2005-532, IN RE CHRISTOPHER K.

The respondent, Christopher K., appeals an order of the

orally), for the State. attorney general, on the brief, and K. Allen Brooks, assistant attorney general, Kelly A. Ayotte, assistant

and orally), for the respondent. Disabilities Rights Center, Inc. on the brief to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

brief and orally), for the petitioner.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as was insufficient to establish current dangerousness. p. 2 petitioner intended to prove at the hearing on the merits; and (5) the evidence numerous allegations dating back several years failed to give notice of what the

specific enough to satisfy RSA 135-C:36, I(b) (2005) or due process because the

and during the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation; (4) the petition was not because the respondent did not have the effective assistance of counsel before the testimony of Dr. Albert Drukteinis, the court-appointed psychiatrist,

expired prior to the hearing date; (3) the probate court erred in not excluding

conditional discharge because his previous involuntary admission order had probate court was prohibited from granting a renewal of the respondent’s the involuntary admission of persons who are not currently dangerous; (2) the

Due Process Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions because it permits

On appeal, the respondent argues that: (1) RSA 135-C:45, III violates the

conditional discharge, rather than the degree of certainty in the result. Thus,

court renewed the conditional discharge for a period of three years. Greater Manchester, filed a petition to renew that conditional discharge. The

actually relates to the elements that must be established for renewal of a

April 18, 2005, the petitioner, Richard Herron of the Mental Health Center of

involuntary admission. We believe, however, that the respondent’s argument conditional discharge requires a lower standard of proof than the initial Regarding the first point, the State disputes that the renewal of a

illness. Thereafter, the respondent was again conditionally discharged. On Mental Health Center, and drug use to a degree that exacerbated his mental medication, threatening and/or assaulting behavior toward the staff of the

conditional discharge was revoked because of his noncompliance with taking

constitutionally required. dangerousness; and (2) that a finding of current dangerousness is nevertheless initial involuntary admission, and does not require a finding of current 2

of persons who are not currently dangerous. See and Federal Due Process Clauses because it allows the involuntary admission

Abuse; and Antisocial personality traits.” In May 2003, the respondent’s in remission; Anxiety Disorder NOS; Depressive Disorder NOS; Polysubstance respondent at the time of his conditional discharge as having “Schizophrenia,

proof for renewing a conditional discharge is lower than that for obtaining an

The respondent first contends that RSA 135-C:45, III violates the State

psychiatrist in this proceeding, New Hampshire Hospital diagnosed the

U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. He argues: (1) that the statutory standard of

respondent was conditionally discharged. According to the court-appointed years with a conditional discharge as soon as appropriate.” At some point, the involuntarily admitted to New Hampshire Hospital “for a period not to exceed 3

hearing in the Merrimack County Probate Court, the respondent was The record supports the following facts. On May 7, 2002, following a dangerousness,” In re Fasi, a/k/a Cass p. 3 be ordered without proof of specific acts or actions demonstrating

petitioner alleges satisfy RSA 135-C:34.” Thus, although “commitment will not

involuntary admission shall include “[t]he specific acts or actions that the

In addition, RSA 135-C:36, I(b) (2005) states that the petition for an

others.

to create a potentially serious likelihood of danger to himself or to

person is in such mental condition as a result of mental illness as facility for treatment on an involuntary basis shall be whether the We recently noted in In the Matter of B.T. in determining whether a person should be admitted to a receiving

circumstances which led to the person’s dangerous condition. care or treatment is necessary to prevent the recurrence of the

dangerous propensity.” Id The standard to be used by a court, physician, or psychiatrist

but a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological

question and the probative force of the other evidence adduced to prove (2005): The standard for involuntary admission is set forth in RSA 135-C:34 to such an extent that he no longer requires inpatient treatment appropriate when the person has recovered from his mental illness Admission for purposes of conditional discharge shall be

plain language of this statute requires that an order of admission precede an

on the nature and circumstances of the act, the history of the person in requirement. Rather, we have said that “what is sufficiently recent will depend We have never imposed a particular time limit on the specific act

provides, in part: merely evidence bearing on the issue of dangerousness.” In re Field Conditional discharge is provided for in RSA 135-C:45 (2005). Section II

