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2007-245, PETITION OF GRANT KILTON

New Hampshire Legal Assistance

Opinion Issued: December 31, 2007 Argued: November 13, 2007

PETITION OF GRANT KILTON

No. 2007-245

Original

___________________________

of age inclusive; is a resident of the state; and is disabled as defined in the of certiorari, see person is eligible for APTD benefits “who is between the ages of 18 and 64 years Concord BRODERICK, C.J. The petitioner, Grant Kilton, has petitioned for a writ, 916 F.2d 744, 745 (1st Cir. 1990). Pursuant to RSA 167:6, VI, a assistance programs administered by the department. See Baker v. City of applied for benefits under the APTD program, which is one of various public The record supports the following facts. In April 2005, the petitioner Kelly A. Ayotte I

Disabled (APTD) program. See RSA 167:6, VI (2002). We affirm. his application for benefits under the Aid to the Permanently and Totally New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (department), of

Sup. Ct. R. 11, challenging the denial by the respondent, the THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

brief, and Rosemary Wiant, attorney, orally), for the respondent.

, attorney general (Jill A. Desrochers, attorney, on the

P. Baird & a. on the brief, and Mr. Baird orally), for the petitioner.

, of Claremont and Concord (Jonathan

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as pertinent part: “Each party has the right to be represented by an attorney, scheduling the hearing for February 16, 2006. This notice provided, in In November, the department sent the petitioner a notice of hearing,

WILL NOT PAY YOUR LEGAL FEES. quickly as possible to avoid unnecessary delay. THE DIVISION

Assistance office nearest you. Contact your representative as telephone directory or District Office for the New Hampshire Legal

legal counsel. If you need free legal counsel, consult your You may represent yourself or be represented by others, including

SSI/SSDI eligibility and

so stated: The petitioner timely requested a fair hearing. The form on which he did

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meets or equals the same level of severity as that established for Medicaid. NH Medicaid requires that you have an impairment that Permanently & Totally Disabled (APTD) category of eligibility for NH You have been denied the medical eligibility for Aid to the

consecutive months.” Specifically, the notice of denial informed the petitioner: appeal hearing.” represent yourself or be represented by others including legal counsel, at the would not prevent him “from performing substantial gainful activity for 48 mid-October because his impairment failed to meet “the severity required” and decision, you have the right to appeal and ask for a fair hearing. You may The department denied the petitioner’s application for APTD benefits in Further, the notice stated, in pertinent part: “If you disagree with this falling short of the forty-eight-month durational requirement for APTD benefits. petitioner’s prognosis for returning to work was within a year or less, thus, machine operator or assembler. Moreover, the notice of denial noted that the cognitive impairment that would prevent him from working in his prior job as a conditions should remit with counseling and medication, and that he had no petitioner suffers from generalized anxiety disorder and depression, these The notice also referred to medical records, which indicated that, while the

activity for 48 consecutive months. your impairment prevent you from performing substantial gainful not have an impairment that meets the severity required nor will gainful activity for 48 consecutive months. (RSA 167:6, VI) You do

that the impairment(s) prevent substantial

Act.” RSA 167:6, VI. “the standards for ‘substantial gainful activity’ as used in the Social Security the impairment shall be 48 months.” Disability is determined by reference to federal Social Security Act, . . . except that the minimum required duration of lengthy appeal process. closed and that granting the request “would only further delay the already too early May, the department denied the request, stating that the record was now department to reconvene the hearing so that NHLA could represent him. In department by letter that it now represented the petitioner and asked the On April 26, 2006, soon after the sixty days expired, NHLA informed the

information in response, if any. additional information and to allow the department to submit further would hold the record open for sixty days to permit the petitioner to submit that the presiding officer believed might be relevant, she indicated that she Because the petitioner had identified, but did not have possession of records had been hospitalized for anxiety and depression “three or four times.” petitioner testified that since the department had denied his application, he asked the petitioner a number of questions “to help [him] tell [his] story.” The The petitioner questioned the nurse briefly. The presiding officer then

