2004-789, IN RE JUVENILE 2004-789-A, -B

The Unity School District (Unity SD) appeals from

brief and orally), for the appellee, Manchester School District. Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, P.L.L.C., of Manchester (Dean B. Eggert on the

Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: District. Dowd on the brief, and Ms. Moran orally), for the appellant, Unity School Upton & Hatfield, LLP, of Hillsborough (Margaret-Ann Moran and Kelly E.

No. 2004-789 errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Manchester District Court Hampshire, One Noble Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court's home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as the District Court ( p. 2 “appropriateness” of his remaining there. On November 4, following a hearing,

motion to reconsider. This appeal followed. August 2004, the trial court denied Unity SD’s motion to dismiss, as well as its 2 Laurel Center in Bedford.

motion to dismiss, our standard of review is

mother’s friend while DCYF conducted an investigation into the

town of Unity.

related to Juvenile B under RSA 193:29, I(a). Following hearings in April and The mother remained there until April 2005, when she was admitted to the Nursing Home is located within the geographic boundaries of the Unity SD. or about October 28, 2003. There is no dispute that the Sullivan County and (2) determining the residency of Juvenile B’s mother. In considering a court erred in: (1) failing to apply the correct definition of “sending district”; interpretation and application of RSA 193:27. Specifically, it contends that the (DCYF). The court also ordered that Juvenile B continue to live with the Unity SD argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in its

attended school in Manchester; he has never lived or attended school in the

reimbursing the Nashua School District for the special education expenses the “sending district,” pursuant to RSA 193:27, IV, for the purpose of dismissed from the proceedings. It contended that Manchester SD should be Manchester, the mother was admitted to the Sullivan County Nursing Home on See RSA 193:27, IV. Unity SD objected to being so designated and moved to be determined that Unity SD was the “sending district” with respect to Juvenile B. As a result of subsequent proceedings, the District Court (Emery, J.)

supervision” of Juvenile B to the division for children, youth and families

Children’s Home. Prior to his placement there, Juvenile B had lived and On November 10, DCYF actually placed Juvenile B in the Nashua

place him in a licensed and certified out-of-home placement. B was neglected, and awarded legal custody of him to DCYF, with orders to

discussion and analysis to the circumstances of Juvenile B. On October 31, after a preliminary hearing, the trial court awarded “legal between the parties concerning Juvenile A, we limit the balance of our learning disabled, and receives special education. As there is no dispute

neighborhood friend in Manchester, as she was scheduled to enter a nursing On or about October 27, the mother left Juvenile B in the care of a

veterans affairs medical facility; he is not a party to this appeal. Juvenile B is the children’s father was, and continues to be, hospitalized in an out-of-State chosen not to do so.

p. 3 amended, as we will not put words into the statute where the legislature has

legislature to determine whether the statute, as interpreted here, should be statutes, administrative rules, and our previous case law. It is for the believe is justified based upon the language of the statute and associated

retained in the legal custody of a parent residing within the state,

Our holding today confirms a bright-line rule for its application, one that we

a parent or if the parent resides outside the state; if the child is

“statutory thicket,” requiring “more than a fair degree of stamina to navigate”).

most recently resided . . . if such child is not in the legal custody of “Sending district” means the school district in which a child underlying policies. statutes defining rights and obligations related to public education are RSA 193:27, IV defines “sending district” and reads, in pertinent part:

759 (2002). Owners’ Assoc., 150 N.H. 111, 118 (2003); In re Estate of Locke, 148 N.H. 754,

As such, this appeal presents a question of law, which we review

statutes, construing them, where reasonably possible, to effectuate their 632-M, 2001 WL 311202, at *2 (D. N.H. March 26, 2001) (New Hampshire’s for school districts. complaint, however, which are merely conclusions of law. See Manchester School District v. Crisman, No. Civ. 97it is understandable why the definition of “sending district” has been confusing District, 136 N.H. 32, 36 (1992). Because RSA 193:27 is not a model of clarity, ordered placement of juveniles. See Town of Gilsum v. Monadnock Reg. School interrelationship of several statutes pertaining to education and the court- At the outset, we note that this case requires us to again examine the

construed RSA 193:27 and applied it to an essentially undisputed set of facts. provisions harmoniously. Id. (1995). Insofar as reasonably possible, we will construe the various statutory

start with consideration of the plain meaning of this and other relevant IV defines a sending school district and governs this case. Our analysis must need not assume the truth of statements in the plaintiff’s the correct definition of “sending district.” Both parties agree that RSA 193:27, reasonable inferences drawn therefrom most favorably to [it]. We assume the plaintiff’s pleadings to be true and construe all We first turn to Unity SD’s argument that the trial court failed to apply

State v. Simone, 151 N.H. 328, 330 (2004).