conditional discharge. petitionee to commit future dangerous acts.” In re Fasi, 132 N.H. at 483. respective requirements for an initial involuntary admission and a renewal of a the present mental condition of the petitionee, and the propensity of the substantive due process challenge. Accordingly, we first examine the 206, 209 (1980) (decided under prior law). “[T]he proceeding itself focuses on

demonstrate the mental condition . . . are not the focus of the inquiry, but are

upon procedural due process, we interpret the respondent’s claim as a while the State found the respondent’s claim unclear, and focuses its own brief p. 4 State v. Hudson

discharge under RSA 135-C:45, III. Regarding prior law, however, we noted in should have “recovered from his mental illness to such an extent that he no

requirement of RSA 135-C:36, I(b) applies to a petition to renew a conditional Under the standard of RSA 135-C:45, II, a person on conditional discharge We have not yet had occasion to address whether the specific act

dangerous act, as long as he complies with the prescribed treatment regimen. A person on conditional discharge should be even less likely to commit a RSA 135-C:34.

admitted person receive treatment for his mental illness. See

135-C:45, II, “a potentially serious likelihood of danger to himself or to others,” treatment, or both. not any cure for the defendant’s condition has been effected.” Id

security needed for the person. See

of the circumstances which led to the person’s dangerous condition.” Id admissions under RSA 135-C:45, I, the legislature clearly intended that the

psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment is necessary to prevent,” RSA receiving facility, due to restrictions on the person’s activities, successful condition, as a result of mental illness, that “a prescribed regimen of medical, acts committed during the time a person is involuntarily admitted to a on a pattern of prior action and testimony relating to the question whether or respondent in a conditional discharge renewal proceeding is currently in such legislature was presumably aware that there should be few specific dangerous

the legislature contemplated that inpatient admission provide the degree of involuntary admission is necessary for treatment of the person). In addition, C:40, II (requiring court-appointed psychiatrist to determine whether

We reach the same conclusion here. In authorizing involuntary such an order, for the purpose of permitting the respondent to remain on The court may “order involuntary admission to a receiving facility, or renew

orders need not be based on specific acts, because commitment may be based admission must also be met. Id read RSA 135-C:45, III in light of RSA 135-C:34 to require proof that a 135-B:28 (repealed 1986) “relates to the original commitment only. Renewal this reason, the standard provided in RSA 135-C:34 for an involuntary , 119 N.H. 963 (1979), that the specific act requirement of RSA

A conditional discharge may be renewed pursuant to RSA 135-C:45, III.

serious likelihood of danger to himself or to others.” RSA 135-C:34. Thus, we step process for an admission for the purposes of conditional discharge.” For “such mental condition as a result of mental illness as to create a potentially allowance for conditional discharge. Thus, the statutory scheme creates a twointerpret “dangerous condition” to refer back to the language of RSA 135-C:34:

argument that it violates due process. We first address his claims under our

Having interpreted the statute, we now address the respondent’s

sense of a recent dangerous act.

real danger of institutionalization without further judicial action.” See argument, the statute does not require proof of “current dangerousness” in the unreasonable.” Seabrook Police Assoc. v. Town of Seabrook

dangerous act, as it would defeat the evident purpose of the statute. See in the first instance to a relatively unrestricted setting, carries with it a very discharge of another the task of alleging and proving an additional recent under RSA 135-C:45, III, or, to use the terms respondent employs in his discharge can have his discharge revoked, “[t]his kind of commitment, though a compelling State interest” and is “neither unduly restrictive nor intended to impose upon a petitioner seeking to renew the conditional stake.” In particular, he contends that because a person on conditional

due process is strict scrutiny), cert.

standard applies. See interests asserted, we will assume, without deciding, that a strict scrutiny federal ‘narrowly tailored’ requirement.” Id. (1993). We have noted that the latter prong of our state test is “similar to the

an involuntary admission for the purpose of continuing a conditional discharge fundamental right will pass constitutional muster if it is “necessary to achieve Given this statutory framework, we believe the legislature could not have we hold that there is no additional “specific act requirement” for the renewal of The respondent asserts that “there are significant liberty interests at Under our state strict scrutiny test, a statute’s infringement upon a within six months of termination motion would lead to absurd result). Thus,

standard for determining whether civil commitment law violates substantive

135-C:51 (2005) (Revocation of Conditional Discharge). Given the liberty

he is in compliance. continued incapacity of ward solely upon acts, occurrences or statements Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983). inpatient facility, he is presumably less likely to commit a dangerous act while State v.