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impairments “immediately [a]meliorate[ ].” durational requirement because, with antipsychotic medication, his that the petitioner’s impairments (anxiety and depression) did not meet the testified that based upon documents in the file, the review team determined impairments met the forty-eight-month durational requirement. She further there was documentation to support such an allegation; and (4) whether his gainful activity; (2) whether he had alleged a severe impairment; (3) whether application to determine: (1) whether he was currently engaged in substantial was denied. Specifically, she testified that a medical review team examined his medical witness, explained the process by which the petitioner’s application represented by counsel. A registered nurse, testifying for the department as a case manager accompanied him for support. The department was also not The petitioner represented himself at the February hearing, although his

represented by an attorney at your own expense[;]” and “You do not need yourself, be represented by a friend, relative, or other person, or may be information about a claimant’s right to an attorney: “You may represent The “Frequently Asked Questions” material included the following

N.H. Admin. Rules, He-C 203.04(a)(2). list included numerous offices of New Hampshire Legal Assistance (NHLA). See to assist individuals or to provide them with a referral for legal counsel. This “Frequently Asked Questions” attachment also included a list of organizations laws and rules are the same whether or not you have an attorney.” The attorney, however, you may want one to protect your interests and rights. The

an

hearing disclosure requirements. (See attached Frequently Asked Questions).” you have an attorney or not, each party must comply with the mandatory prehowever, the cost of representation shall be at the party’s expense. Whether due process, we typically employ a two-prong analysis. Appeal of Town of To determine whether particular procedures satisfy the requirements of

law.” Bragg v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles law of the land.” “[T]he law of the land is synonymous with due process of or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled “No [person] shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution provides, in pertinent part:

4

Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 328 (2006). Initially, we ascertain whether a legally

(quotations omitted).

, 141 N.H. 677, 678 (1997)

N.H. 93, 95 (2007) (quotation omitted). process requirements of the State Constitution.” In re Father 2006-360, 155 Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983). “This court is the final arbiter of the due the State Constitution, citing federal opinions for guidance only. See State v. XIV; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15. We first address the petitioner’s claims under notice of his right to seek free legal representation. See U.S. CONST. amend. due process were violated because he received inadequate oral and written The petitioner argues that his federal and state constitutional rights to

[department] is by petition for a writ of certiorari.” Petition of Walker III “The only judicial review of a fair hearings decision issued by the otherwise would result in substantial injustice. Id. exercise our power to grant such writs sparingly and only where to do II its discretion or acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or capriciously. Id. We and this petition for writ of certiorari followed. jurisdiction, authority or observance of the law or has unsustainably exercised 2007, the presiding officer denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, limited to determining whether the agency has acted illegally with respect to to notify him adequately of his right to seek free legal counsel. On March 9, review of an administrative agency’s decision on a petition for certiorari is reconsideration, asserting, among other things, that the department had failed the court. Petition of Chase Home for Children, 155 N.H. 528, 532 (2007). Our petitioner’s application for benefits. The petitioner, through counsel, moved for available only in the absence of a right to appeal, and only at the discretion of officer issued her final decision affirming the initial decision to deny the 471, 473 (1994). Review on certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, usually Approximately three months later, on August 10, 2006, the presiding, 138 N.H. and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.” Berube has been clear: Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; “For more than a century, the central meaning of procedural due process

5

the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Jones v. Flowers, 547 due the means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 315 (1950). “[W]hen notice is a person’s information” and must be more than “a mere gesture.” Mullane v. Central notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978). To satisfy due process, “[t]he and permit adequate preparation for, an impending ‘hearing.’” Memphis Light, notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, v. Belhumeur, 139 N.H. 562, 567 (1995) (quotation omitted). “The purpose of

that he was constitutionally due. reveals that, contrary to his assertions, the petitioner received all of the notice he claims entitlement, and we have found none. Our review of the record authority to support his assertion that due process requires the notice to which required by state unemployment compensation statute). He cites no direct S.W.2d 21, 24-25 (Tenn. 1990) (ruling that these kinds of procedures are H.H.S., 826 F.2d 136, 142-43 (1st Cir. 1987); cf. Simmons v. Traughber, 791 the denial of an application for APTD benefits. See Evangelista v. Secretary of asks the court to hold that they are constitutionally mandated in appeals from statutorily required in social security administration appeals and, in effect, protect an appellant’s interests.” He notes that these kinds of procedures are include “essential information about the value of an attorney in helping to the right to seek free legal representation.” This notice, he asserts, should the administrative hearing about whether [the petitioner] understood he had seek free legal counsel, followed by an oral inquiry from the Hearing Officer at process require[s] clear and understandable written notice about the right to Without citing to any direct authority, the petitioner asserts that “due

