2004-695, STATE OF NH v. CHRISTOPHER BELTRAN

2003, Christopher Squeglia and Amy Knott were shot and killed in a parking The jury could have found the following relevant facts. On April 17,

its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement. We affirm. extrinsic evidence to impeach Siegel; and (3) by allowing the State to impeach Arica Siegel; (2) by refusing to allow him to introduce a police report as admitting detailed evidence that he physically abused his former girlfriend, trial in Superior Court (Barry, J.). He argues that the trial court erred: (1) in two counts of second-degree murder, see RSA 630:1-b (1996), following a jury HICKS, J. The defendant, Christopher Beltran, appeals his conviction of

brief and orally, for the defendant. David M. Rothstein, deputy chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the

brief, and Mr. Delker orally), for the State. attorney general, and Karen E. Huntress, assistant attorney general, on the Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (N. William Delker, senior assistant

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. v.

errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. No. 2004-695 Hampshire, One Noble Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial Hillsborough-northern judicial district Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as a gun which he wanted “to put the fear of God into somebody.”

p. 2 Goupil’s home to sell him drugs. Goupil testified the defendant was looking for

watch themselves tonight.” Squeglia was dating. The defendant told her that she and Squeglia had “better 2

negative, and the defendant and Siegel left. that he had a problem and asked if Case had a gun. Case responded in the departed. The defendant then received a call from Goupil, and drove to

broken.

defendant had a confrontation with several people, including a woman whom

defendant put socks on his hands and reloaded the shotgun. instructed Siegel to wipe off the shells to remove any fingerprints. The the home of Richard Case and Linda Segebarth, where the defendant told Case the murders took place. Following the meeting, the defendant and Siegel threw it on the bed. The defendant picked up the gun and unloaded it. He customers. Squeglia was another drug dealer in Manchester. After the house emptied, Badeau took out a pump action shot gun and

defendant said that Squeglia told him that Goupil deserved to have his jaw

fight, Goupil discussed what had happened with the defendant. The defendant and Siegel next went to Badeau’s house, where the fight, several of Squeglia’s friends attacked him and broke his jaw. After the he was “no good.” In March 2003, Goupil fought with Squeglia; during the

Siegel went to Manchester on April 16 to sell crack cocaine. They stopped at Later in the evening, the defendant met Badeau in the parking lot where against the defendant at trial. Knott was also one of the defendant’s

run into “a bunch of people on [Reed’s] front porch” including Squeglia. The the defendant went into the house. Upon his return, he told Seigel that he had They later stopped at Karen Reed’s home. Seigel stayed in the car while

testified that the defendant said that he did not like Squeglia and thought that

bringing back two kilograms of cocaine. After his return, the defendant and ultimately pled guilty to acting as an accomplice to the murders and testified trips to California. On his last trip in April 2003, he told Badeau that he was a heavy drug user to whom the defendant sold crack almost every day. Badeau Between November 2002 and April 2003, the defendant made several she was eighteen years old and addicted to crack cocaine. Richard Badeau was

Benoit Goupil was a customer of both the defendant and Squeglia. He

His former girlfriend, Siegel, first met the defendant in November 2002, when lot on Calef Road in Manchester. The defendant was a crack cocaine dealer. which Siegel testified about the abuse and its impact on her conduct on the

p. 3 he instructed.

withheld information from and repeatedly lied to the police. After a hearing at

she was afraid that she would be harmed by the defendant if she did not do as

victims. 3 gunshots. The defendant and Badeau got back into the truck and drove away. truck. He and Siegel both heard two gunshots, a pause, and then two more

loaded the gun for the defendant prior to the murders and why she initially and on several occasions shooting her with a taser gun, to explain why Siegel happened. defendant physically abused her by pulling her hair, punching and beating her,

be no warning to the victims. Siegel testified that she loaded the gun because down.” The defendant wanted the gun loaded in advance so that there would “You just press the button down by the trigger and you slide the thing up and degree murder and testified against the defendant at trial, murdered the

testified that he saw the defendant carrying the gun toward the back of the

where they had met earlier in the evening.