154 N.H. ___, ___, 911 A.2d 35, 43 (2006) (requiring guardian to prove conditional discharge no longer requires the secure custodial function of an appreciable extent, the purpose of the statute”); cf. In re Guardianship of E.L., longer requires inpatient treatment.” In other words, because a person on (legislature will not be presumed to enact legislation “nullifying, to an Weare Land Use Assoc. v. Town of Weare, 153 N.H. 510, 511-12 (2006) individual] against his will in a mental institution is improper

p. 6 person will become dangerous in the future, for “keeping [an

dangerousness at some time in the past or on a concern that the Involuntary commitment cannot be permitted based on a finding of

further asserts:

“judicial finding of current dangerousness” is “constitutionally required.” He may be “subject[ed] to all of the deprivations of involuntary hospitalization,” a more specific meaning of dangerousness. He contends that before a person

to constitutional limits. Rather, his constitutional challenge focuses upon the

findings of mental illness and dangerousness to confine involuntary admissions unreasonable.” Seabrook Police Assoc. The respondent does not quarrel in general with an analysis using

the State’s compelling interest and “neither unduly restrictive nor We now examine whether the statutory restriction is necessary to achieve dangerous beyond their control”).

confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them mentally ill”).

abnormality.’” Kansas v. Hendricks

Addington v. Texas

that “[t]hese added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil interest in both protecting the public from . . . violence and rehabilitating the narrow tailoring, we believe its analysis can be so applied. Cf. id. (explaining Court’s discussion was not couched in the federal strict scrutiny terms of

basis. See civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with commitment: law for guidance, we note that the United States Supreme Court has “sustained

dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill. authority under its police power to protect the community from the emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has commitment of sexually dangerous persons, that “[s]tates have a compelling 594 N.W.2d at 872 (concluding, in examining law providing for civil little trouble concluding that these interests are compelling. Cf. In re Linehan, Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 554, 560-61 (1983). We have or psychiatric treatment to persons involuntarily admitted on an emergency Supreme Court has recognized the following state interests in civil interests in the closely related situation of administering compulsory medical Accordingly, we first examine the State’s interest. The United States , 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). We have noted similar state

powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of

p. 7 for the person to control his dangerous behavior.” Id abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not impossible,

The Hendricks 7

conditional discharge renewal proceeding is currently in such condition, as a dangerous act or acts proved against him. Cf

Hendricks

danger in the future. In Hendricks interpreted RSA 135-C:45, III to require proof that a respondent in a respondent in a conditional discharge renewal proceeding will have had a past person, because of mental illness, poses a potentially serious likelihood of. at 358. We have

additional factor such as mental illness: “It requires a finding of future constitutional requirement of coupling proof of dangerousness with proof of an

convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense.’”). process, the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, a civil commitment statute. “[c]ommitment proceedings can be initiated only when a person ‘has been Act at issue required evidence of past sexually violent behavior where

521 U.S. at 357. Having previously been involuntarily admitted, the based upon a finding of dangerousness in the past and a finding that the “requires proof of more than a mere predisposition to violence.” Hendricks, not incapacitated.” Id. at 357 (emphasis added). RSA 135-C:45, III also condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a present mental statute “requires proof of more than a mere predisposition to violence; rather, it

, 521 U.S. at 350-51, 356. The Hendricks Court noted that the

against several federal constitutional challenges including substantive due insane.” Foucha, the United States Supreme Court upheld,

our State Constitution is not violated by the renewal of a conditional discharge The respondent’s reliance upon Foucha Looking to Hendricks

dangerous, but whether he was currently mentally ill. at 79. Thus, the issue in Foucha was not whether the defendant was currently the trial court, Foucha [wa]s not suffering from a mental disease or illness.” Id. psychiatric hospital where “according to the testimony given at the hearing in absent a determination in civil commitment proceedings of current defendant could, consistently with the constitution, be confined in a