B

deciding whether the procedures at issue complied with due process. See id. had a property interest entitled to due process protection. We turn then to obtaining APTD benefits. We will assume, without deciding, that the petitioner process protection because he has no legally protected property interest in The department contends that the petitioner is not entitled to due

A

interest. Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. at 328. afford appropriate safeguards against a wrongful deprivation of the protected 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). We then determine whether the procedures provided protected interest has been implicated. See id.; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, represented by an attorney at his own expense. See cause could result in the appeal being dismissed, and that he had a right to be officer would hold the hearing, that failure to attend the hearing without good location of the hearing, the applicable statutes and rules, that a presiding Further, the notice of hearing notified the petitioner of the date, time and

directory or NHLA; and (4) the department would not pay his legal fees. hearing; and (3) if he needed free legal counsel, he could consult the telephone represent himself or be represented by others, including legal counsel, at the hearing verbally, he could contact his district office; (2) he had the right to hearing that: (1) if he needed help completing the form or wished to request a In addition, the petitioner received notice on the form requesting a fair

6

Hampshire which provide free or reduced cost legal services”). required by RSA 541-A:31, III and “[a] list of the organizations in New N.H. Admin. Rules, He-C 203.04 (notice of hearing must include information

RSA 541-A:31, III (2007);

appeal the denial. thirty days to contact his case worker and tell him or her that he wished to others, including legal counsel; and (7) if he wished to appeal, that he had hearing; (6) that he had the right to represent himself or be represented by determined; (5) that he had the right to appeal the denial and ask for a fair the denial; (4) the standards by which his eligibility for APTD benefits was denial; (2) how the department reached its decision; (3) the statutory basis for application for APTD benefits, he was notified: (1) of the full reasons for the The record shows that, when the department denied the petitioner’s

must be given to the recipients of the benefits.” Petition of Clark that “a timely and adequate notice stating the reasons for the proposed action With respect to terminating or reducing welfare benefits, we have held

that these rules apply to denials of an application for APTD benefits. eligibility.” Petition of Clark, 122 N.H. at 891. We assume, without deciding, that action, and any other data the recipients might need to figure out their the information upon which the proposed action is based, the full reasons for considered adequate, the notice must give a reasonably complete statement of 888, 891 (1982); see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970). “To be

, 122 N.H.

and circumstances of each case.” Id. focuses upon whether notice was fair and reasonable under the particular facts of Hiscoe, 147 N.H. 223, 227 (2001) (quotation omitted). “Thus, our inquiry the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Appeal under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of however, does not require perfect notice, but only notice reasonably calculated, U.S. 220, 229 (2006) (quotation, ellipsis and brackets omitted). “Due process, notified that he could have an attorney present at the fair hearing, see “right” to seek free legal counsel. Rather, by statute, he had a right to be We observe, first, that the petitioner had neither a statutory nor a regulatory because it was misleading with respect to his right to seek free legal counsel. The petitioner also contends that the notice he received was insufficient rights was neither confusing nor misleading. The petitioner was notified The record demonstrates that the notice the petitioner received of these

7

services, see N.H. Admin. Rules, He-C 203.04. organizations in New Hampshire that provide free or reduced cost legal 541-A:31, III, and pursuant to regulation, he had a right to receive a list of

RSA

notice of his ability to seek free legal counsel. Constitution does not require that he receive any additional notice, including notice to which due process entitled him. The Due Process Clause of the State Appeal of Hiscoe, 147 N.H. at 227. The petitioner, thus, received all of the notice was fair and reasonable under the particular facts of this case. See his eligibility. Petition of Clark, 122 N.H. at 891. Moreover, we hold that the reasons” for the denial, and data regarding what he might need to figure out process. See of the information upon which the denial of his application was based, “the full We hold that the notice the petitioner received more than satisfied due The notice given to the petitioner gave him a “reasonably complete statement” availability of community legal services “amply safeguard” recipient’s interest). represented by counsel, relative or friend or other spokesman, and of method of obtaining fair hearing, that recipient may represent self or may be notice of any action affecting right to assistance, of right to fair hearing, of 374, 376 (N.Y. 1975) (regulations entitling recipient of aid to the disabled to specific notice of the recipient’s right to appeal); Brown v. Lavine, 333 N.E.2d for the change in status; (3) citation to specific statutory authority; and (4) they contained: (1) a detailed statement of the intended action; (2) the reason reductions and terminations in welfare benefits satisfied due process when

