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2006-785, I/M/O AMY ALDRICH AND RYAN GAUTHIER
was not alleged in the petition. The trial court overruled the objection. would kill me.” The respondent’s counsel objected, arguing that such a threat violence restraining order of the Littleton Family Division (respondent had stated: “if I ever tried to take [the child] from him, then he respondent had threatened to kill her, at the hearing she testified that the While nowhere in the petition did the petitioner allege that the
petition. with the respondent’s mother, who was not named as a respondent in the she had a child. Her petition principally alleged that she was having disputes whom she had been in a relationship for more than five years, and with whom petition for a domestic violence restraining order against the respondent, with The following appears in the record: The petitioner, Amy Aldrich, filed a
Cyr, J.). We reverse.
DALIANIS, J.
The respondent, Ryan Gauthier, appeals a final domestic
to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Gillian Morrison, of Littleton, on the brief and orally, for the respondent.
for the petitioner. Carter Law Office, of Lancaster (George C. Carter on the brief and orally),
Opinion Issued: August 22, 2007 Argued: June 20, 2007
IN THE MATTER OF AMY ALDRICH AND RYAN GAUTHIER
editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2006-785 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Littleton Family Division Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00
well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as considers relevant and material.” RSA 173-B:3, VIII. be bound by the technical rules of evidence and may admit evidence which it
173-B:3, VIII states: “In any proceeding under this chapter, the court shall not
2
supplemental or amended petition.” RSA 173-B:3, I. On the other hand, RSA
respond. must be done prior to the hearing so that the defendant has an opportunity to arise to supplement or amend the petition to modify the facts alleged, this, too, must be supplied in advance of the hearing on the petition. Should the need effectuate the legislative purpose of the statutes. Id. contradict each other, and so that they will lead to reasonable results and deal with a similar subject matter, we construe them so that they do not Resort, 152 N.H. 399, 405 (2005). When interpreting two or more statutes that harmony with the overall statutory scheme. defendant is provided an opportunity prior to the hearing to respond to the the words used. Soraghan v. Mt. Cranmore Ski We do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to do so in the defendant. . . .” The petition may be supplemented or amended “only if the states: “Notice of . . . the facts alleged against the defendant shall be given to admitted regardless of whether it was alleged in the petition. RSA 173-B:3, I,
Under the plain terms of the statute, facts alleged against the defendant
legislature might have said nor add words that it did not see fit to include. Id. meaning is not subject to modification. Id. We will neither consider what the appeal followed. Id. When the language of a statute is clear on its face, its statute, and, where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to statute considered as a whole. Id. We first examine the language of the the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the alleged death threat was material and relevant evidence which could be novo. In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 429 (2006). We are broad discretion to admit evidence it deems relevant and material, and that the The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de petitioner counters that under RSA 173-B:3, VIII (2002), the trial court has testify to such a threat and that the court erred in allowing this testimony. The
plaintiff.” The respondent sought reconsideration, which was denied. This Threatening. This Court finds that the defendant has threatened to kill the finds that there has been abuse within the meaning of RSA 173-B:1, Criminal
was required of an allegation of a death threat before the petitioner could The respondent argues that, pursuant to RSA 173-B:3, I (2002), notice
the petitioner’s testimony concerning the death threat, as follows: “This Court In granting the restraining order, the trial court specifically relied upon 3
B: 3, I, but it should not admit evidence on unnoticed charges.
deems “relevant and material” pertaining to facts alleged pursuant to RSA 17 3hearing contest. The trial court has broad discretion to admit evidence it notice requirement of RSA 173-B:3, I. RSA 173-B:3, I, sets the contours of the
BRODERICK, C.J., and DUGGAN, GALWAY and HICKS, JJ., concurred.
Reversed.
trial court’s power to admit evidence under RSA 17 3-B:3, VIII is limited by the RSA 173-B:3, VIII must be read in harmony with RSA 173-B:3, I. The