, 504 U.S. at 73. The question in Foucha was whether the

“unless he proves that he is not dangerous[,] . . . whether or not he is then guilty by reason of insanity would be committed to a psychiatric hospital a Louisiana commitment scheme in which a criminal defendant found not

(Quoting Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added by respondent)).

mental illness and dangerousness.” issue of a subsequent involuntary admission has been filed with

p. 8 I (c), provided that a petition requesting a judicial hearing on the

pursuant to RSA 135-C:45 may be continued under subparagraph A period of involuntary admission ordered by a probate court

(2005), which provides:

discharge, was set to expire on May 6, 2005. The respondent’s involuntary admission, and therefore his conditional involuntary admission was “arguably” extended pursuant to RSA 135-C:39, II to the expiration of the initial period of involuntary admission, that period of The respondent argues that because the petition to renew was filed prior

circumstances which led to the person’s dangerous condition. such treatment is necessary to prevent the recurrence of the permitting the respondent to remain on conditional discharge if

May 9, 2005. The hearing was actually held on May 24. to prepare for the hearing. He requested that the hearing be rescheduled to receiving facility, or renew such an order, for the purpose of ineffective and that he had retained new counsel who required additional time

the hearing, the court may order involuntary admission to a motion to reschedule, explaining that his appointed counsel had been If the respondent is on a conditional discharge at the time of

expired prior to the hearing date. RSA 135-C:45, III provides: [State’s] legitimate objective[s],” Seabrook Police Assoc. upon fundamental liberty are no “greater than necessary to effectuate the

expiration of the respondent’s conditional discharge. The respondent filed a

conditional discharge because his previous involuntary admission order had or her behavior. We therefore conclude that RSA 135-C:45, III’s restrictions

Federal Constitution under these circumstances. See The State Constitution provides at least as much protection as the

on April 18, 2005, and the court scheduled a hearing for May 4, prior to the

treatment, would make it difficult if not impossible for the person to control his as we do under the State Constitution. dangerousness to the existence of a mental illness that, without the prescribed We conclude that this standard appropriately links a finding of future

process standards under our State Constitution.

357-58. Accordingly, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution

psychological care or treatment is necessary to prevent,” RSA 135-C:45, II, “a

(quotations omitted), and that the statute therefore satisfies substantive due

p. 9 We must first determine whether RSA 135-C:39, II’s instruction that the

RSA 135-C:39, II, we reject his argument. Because we disagree with the respondent’s interpretation and application of

lack of jurisdiction.

involuntary admission, its order granting that extension is void for of RSA 135-C:45, III, extend respondent’s previous order of court acted on the petition. Because the Court could not, by virtue

involuntary admission period had expired by the time the probate

illness.

By operation of RSA 135-C:39, II, the previous order of

effective, and efficient system of services for persons with mental the hearing on the petition.” He concludes:

(a) Establish, maintain, and coordinate a comprehensive, 2005, and, therefore, the order “was not in effect on May 24, 2005, the day of

and human services to:”

enforcing the statute’s mandate. See 9

thirty-day extension on the order for involuntary admission expired on May 18, The respondent further contends, however, that under this provision, the The purpose of RSA chapter 135-C is “to enable the department of health

the extension of the period of involuntary admission is the appropriate mode of

enforcement of the mandate.” Id

its filing. N.H. 548, 551 (1994); see also In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. at 381.

Accordingly, we look to the statutory goals to determine whether terminating for the court’s failure to act within thirty days of the filing of the petition.

the inquiry, however, for “we must next determine the appropriate mode of thirty-day time limitation to be mandatory. See id. at 380. This does not end command which requires mandatory enforcement.” Id. Thus, we consider the “The general rule of statutory construction is that the word ‘shall’ is a

itself, ascribing to the words used their plain and ordinary meaning. See id. that the probate court shall act upon the petition within 30 days of enacting the statute.” Id. We start by examining the language of the statute order of the probate court pursuant to RSA 135-C:45; provided N.H. 377, 379 (1983). Our task is to “determine the intent of the legislature in of involuntary admission may be extended until the issuance of the In re Robyn W., 124

