2006-104, IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF R.A.

The petitioner, R.A., appeals a decision of the Coos County

and orally), for the guardian. John D. MacIntosh, P.C., of Concord (John D. MacIntosh on the brief to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

Friedrich K. Moeckel on the brief, and Mr. Stewart orally), for the petitioner. Tarbell Professional Association, of Concord (Shane R. Stewart and

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2006-104 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Coos County Probate Court Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as notice of the admission and the reasons therefor . . . . The

p. 2 shall be in accordance with the following: within or without this state. Admission to a state institution institution, the guardian shall submit to the probate court

authority. subparagraph (a) does not require a five-year review of the guardian’s governs a guardian’s admission of a ward to New Hampshire Hospital, and

custody of the ward and may establish the ward’s place of abode hours . . . of such an admission of a ward to a state and is the least restrictive placement available. Within 36 Hampshire, that the placement is in the ward’s best interest

response, OPG argues that it is RSA 464-A:25, I(a), not RSA 464-A:25, I(c), that

or commitment of the ward, the guardian shall be entitled to

certification by a . . . psychiatrist licensed in the state of New

review of the guardian’s authority, R.A. argues, the authority terminated. In every five years, which had not been done. Once five years elapsed with no order by a court of competent jurisdiction relating to detention 464-A:25, I(c) required that the guardian’s authority be reviewed by the court

without prior approval of the probate court upon written and duties, except as modified by order of the court: (2) A guardian may admit a ward to a state institution

. . . . provided, in pertinent part:

considered as a whole.

(a) To the extent that it is consistent with the terms of any medication. This authority had ended by that time, R.A. argues, because RSA

The version of RSA 464-A:25, I, that was in effect on November 21, 2005,

not look beyond it for further indication of legislative intent. Id. the statute itself. Id. If the language is plain and unambiguous, then we need

arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute N.H. 492, 494 (2006). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final have authority to admit him to New Hampshire Hospital or consent to his is a matter of law that we review de novo. In re Guardianship of Kapitula, 153 Resolution of the issue before us requires statutory interpretation, which

R.A. appeals, arguing that, on November 21, 2005, his guardian did not

his medication. Hampshire Hospital for a period not to exceed eight months and to consent to in November of 2005.

p. 3 decline to adopt R.A.’s interpretation of the version of RSA 464-A:25, I, in effect

academic or dead.”

requirement present in subparagraph (c), as it read in November 2005.

to New Hampshire Hospital upon court review every five years. Accordingly, we

doctrine of mootness is designed to avoid deciding issues that “have become consent to R.A.’s medical treatment on November 21, 2005, is moot. The argument, both parties addressed whether the issue of Feinstein’s authority to 3

Instead, he argues that Feinstein failed to comply with the five-year-review

Nothing in RSA 464-A:25 conditions the guardian’s authority to admit the ward It is this authority “which . . . shall be reviewed by the court every 5 years.” approval to enable the ward to receive medical or other professional care . . . .”

consent to medical treatment had expired by November 21, 2005. At oral authority shall be reviewed by the court every 5 years.

that Feinstein failed to comply with the requirements in subparagraph (a). interest involved or future litigation may be avoided. Id. guardian to admit a ward to New Hampshire Hospital. R.A. does not contend decision upon the merits may be justified where there is a pressing public language of RSA 464-A:25, I, it is clear that subparagraph (a) authorizes a to rigid rules, but is regarded as one of convenience and discretion. Id. A 690, 692 (2006) (quotation omitted). The question of mootness is not subject

to a hospital. Subparagraph (c) authorizes a guardian to give “consent or

We next address R.A.’s argument that his guardian’s authority to previously authorized the guardian to have this authority, which consent for a specific treatment, provided that the court has

professional care, counsel, treatment, or service or may withhold

New Hampshire Hospital on November 21, 2005. Based upon the plain

Subparagraph (c), however, does not authorize the admission of a ward

or approval to enable the ward to receive medical or other

We begin by addressing whether OPG had the authority to admit R.A. to

RSA 464-A:25, I. to present evidence at that hearing.

the admission by the guardian, and the right to a hearing and ward has the right to appointed counsel, the right to oppose

(c) A guardian of the person may give any necessary consent

. . . .

court shall also provide the ward a notice stating that the court shall promptly appoint counsel for the ward . . . . The authority, we conclude that this issue is moot.

p. 4 no bearing on whether Feinstein, or other guardians, currently have such

was authorized to make medical decisions for R.A. in November 2005 will have

authority to give consent for medical treatment. Because whether Feinstein

required by the current RSA 464-A:25, I(d) would have upon a guardian’s to consider at this time what effect, if any, a failure to obtain the annual review RSA 464-A:25, I(c) to the probate court in April 2006. Thus, we have no reason

that Feinstein submitted the annual report required by the current version of

construe the current version in a similar manner. Moreover, it is undisputed the former RSA 464-A:25, I(c), it does not necessarily follow that we would bearing on the authority of guardians today. Even if we were to so construe

five years because the probate court had not reviewed it, that would have little

that OPG’s authority to consent to the ward’s medical treatment expired after review of the guardian’s annual report. Due to this change, even if we assume to every year, and added that such review would occur as part of the court’s 2006) reads, in pertinent part: the court finds that such report is not necessary.” RSA 424-A:25, I(d) (Supp.

BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, DUGGAN and HICKS, JJ., concurred.

guardian’s authority to consent to a ward’s medical care from every five years

entirety: “A guardian shall file an annual report with the probate court, unless

previously authorized the guardian to have this authority,

(Emphasis added.) Thus, the amendment changed the period to review a

January 1, 2006. As amended, RSA 424-A:25, I(c) (Supp. 2006) reads, in its guardian’s annual report. prevent future litigation. RSA 464-A:25 was amended, however, effective authority shall be reviewed by the court as part of its review of the Feinstein had the authority to consent to R.A.’s medical care on that date could which consent for a specific treatment, provided, that the court has professional care, counsel, treatment, or service or may withhold approval to enable the ward to receive medical or other A guardian of the person may give any necessary consent or

2005, were still in effect today, we might conclude that resolving whether If the version of RSA 464-A:25, I(c) that was in effect on November 21,