Garrett v. Puett, 707 F.2d 930, 931 (6th Cir. 1983) (notice of

petitioner or provide him with a referral for legal counsel. included a list of organizations in New Hampshire that could assist the if he had additional questions. Moreover, the “Frequently Asked Questions” hearing, the procedures that would be used at the hearing, and who to contact exhibits, what to do if he could not attend the hearing, when to arrive at the Asked Questions” also informed the petitioner about how to identify his witnesses; and question or refute any testimony or evidence. The “Frequently evidence; present relevant arguments; cross-examine the other party’s file; testify at the hearing; have witnesses testify at the hearing; introduce right to: be represented by an attorney at his own expense; examine his case “Frequently Asked Questions” regarding his rights at the hearing, including his Additionally, the petitioner received information from the department’s Nor is this case similar to Vargas

8

of notice than that which the petitioner received. Jones While the petitioner relies upon Covey v. Town of Somers filing a form or by making the request verbally. the “practicalities and peculiarities” of this case do not require a different kind that he intended to appeal; and given the option of requesting a fair hearing by vulnerable population, of which [the petitioner] is an example.” We hold that application; given thirty days to meet with his case worker to notify him or her constitutionally infirm because it was not tailored to “the needs of [a] was: afforded written notice of the reasons that the department denied his terminated and then to appeal. Id. at 489-90. By contrast, here, the petitioner to meet with their caseworkers to learn why their benefits had been reduced or or from complying with the administrative review process. See 489. The notice in Vargas In Covey informed the recipients that they had only ten days prevented him from understanding the notice that his application was denied handicaps . . . to take the necessary affirmative action.” Vargas, 508 F.2d at The petitioner does not argue that his physical or mental condition anticipated, would be unable or disinclined, because of physical [or mental] the “aged, blind or disabled, many of whom . . . [it] could have [been]

. That case involved notice addressed to

denial of his application for benefits. understand the nature of the proceedings against him or unable to appeal the evidence that, and the petitioner does not allege that, he was unable to The petitioner also contends that the notice he received was proceedings against her.” Covey, 351 U.S. at 146-47. By contrast, there is no an incompetent and was “wholly unable to understand the nature of the

, the recipient of the notice had no guardian, was known to be

Ill. 1986), these cases are distinguishable from the instant matter. denied, 420 U.S. 1008 (1975), and Tripp v. Coler, 640 F. Supp. 848, 850 (N.D. 146-47 (1956), Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 489-90 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.

, 351 U.S. 141,

request for fair hearing. benefits. See id. at 1102. Indeed, the record shows that he timely submitted a evidence that the petitioner was unable to challenge the decision to deny him Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2001). Nor was there any

Udd v.

(quotation omitted).

, 547 U.S. at 230

provides free legal services. fair hearing request form specifically identified NHLA as an organization that provide legal counsel. Several NHLA offices were included in that list and the was given the names and contact information for community organizations that numerous times of his right to have counsel present at his own expense and he In re Father 2006-360

that additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.

the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens

procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of

We find the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews

the interest of a social security disability benefits recipient in continued and In balancing the three factors set forth above, the Court first looked to

9

act. Id. at 336 (quotation omitted). substantial gainful activity,” as defined by the social security administration three factors: benefits, “a worker must demonstrate that he is unable to engage in any safeguards the petitioner seeks in this appeal, we must balance the following could be terminated. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323. To be eligible for such parties argue that to determine whether due process requires the additional evidentiary hearing before an individual’s social security disability benefits free legal counsel, the process he received was fundamentally unfair. The instructive. In Mathews, the court evaluated whether due process required an The petitioner asserts that without additional notice of his “right” to seek

contemporaneous notice requirement). declines to apply Mathews to decide what type of notice is adequate to meet the 2003) (under Mathews, tenants entitled to contemporaneous notice, but court due process claims.”); Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1242 (11th Cir. have never viewed Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding applies. But see Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (“We both parties rely upon it, we assume, without deciding, that this three-part test

