2006-807, IN THE MATTER OF GRETCHEN CONNER AND ROGER CONNER

The respondent, Roger T. Conner (the father), appeals two

Campbell Harvey, of Manchester, orally, for the petitioner. Gretchen M. Conner, pro se, on the memorandum of law, and J.

brief and orally), for the respondent. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Braiterman Law Offices, P.L.L.C., of Concord (Robyn A. Guarino on the

GRETCHEN M. CONNER AND ROGER T. CONNER

No. 2006-807 editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Brentwood Family Division Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as assistance will they ask the Court to decide the issue.

p. 2 unable to work out the disagreement after seeking third party neutral third party to assist them. Only if the parents are work out the disagreement, they shall seek the help of a best interest of the child(ren). If the parents are unable to

parenting issues, the parents shall try to work it out in the

of proof.

In the future, if the parents have a disagreement about

would be resolved. It provides: (Supp. 2006), which included a section on how disputes about parenting issues the divorce, the parties filed an agreed-upon parenting plan, see RSA 461-A:4 Before discussing the father’s claims of error, we note that at the time of

constitutional due process violations. expenses. He argues that the first and third asserted errors rise to the level of guardian ad litem; and (3) finding him in contempt for failure to pay daycare guardian ad litem. The motion was denied and the hearing proceeded on offers motion to convert the hearing to a structuring conference; (2) not appointing a structuring conference to allow time for discovery and for the appointment of a On appeal, the father argues that the court erred in: (1) denying his court to convert the hearing from a final hearing on the motions to a treatment for the children. On the day of the hearing, the father asked the and miscellaneous expenses. motion for contempt and ordered the father to pay $1,240, his share of daycare medication “he will forfeit his custodial time.” The court also granted the prescribed by [the child’s] physician” and stating that if he fails to provide the modify by requiring the father to “provide [the child] his medication as On August 31, 2006, the court granted the motion to bring forward and

arguing, deficit hyperactivity disorder. The mother also filed a motion for contempt him prior to incurring them and to consult with him concerning medical motion, asking the court to order the mother to discuss daycare expenses with modify the parties’ child support obligations, and an answer to the contempt guardian ad litem. He also filed both a cross-motion, asking the court to the motion to modify, asking that it be denied and that the court appoint a heard on August 30, 2006. On August 22, 2006, the father filed an answer to In mid-July 2006, the parties were notified that the motions would be

the daycare expense for the children . . . .”

inter alia, that the father had “refused to pay his one-half portion of

the children a medication specifically prescribed for that child’s attention with their father during the school week and to order the father to give one of p. 3 3

will discuss these expenses. Neither party will unreasonably withhold miscellaneous expenses for the children.” They also agreed that “[t]he parties

court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion by not appointing a GAL. specialist regarding the need for the medication. Given this information, the judge had a letter from the child’s regular physician and an evaluation from a mother and father agreed to “equally share the cost of daycare and Under the permanent stipulation that was part of the divorce decree, the

should not have been found in contempt for non-payment. did not discuss the daycare expenses with him prior to incurring them, he for his failure to pay daycare expenses. He contends that because the mother Third, the father argues that the court erred in finding him in contempt

whether to appoint a GAL is within the trial court’s discretion. Here, the trial administer the prescribed medication. Under RSA 461-A:16, I (Supp. 2006), court on whether it was in the child’s best interests to require him to ad litem (GAL). The father argues that a GAL was necessary to report to the The second issue is whether the court erred by not appointing a guardian

exercise its discretion in denying the motion. at 296. On these facts, we conclude that the court did not unsustainably untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. See Lambert, 147 N.H. standard, the respondent must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly exercise of discretion standard). To establish that the court erred under this at 267; State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. See Murray, 149 N.H. discretion of the trial judge”). We review a trial court’s rulings in this area issues in an action is a question of justice and convenience within the N.H. 67, 72 (2001) (“[t]he manner and timing of the trial of all or part of the provisions in parenting plans. discovery and ruling on the conduct of the trial); Blevens v. Town of Bow, 146 the court to intervene. In future cases, we expect parties to comply with such (200 p. 3 3) (broad discretion afforded the trial court in managing and supervising parents in resolving their disagreements about parenting issues before asking it. Murray v. Developmental Servs. of Sullivan County, 149 N.H. 264, 268 The trial court has broad discretion in managing the proceedings before

notification of the hearing date and the hearing itself. The mother counters that the father had forty-two days between the prevented him from conducting discovery prior to the hearing on the merits. motion to convert the hearing to a structuring conference, the court effectively As for the father’s first argument, he contends that by denying his

mutually agreed-upon obligation to have a neutral third party assist the Neither the parties nor the court referenced this apparently mandatory, simply refused to pay.

implicit finding that the parties discussed daycare expenses and the father children from time to time. Thus, this record amply supports the trial court’s expenses by allowing the grandmother and step-grandmother to watch the

acknowledged that he had spoken with the mother about reducing daycare picked up the children from both providers. Moreover, the father

properly raised them below. We therefore refuse to address these assertions.

BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, GALWAY and HICKS, JJ., concurred.

father two letters regarding his failure to pay the expenses; and ( p. 4 4) the father State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 (1986). another provider on Mondays and occasional Tuesdays; (3) the mother sent the March 2006, the mother contacted the father and told him that she needed the State Constitution, he has failed to demonstrate where, in the record, he Wednesdays and Thursdays “for two years, so prior to the divorce”; (2) in early To the extent the father asserts violations of his due process rights under

not to pay.” that the father was consulted, knew of the expenses and “had merely chosen noted that: (1) the children had been with one of the daycare providers on In her offer of proof, which the court apparently credited, the mother

exercise its discretion. Stall, 153 N.H. 163, 168 (2005). We hold that the court did not unsustainably trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion.” In the Matter of Stall & whether we would have found the respondent in contempt, but whether the “The contempt power is discretionary and the proper inquiry is not

address whether the mother discussed daycare arrangements, she contends agreement.” (Emphasis omitted.) Although the trial court did not directly