2004-727, IN THE MATTER OF SONIA RAMADAN AND SAMER RAMADAN

and resided there until 1997. They moved to Egypt in 1998, and returned to thereafter lived in Texas from 1991 to 1992. In 1992, they moved to Lebanon The parties remained in Massachusetts from 1986 to 1990, and

Tober Law Offices, P.A.

No. 2004-727 Brentwood Family Division

Massachusetts shortly after they were married.

the time, a resident of the United States, and the couple settled in deferred “dower” payment of 250,000 Lebanese liras. The respondent was, at represented by her father, entered into a “marriage contract” promising a

their marriage, on November 27, 1986, the respondent and the petitioner, as

, of Portsmouth (Timothy C.

Tripoli, Lebanon on December 5, 1986. They have three children. Prior to The record supports the following facts. The parties were married in

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

and uniform support order of the petitioner, Sonia Ramadan. We affirm. Brentwood Family Division (Taube, J.) adopting the proposed divorce decree DALIANIS, J. The respondent, Samer Ramadan, appeals an order of the

Coughlin on the brief and orally), for the respondent. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Coughlin, Rainboth, Murphy & Lown, P.A.

Schoff on the brief, and Ms. Schoff orally), for the petitioner.

errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Hampshire, One Noble Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as and uniform support order without amendment. p. 2 a divorce decree approving and incorporating the petitioner’s proposed decree The respondent did not appear for the final hearing, and the trial court entered

participate in discovery and scheduled a final hearing for September 16, 2004.

September 2, 2004, the trial court noted that the respondent had refused to interrogatories. After he failed to appear for a pre-trial conference on default was entered against the respondent for failure to answer

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On August 20, 2004, a notice of conditional

informed the trial court of his intent to ignore its orders because he claimed The respondent returned to Lebanon in 2004 and, through his attorney,

motions.

temporary order, and to supplement the record. The trial court denied the

children. The respondent thereafter filed motions to reconsider, to stay the referring to her “as a Muslim/Muslim woman” within the hearing of the prohibited the respondent from speaking negatively about the petitioner or

alimony, and certain personal and real property. The temporary decree also

primary physical custody of the parties’ children, monthly child support and and entered a temporary decree awarding the petitioner sole legal custody and her Petition for Divorce,” denied the respondent’s motion on February 4, 2004,

instituted by [the] Respondent in Lebanon prior to the date the Petitioner filed

motion to dismiss. The trial court, finding that “no valid judicial process was On January 30, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on the respondent’s

lacked jurisdiction over the divorce in light of the Lebanese decree.

dismiss the petition for divorce in New Hampshire, asserting that the trial court

pursuant to the respondent’s repudiation of his wife. The respondent moved to Lebanon issued a decree that the parties were divorced on October 13, 2003, in hand on the same day. On December 18, 2003, a religious magistrate in

respondent returned to New Hampshire on December 12, 2003, and was served

The trial court issued an Order of Notice on October 30, 2003. The

traveled to Lebanon to see his attorney and “sign the necessary papers.”

listening, that he had divorced his wife. On October 18, 2003, the respondent

attorney in Lebanon on the same day and declared, with two witnesses presence of the petitioner. The respondent also claims that he telephoned an Islamic law by declaring “I divorce you” three times in succession in the

petitioner filed for divorce in New Hampshire – he initiated a divorce under

The respondent claims that on October 13, 2003 – the day before the

the irremediable breakdown of the marriage.

divorce on October 14, 2003, asserting that irreconcilable differences had led to the United States in 1999, settling in New Hampshire. The petitioner filed for p. 3 DeMauro v. DeMauro

discretion to dismiss. which that party seeks relief, we may exercise our court order that has direct bearing upon an issue for

has consciously and deliberately disregarded a trial

where both parties were domiciled in the state when the action was

issue of contempt is not being appealed. When a party the issues raised by the appellant on appeal, and the with an order of the trial court that relates directly to

Jurisdiction over parties to a divorce action in New Hampshire “exists . . .

may be dismissed if the appellant has failed to comply

Hampshire. We find the respondent’s arguments unconvincing. October 13, 2003, the day before the petitioner filed for divorce in New

[I]n limited circumstances, an appeal in a civil case

1986 and, moreover, a Lebanese court decreed the parties divorced as of

accordingly found to be in contempt. We have held: appeal because he refused to comply with the trial court’s orders and was

the divorce because the parties entered into a marriage contract in Lebanon in The respondent first argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over

We first address the petitioner’s request that we dismiss the respondent’s

respondent’s entire appeal.