woman had been shot. He also instructed Siegel to lie if questioned about what defendant had abused Siegel. Specifically, the State offered evidence that the would not have to worry about “Chris” anymore, and that Squeglia and the parents’ home. During the trip the defendant called Goupil, and told him he Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to admit evidence that the

testified that she told the defendant she did not know how and he responded, contended that Badeau, who pled guilty to being an accomplice to secondhe conceded to being present in the parking lot at the time of the murders, but The defendant and Badeau got out of the truck and took the gun. Badeau The defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder. At trial

discussed where to shoot Squeglia and decided to return to the parking lot told him to follow them. As they were leaving, the defendant and Badeau shotgun was in the back seat. They met Squeglia at a convenience store, and

After returning to Badeau’s home, the defendant and Siegel left for her

a round in the gun. She did not respond and the defendant yelled at her. She

When they arrived at the parking lot, Squeglia and Knott were waiting.

meet. The defendant, Badeau, and Siegel got into Badeau’s truck. The

before,” to which the defendant responded, “Let’s do it.”

On the way to the parking lot the defendant instructed Siegel to chamber

The defendant and Badeau then made plans with Squeglia by phone to

testified that she heard Badeau say, “I’m down with it. I’ve killed people Later, the defendant and Badeau discussed killing Squeglia. Siegel committed these murders.” p. 4 Badeau, as the man who acted in conformity with his character when he

the evidence had an “unmistakable tendency to isolate [him], as opposed to

case.

mandated that the evidence be excluded.” Finally, the defendant argues that

if it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant’s

accident. preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or “[i]n light of its low probative value, the prejudicial impact of [the] testimony not be substantially outweighed by its prejudice to the defendant. purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, admitting the details of [his] . . . treatment of his girlfriend.” He contends that defendant committed the act; and (3) the probative value of the evidence must loaded the gun [for the defendant] was not sufficiently important to justify defendant’s character or disposition; (2) there must be clear proof that the

of other crimes or wrongs. merits of the crime as charged and to prevent a conviction based upon evidence Id. The defendant claims that the State failed to meet its burden,

court’s ruling for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, and will reverse only demonstrating the admissibility of prior bad acts. Id. We review the trial Smalley, 151 N.H. 193, 196 (2004). The State bears the burden of

naked in the shower. The defendant argues that “the issue of why [Siegel] 404(b): (1) the evidence must be relevant for a purpose other than proving the have established a three-part test for the admissibility of evidence under Rule

The purpose of Rule 404(b) is to ensure that the defendant is tried on the

the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove that on one occasion, the defendant shot her with a taser gun while she was physical abuse, including the repetitive use of a taser stun gun. Siegel testified New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404 (b) provides: permitted the State to elicit testimony from Siegel that he subjected her to

murders and not the defendant.” particular in light of the defendant’s claim that Richard Badeau committed the that the “probative value of the evidence [was] far greater than the prejudice, in

On appeal, the defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it

See RSA 630:1-b. This appeal followed. A jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of second-degree murder.

relevant” to explain her conduct, that there was clear proof of the bad acts, and night of the murders, the trial court found that the evidence was “highly especially the taser evidence.” We disagree. p. 5 was not so critical as to warrant the admission of the abuse evidence, about the defendant’s responsibility.” The defendant argues that “this issue

orders. because she was afraid that the defendant would hurt her if she disobeyed his

defendant] that was used to kill two people and then [why she lied] to the police

engaged in the extreme conduct of loading the murder weapon [for the murders and why she initially lied to the police about the murders. the claim that Siegel was lying, and to explain her conduct on the night of the

[her] up or do something to [her] or [her] family if [she] ever did anything and her delay in reporting). The defendant argues that the specific could have [her] watched and that he could have someone hurt [her] or beat against a victim was admissible to explain the victim’s submission to the acts hurt [her].” She testified that in the past the defendant had told her that “he Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1465 (4 Cir. 1995) (evidence of appellant’s violence th surrounding the murders and her delay in reporting. Cf. United States v. character, or propensity. of Siegel was admissible to explain her submission to the defendant’s demands in dispute, without relying upon forbidden inferences of predisposition, For purposes of this case, the detailed evidence of the defendant’s abuse the abuse was necessary for the jury to understand why Siegel would have police afterward.” The State argues that the “[s]pecific evidence of the nature of the past to get herself out of trouble. Thus, the evidence was relevant to rebut Siegel in order to explain her conduct during the murders and her lies to the

was “scared that [the defendant] might do something to [her] or have someone During a hearing out of the presence of the jury, Siegel testified that she

chain of reasoning by which it will tend to prove or disprove an issue actually

her extensively and introduced extrinsic evidence to prove that she had lied in when it permitted the State to introduce details of the defendant’s abuse of was concerned about her own criminal liability. The defense cross-examined At trial it was the defendant’s theory that Siegel was lying because she

specify the purpose for which the evidence is offered and articulate the precise

The State contends that the trial court “properly exercised its discretion

N.H. 505, 507 (1995). and not so remote in time as to eliminate the nexus. State v. McGlew, 139 significant way connected to material events constituting the crime charged

