This page is an unofficial mirror and is not legal advice. Verify the document against the official source before relying on it.
2006-817, KARL KIESMAN v. STEPHEN MIDDLETON
Maurice D. Geiger
Opinion Issued: December 4, 2007 Submitted: October 18, 2007
STEPHEN MIDDLETON
v.
KARL KIESMAN
No. 2006-817
District Court for Northern Carroll County
___________________________
those matches. league season. This case arises from encounters the parties had at two of team, the Waste of Maine, play each other two or three times during each Valley Dart League (MWVDL). Middleton’s team, the Bullfrogs, and Kiesman’s plaintiff, Karl Kiesman, play for competing teams in the Mount Washington The trial court could have found the following facts. Middleton and the
order, see DUGGAN, J. The defendant, Stephen Middleton, appeals a final stalking
Karl Kiesman
Northern Carroll County (McKenna, J.). We vacate and remand.
RSA 633:3-a, I(a) (2007), issued against him by the District Court for
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
, pro se, filed no brief.
, of North Conway, by brief, for the defendant.
page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as grant of a final stalking order, as required by Fisher v. Minichiello vacated because the trial court failed to make specific findings in support of its On appeal, Middleton argues that: (1) the protective order must be
for the finding.” On October 1, 2006, the trial court denied the motion. presented via a Check List Form . . . [and] provide[d] no details as to the basis that the stalking order should be vacated because “the court’s decision [was] the order. Middleton moved for reconsideration, arguing, among other things, on a standardized form that did not indicate the basis for its decision to grant him. On April 13, after a hearing, the trial court issued a final stalking order protective order against Middleton, asserting that Middleton had been stalking On March 16, 2006, Kiesman filed a petition with the trial court for a
Kiesman for the remainder of the season. also reprimanded Middleton and barred him from coming into contact with hearing, the board reprimanded Kiesman for his conduct. However, the board hands with their competitors upon completion of a match. After conducting a breaching a MWVDL bylaw that mandates that all league participants shake Middleton subsequently reported Kiesman to the league board for
Middleton’s captain asked Middleton to leave. and various other epithets. This verbal barrage continued until, finally, sportsmanlike manner. Middleton responded by calling Kiesman a “sore loser” Middleton’s hand because he believed that Middleton was acting in an un- Following the completion of their game, Kiesman refused to shake
2
purpose independent of making contact with Kiesman and, therefore, he was 188, 193 (2007); (2) his conduct was necessary to accomplish a legitimate
, 155 N.H.
throughout the remainder of their match. Kiesman had overreacted, Middleton became upset and taunted Kiesman the teammate move away or refrain from yelling entirely. Believing that loudly in Kiesman’s ear while cheering for his team. Kiesman requested that in a dart match. During that game, one of Middleton’s teammates was yelling when, on March 1, 2006, they were again randomly selected to play each other The parties had no further contact until approximately one year later
banquet. roughly seven years earlier Middleton had brought a small firearm to a MWVDL Kiesman believed that Middleton did in fact have a firearm on him, because hit him and announced to the crowd that he had a firearm in his vehicle. sparking a quarrel. As the encounter escalated, Middleton invited Kiesman to into him, “made a very loud sound,” and sprayed saliva on Kiesman’s face, game, the parties proceeded to shake hands and Middleton pulled Kiesman play each other when their teams competed in a MWVDL match. After their In the spring of 2005, Middleton and Kiesman were randomly selected to Vacated and remanded
BRODERICK, C.J.
, and DALIANIS, GALWAY and HICKS, JJ., concurred. 3
We have held that “when issuing a stalking order in response to a civil
.
conduct). failed to make specific findings as to the defendant’s purportedly illegal issuance of a protective order under RSA chapter173-B where the trial court N.H. at 193; cf. Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283, 284 (2001) (vacating the Id. We therefore vacate the final stalking order and remand. See Fisher, 155 evidence[] a continuity of purpose.” RSA 633:3-a, II(a). findings. Id. This is precisely the scenario that we sought to prevent in Fisher. further defined as “2 or more acts over a period of time, however short, which defendant are left to speculate as to the precise nature of the trial court’s both cases, the person must have engaged in a “course of conduct,” which is relied in issuing the order, nor the reasoning. Both this court and the place that individual in fear for his . . . personal safety[,]” RSA 633:3-a, I(b). In standardized form, gives no indication of the facts upon which the trial court a course of conduct targeted at a specific individual, which the actor knows will findings in this case. The final stalking order, which was issued on a Fisher RSA 633:3-a, I(a); and (2) where a person “[p]urposely or knowingly engages in, 155 N.H. at 193 (citation omitted). The trial court failed to make such period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.” his . . . personal safety . . . and the person is actually placed in such fear[,]” on the record that a defendant engaged in two or more specific acts over a targeted at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to fear for petition filed pursuant to RSA 633:3-a, III-a, the trial court must make findings person “[p]urposely, knowingly, or recklessly engages in a course of conduct categories of conduct, two of which are arguably relevant here: (1) where a RSA 633:3-a, I, defines the act of stalking to include three distinct
Fisher, 155 N.H. at 193. specific findings in support of its imposition of a final stalking order. See arguments, because we agree that the trial court erred by failing to make committed the offense of stalking. We need not address Middleton’s latter two there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that he not engaging in a course of conduct as required by RSA 633:3-a, II(a); and (3)