2008-046, I/M/O MARY BETH GEORGAKILAS AND GEORGE GEORGAKILAS

responsibility, paragraph B of the parenting plan provided that the respondent shall be consulted and agree on [the child’s] religion.” Regarding residential

the child during the time he/she is caring for the child,” and “[b]oth parties

regarding their then two-year-old son.

decisions about the child,” “[e]ach parent shall make day-to-day decisions for stated that “[b]oth parents shall share in the responsibility for making major respect to decision-making responsibility, paragraph A of the parenting plan

terms of their permanent stipulation, which included a parenting plan The parties divorced in 2006. Their final divorce decree incorporated the

divorce from the petitioner, Mary Beth Georgakilas. We affirm. Court (Fauver, J.) denying his motion for reformation of the certificate of his recommended by a Marital Master (Nute, M.) and approved by the Superior DALIANIS, J. The respondent, George Georgakilas, appeals an order

and Robert G. Eaton, of Rye, by brief, for the respondent. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Mark S. Moeller, P.A., of Dover (Mark S. Moeller on the brief and orally),

Mary Beth Georgakilas, pro se, filed no brief.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2008-046 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Strafford Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as the Parenting Plan as written,” and would not be revised. p. 2 certificate of divorce “correctly complie[d] with the [court’s] understanding of

not state that they had “shared (or joint) residential responsibility,” the

court concluded that because paragraph B of the parties’ parenting plan did the requirements for delineating the parenting rights and responsibilities.” The create their own format,” the court cautioned, “they should be sure to follow

to the public on the internet” use this specific language. “If counsel wish to

court noted that “the Parenting Plan forms supplied by the Court and available for ‘shared (or joint) residential responsibility,’ but they did not do so.” The parties should have used the terminology in paragraph B of the Parenting Plan

equal, ‘50/50’ or shared residential responsibility. If that were the case, the

[is] a kind, caring, loving and nurturing parent and that their son . . . will

court stated that it could not “construe the language of the Parenting Plan as

paragraph B provided: “The parties acknowledge and agree that each of them approximately equal periods of residential responsibility.” Additionally, paragraph C, the plan states: “This Parenting Plan is for equal or

grant the petitioner primary residential responsibility for the child. The trial denying the motion, the trial court interpreted the parties’ parenting plan to reflect the fact that the parties had joint physical custody of their son. In

physical custody of their son. We disagree. amend the certificate of divorce to reflect the fact that the parties shared with responsibility. For school purposes only, the child’s legal residence shall be “This Parenting Plan “equal or approximately equal” residential responsibility for their son. In is for equal or approximately equal periods of residential provision concerning the child’s legal residence for school attendance stated: Under the plain meaning of their stipulation, the parties were to have

of the parties as expressed in the language of the stipulation. Id. novo. Sommers v. Sommers, 143 N.H. 686, 692 (1999). We consider the intent him. Thereafter, the respondent moved to modify the certificate of divorce to In interpreting the meaning of a divorce decree, we review the decree de

parties’ parenting plan and, therefore, erred when it denied his request to On appeal, the respondent argues that the trial court misinterpreted the

of each party’s parenting time being approximately equal.” Paragraph C, the

joint legal custody of their son, but that the mother had physical custody of

son . . . will benefit by having active involvement by both parents, with the goal that each of them [is] a kind, caring, loving and nurturing parent and that their Hampshire.” This provision also stated: “The parties acknowledge and agree

The certificate of divorce entered by the court stated that the parties had

[the petitioner].”

respondent] is not flying [as a commercial airline pilot] and is in New “shall have liberal and generous parenting time with his son . . . whenever [the p. 3 RSA 461-A:20, it is, of course, free to amend it.

the applicable law. Should the legislature disagree with our construction of

assertions, the certificate of divorce comports with the parties’ stipulation and status upon the petitioner. Accordingly, contrary to the respondent’s “custodial parent.” As drafted by the parties, their stipulation confers this

for their son, pursuant to RSA 461-A:20, only one of them could be the

that the parties would each have fifty percent of the residential responsibility

“custodial parent” status upon the respondent. Unless the parties had agreed declined to reform the parties’ certificate of divorce and, in effect, confer commercial airline pilot, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it

description of the respondent’s frequent absences from the state for his job as a

BRODERICK, C.J.