involuntary admission. Upon the filing of the petition, the period the appropriate probate court within the initial period of result. See

p. 10 into the general population. The legislature could not have intended such a

person without needed treatment or cause the release of a dangerous person

respondent and protection of the public. Such an interpretation could leave a would thwart both purposes of RSA chapter 135-C: treatment of the for good cause (such as here, where the respondent moved for a continuance),

notwithstanding that the probate court’s failure to act within that period was

addressed to our original jurisdiction, unless non-compliance is de involuntary admission terminates at the end of the thirty-day period, May 24, 2005. RSA 135-C:45, III. Accordingly, we reject the respondent’s To interpret RSA 135-C:39, II so that the extension of the period of

As we stated in In re Robyn W.

against a dilatory judge, whether raised by appeal or by petition the time limitation under this statute by entertaining complaints respondent was still “on a conditional discharge at the time of the hearing” on to this court in its supervisory role. RSA 490:4. We will enforce persons who are dangerous.

Prisoners Act]”).

not automatically terminate at the end of the thirty-day period. Thus, the reconciled only by treating the statutory mandate as one directed respondent’s involuntary admission, and thus his conditional discharge, did protecting mentally ill persons and at protecting the public from mentally ill Under RSA 135-C:39, II, as here interpreted, the extension of the RSA 135-C:1, I (2005). Thus, RSA chapter 135-C is aimed at both treating and

others,” a result “inconsistent with the purpose of the [Mentally Disordered of need, and require his or her release, regardless of the potential danger to terminate [a mentally disordered offender’s] involuntary treatment, regardless

We find that the various interests may be promoted and

In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. at 381. others.

minimis.

court of jurisdiction where such result “would, in effect, automatically

(c) Prevent mentally ill persons from harming themselves or

emotional, and behavioral disabilities.

deadline for commencing involuntary commitment trial did not deprive the trial Williams, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 12 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that violation of

Weare Land Use Assoc., 153 N.H. at 511; see also People v.

(b) Reduce the occurrence, severity and duration of mental, what the remedy for ineffective assistance might be. Cf

p. 11 assistance of counsel exists in the context of involuntary commitments, or unconditional.” We have never discussed whether a right to the effective during any judicial hearing conducted under this chapter shall be absolute and counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id

different.” State v. Walton

sought to be admitted to a program or facility to legal counsel prior to and unable to demonstrate . . . prejudice, we need not even decide whether

have been significant, for it appears respondent was poorly prepared to provide

is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been

Pursuant to RSA 135-C:22 (2005), “[t]he right of a client or a person In fact, the analysis proceeds in the opposite direction: “If the [respondent] is cites no authority for a presumption of prejudice from a lack of representation. representation provided at a critical phase of the proceedings.” The respondent 11

He argues that the assistance of counsel prior to the evaluation “may

the outcome of the case. The level of actual prejudice must be such that there for an unsustainable exercise of discretion. See counsel’s representation was constitutionally deficient and actually prejudiced Drukteinis. We review the trial court’s decision on the exclusion of testimony “A successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that evaluation which was conducted without counsel’s assistance.” failure to provide respondent with effective representation was to strike the should be required when, as in this case, there has been a complete lack of

respondent demonstrated prejudice.

evaluation, the probate court should have excluded the testimony of Dr. Assuming, however, without deciding, that the criminal standard would apply:

then argues, without legal citation, that “[t]he proper remedy for counsel’s The respondent first contends that “no showing of actual prejudice

ellipses omitted).

assistance of counsel before and during the court-ordered psychiatric that “examinee was not foreclosed from effective assistance of counsel”). The respondent next contends that because he was without the effective no Sixth Amendment right to presence of counsel at psychiatric examination, for later preparation for cross-examination at the hearing on the merits. He 210 (observing, in holding that person sought to be involuntarily admitted had prepare him for the evaluation and failed to request a record of the evaluation. In re Field, 120 N.H. at asserts that his prior counsel, who had been appointed by the court, failed to

discharge. argument that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to renew his conditional

(explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard). The respondent 144 N.H. 635, 640 (2000); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001)

p. 12 Finally, the respondent argues that the order renewing his conditional

petition are inconsequential. renewal of a conditional discharge, the allegations of specific acts in the

