2007-065, GREEN MEADOWS MOBILE HOMES & a. v. CITY OF CONCORD

The petitioners, Green Meadow Mobile Homes, Inc. (Green

the respondent. Paul F. Cavanaugh, city solicitor, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for

the brief and orally), for the petitioners. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, PLLP, of Concord (Mark H. Puffer on

GREEN MEADOWS MOBILE HOMES, INC. & a.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2007-065 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Merrimack Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as goods esp[ecially] without altering their condition.”

p. 2 25A C.J.S. by sale in lesser amounts; one who buys to sell as an avocation or business.”

does business” and “a person who makes a business of buying and selling housing held for sale or storage by an agent or dealer.

whole. or where more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we review legislative intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a Dealer at 533 (1966). “Where the statutory language is ambiguous

narrowly defined as “one who buys the product in quantities and parcels it out International Dictionary 581 (unabridged ed. p. 2 2002). Or, it can be more

The term “dealer” is ambiguous. It can be broadly defined, as “one that in any year . . . . This paragraph shall not apply to manufactured plain and ordinary meanings to words used. into the state on or before April 1 and remains here after June 15 Id. look first to the statutory language itself, and where possible, we ascribe the town in which it is located on April 1 in any year if it was brought Estate of Ireland v. Worcester Ins. Co., 149 N.H. 656, 661 ( p. 2 2003). We

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the 7 p. 2 2:7-a, I, provides, in pertinent part: the lot and does not transfer it to a new location. they hold for sale because they are “dealer[s]” of such units. We disagree. for sale. Once it has been purchased, generally the new owner occupies it on The petitioners assert that the City may not tax them for any unit that purchase a manufactured housing unit, place it on the vacant lot and offer it upon their claim regarding moving abandoned units. This appeal followed. taxed the petitioners for the manufactured housing units and declined to rule

commercial or industrial purposes is taxable as real estate in the Manufactured housing suitable for use for domestic,

City’s practice of taxing them pursuant to RSA 7 p. 2 2:7-a, I (Supp. 2007). RSA The petitioners first argue that the trial court erred when it affirmed the

either Valley Stream or Green Meadows, through a related company, will

violated pertinent statutes. The trial court found that the City permissibly abandoned units. The petitioners alleged in their petition that these practices which are not yet connected to utilities, and its practice regarding moving of taxing them for manufactured housing units, which they offer for sale and The petitioners brought the instant action to challenge the City’s practice

Generally, when a site becomes available in one of the petitioners’ parks,

comprising the parks. of his or her unit and assesses taxes to the petitioners for the value of the land units for whom such units constitute their “stock in trade.” p. 3 referred to those engaged in the business of selling manufactured housing

1970 amendment and after, the word “dealer” as used in RSA 72:7-a, I, such units were exempt from taxation under RSA 72:7-a, I. Both before the manufactured housing units that constitute the stock in trade of “dealer[s]” of the property tax in RSA 72:7-a, I. Both before the 1970 amendment and after,

to or used in the conduct of a trade or business” as in “the goods kept for sale Woodworth v. Concord, 78 N.H. 54, 55 (1915). It is “the equipment necessary “Stock in trade . . . is merchandise or goods kept for sale or traffic . . . .”

package. taxes, when it enacted the business profits tax, as part of the omnibus tax the reference to the stock in trade tax, it did not intend to expand the scope of This legislative history demonstrates that when the legislature deleted

“manufactured housing” for “mobile homes.” See Laws 1983, 230:18. N.H.H.R. Jour. 1462 (1971). In 1983, the sentence was amended to substitute make clear that mobile homes held by dealers were exempt from taxation. See business constitute[d] personal estate liable to be taxed.” sale or storage by an agent or dealer.” The purpose of this last sentence was to last sentence read: “This paragraph shall not apply to mobile homes held for reference to the stock in trade tax. See Laws 1971, 363:1. As amended, the (1995). In 1971, it amended the last sentence of RSA 72:7-a, I, to delete the

See Laws 1970, ch. 5; Baxter Int’l v. State, 140 N.H. 214, 217-18

In 1970, the legislature repealed the stock in trade tax, among other

Claremont, 98 N.H. 446, 449 (1954). possessor of the property at fixed annual intervals.” Bemis &c. Bag Co. v. Concord, 101 N.H. 291, 292 (1958). The tax was “levied upon the owner or

“[s]tock in trade of merchants and shopkeepers employed in their trade or This sentence referred to the stock in trade tax. Under this tax, the

in trade.” Id. trailers and mobile homes held by a manufacturer or dealer as part of his stock herein contained shall be construed as changing the method of taxing house Laws 1961, 41:1. The last sentence of the new provision stated: “Nothing were taxable as real estate, provided that certain conditions were met. See housing units, which were suitable for domestic, commercial or industrial use, A new provision was enacted in its stead pursuant to which manufactured property. See id. In 1961, this provision was repealed. See Laws 1961, 41:4. trailer”) used as a dwelling by a state resident would be taxed as personal enacted, it provided that any manufactured housing unit (then called a “house RSA 72:7-a, I, was first enacted in 1955. See Laws 1955, 137:1. As first

(2003) (quotation omitted). history to aid in our analysis.” Appeal of Ann Miles Builder, 150 N.H. 315, 318 p. 4 RSA 78-B:4, IV(b).

for use as a dwelling or for commercial or industrial uses. may be taxed as property pursuant to RSA 72:7-a, I, or when it is deemed fit

dwelling by anyone other than a dealer then its sale shall be a taxable transfer.