temporary order and urges this court to dismiss his appeal. claims that the respondent continues to refuse to abide by the trial court’s

related to the ignored orders of the trial court, we decline to dismiss the Lebanese divorce decree’s validity. Because these latter issues are not directly litigation, as well as the trial court’s refusal to consider evidence of the their children was an unconstitutional abridgment of his rights. The petitioner

subject matter jurisdiction, which he has contested throughout the underlying respondent from referring to his wife as a Muslim woman in the presence of reasoning; and (6) that the trial court’s temporary order prohibiting the the trial court decreed an inequitable property division without stating its

ignored, is directly related. However, the respondent also appeals the issue of

trial court erred by adopting the petitioner’s proposed divorce decree; (5) that

divorce decree, an issue to which the orders of the trial court, which he respondent has appealed the trial court’s adoption of the petitioner’s proposed

documentary evidence of the Lebanese divorce decree was error; (4) that the divorce petition; (3) that the trial court’s refusal to consider additional jurisdiction was error; (2) that principles of comity required dismissal of the

court’s refusal to dismiss the divorce petition for lack of subject matter On appeal, the respondent raises the following issues: (1) that the trial matter of comity. Stankunas

p. 4 petition by the trial court. We have recognized foreign divorce decrees as a

argument that principles of comity mandated the dismissal of the divorce having force or effect in New Hampshire, we take note of the respondent’s Though we believe that RSA 459:1 precludes the Lebanese decree from

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. that the trial court did not err when it refused to dismiss the divorce petition under RSA 459:1, regardless of its validity in Lebanon. As such, we conclude

proffered by the respondent can have no force or effect in New Hampshire

whole. In the Matter of Donovan & Donovan

doing the same. See 4

years when the divorce action was commenced, the Lebanese divorce decree Since the parties had been domiciled in New Hampshire for at least three legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the our national borders, including Lebanon.

over the parties’ divorce, this alone would not preclude another forum from

within the United States, but also those of sovereign states existing outside of for the divorce was commenced.” RSA 459:1 (2004).

which any particular power may be exercised.” Webster’s Third New

Though we conclude that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction

New Hampshire, trial court had compelling interest in retaining jurisdiction).

that RSA 459:1 is to be construed broadly, encompassing not only jurisdictions over the cause for divorce. Cf parties to the marriage were domiciled in this state at the time the proceeding International Dictionary exercised personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction 1227 (unabridged ed. 2002). We believe, therefore,

the context of RSA 459:1, is ordinarily defined as “the limits or territory within 399, 401 (2005); see RSA 21:2 (2000). The term “jurisdiction,” as it is used in meanings to the words used. Soraghan v. Mt. Cranmore Ski Resort, 152 N.H. in the state.” RSA 458:6 (2004); see examining the language of a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary

Hampshire, and only assets which plaintiff sought to retain were located in

in another jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in this state . . . if both and had been so for at least three years. As such, the trial court properly chapter 459 (2004), however, establishes the principle that “a divorce obtained

action “exists when it wholly arose or accrued while the plaintiff was domiciled commenced.” RSA 458:5, I (2004). Jurisdiction over the cause of a divorce

(where cause of action arose in New Hampshire, parties’ children were in New

New Hampshire when the divorce action was commenced on October 14, 2003, 67 (1974). A review of the record confirms that the parties were domiciled in

p. 5 such foreign country at the commencement of the proceedings for divorce,” and country have no jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of parties not domiciled in trial court’s decision to retain subject matter jurisdiction. “[C]ourts of a foreign

Furthermore, we believe that public policy considerations support the

we did in Vazifdar

after the respondent moved there. , the defendant in a New Hampshire divorce action claimed suggests that she and her children were left with minimal financial resources Slessinger forced to bear the burdensome cost of traveling to Lebanon, and the record

, that the trial court did not engage in an unsustainable

Therefore, even if RSA 459:1 did not settle this issue, we would hold, as

New Hampshire. divorce. Id

, the First Circuit articulated a sound public policy that applies in

F.2d 937, 942-43 (1st Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted). We believe that, in witnesses [were] here in New Hampshire.” Id presented could be determined in New Hampshire. The petitioner would be limiting divorce.” Slessinger v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 835 traveling to India, solely for the defendant’s convenience, since all evidence and is domiciled “would frustrate and make vain all State laws regulating and

parte divorce obtained in a foreign nation where neither party

458:6. Much like the plaintiff in Vazifdar

exercise of discretion in the trial court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over the

considerable hardship in seeking relief in Lebanon, when all of the issues determine all the issues presented, and “bear the burdensome costs of at the time the divorce actions were commenced, would be subject to to render complete justice. Vazifdar New Hampshire with the respondent and their children for at least three years

parties and the subject matter of the divorce pursuant to RSA 458:5 and RSA In the instant case, the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the after his family settled in New Hampshire. Id

status because it was under Parsi law that they had been married. Id. jurisdiction of a Parsi court in India for the determination of the parties’ marital discretionary nature of the comity doctrine, we found no unsustainable

have to seek partial relief in India, even though New Hampshire could policy of the forum state, or if it leaves the court in a position where it is unable with the parties’ children for approximately ten years, noting that she would discretionary doctrine that will not be applied if it violates a strong public hardship that would befall the plaintiff, who had resided in New Hampshire