C:45, III does not require the allegation or proof of a recent “specific act” for the

petitioner alleges satisfy RSA 135-C:34.” Because we have held that RSA 135involuntary admission to include “[t]he specific acts or actions that the As noted previously, RSA 135-C:36, I(b) requires the petition for an

of RSA 135-C:36, I(b) . . . . petition failed to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and petitioner to even attempt to prove the majority of them, the

dates and context, their misleading nature, and the failure of the

covered, the failure to include sufficient information about their

Due to the number of allegations, the span of years they

allegations of dangerous behavior, the respondent argues:

dated allegations going back to November 2000 and a dozen undated

Due Process Clauses. Noting that the petition included more than twenty-five merits, and therefore violated RSA 135-C:36, I(b) and the Federal and State give notice of what the petitioner intended to prove at the hearing on the

The respondent next argues that the petition was not specific enough to

Drukteinis’ testimony. court committed an unsustainable exercise of discretion in admitting Dr.

appropriate remedy in such cases. Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial

claim fails and we need not consider whether the exclusion of evidence is an

probate court’s implicit finding that the respondent’s ineffective legal assistance Drukteinis observed prior to giving his own testimony. Thus, we affirm the representations during his cross-examination of the petitioner, which Dr. 12

the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id The respondent has failed to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that

was misleading, replacement counsel pointed out the misleading

Moreover, even if some information Dr. Drukteinis may have used to fill in gaps specific fact not known by Dr. Drukteinis that might have changed his opinion. history, the respondent has not demonstrated on appeal that there existed any

portions that could be misleading. which the petitioner, when cross-examined at the hearing, admitted contained respondent points out, Dr. Drukteinis took information from the petition,

Even if the respondent was unable to provide Dr. Drukteinis with a detailed

either of doubtful reliability or not thoroughly examined.” In particular, the relevant information” and “[o]ther information available to the examiner was

and ellipsis omitted), had his prior counsel prepared him for the evaluation.

p. 13 finder could have made the findings by clear and convincing evidence” to

potentially serious likelihood of danger.” We find no error.

After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that “no rational fact-

would believe that that’s a very serious sign, and I think it does point to a

to taking his medications. admitted and competent evidence as to the respondent’s intentions with regard

medication, would you deem that to be a danger today . . . ?” He responded: “I treating psychiatrist, Janet Carella, that he will absolutely stop taking his “[I]f [the respondent] were to have said . . . as Mr. Herron testified, to his

appeal the court’s ruling on his hearsay objection, the statement remains

some sort of conditional discharge on him.” Finally, Dr. Drukteinis was asked,

taking medication was ‘[t]hat he’s going to stop taking them.[’]” As he fails to

ominous situation,” and “then I think we have to be very concerned to not have taking medications, he was emphatic that if true, that would present “a very evaluation of the respondent, as to whether the respondent would discontinue

Herron’s discussion with Dr. Carella, respondent’s ‘most recent position’ about states, “Herron was permitted to testify, over a hearsay objection, that based on challenge on appeal the introduction of this evidence. Thus, for instance, he

Although Dr. Drukteinis was not able to form an opinion, based upon his own

and statements of non-testifying individuals. Nevertheless, he does not

and therefore, in my opinion, he needs to have continued monitoring.”

compliance” and that the petitioner instead sought to rely upon the opinions BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, J., concurred. dangerousness. He asserts that “there was no actual testimony of nonwith taking his medications was also insufficient to establish current

would sooner or later be accompanied by threatening or dangerous behavior, become psychotic and paranoid again, there’s a very high likelihood that it testified that “[b]ecause the disorder that he has is chronic, if he were to

The respondent next contends that the evidence of his noncompliance.

psychosis . . . has been accompanied by violent type of behavior.” He further

require proof of a specific dangerous act. Thus, we reject this argument. behavior.” Again, however, we held above that RSA 135-C:45, III does not

testified that the respondent has a “chronic psychotic disorder” and that “[h]is

“no substantive evidence was introduced about specific acts of dangerous

made the findings by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Sandra H. uphold the probate court’s ruling unless no rational fact-finder could have

The respondent first argues that the evidence was insufficient because

N.H. 634, 640 (2004).