In order to meet its burden under the first prong, the State is required to

of the Rule 404(b) analysis. challenging the trial court’s decision with respect to the first and third prongs towards others was admitted, and that the jury was unlikely to have been

p. 6 evidence of Badeau’s prior history of violence, his bad character and behavior Badeau, behaved as the State claimed.” The record reveals that substantial “sadistic behavior toward [Siegel] made it more likely that he, as opposed to

contends that the evidence left the jury with the misimpression that his

in nature to warrant exclusion of the evidence of abuse. The defendant also of Siegel was prejudicial, the similarity argued by the defendant is too tenuous we recognize that the introduction of the details of defendant’s physical abuse

the case.

to base its decision upon something other than the established propositions in

substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.

because they were both sadistic in nature. The acts alleged, however, are not

incident to that for which the defendant is currently on trial.

to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a jury

case. admissible if the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant does not

The defendant argues that the murders and the abuse were similar his guilt.

omitted). The degree of prejudice may depend upon the similarity of the other similar crimes or prior convictions.” Id. at 200 (quotations and brackets was unduly prejudicial. “Unfair prejudice is inherent in evidence of other appeal to a jury’s sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, or provoke its instinct The defendant argues that even if evidence of the abuse was relevant, it

Id. court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his the third prong of Rule 404(b). Under this prong, evidence of prior bad acts is Smalley, 151 N.H. at 198. To prevail, the defendant must show that the trial determination in balancing prejudice and probative worth under Rule 404(b). Id. We accord considerable deference to the trial court’s evidence that is merely detrimental to the defendant because it tends to prove State v. Fernandez, 152 N.H. 233, 240 (2005). It is not, however,

prompted her to chamber the round and subsequently lie to the police. at 198. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose or effect is to for non-propensity reasons to explain her justifiable fear of the defendant that Smalley, 151 N.H. her. As the trial court aptly noted, the defendant’s abuse of Siegel was relevant

The defendant next argues that the trial court erred in its analysis under

pursued at trial. Additionally, it was also highly relevant to her credibility, an issue vigorously character or disposition. See State v. Berry, 148 N.H. 88, 92 (2002). was relevant under Rule 404(b) for purposes other than proving the defendant’s State v. Martin, 138 N.H. 508, 518-19 (1994). We conclude that the evidence

challenge that he was abusive towards Siegel or the effects of the abuse upon circumstances of the abuse were irrelevant because he did not intend to was untrustworthy because it contained multiple levels of hearsay. We agree. p. 7 Siegel had made inconsistent statements to the Maine state trooper and that it

not sufficiently reliable under any exception to the hearsay rule to prove that

the incident. The trial court concluded that the Newmarket police report was about the incident. The Newmarket officer also had no independent memory of which he had recorded information he received from the Maine state trooper

extrinsic evidence of a police report written by a Newmarket police officer in

to the hearsay rule. regarding the incident. The defendant sought to impeach Siegel by introducing The trooper had no memory of the statements allegedly made by Siegel reporting to a Maine state trooper that her stepfather had sexually abused her.

trustworthiness and reliability that would justify its admission as an exception

stepfather of sexually abusing her. On cross-examination, Siegel denied

statements contained in the document lacked the characteristics of to the Newmarket police officer. The trial court properly found that the appeal that a hearsay exception applies to the Maine state trooper’s statement worth under Rule 404(b). Siegel’s mother tried to get her to return home, Siegel threatened to accuse her considerable deference to the trial court’s balancing of prejudice and probative Francoeur, 146 N.H. 83, 87 (2001). The defendant makes no argument on hearsay must be admissible under a specific hearsay exception. See State v. a statement made by Siegel. For the report to be admissible, each level of her mother, that her Stepfather sexually assaulted her.” a statement made to him by the Maine state trooper, who in turn was repeating 471, 476-77 (1985). In other words, the Newmarket police officer documented report contained multiple levels of hearsay. See State v. Winders, 127 N.H. be an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id. Here, the Newmarket police 409, 416 (2004). We will not disturb such a determination unless we find it to for the trial court to determine. See Carignan v. N.H. Int’l Speedway, 151 N.H. Whether testimony is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule is

when she had run away from home. The defendant’s theory was that when Badeau committed the murders and not the defendant.” We accord

him “to impeach [Siegel’s] denial that she ever told a Maine State Trooper, or

untenable nor unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant’s case.