deemed “real estate” for the purposes of the transfer tax. RSA 78-B:1, IV, like

“adapted to a use or purpose : FIT.” into required utilities.” RSA 477:44, II. It says nothing about when the unit without being tied to utilities. The plain meaning of the word “suitable” is

transfer. RSA 78-B:4, IV(a). Conversely, if the unit has been occupied as a been occupied as a dwelling, then its initial sale by the dealer is not a taxable If the unit “constitutes the stock-in-trade” of a dealer and has not previously

which like RSA 477:44, addresses when a manufactured housing unit is Presumably, the petitioners intended to rely upon RSA 78-B:1, IV (2003),

“real estate for the purposes of transfer” when it is “placed on a site and tied unit may be “suitable for use for domestic, commercial or industrial purposes” provides that a manufactured housing unit is deemed a building and therefore estate transfer tax, not the tax that is the subject of RSA 72:7-a, I. RSA 477:44

It defines when the sale of a manufactured housing unit is a taxable transfer. The petitioners’ reliance upon RSA 78-B:4, IV is particularly perplexing.

petitioners are not “dealer[s]” as that term is used in RSA 72:7-a, I.

industrial purposes.” RSA 72:7-a, I. To the contrary, a manufactured housing to utilities and, thus, are not “suitable for use for domestic, commercial or 477:44 (Supp. 2007) and RSA 78-B:4, IV (Supp. 2007), which concern the real because the manufactured housing units that they own are not yet connected To support their argument, the petitioners mistakenly rely upon RSA

is connected to utilities. as soon as it is manufactured with such use in mind, regardless of whether it eventual use as a domestic dwelling or for commercial or industrial purposes business and do not constitute their “stock in trade.” Accordingly, the Dictionary, supra at 2286. A manufactured housing unit may be fit for connected to utilities, therefore, are not necessary to carry on the petitioners’ Webster’s Third New International uphold. Manufactured housing units that are for sale but are not yet housing units at their parks. The record supports these findings, which we

erred by affirming the City’s practice of taxing them under RSA 72:7-a, I, The petitioners argue that even if they are not “dealer[s],” the trial court

also found that the petitioners do not maintain an inventory of manufactured business of owning and managing manufactured housing parks.” The court “they are not in the business of selling [such units],” but rather “are in the found that while the petitioners on occasion sell manufactured housing units, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, supra at 2247. The trial court by a shopkeeper” or “the aggregate of things necessary to carry on a business.” housing may be relocated without the payment of the taxes assessed thereon

p. 5 selectmen or assessors . . . may issue a statement that the manufactured

tenant has abandoned the premises. Under RSA 205-A:4-a, VII, “[t]he board of manufactured housing park moves an abandoned unit. rights, unless those rights have been deemed waived because, for instance, the assessed taxes have not been paid. This statute, on its face, applies to the unit to recover the amount of its claim subject to the tenant’s homestead moving and storage costs. RSA 205-A:4-a, VII permits the park owner to sell

a declaratory judgment that RSA 80:2-a does not apply when the owner of a selectmen or assessors that the unit may be relocated even though the conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the petitioners’ request for petitioners do not argue that this exemption applies to them. We, therefore, the amount of rent and other charges due from the tenant and for reasonable obtained a writ of possession against a tenant is granted a lien on the unit for complying with RSA 80:2-a. Under RSA 205-A:4-a, VII, a park owner who has owner, under certain conditions, to relocate an abandoned unit without abandoned a unit. RSA 205-A:4-a, VII permits a manufactured housing park a, VII (2004), which is available to the petitioners when a tenant has Our holding is buttressed by the alternative remedy under RSA 205-A:4-

have been paid in full, or a statement signed by a majority of the board of moving the same” a receipted tax bill, a certificate from the city that all taxes in-trade of a dealer in the business of selling manufactured housing.” The last taxed unless the owner thereof shall produce and deliver to the person RSA 80:2-a exempts only “manufactured housing consisting of the stock-

conditions are met. such building or structure from being relocated by anyone unless certain by park tenants. We hold that the trial court did not err in this respect. said building or structure. The statute, under its plain terms, prohibits any of manufactured housing parks when they move units owned and abandoned language of the statute is not limited, as petitioners suggest, to the owner of person or entity that moves a building or structure taxed as real estate. The

industrial uses. it address when a unit is deemed “suitable” for domestic, commercial or

78-B:1, IV; that is taxed as real estate . . . , shall be moved from the location where it was RSA 80:2-a provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o building or structure

their request for a declaration that RSA 80:2-a (2003) does not apply to owners The petitioners next contend that the trial court erred when it declined

address when a unit may be taxable as property under RSA 72:7-a, I. Nor does

see RSA 477:44, II. Like RSA 477:44, II, RSA 78-B:1, IV does not

transfer tax when “it is placed on a site and tied into required utilities.” RSA RSA 477:44, II, provides that such a unit is “real estate” for purposes of the p. 6 6

themselves of the remedy set forth in RSA 205-A:4, VII. Possession.” Having obtained a writ, the petitioners may, thereafter, avail Concord District Court, based on nonpayment of rent, and obtain a Writ of abandoned a unit, “the petitioners file a Landlord-Tenant eviction action in

BRODERICK, C.J., and DUGGAN and HICKS, JJ., concurred. this is the process they follow. As they note in their brief, when a tenant has

respect to RSA 80:2-a. not err when it denied the petitioners the declaratory relief they sought with For all of the above reasons, therefore, we hold that the trial court did

Indeed, the petitioners concede, without citing RSA 205-A:4-a, VII, that

insufficient to pay the full amount of the property tax outstanding.” as provided in RSA 80:2-a in the event the proceeds from the sale are