2007-597, GREAT TRADITIONS HOME BUILDERS, INC. v. MARIE O'CONNOR

The plaintiff, Great Traditions Home Builders, Inc., appeals

orally), for the defendant. Hanlon & Zubkus, of Rochester (Robert A. Zubkus on the brief and

orally), for the plaintiff. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Casassa and Ryan, of Hampton (Daniel R. Hartley on the brief and

GREAT TRADITIONS HOME BUILDERS, INC.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2007-597 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Rochester District Court Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

against her actions is nullified under these circumstances because the damage plaintiff essentially argues that the need to notify or warn the defendant cured by any “future” action or inaction on the part of the defendant. The III to this case because the defendant’s actions caused harm that could not be

ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used.

whole.

The plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in applying RSA 540: p. 2 2, interpretation leads to an absurd result, and, therefore, should not be upheld. constitute grounds for eviction. apply given the facts of this case, or, in the alternative, that the trial court’s novo. Id. absurd result. Id. We review the trial court’s interpretation of a statute de statutory language in a literal manner when such a reading would lead to an Dep’t of Envtl. Servs., 155 N.H. 647, 653 (2007). However, we will not interpret

We first examine the language found in the statute, and, where possible, we Chesley v. Harvey Indus., 157 N.H. ___, ___ (decided April p. 2 22, 2008). legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the

that in the future such actions or inactions would

notice. On appeal, however, the plaintiff argues that RSA 540: p. 2 2, III should not notice, provide the tenant with written notice stating defendant written notice pursuant to RSA 540:2, III prior to serving the eviction the landlord shall, prior to the issuance of the eviction Chiaramitaro. The plaintiff also acknowledges that it did not provide the is based on the actions or inactions of the tenant . . . cause” based upon the defendant’s actions; that is, the statements against The plaintiff does not dispute that the eviction notice is for “other good

That statute provides, in pertinent part, appeal followed. plaintiff had failed to satisfy the notice requirement set forth in RSA 540: p. 2 2, III. RSA 540:2, III. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. This at which the defendant moved to dismiss. The defendant argued that the her apartment by the prescribed date. A hearing was held on August 3, 2007,

specified these statements as the basis for the eviction,

forth in paragraph II(e) of this section, and such cause If the grounds for eviction is other good cause as set

The plaintiff filed this eviction action after the defendant did not vacate

( p. 2 2007), and required the defendant to vacate her apartment by July 1, 2007.

her apartment when she was not at home and taken items. The eviction notice had informed at least two tenants of her belief that Chiaramitaro had entered inconsistent, as the written notice would indicate that “such actions” would be p. 3 this interpretation the written notice and subsequent eviction notice would be

upon the completed past actions. As the plaintiff points out, however, under action or inaction upon receipt of that notice, and still be evicted based solely could receive the written notice prior to an eviction notice, cease the offensive ultimate loss of his or her home. Under the plaintiff’s interpretation, a tenant an exception where the legislature has not seen fit to do so. potential consequences of continuing that conduct, prior to the tenant’s trial court erred in dismissing its eviction action. to the defendant prior to serving its eviction notice, we cannot conclude the

without any additional actions or inactions on the part of the tenant. consistent with RSA 540:2, III, and subsequently serve the eviction notice,

damage is correctable or not. We will not interpret the statute to create such grounds for eviction, should they continue. This alerts the tenant to the based upon the type of damage suffered by the landlord; that is, whether the Because the plaintiff admits that it did not provide the required written notice a tenant with written notice that his or her actions, The plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute requires that we create an exception in the future, would be repair, the circumstances of this case fall squarely within RSA 540:2, III. As we have already stated, RSA 540:2, III requires that a landlord provide or her actions will be grounds for eviction, in the future, should they continue. damage it allegedly suffered was an intangible harm perhaps incapable of certain actions by the tenant/defendant. Regardless of the fact that the disagree.

540:2, III leads to an absurd result. It asserts that it may send a notice The plaintiff next argues that the trial court’s interpretation of RSA

future action of the tenant. It simply requires that a tenant be notified that his whether that damage may be “cured,” as the plaintiff describes it, by some under the “other good cause” provision of RSA 540:2, II and was based upon tenant’s actions or inactions in applying the statute. It does not consider Here, the plaintiff acknowledges that its eviction notice was brought would have us do, weigh the amount or type of damage resulting from the

N.H. Ins. Dep’t, 156 N.H. 578, 581 (2007). such cause is based upon any action or inaction by the tenant. Nenni v. Comm’r,

makes provision mandatory). The plain language does not, as the plaintiff Matter of Bazemore & Jack, 153 N.H. 351, 354 (2006) (general use of “shall”

eviction fall under the “other good cause” provision of RSA 540:2, II (2007), and statute makes prior written notice to the tenant mandatory if the grounds for The plain language of RSA 540:2, III is clear and unambiguous. This

statute. to Chiaramitaro’s reputation is already done. The plaintiff misinterprets the intend this broad application, “it is free to amend the statute[ ] as it sees fit.” p. 4 followed by further “such actions” by the defendant. If the legislature did not statements, it may not evict her without providing the required statutory notice

reasons that do not require prior written notice to the tenant. result and nullifying, to an appreciable extent, the purpose of the statute.” that “[t]he legislature will not be presumed to pass an act leading to an absurd is free to pursue a tort action against the defendant for her alleged slanderous provision for actions or inactions of the tenant. In this case, while the plaintiff notice prior to eviction, if eviction is sought through the “other good cause” grounds for eviction, either by specific reference in the statute, or by written

subsequent actions than those that prompted application of the statute. In the Matter of Fulton & Fulton, 154 N.H. 264, 268 (2006) (quotation omitted). further evidence that the written notice is intended to reference different, inaction of the tenant,” but may include legitimate business or economic

action prior to losing his or her home. It is well settled in our jurisprudence

suggests a legislative intent to provide notice to a tenant as to what constitutes requires prior notice. Read in the context of the statute as a whole, RSA 540:2 tenant amounting to “other good cause” for eviction, the legislature explicitly V (2007). However, as for otherwise unspecified actions or inactions by a

subsequent to the notice, prior to being evicted for those particular types of cause” provision, the cause for termination “need not be based on the action or require some additional action or inaction on the part of the tenant, II (a), (b), (c). The legislature further provided that, even under the “other good plain and ordinary meaning of this phrase signifies a legislative intent to tenant would, in actuality, receive no warning or opportunity to cease the tenant to comply with a material term of the lease, among others. RSA 540:2, upon those past actions. The required notice would be superfluous, as the substantial damage to the property, failure to pay rent, and failure of the actions serves no purpose if the landlord could immediately evict based solely landlord to provide prior written notice. See RSA 540:2, II. These include tenant of restricted property, like the plaintiff’s property, that do not require a statutory scheme. RSA 540:2, II, sets forth several grounds for eviction of a Furthermore, the plaintiff’s interpretation is inconsistent with the

Weare Land Use Assoc. v. Town of Weare, 153 N.H. 510, 511-12 (2006).

interpretation ignores the legislature’s use of the phrase “in the future.” The

purpose of the statute. A written notice warning the tenant against certain More significantly, the plaintiff’s interpretation is inconsistent with the

The plaintiff’s interpretation fails in several respects. First, the plaintiff’s

an eviction notice based upon the past acts. grounds for eviction “in the future,” and yet, the tenant would be served with p. 5 5

BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, DUGGAN and HICKS, JJ., concurred.

lead to an absurd result. Under the plain language of the statute, the trial court’s interpretation does not