97. The defendant was residing in India, having returned and remained there

that, as a matter of comity, the trial court should have deferred to the In Vazifdar

p. 6 trial court from being able to determine whether the disposition was in fact marital property is unequal when the defendant has effectively prevented the

A defendant in a divorce proceeding cannot argue that the disposition of

its proceedings or to comply with its orders. a burden upon a court faced with a litigant who refuses either to participate in inequitable” decree. The respondent cites no authority, however, placing such

or allowed an interlocutory appeal to this court before entering a “patently

fashioning a divorce decree. See

. . . devised a way to discern some salient facts regarding the parties’ marriage” refused to recognize its jurisdiction or participate in the litigation, “should have respondent now asserts that the trial court, knowing that the respondent discretion in determining matters of property distribution and alimony when failing to articulate specific reasons for doing so. The trial court has broad marital assets and custodial rights in an inequitable fashion, and erred by

outcome that he could have prevented. See the parties. The respondent cannot now, on appeal, challenge the precise

the petitioner’s proposed decree as the permanent decree of divorce. The without hearing evidence of husband’s financial condition, where husband

The respondent further contends that the trial court divided the parties’

in a final divorce decree striking a more even balance between the interests of

as he concedes, to submit a proposed decree of his own, the trial court adopted when it entered divorce decree providing for unequal distribution of property to the divorce. When the respondent failed to appear for the final hearing or, distribution of marital assets, custody, support, and other matters pertaining court did not err by refusing to consider additional evidence on that issue. by the respondent is irrelevant in light of RSA 459:1, we conclude that the trial opportunity to provide the trial court with information that could have resulted trial court, and did not appear for the final hearing. He was afforded ample in discovery, declined to submit a proposed permanent divorce decree to the

283, 285-86 (2000) (trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion

divorce decree. Because the validity of the Lebanese divorce decree proffered

the trial court’s orders, failed to answer interrogatories, refused to participate

The petitioner submitted a proposed permanent decree at the final

consider additional documentary evidence of the validity of the Lebanese The respondent next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to

not overturn its ruling or set aside its factual findings. Id. N.H. 551, 554 (2004). Absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion, we will

court as a matter of comity. exercise of discretion by declining to defer to the jurisdiction of a Lebanese moot.

p. 7 the permanent divorce decree. As we now affirm that decree, this issue is restraint on his freedom of speech, the offending language was not repeated in “Muslim woman” in the presence of their children was an impermissible prior

order prohibiting the respondent from referring to his wife as a “Muslim” or

Assuming without deciding that the portion of the trial court’s temporary

protected right to parent” and his “free speech rights.” to New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 23. such, we decline the petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant faith, and the interests of justice do not merit an award of attorney’s fees. As

an “unconstitutional abridgment of his rights,” specifically his “constitutionally

nothing in the record suggesting that the respondent acted frivolously or in bad

the children.” The respondent asserts that this portion of the order comprises

is no evidence in the record that such a motion was ever submitted. We find with this court regarding the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, though there intention to file a motion seeking permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal

the Petitioner as a Muslim/Muslim woman to the children or within hearing of February 2004 temporary order stating, in part, that he “shall not speak about The respondent next challenges the provision in the trial court’s

On June 24, 2004, he, through counsel, informed the trial court of his

contested subject matter jurisdiction from a point early in the divorce litigation. is deemed . . . to have been frivolous or in bad faith.” The respondent has to “award attorney’s fees related to an appeal to a prevailing party if the appeal

was not an unsustainable exercise of discretion. this issue on the merits, we would conclude that the trial court’s final decree had little choice but to adopt it without modification. Thus, were we to review

“[i]n the interest of justice in extraordinary cases, but not as a matter of right,”

.

DUGGAN and GALWAY, JJ., concurred.

A f f i r m e d nothing to weigh the petitioner’s proposed final decree against, the trial court

pursuant to New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 23, which permits this court,

proceedings left the trial court without evidence favoring his interests. With respondent concedes, however, that his refusal to participate in the judicial (2004) to specify written reasons for the ordered division of property. The The petitioner requests that she be awarded attorney’s fees and costs

review of this issue. See

note the respondent’s claim that the trial court was required by RSA 458:16-a

Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has forfeited the right to appellate previously failed to answer interrogatories about that very subject).

Though we need not reach the issue in light of our conclusion above, we