brackets omitted). In denying Unity SD’s motion to dismiss, the trial court Karch v. Baybank FSB, 147 N.H. 525, 529 (2002) (citations, quotations and

susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery. We whether the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleadings are reasonably that the sending district was the school district in which the mother resided. p. 4 mother’s legal custody prior to placement,” and applied the second definition — Juvenile B at the Nashua Children’s Home, concluded that he “was in the

the Nashua Children’s Home.”

examined the time period from October 27, 2003, to the “placement” of

Unity “when custody was transferred to DCYF and prior to [his] placement at in his mother’s custody until November 4, 2003, and the mother resided in contends that the trial court’s ruling was correct because Juvenile B remained

must be made. In denying Unity SD’s motion to dismiss, the trial court agree that RSA 193:27 is silent as to when the sending district determination must apply RSA 193:27 to determine the sending district. The parties also

that the second definition of “sending district” is applicable. It further

in the legal custody of his mother when the trial court denied its motion to Juvenile B was awarded to DCYF on November 4, 2003, and the child was not

applicable to the facts of a case depends upon the time at which the trial court

(the date the court awarded custody to DCYF). As such, Manchester SD argues

the first definition of “sending district” is applicable because legal custody for

within the State. Both parties agree that the question of which definition is instances where the child is retained in the legal custody of a parent residing parent resides outside the State. The second definition applies in those time immediately prior to the change in custody” — here, November 4, 2003 Manchester SD contends that the relevant time standard is that “point in

confirming Unity SD as the sending district). As such, Unity SD argues that October 1, 2004 (the date the court denied the motion to dismiss, thereby the trial court actually makes the funding liability determination — here, Unity SD contends that the relevant time standard is the date on which

those instances where the child is not in the legal custody of a parent, or the

the receiving district . . . .

original placement. forward, that district in which the child resided at the time of the distinct definitions for a sending school district. The first definition applies in district” shall be, from the change in legal custody or guardianship As noted by both parties and the trial court, RSA 193:27, IV contains two placement of a child in a home for children, . . . the “sending

or health care facility, the sending district shall make payments to For any child placed and cared for in any home for children

expenses for a child placed in a home for children and reads, in pertinent part: RSA 193:29, I, details a sending school district’s liability for the educational

resides. . . . When custody is transferred subsequent to the original “sending district” means the school district in which the parent not see fit to include.”

neither consider what the legislature might have said nor add words that it did the legislature did not see the need to do so. “In construing a statute, we will believe it necessary to literally engraft a time standard onto RSA 193:27 when

district as defined in RSA 193:27. Specifically, RSA 193:29, IV states:

parent who resides within the state. (Emphasis added.)

and where the child last resided placement. district in which the child resided at the time of the original from the change in legal custody or guardianship forward, that consequently, no financial liability for that child. Accordingly, we do not of a child in a home for children, . . . the “sending district” shall be, When custody is transferred subsequent to the original placement children’s home is the intended time standard for determining the sending (Emphasis added.) RSA 193:27, IV states:

parent of the child resides if the child is in the legal custody of a health care facility.” children, health care facility, or state institution or where the

sending and receiving districts of where the child presently resides The agency responsible for placing the child shall inform the

in a home for children, there is no sending district, no receiving district, and, language of RSA 193:29. Clearly, until a child is actually placed and cared for consequent time standard for construing RSA 193:27 already exist in the plain supports our view that the date of the original actual placement of a child in a The plain language of both RSA 193:29, IV and RSA 193:27, IV further

N.H. 769, 771 (2002).

consistent application of the statutes. Such a rule, however, and the We agree with both parties that a “bright-line” rule is necessary for the

Specifically, the determination of the sending district should be based upon terms in RSA 193:27 is provided in the plain language of RSA 193:29, I. determination. Instead, we find that the relevant time standard for defining the We disagree with both parties’ arguments, and with the trial court’s adjudicated.”

p. 6 when the child is actually placed in the children’s home. Specifically: temporal context for the definitions in RSA 193:27, and refers to that time

in every case . . . [and] inconsistent [or arbitrary] results in cases that are

Rules gives further support that the word “placed” in RSA 193:29 provides the

between school districts over their financial liability.

the words of the Manchester SD, “avoid[ ] the requirement of judicial resolution provisions harmoniously as we have provides a bright-line rule. Such rules, in either party’s interpretation of RSA 193:27. Instead, construing the statutory charged with the responsibility of enforcing that statute.”); cf. Appeal of N.H. reasonable interpretation of a state statute by the state administrative agency School Dist., 306 F.3d at 9 (“New Hampshire . . . gives some deference to the interpretation of the statutes, we note that the State Code of Administrative N.H. Admin. Rules, Ed 1130.02(a)(12), (13) (emphasis added); see Manchester

program or facility of handicapped children will not be interrupted by disputes. . . . or moving a child to, an educational program or residential . . . “Placement” means the enrollment of a child in, or committing

“Place” means the act of enrolling a child in a placement.