, 155 N.H. at 95; see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Because

these deficiencies. received of the reasons the department denied his application has none of determined to have overused medical care. Id. The notice the petitioner issue, and even failed to identify which person in the recipient’s family was usage was judged, failed to identify the precise medical items or services at reasons, did not identify the legal standard by which a recipient’s medical reasons for its decisions. Id. at 858-59. Rather, the notices gave ultimate these decisions, however, failed to inform the class adequately of the agency’s Aid for overuse of medical services. Tripp, 640 F. Supp. at 849. The notices of Medicaid had been restricted or terminated by the Illinois Department of Public in Tripp. The appellants in Tripp were a class of people whose continued use of The notice the petitioner received here was also superior to that at issue the private interest at stake in Mathews The petitioner’s private interest in obtaining APTD benefits is similar to

10

because the petitioner must meet an eligibility standard that is similar to that of disability benefits.” Id administration act. RSA 167:6, VI; see right, an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination Mathews, 424 U.S. at 336. Moreover, engage in any “substantial gainful activity,” as defined by the social security costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional entitled to benefits, the petitioner must demonstrate that he is unable to The Court finally examined “the administrative burden and other societal . Like the recipient in Mathews, to be

that the administrative process at issue was fair. Id. at 348-49. observing that this type of judicial procedure need not be imposed to assure Court ruled that a pretermination evidentiary hearing was not required, and administrative burden “would not be insubstantial.” Id. Ultimately, the

. at 347. The Court recognized that the financial cost

final.” Id. at 344-45, 349. as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the denial of his claim becomes procedural safeguards.” Id to any administrative action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional The Court then examined “the fairness and reliability of the existing only provide the claimant with an effective process for asserting his claim prior than in Goldberg,” particularly “where, as here, the prescribed procedures not “[t]he potential value of an evidentiary hearing . . . [was] substantially less . . . to the decisionmaking process.” Id. at 343-44. Thus, the Court reasoned, deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and veracity often are critical determine welfare eligibility where “a wide variety of information may be subsistence level.” Id omitted). The risk of error, the Court ruled, was lower than in proceedings to termination of disability benefits places a worker or his family below and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists.” Id. at 344 (quotation discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon routine, standard,

. The Court observed that “the decision whether to

sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Id. at 343. the ordinary principle . . . that something less than an evidentiary hearing is temporary income, there is less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from

. at 342. Because of “these potential sources of

other forms of government assistance will become available where the welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of access to private resources, U.S. at 340-41. “[T]he disabled worker’s need is likely to be less than that of a at stake in Goldberg differed from that at stake in Mathews. Mathews, 424 deprived of welfare benefits, see Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264, the private interest required an evidentiary hearing before a welfare recipient could be temporarily at 340. The Court noted that although it had previously held that due process uninterrupted receipt of benefits pending final determination of his claim. Id. reviewing APTD eligibility determinations is fair. See

and administrative burden on the department, as would requiring the presiding applicant of his ability to seek free legal counsel would impose some financial Finally, requiring the department to issue additional notices to the

11

We hold that these procedures adequately ensure that the process for

and to assure quality and fairness in adjudication.” Id. at 376. described above “as a whole would appear designed to minimize inaccuracies legal representation is relatively minimal. See id. at 376-77. The procedure presiding officer, see 376. The potential value of additional notice that an applicant may seek free hearing, as well as to submit proposed findings of fact and rulings of law to the Brown, 333 N.E.2d at

petition for writ of certiorari, see Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. at 473. Rules, He-C 203.22; and (12) the opportunity to seek judicial review by filing a 204; (11) a written decision on the motion for reconsideration, see N.H. Admin. opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration, see N.H. Admin. Rules, He-C A:35 (2007); N.H. Admin. Rules, He-C 203.19(c), He-C 203.22; (10) an the record that includes findings of fact and conclusions of law, see RSA 541- Rules, He-C 203.19; (9) a written decision on the merits or a decision stated on

