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2006-180, STATE OF NH v. WENDY RUFF

home. relationship for many years, and the defendant was not welcome at Benita’s another of Benita’s sons. The defendant and Benita have had an acrimonious and daughter, lives at the same residence. The defendant is married to North Village Road in Warner since 1992. Her son, Arthur, along with his wife

Court (

presented. Benita Flanders, the defendant’s mother-in-law, has resided at 258

for criminal trespass, RSA 635:2 (Supp. 2006), following a jury trial in Superior

The jury could have found the following facts based upon the evidence

McGuire, J.) challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

BRODERICK, C.J.

The defendant, Wendy Ruff, appeals her conviction

brief, for the defendant. Theodore Lothstein, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the

general, on the brief), for the State. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, assistant attorney

Opinion Issued: June 8, 2007 Submitted: February 27, 2007

WENDY RUFF

v.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2006-180 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Merrimack Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as 2

apparent authority to exclude her from the residence, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

( 2005); State v. Littlefield, 152 N.H. 331, 350 (2005). We view the evidence in

See State v. Emery, 15 2 N.H. 783, 788

premises. While she concedes that the evidence established that Arthur had carries the burden of proving that no rational trier of fact could have found her Because the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, she

conviction for criminal trespass.”). defendant’s refusal to do so, the evidence was sufficient to support his individuals in actual or apparent authority to leave the police station, and the see State v. Gaffney, 147 N.H. 550, 555 ( 2002) (“Given the repeated orders by III(b)(2). “other authorized person,” RSA 635:2, III(b), is one with actual authority. But communicated to him by the owner or other authorized person.” RSA 635:2, authority to order her to leave the home. We assume without deciding that an evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Arthur had actual

she contends that no

residence or that the owner authorized him to exclude others from the She contends that no evidence was introduced showing that Arthur owned the ordered to leave “by the owner or other authorized person.” RSA 635: 2, III(b). the criminal trespass charge. This appeal followed. dismiss because the evidence was not sufficient to establish that she was a not guilty verdict on the criminal threatening charge and a guilty verdict on The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to of the charged crimes. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury returned State’s case, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish all elements

in defiance of an order to leave or not to enter which was personally misdemeanor offense if “[t]he person knowingly . . . remains . . . [i]n any place Arthur locked the door and called the police. enters or remains in any place.” RSA 635: 2, I. Criminal trespass constitutes a removed a final time, she got into her car and left with Whiting. Benita and criminal trespass if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he times, but repeatedly managed to force her way back in. When she was The criminal trespass statute provides that: “A person is guilty of she refused. The defendant was physically removed from the home several

threatening. At trial, she moved to dismiss both charges at the close of the The defendant was charged with criminal trespass and criminal

home and immediately interceded. He commanded the defendant to leave, but and uninvited. A heated dialogue ensued. Shortly thereafter, Arthur arrived Whiting conversed, the defendant suddenly entered the home unannounced home to deliver a message on the defendant’s behalf. While Benita and On the evening of September 2 3, 2004, Tex Whiting arrived at Benita’s 3

terms and to promote justice,” RSA 625: 3 (1996). “This court is the final

leave the premises, Arthur called the police. Benita, without Benita objecting. When the defendant finally was forced to

meaning of the statute. status as a resident would qualify him to be an “authorized person” within the Arthur was a long-time resident. Therefore, we must consider whether Arthur’s the light most favorable to the State, proves beyond a reasonable doubt that at ___, and construe the Criminal Code “according to the fair import of [its] statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation,” id. to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. at ___. In addition, “we interpret language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according v. Balukas, 155 N.H. __, __ (decided May 3, 2007). That is, “we first look to the term in accordance with our normal rules of statutory construction. See State and repeatedly instructed the defendant to leave the residence in front of When discerning the meaning of “authorized person,” we interpret the Moreover, when Arthur arrived at the house, he walked in without knocking calling it his “home,” and calling the property “my yard” and “our yard.” Throughout his testimony, Arthur referenced the premises as his residence,

finding that Arthur was the owner, the evidence, viewed in its totality and in We conclude that even assuming that the evidence would not support a

the defendant’s sudden entry into the residence as “all of a sudden lived at the Warner residence for approximately eight or nine years. concerning the furniture within it, as well as the abode itself. Benita described Regarding Arthur, at the time of trial, he and his wife and daughter had

kitchen, which was just a step away. ’cause I have a small trailer, so I was like almost into the the other side of the room, you’re going into my kitchen, chair and the computer is, my sofa, and then when you go to As you come in the door, you go to the left. That’s where the

opened.” (Emphasis added.) Further, she explained:

my door

describing the layout of the premises, Benita made statements of ownership she heard a knock on the door that evening, she replied, “Come in.” When his family also lived there. She exercised dominion over the home in that when testified that she had lived at the residence since 1992, and that Arthur and During her testimony, Benita referred to the premises as her home. She

conclusions except guilt in order to be sufficient to convict. Id. the evidence presented is circumstantial, it must exclude all rational context of all the evidence, not in isolation. Littlefield, 152 N.H. at 350. When the light most favorable to the State and examine each evidentiary item in the 4

under RSA 635:2, III(b).

defendant’s conviction. which he and his family lived. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the from the home in which he lives, and thus constitutes an “authorized person” authorized to exclude the defendant, a non-resident, from the premises in conclude that a lawful resident has actual authority to exclude a non-resident resident to exclude non-residents from the home. Accordingly, Arthur was Considering the ordinary meaning of the term and the statutory scheme, we persons from invading premises in which they have no legitimate purpose. DALIANIS, DUGGAN, GALWAY and HICKS, JJ., concurred.

Affirmed.

burglary charge). (circumstantial evidence can establish lack of privilege to enter premises in

Cf. State v. Flynn, 1 44 N.H. 567, 570 (1999)

defendant to leave in front of Benita, who did not dispute his authority as a Arthur lived at the Warner home for a number of years. He ordered the Burial Ground, RSA 635:6. The statutory scheme focuses upon proscribing RSA 635:1, Trespassing Stock, RSA 635:3, and Interference with Cemetery or of the statute and promotes justice. addition to criminal trespass, it includes such prohibited activity as Burglary, See RSA 625:3. This construction of the criminal trespass statute comports with the fair import believes he or she has as a result of the agent’s dealings with the principal”). (defining “actual authority” to include “authority that the agent reasonably

See Black’s Law Dictionary 1 42 (8th ed. 2004)

statute. We look to the dictionary for guidance as to its ordinary meaning. chapter containing RSA 635:2 is entitled “Unauthorized Entries” and, in criminal trespass statute is embodied. See Balukas, 155 N.H. at __. The guidance from the context of the overall statutory scheme within which the right to command and give final decisions . . . .” Id. at 1 46. We also seek to expect obedience: superiority derived from a status that carries with it the “authority,” in turn, means “power to require and receive submission: the right Third New International Dictionary 147 (unabridged ed. 2002). The term authority . . . endowed with authority . . . sanctioned by authority.” Webster’s means “having authority: marked by authority: recognized as having examine meaning of element of crime). The term “authorized” commonly State v. Kelley, 153 N.H. 481, 483 (2006) (relying upon dictionary definition to

See

The term “authorized person” is not defined in the criminal trespass

considered as a whole.” Balukas, 155 N.H. at __. arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute

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