2008-027, DALE ROBINSON v. NEW HAMPSHIRE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

own property. complaint alleging that the petitioner engaged in misconduct when selling his

issue: whether the Commission had jurisdiction to hold a hearing on a

Commission had jurisdiction. We reverse.

See RSA 331-A:4, I (2004). The trial court ruled that the

denying his motion for summary judgment. Both motions concerned a single respondent, the New Hampshire Real Estate Commission (Commission), and Superior Court (Mangones, J.) granting the motion to dismiss filed by the DALIANIS, J. The petitioner, Dale Robinson, appeals the order of the

attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the respondent. Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Suzanne M. Gorman, senior assistant

Dale Robinson, orally, pro se.

Gayle M. Braley on the brief), for the petitioner. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: D'Amante Couser Steiner Pellerin, P.A., of Concord (R. James Steiner and

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. v.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2008-027 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Merrimack Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as p. 2 Hampshire Real Estate Practices Act (the Act). membership in a state or national realty organization. revoking his licenses; and (3) RSA 331-A:26, XVI (2004) by misrepresenting his

signs. Realty. The business card contained the same “R” emblem as the “For Sale” Commission, in which they alleged that the petitioner had violated the New the Moreiras with a business card that identified him as a broker at Homestead (2) RSA 331-A:26, II (2004) by disregarding the Commission’s prior order

dispute regarding the contract’s terms, the Moreiras filed a complaint with the 2 to which he said, “yes.” Upon meeting them, the petitioner allegedly provided Moreiras subsequently paid the remainder of the down payment. Following a which also identified him as a broker and included the “R” symbol. The 2007) by directly or indirectly acting as a real estate broker without a license; petitioner had violated: (1) RSA 331-A:3 (2004) and RSA 331-A:34 (Supp. the motion and conducting the hearing, the Commission concluded that the petitioner owned the property at issue.

buying the property. They asked whether he was the realtor for the property, signs, Carlos and Katherine Moreira telephoned the petitioner to ask about Realty. The petitioner wrote a receipt on the back of a second business card, Realty is a member of the National Association of Realtors. Upon seeing the See RSA 331-A:4, I. dismiss the proceedings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After denying is whether the Commission had subject matter jurisdiction even though the Commission’s decision, and this appeal followed. The sole issue for our review Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction. The superior court upheld the The petitioner appealed to the superior court contesting the

petitioner a second deposit, a $1,000 check made payable to Homestead Realty,” a telephone number, and an “R” emblem indicating that Homestead wrote “No Broker” on the receipt. Two weeks later, the Moreiras gave the agreement, and the Moreiras gave him a first deposit of $1,000. The petitioner At the hearing on the Moreiras’ complaint, the petitioner moved to

Supp. 2007).

Pembroke, and at nearby locations. The signs included the name “Homestead The Moreiras and the petitioner entered into a purchase and sale

nor a salesperson license.

In 2005, the petitioner placed “For Sale” signs on property he owns in

1989. Since 1989, therefore, the petitioner has had neither a real estate broker 1965. The Commission suspended his licenses in 1987, and revoked them in a licensed real estate salesperson in 1963 and a licensed real estate broker in The trial court’s order recited the following facts. The petitioner became p. 3 A:2, III].” RSA 331-A:2, X (2004).

licensed under a broker to participate in any activity described in [RSA 331-

salesperson without a license constitutes a class A misdemeanor.

estate.” RSA 331-A:2, III(g) (2004). A salesperson is “an individual who is engaged in the business of buying, selling, exchanging, renting or leasing real chapter who” among other things “[a]dvertises or holds oneself out as being 3

the business or acting in the capacity of a real estate broker or real estate

provisions of this chapter,” RSA 331-A:3. Acting as a real estate broker or

commission or for other compensation . . . , or any person licensed under this

statute, the Commission “may investigate the actions of any person engaged in was enacted to protect the public against broker fraud and incompetence. The Commission administers the Act. See RSA 331-A:5 (2004). By confidence in the business of real estate brokerage.” RSA 331-A:1 (2004). It or real estate salesperson without a license and otherwise complying with the

brokers are regulated by the strictures of the licensing law.” whereby all persons who act in the capacity of real estate salespeople or The Act defines a “[b]roker” as “any person acting for another on