the risk of inconsistent or arbitrary results that we believe might follow from

Although our plain meaning analysis provides ample foundation for our

other child care facilities, and second, to ensure that the education had placed on school districts in which there were group homes or

application of a time standard already extant in the statutory scheme reduces Id. (quotations omitted); see In re Gary B., 124 N.H. 28, 32 (1983). Here, our

first, to alleviate the unfair financial burden which previous laws

purposes behind these statutes and RSA 193:27 were institutionalized children. See Town of Gilsum, 136 N.H. at 39. The legislative and RSA 186-C:13, I(a) are concerned with the costs of special education for RSA 193:27 also effectuate the statutes’ underlying policies. RSA 193:29, I(a) Further, our plain meaning analysis of RSA 193:29 and its application to

Cir. 2002) (same). N.H. at 459 (same); Manchester School Dist. v. Crisman, 306 F.3d 1, 11-14 (1st accordance with RSA 193:29.”) (emphasis added)); Nashua School Dist., 140 in RSA 193:27, the liability for expenses for such child shall be determined in disabled child is placed in a home for children or health care facility as defined recognized the same. See RSA 186-C:13, I(a) (1999) (“When an educationally Other associated statutes, as well as earlier cases, have implicitly school in the Manchester SD. p. 7 liable for Juvenile B’s special education expenses while he was attending

children.” transferred subsequent to the original placement of a child in a home for

Manchester. We decline to interpret RSA 193:27, IV to render the Unity SD

language of RSA 193:27, IV regarding funding liability when “custody is

Juvenile B was actually enrolled in the McLaughlin Middle School in in the Nashua Children’s Home on November 10. During that time, however, B’s special education expenses incurred from November 4 until his placement

determination is made. Such circumstances would render superfluous the

custody date) would result in the Unity SD being financially liable for Juvenile

transfer of school district financial liability, before a funding liability could be the subject of one or more custody transfers, without a corresponding temporal fluidity of Unity SD’s proposed interpretation may mean that a child

custody change, we further decline to interpret RSA 193:27, IV such that its

custody of DCYF. Manchester SD’s interpretation (looking to the change in

most cases, children will be in parental custody immediately prior to an initial custody when applying the definition of RSA 193:27, IV. Assuming that, in trial court must look to that point in time immediately prior to the change in 4, 2003. After November 4, however, Juvenile B was, and remains, in the legal Juvenile B was in the legal custody of his mother from October 27 to November liability for a sending school district before such liability was incurred. Here,

after Juvenile B’s initial placement in the Nashua Children’s Home. Although October 1, 2004. That motion was denied on October 21, over eleven months Unity SD moved to reconsider the trial court’s funding liability determination of

and to avoid an absurd or unjust result.”). In addition, we disagree that the (“We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose SD’s interpretation would sometimes result in a determination of financial See Monahan-Fortin Properties, 148 N.H. at 771

determination until a date significantly after the initial placement. In this case,

(here, to DCYF), is equally susceptible to such fluidity. In addition, Manchester based upon “that point in time immediately prior to the change in custody” Manchester SD’s proposed interpretation, to define “sending district”

presumed not to have used superfluous words).

See Binda v. Royal Ins. Co., 144 N.H. 613, 616 (2000) (legislature is potential for reconsideration of an initial adjudication, might delay a liability

judge’s scheduling limitations, the possibility of multiple hearings, or the would render such definition unnecessarily fluid. An individual court or

upon when the trial court actually makes a funding liability determination, Unity SD’s proposed interpretation, to define “sending district” based

administrative entity without legislative interference). doubt, court defers to long-standing practical interpretation given statute by Dep’t of Transportation, 152 N.H. 565, 573 (2005) (when meaning of statute in or domicile.” p. 8 “refers to the place where a child actually lived, rather than to legal residence

most recently resided. We have already held that “resided” in this context

Accordingly, the “sending district” is the school district in which Juvenile B 2003, the date he was actually placed in the Nashua Children’s Home. Consequently, he was not in the legal custody of his parents on November 10,

On November 4, 2003, Juvenile B was in the legal custody of DCYF. 193:27 and RSA 193:29, Manchester SD is the sending district. or with her neighborhood friend. Pursuant to the plain language of RSA DALIANIS, DUGGAN and GALWAY, JJ., concurred.

and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. B’s mother. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Unity SD’s motion to dismiss, SD’s second argument regarding the determination of the residency of Juvenile Because our holding, above, is dispositive, we need not turn to Unity

conclude that the Manchester SD is the sending school district for Juvenile B.

Nashua Children’s Home, Juvenile B was living in Manchester with his mother the petition for abuse and neglect, and until his actual placement at the

Gary B., 124 N.H. at 32 (citation omitted). Prior to the filing of

Applying our interpretation of the statutes to the facts of this case, we

parent resides outside the State. first definition could be applicable only in those very few cases where the