613(b). During trial the defendant cross-examined Siegel about an incident than the prejudice, particularly in light of the defendant’s claim that Richard

Next, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow

the defendant. We conclude that the trial court’s ruling was neither clearly evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to

The trial court ruled: “The probative value of the evidence is far greater

murders because he was more virtuous than the defendant. misled into believing that Badeau would have been less likely to commit the and not as substantive evidence of the truth of the statement. p. 8 they could consider Goupil’s prior statement only in assessing his credibility Goupil’s credibility. 8 introduced, that it could not be used substantively, but only to evaluate anticipated trial testimony and is, therefore, not surprised by it. when the party calling the witness already knows the substance of the directly inculpate the defendant, the State may not use a allow a witness’s prior statements to be used for impeachment purposes even

discretion.

Following this testimony, the trial court immediately instructed the jury that testimony by instructing the jury, after the impeachment evidence was

admitted to attack [his] credibility even if the statement tends to Rule 607 as enabling a trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to While the [witness’s] prior inconsistent statement may be

In Soldi, we stated:

See State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 274 (2002), cert. denied, 538

the admissibility of said evidence absent an unsustainable exercise of Soldi, 145 N.H. 571, 573 (2000). We will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on coming from Nevada or Las Vegas to take care of the situation with Squeglia. See State v. Tina Baraw, to testify that he had told her specifically that he had someone State argues that the trial court minimized any potential misuse of Baraw’s Squeglia. The State impeached Goupil on this point by calling his girlfriend, Goupil gave extensive testimony that was crucial to its case. In addition, the Goupil as a subterfuge to present hearsay evidence. Instead, it contends that be accomplished by use of a prior inconsistent statement. We have construed New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 613(b) provides that such impeachment may witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.” New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 607 provides that the “credibility of a

about someone coming out from Nevada to “take care of” the situation with inadmissible hearsay before the jury. The State counters that it did not call a prior statement when the primary purpose for doing so is to place otherwise The defendant argues that a party may not impeach its own witness with

he ever told anyone that he had talked to the defendant prior to the murders Goupil’s testimony on direct examination by the State, he expressly denied that State to impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement. During Finally, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in permitting the

precluding the defendant from introducing the police report. stepfather of molesting her. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in mother, who could have testified whether Siegel threatened to accuse her Moreover, the trial court noted that the defendant had subpoenaed Siegel’s for other purposes, such as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

p. 9 her with a taser stun gun, once while she was showering.

conflicted with the State’s account of the same events. is typically inadmissible as character evidence, but that it may be admissible

defendant’s hands, including testimony that the defendant repeatedly attacked

Goupil, followed by a limiting instruction, about an aspect of his testimony that unsustainable exercise of discretion when it permitted the State to impeach New Hampshire recognizes that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts constructing the State’s case. Consequently, the trial court committed no

court. instruction). The jury is presumed to follow the instructions given by the trial detailed testimony from Siegel regarding the abuse she suffered at the by the majority, I believe that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence DALIANIS, J., concurring specially. While I agree with the result reached evidence. RSA 490:3, concurred; DALIANIS, J., concurred specially. GALWAY, J., concurred; BROCK, C.J., retired, specially assigned under

testimony contained evidence that was relevant to, and instrumental in, error. State v. Fortier, 146 N.H. 784, 793 (2001). Accordingly, we find no

consistent statement unfounded, especially in light of trial court’s limiting (defendant’s claim of prejudice from potential substantive use of prior potential for unfair prejudice. See State v. Dean, 129 N.H. 744, 750 (1987) instruction minimized the possibility of misuse of Baraw’s testimony and the testimony contains relevant evidence other than the impeaching

with the State's account of the same events. . . .

Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, we conclude that Goupil’s

Soldi, 145 N.H. at 574 (citations, quotation and brackets omitted).

would constitute subterfuge, courts look at whether the witness’s In analyzing whether impeachment of a party's own witness

impeach [him], about those aspects of [his] testimony that conflict State has the right to question the witness, and to attempt to testimony is instrumental to constructing the State's case, the Where the State has called a witness whose corroborating subterfuge to avoid the hearsay rule. using impeachment by prior inconsistent statement as a mere substantive evidence. This limitation prevents the State from purpose of placing before the jury otherwise inadmissible statement under the guise of impeachment for the primary undermine the purpose of Rule 404(b).

p. 10 gaining the admission of prejudicial propensity evidence. Such a result would

bolster the credibility of a dubiously reliable witness while simultaneously I believe that the position taken by the majority may allow prosecutors to defendant was inclined to commit the violent act for which he was being tried.

in reporting sexual abuse suffered at the hands of the defendant.

character, and was plainly offered for that purpose. relevant only to show that the defendant was a man of despicable and violent 10 instant case, the proffered evidence tended to reinforce the notion that the commit the charged crime.

towards her fails the first and third prongs of the three-part test. As such, I

household was admissible, under Rule 404(b), to explain the daughter’s delay

witness’s credibility as the trial court found. In

the defendant assaulted her on numerous occasions with a taser gun, could be conduct for which the defendant was being tried (sexual assault). In the only be considered evidence of the defendant’s character or propensity to

I believe that Siegel’s testimony detailing the defendant’s violent acts

abused his adopted daughter and created an atmosphere of fear in his family’s

evidence prejudicial to the defendant simply because it is relevant to a

inflicting the abuse was not. Such evidence, including Siegel’s testimony that explaining Siegel’s conduct, evidence detailing the defendant’s savagery in evidence (physical abuse) did not tend to demonstrate a propensity towards the Siegel was abused by and afraid of the defendant was, arguably, relevant to incidents and behavior underlying a witness’s submission to a defendant can We held that it was. Id. In Berry, however, the conduct portrayed by the contemplated for admissibility under Rule 404(b). In my view, cataloging the Id. at 92. because I do not believe that “explaining witness submission” is a category

(2002), we considered whether evidence demonstrating that the defendant

Moreover, I do not believe that Rule 404(b) contemplates the admission of

he was abusive to Siegel and that she was afraid of him. While evidence that

admissible under Rule 404(b) to explain Siegel’s submission to the defendant, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this evidence was not be substantially outweighed by its prejudice to the defendant.

The defendant did not challenge the admission of general evidence that

Smalley, 151 N.H. 193, 196 (2004).

defendant committed the act; and (3) the probative value of the evidence must the defendant’s character or disposition; (2) there must be clear proof that the Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence must be relevant for a purpose other than proving 404(b). As the majority notes, there is a three-part test for admissibility under plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” N.H. R. Ev. the result. p. 11 Accordingly, I believe that the trial court’s error was harmless, and I concur in jury would have convicted the defendant without the evidence of the abuse.

After a review of the record, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the

phone records and other evidence that placed him at the scene of the murders.

involvement in the murders, which were directly contradicted by his cellular murders. Moreover, the jury heard the defendant’s own lies to police about his prior to the murders and his admissions to Goupil immediately following the

murders. The jury heard evidence of the defendant’s effort to obtain a gun relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt. inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative or inconsequential in 11

both testified about the defendant’s conduct leading up to and following the and Badeau about the events that took place in the parking lot. In addition, is of an overwhelming nature, quantity, or weight and if the conduct surrounding the murders. The jury heard testimony from both Siegel

reasonable doubt if the alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt included detailed testimony from key witnesses regarding the defendant’s inadmissible evidence itself. An error may be harmless beyond a alternative evidence presented at trial and of the character of the

This case involved a ten-day trial with over twenty-five witnesses. The evidence Here, the alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. standard has been achieved involves consideration of the

bears the burden of proving harmless error. Id. State v. Enderson, 148 N.H. 252, 255 (2002) (quotation omitted). The State

The harmless error standard is as follows:

evidence did not affect the verdict. The evaluation of whether this it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible In determining the gravity of an error, this court asks whether

Nevertheless, it is my opinion that the trial court’s error was harmless.

404(b). believe that the trial court should have found it inadmissible pursuant to Rule