2006-348, STATE OF NH v. WILLIAM LOONEY

The defendant, William Looney, appeals the order of the

for the defendant. Moir & Brodich, P.A., of Concord (James H. Moir on the brief and orally),

general, on the memorandum of law and orally), for the State. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Nicholas Cort, assistant attorney

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. v.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2006-348 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Hillsborough-northern judicial district Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as timely. p. 2 new trial. Thus, he argues, the motion he filed on December 20, 2004, was January 8, 2003, he had until January 8, 2006, in which to file a motion for a

that because this court did not return the mandate to the superior court until

resolved and the mandate has been returned to the trial court. He contends

especially where it has been recorded.” decision of the court has been properly filed with the clerk of court, and dismissal.

the appeal period has expired or, if an appeal has been filed, it has been judgment is not “rendered” until it is final, which, he argues, means either that years after the rendition of the judgment complained of.” He asserts that a

denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971) (hereinafter Sceva). On September 25, 1974,

Id. at 710; see Bricker v. Sceva Speare Hosp., 111 N.H. 276, cert.

used in RSA 526:4, as follows: “A judgment is rendered where the written dismissal to this court, and, on July 29, 1971, we sustained the trial court’s court dismissed Bricker’s action on May 17, 1971. Id. Bricker appealed the hospital from enforcing its decision not to reappoint him. Id. at 709. The trial Bricker, a physician, brought a bill in equity to enjoin the defendant

reading of Bricker reveals that he is mistaken. supported his view that a judgment is not “rendered” until it is final. A close part: “A new trial shall not be granted unless the petition is filed within three oral argument, the defendant asserted that this construction of the phrase N.H. 709, 712 (1975) (quotation and brackets omitted) (hereinafter Bricker). At

verdict (September 18, 2000) or the date of the mittimus (December 20, 2000). We have previously construed the phrase “rendition of judgment,” as

statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Furthermore, we interpret the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language Victoria, 153 N.H. 664, 666 (2006). In interpreting a statute, we first look to in the words of a statute considered as a whole. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. interpreted the relevant statute, RSA 526:4 (1997), which provides, in pertinent This court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed

judgment in his criminal case, which the court defined as either the jury’s untimely because it was filed more than three years from the rendition of demand a new trial. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion as

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erroneously

December 20, 2004, the defendant again moved to set aside the verdict and/or See id. The mandate was returned to superior court on January 8, 2003. On We affirmed his conviction in an opinion issued on December 16, 2002.

dismissed. The defendant did not appeal this dismissal. set aside the verdict and/or demand a new trial, which the trial court used in relation to a judgment or the date of the judgment. p. 3 “entered” is synonymous with neither “signed” nor “rendered” when

trial court dismissed his motion on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. He

trial court by a purely ministerial act of the clerk of the court, and

the three-year period had not yet elapsed, he moved for a new trial, and the

court aptly dismissed it under RSA 526:4.

judgment is “entered” when it is spread upon the minutes of the 3 signed by the court is a ministerial act of the court . . . . A The subsequent reduction of the pronouncement to a writing

“true travesty of justice.” He observes that while his appeal was pending and

later, on December 20, 2004. His motion was therefore untimely and the trial December 19, 2000. He filed his motion for a new trial more than three years

either orally in open court or by memorandum filed with the clerk. was “rendered” on July 29, 1971, when we decided

The defendant argues that affirming the trial court’s decision results in a

In this case, the trial court sentenced the defendant to state prison on

Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 641 A.2d 1356, 1371 (Conn. 1994). “rendered” when the sentence has been imposed by the trial court. Judgments submitted to [the court] for adjudication is officially announced §§ 56, 60 (2006). In the context of a criminal case, a judgment is the date on which it becomes “final,” we would have ruled that the judgment on other grounds by is “rendered.” A judgment is “rendered” when the matter 130 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. 2004); see also 46 Am. Jur. 2d In re R.A.H., 117 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Tex. App. 2003) (citations omitted), reversed

statutes. “rendition of judgment” has been interpreted by courts construing similar

and when it becomes “final.” Had we believed that a judgment is “rendered” on (2) signing, and (3) entry. The judgment becomes effective once it A judgment routinely goes through three stages: (1) rendition, superior court dismissed Bricker’s equity action. cases). As one court has explained:

See Jones v. Hubbard, 740 A.2d 1004, 1008-10 (Md. 1999) (citing

This construction of RSA 526:4 is consistent with how the phrase

returned the mandate to the trial court.

impliedly distinguished between the date on which a judgment is “rendered”

We ruled that judgment was rendered on May 17, 1971, when the

and, ultimately, we did as well. Id. at 710, 712. that it was untimely under RSA 526:4. Id. at 709-10. The trial court agreed, N.H. at 709. The hospital moved to dismiss Bricker’s motion to vacate, arguing Bricker moved to vacate the May 1971 dismissal of his action. Bricker, 115 motion for new trial.

p. 4 the case, in whole or in part, to the superior court so that it could decide the subsidiary or independent matters, he could have asked this court to remand appealed the dismissal. To the extent that the motion did not raise collateral,

when it dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, and the defendant could have

timely. Instead, he did not file it until December 20, 2004. defendant filed his motion on or before December 19, 2003, it would have been The mandate was returned to the trial court on January 8, 2003. Had the

collateral, subsidiary or independent matters, the trial court may have erred BRODERICK, C.J., and GALWAY and HICKS, JJ., concurred.

omitted)). Affirmed.

denied, 530 U.S. 1014 (2003).

passing on collateral, subsidiary or independent matters affecting the case.” observe that he waited an additional twelve months before filing the motion.

jurisdiction to decide other issues. Accordingly, to the extent that the defendant’s motion for new trial raised

jurisdiction of the cause and transfers it to the appellate court.” (quotation the general rule” that “the perfection of an appeal divests the Trial Court of pending appeal is an independent matter and thus falls within this exception to Id. (quotation omitted); see also State v. Gubitosi, 153 N.H. 79, 81 (2005) (“Bail

proceedings . . . [;] [this] general rule . . . does not prohibit the Trial Court from vested with the exclusive power and jurisdiction over the subject matter of the wait until the mandate was returned before moving again for a new trial, we N.H. 739, 745 (2005). “After the appeal has been perfected, this Court is

jurisdiction to decide certain issues while an appeal is pending, it retains which he failed to pursue. For instance, although the trial court lacks Moreover, contrary to his assertions, the defendant had other choices,

Even if we assume, arguendo, that the defendant had “no choice” but to

as the Supreme Court appeal was decided before he could re-file the motion.” argues that, once this occurred, he had “no choice but to wait until such time