RSA 541-A:31, IV (2007); RSA 541-A:33; N.H. Admin.

present witnesses and cross-examine the other party’s witnesses at the see RSA 541-A:31, III; N.H. Admin. Rules, He-C 203.04; (8) the opportunity to the right to have an attorney present at the hearing at the applicant’s expense; apply, see RSA 541-A:33; N.H. Admin. Rules, He-C 203.15 to He-C 203.18; (7) 201.05, of which a record is made, and at which the rules of evidence do not before a presiding officer, see RSA 541-A:33 (2007); N.H. Admin. Rules, He-C A:31, III; N.H. Admin. Rules, He-C 203.04; (6) an evidentiary hearing held department personnel in completing an application for benefits, see New Hampshire that provide free or reduced cost legal services, see RSA 541is determined already includes the following safeguards: (1) assistance from to represent the party at the party’s expense, and a list of the organizations in Further, the process by which the petitioner’s eligibility for APTD benefits involved, a statement that each party has the right to have an attorney present the statutes and rules involved, a short and plain statement of the issues under which the hearing is to be held, a reference to the particular sections of of the time, place, and nature of the hearing, a statement of the legal authority N.H. Admin. Rules, He-C 203.02; (5) a hearing notice that includes a statement has been denied, notice that the person is entitled to request a hearing, see denied, a statement of the specific reasons therefor, see id.; (4) if an application accepted or denied, see RSA 167:10 (2002); (3) if the application has been (Supp. 2007); (2) written notification of whether the application has been

RSA 167:8

physician specialists.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344 (quotation omitted). in most cases, upon routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by in Mathews, determining the petitioner’s eligibility for APTD benefits “will turn, both constitutions. See

protection under these circumstances, we reach the same conclusion under

Because the Federal Constitution offers the petitioner no greater

DALIANIS, DUGGAN, GALWAY and HICKS, JJ., concurred.

Affirmed

12

address it. See briefed the argument that he had a due process right to counsel, we decline to “asking [it] to mandate meaningful notice.” Because the petitioner has not. the Court to establish a new right to counsel in civil cases,” but rather was due process right to counsel, in his brief he contended that he was “not asking Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 424 (1999). While at oral argument, the petitioner asserted, in effect, that he had a

Constitution required the department to give him. He relies upon Carbonneau petitioner advocates in this appeal. counsel was “essential information” that Part I, Article 1 of the State Savage The petitioner also argues that notice of his “right” to seek free legal, 120 N.H. at 411. In neither case did we adopt the broad rule the substantively acceptable but also whether they are technically in order.” applicants for subdivision approval “not only whether their applications are N.H. at 99. In Savage, we ruled that such assistance includes informing citizens in applying for certain permits and approvals. See Carbonneau, 120 we reminded the town of its obligation under Part I, Article 1 to assist its town’s obligation under Part I, Article 1 to assist its citizens. In Carbonneau, 409, 411 (1980), for this proposition. Both Carbonneau and Savage concern a v. Town of Rye, 120 N.H. 96, 99 (1980), and Savage v. Town of Rye, 120 N.H.

In the Matter of Bazemore & Jack, 153 N.H. 351, 356 (2006).

(2006). addressing the petitioner’s concerns. Cloutier v. City of Berlin, 154 N.H. 13, 22 are reserved for the legislature, and we therefore leave to it the task of 142-43, he makes his argument in the wrong forum. Matters of public policy federal social security administration act appeals, see Evangelista, 826 F.2d at should have the same procedural protections as are provided to claimants in of policy, applicants appealing the denial of their applications for APTD benefits not command it.” Id. To the extent that the petitioner argues that, as a matter provided, “it is for the Legislature to say so, for constitutional due process does petitioner seeks in this appeal. Id. at 376. If these safeguards are to be that fairness can only be achieved” with the additional safeguards the additional safeguards the petitioner identifies in this appeal. “We cannot say avoiding a fiscal and administrative burden, due process does not require the erroneous deprivation of that interest, and the government’s interest in factors, we conclude that given the petitioner’s property interest, the low risk of officer to notify the applicant verbally of this right. In balancing the three

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