331-A:34. legislature did not see fit to incorporate in the statute. See RSA

maintain minimum standards which promote public understanding and and prohibits “any person, directly or indirectly, to act as a real estate broker sales and brokerage practices. Act sets forth the requirements for licensure, see RSA 331-A:10 (Supp. 2007), Commercial Real Estate v. Paino, 133 N.H. 4, 7 (1990). Towards this end, the

“The primary focus of the [Act] is to provide a licensing procedure,

Blackthorne Group, 150 N.H. at 806.

to consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the

real estate brokers and salespersons in order to ensure that they meet and

The Act establishes a comprehensive system for regulating real estate

be advanced by the statutory scheme. Id. and to interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to isolation. Id. By so doing, we are better able to discern the legislature’s intent interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in

need not look beyond it for further indication of legislative intent, and we refuse words used. Id. When a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we statute, and, where possible, ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the Newmarket, 150 N.H. 804, 806 (2004). We first examine the language of the the words of the statute considered as a whole. Blackthorne Group v. Pines of 707 (2005). We are the final arbiters of the legislature’s intent as expressed in of law that we review de novo. See In re Juvenile 2004-0469, 151 N.H. 706, This jurisdictional issue involves interpreting the Act, which is a question to incorporate in the statute. p. 4 legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit have included similar language. We cannot, however, consider what the

property owner does not hold himself out to be a real estate broker, it could

exempt from the Act’s provisions. 4 A:4, I, is that a property owner with respect to property owned by him is the legislature intended the property owner exemption to apply only when the hearing on the Moreiras’ complaint. We agree. The plain meaning of RSA 331himself or herself out as a real estate broker.” RSA 331-A:4, VIII (2004). Had specifically states that it applies only when the consultant “does not hold

exempt from the Act, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to conduct the engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a real estate The commission may investigate the actions of any person a real estate broker. By contrast, the exemption for corporate consultants matters before it under RSA 331-A:28, I. RSA 331-A:28, I, provides: The State also argues that the Commission had jurisdiction over the

membership in any state or national real estate association. RSA 331-A:26, II,

the owner, builder, or tenant.” The petitioner asserts that because he is builder or tenant of real estate . . . with respect to property owned or leased by RSA 331-A:4, I. It applies even when a property owner holds himself out to be A:4, I, provides that the provisions of the Act shall not apply to: “An owner, broker. There is no qualifying language in the property owner exemption. See not apply here because the petitioner held himself out to be a real estate The State mistakenly contends that the property owner exemption does

Act or any order issued pursuant to the Act; and (2) misrepresenting

salespeople to be held.”

from the Act’s provisions because he was selling his own property. RSA 331- The petitioner, relying upon RSA 331-A:4, I, argues that he is exempt

and may impose discipline for any misconduct, 331-A:26. The conduct prohibited includes: (1) violating any provision of the “shall be subject to disciplinary action as provided in RSA 331-A:28.” RSA licensee found guilty of engaging in the conduct described in RSA 331-A:26

violations of the standards to which the legislature requires brokers and “specific courses of conduct which in and of themselves constitute breaches or RSA 331-A:26 (2004 & Supp. 2007) describes in thirty-eight paragraphs

complaint to be filed. See RSA 331-A:35, I, II (2004). see RSA 331-A:35, IV (2004). The Commission may also cause a criminal

account or in the capacity as broker or salesperson,” RSA 331-A:28, I (2004), salesperson, regardless of whether the transaction was for the person’s own may wish to revise it to make it clearer. p. 5 several internally inconsistent and confusing provisions; thus, the legislature

in question. Any other construction would render RSA 331-A:4, I, superfluous.

legislature disagree with our interpretation of the Act, it is free to amend the jurisdiction to hold a hearing on the Moreiras’ complaint. Should the exempt from the Act’s provisions, and the Commission, thus, lacked

BRODERICK, C.J.