2007-215, APPEAL OF KAT PAW ACRES TRUST

Disabilities Rights Center, Inc.

(New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals) APPEAL OF KAT PAW ACRES TRUST

No. 2007-215

Board of Tax and Land Appeals

previous tax years, but denied exemptions sought for a mudroom, hallway to which was consistent with the town’s tax assessment of the trust’s property in town granted partial exemptions for a paved driveway and air conditioning, persons with disabilities pursuant to RSA 72:37-a. For the 2004 tax year, the tax exemptions for improvements to assist persons with disabilities. See the defendant, the Town of Wentworth (town), for improvements to assist decision of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) denying home in Wentworth. On February 24, 2003, the trust filed an application with HICKS, J. The plaintiff, the Kat Paw Acres Trust (trust), appeals a The record supports the following facts. The trust owns a single family

Gardner Fulton & Waugh PLLC

72:37-a (2003). We affirm.

and orally), for the defendant.

brief, and C. Adrienne Mallinson orally), for the plaintiff.

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as p. 2 RSA 72:37-a (emphasis added). a physical defect or infirmity permanently requires the use of (a) “Person with a disability” means a person who by reason of

Appeal of Town of Wolfeboro Appeals from BTLA decisions are governed by RSA chapter 541 (2007).

taxes upon such real estate.

I. In this section:

unnecessary for propulsion. The trust’s motion for rehearing was denied. burden of proving entitlement to the tax exemption for those improvements omitted.) In applying this test, the BTLA found that the trust did not meet its use of special aids to enable him to propel himself.” (Quotation and brackets disability includes a “physical defect or infirmity that permanently requires the a is not whether a person has one or more disabilities, but whether the conditions. However, it ruled that the test for the exemption under RSA 72:37progressive multiple sclerosis, suffer from serious and debilitating medical assessed value of the residential real estate before determining the recognized that the trustees of the trust, including one who has chronic, After an evidentiary hearing, the BTLA affirmed. In its ruling, the BTLA

and to which he has made improvements for the purpose of 2 II. Every owner of residential real estate upon which he resides,

determined by deducting the value of such improvements from the value, for property tax purposes, upon such residential real estate provides, in relevant part: estate, is each year entitled to an exemption from the assessed Resolution of this appeal requires us to construe RSA 72:37-a, which assisting a person with a disability who also resides on such real

. . . . special aids to enable him to propel himself.

again appealed. The BTLA consolidated the appeals. For tax year 2005, the town issued the same assessment and the trust Wolfeboro, 152 N.H. at 458. evidence that the BTLA’s decision was clearly unreasonable or unlawful. See 410, 411 (2003). To prevail, the trust must show by a preponderance of the from which the [BTLA] could conclude as it did.” Appeal of Huston, 150 N.H. presumption may be overcome only by a showing that there was no evidence by the BTLA are deemed prima facie lawful and reasonable. Id. “This

trust appealed to the BTLA. an in-law apartment, the in-law apartment itself and related plumbing. The purpose. See p. 3 paragraph in conjunction with the first to effectuate the statute’s overall disability with propulsion are exempt from taxation. We construe the second leads us to conclude that only improvements that assist a person with a taxation. The fact that “propel” is used to define a “person with a disability” with a disability” in describing the improvements that are exempt from aids to enable him to propel himself.” RSA 72:37-a, II uses the term “person reason of a physical defect or infirmity permanently requires the use of special RSA 72:37-a, I, defines a “[p]erson with a disability” as someone “who by

or make more comfortable, persons who have a mobility disability. however, that RSA 72:37-a does not exempt all improvements that may assist, improvements that directly assist a person with propulsion. We conclude under RSA 72:37-a. However, it argues that the statute is not limited to improvement must relate to a mobility disability to qualify for the exemption In both its brief and at oral argument, the trust conceded that an

Appeal of Town of Newington, 149 N.H. 347, 352 (2003).

disagree. On appeal, the trust argues, inter statute applies and should not be read into paragraph II of the statute. We disability” as defined in RSA 72:37-a, I, only describes individuals to whom the order to qualify for the exemption. The trust contends that a “person with a the improvements need not assist a person with propulsion within the home in that generally assist an individual with a mobility disability; it contends that exemption. The trust argues that RSA 72:37-a, II exempts any improvements individuals who permanently require the use of such special aids qualify for the assist a disabled person are exempt; only improvements necessary to propel in their homes. The BTLA specifically stated that not all improvements that that assist persons with a disability on a permanent basis to propel themselves 72:37-a, II by ruling that the exemption applies only to property improvements

whole. ElderTrust of Fla. v. Town of Epsom legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a scheme.” Id. (quotation omitted). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the language in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory legislature’s intent, and therefore better able to understand the statutory 366 (2002) (quotation omitted). “In so doing, we are better able to discern the consider the statute as a whole.” Pennelli v. Town of Pelham, 148 N.H. 365, language, we do not merely look at isolated words or phrases, but instead we language the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. “As we examine the as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add meaning to the words used. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute examining the language of the statute, we will ascribe the plain and ordinary

concurred. BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, DUGGAN and GALWAY, J J.,

Affirmed

BTLA’s decision was neither unreasonable nor unlawful, we affirm. sufficient evidence before the BTLA to support this finding. Because the law apartment and related plumbing did not assist with propulsion. There was in propelling himself/herself. The BTLA found that the mudroom, hallway, inperson with a disability” must, at a minimum, assist a person with a disability Accordingly, we conclude that “improvements for the purpose of assisting a