, JJ.,

We are persuaded, however, by the federal cases that have held that an arrest whether an arrest is Specifically, he argues that the “federal circuits are split on the question of police had reasonable suspicion, indeed, probable cause, for the stop, there law to effect a custodial arrest for the particular offense); Based upon the same reasoning, we conclude that because the Ossipee

Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4 Cir. 1974). th constitutional violation unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause); Tex., 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 ( p. 5 5 Cir. 1991) (holding that there is no th Bell, 54 F.3d 502, 504 (8 Cir. 1995); see also Fields v. City of South Houston, th United States v.

authority to arrest pursuant to State law affects constitutionality of the arrest). Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Suffolk, 968 F.2d 1480, 1482-83 (2 Cir. 1992) (whether officers have valid d Malone v. County of arresting officer had probable cause and authority under state or municipal Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7 Cir. 1989) (custodial arrest is constitutional if th circumstances, such an arrest is presumptively unreasonable); cause existed. United States v. officer’s jurisdiction violated the Fourth Amendment; absent exigent Neff, 90 p. 5 5 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (10 Cir. 1990) (arrest executed outside of the th (1 Cir. 2004). He cites federal cases supporting his argument. See Ross v. st her jurisdiction while not in hot pursuit.” See Santoni v. Potter, 369 F.3d 594

The defendant contends that the seizure violated his rights under the

State Constitution.

Id. at 1 p. 5 56-57. We conclude that the stop did not violate the

the evidence seized during the arrest was not necessary because probable unauthorized arrest violated the State or Federal Constitution. Suppression of Supreme Court held that evidence should only be suppressed if the Similarly, in People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 1 p. 5 52 (Colo. 1983), the Colorado S.E.2d 97 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 292 S.E.2d 578 (N.C. 1982).