2007-419, NORTH COUNTRY ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES v. STATE OF NH

The plaintiff, North Country Environmental Services

attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the defendant. Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Maureen D. Smith, senior assistant

Braley on the brief, and Mr. Gould orally), for the plaintiff. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Brown, Olson & Gould, P.C., of Concord (Bryan K. Gould and Philip R.

NORTH COUNTRY ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2007-419 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Merrimack Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as provisions of this section.

p. 2 device, appliance, or installation is used in accordance with the under this chapter for the period of years in which the facility, in accordance with this section, exempted from the taxes levied

amended statute. This appeal followed. judgment, the superior court ruled in favor of the State and upheld the enjoined from applying it to NCES. Ruling on cross-motions for summary 72:12-a, as amended, is unconstitutional, and asking that the State be real estate necessary therefor, or a percentage thereof determined

June 2006, NCES brought a petition in the superior court arguing that RSA pollution shall be entitled to have the value of said facility and any reducing, controlling, or eliminating any source of air or water appliance, or installation wholly or partly for the purpose of

amendment. We address each issue in turn.

statute applies to taxes assessed on or after April 1, 2007. RSA 72:12-a, V. In ancillary facilities located at such landfills. RSA 72:12-a, I. The amended control facilities from taxation does not apply to privately-owned landfills or or places in use in this state any treatment facility, device, Any person, firm or corporation which builds, constructs, installs,

Prior to 2006, RSA 72:12-a provided, in relevant part:

obtained prior to the amendment’s passage are not extinguished by the the amended statute does not violate the constitution, the exemptions it of the New Hampshire Constitution. In addition, NCES contends that even if denies NCES equal protection of the law under Part I, Articles 1, 2, 10 and 12 defined in Part II, Articles 5 and 6 of the New Hampshire Constitution; and (2) 2007). The amended statute states that the paragraph exempting pollution unconstitutional because it: (1) exceeds the legislature’s taxing authority as On appeal, NCES contends that RSA 72:12-a, as amended, is

pollution control facilities qualified for the exemptions.

In 2006, the legislature amended RSA 72:12-a. RSA 72:12-a (Supp.

pollution control facilities at its landfill from property taxation. at 322. Therefore, under RSA 72:12-a, NCES was permitted to exempt certain disagreed and concluded that DES’ findings were supported by the record. Id.

The Town appealed, arguing, in part, that DES had erred in finding that NCES’ certain pollution control facilities at the landfill qualified for exemptions. Id. Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. at p. 3 317. Eventually, DES found that tax exemptions for the pollution control facilities at its Bethlehem landfill. the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) for property Beginning in 2002, NCES applied, pursuant to RSA 72:12-a (2003), to 3

distinctive class.” for taxation so long as the classification is sufficiently inclusive to constitute a this article, the legislature has the broad authority to classify types of property and other classes of property . . . .” N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 6. “Pursuant to owner.” property’s kind or use, but not based upon a classification of the property’s property to be taxable or non-taxable based upon a classification of the

Smith, 141 N.H. at 686. government, or any part thereof, may be raised by taxation, upon polls, estates,

other words, “This provision grants the legislature broad power to declare unreasonable or if its purpose is to discriminate.” Starr, 148 N.H. at 74. In unlimited, however, and the court will invalidate a classification if it is Dep’t of Revenue Admin., 141 N.H. 681, 687 (1997). “This power is not property includes the power to exempt property from taxation.” Smith v. N.H.

Part II, Article 6, in turn, provides that “[t]he public charges of conflict exists between it and the constitution.” (quotation omitted). more, shall fall upon him.” Starr v. Governor, 148 N.H. 72, 74 (2002) “Taxes must be in due proportion, so that each individual’s share, and no uniform in rate, and just.” Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. at p. 3 322. requires that all taxes be proportionate and reasonable, equal in valuation and authority. within [New Hampshire.]” N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 5. “Part II, Article 5 . . . between owners of property, the statute violates the legislature’s taxing assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and residents legislature has the power “to impose and levy proportional and reasonable Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that the

will not hold a statute to be unconstitutional unless a clear and substantial President, 152 N.H. 124, 1 p. 3 33 (2005) (quotation omitted). “In other words, we 72:12-a, I (Supp. 2007). not declare it invalid except upon inescapable grounds.” Baines v. N.H. Senate privately-owned landfills or ancillary facilities located at such landfills.” RSA “In reviewing a legislative act, we presume it to be constitutional and will

differently. Because, according to NCES, the amended statute differentiates pollution control facilities – but treats owners of property within that class Constitution. NCES contends that the statute creates a class of property – legislature’s taxing authority as set out in Part II, Articles 5 and 6 of the State NCES first argues that RSA 72:12-a, as amended, violates the

unchanged, but added the sentence: “This paragraph shall not apply to RSA 72:12-a, I (200 p. 3 3). The 2006 amendment left the above-quoted text p. 4 4

located elsewhere as exempt. landfills as subject to taxation, while classifying pollution control facilities question, supreme. The legislature has, therefore, now classified pollution control facilities at on each subject, the authority of the legislature is, without

owned landfills, like other public properties, are exempt from taxation. See therefore, concerned with such properties as may be subject to tax. Publicly exemptions to that class of property. that the reference imperils the statute. RSA 72:12-a is a taxing statute and is, amendment to RSA 72:12-a refers to “privately-owned landfills,” we do not find We pause briefly to make two interrelated points. First, although the

RSA 72:12-a has removed those pollution control facilities located at landfills. subjects of taxation and the proportion of the tax that shall be laid Out of this broader class of exempt property, however, the amendment to

with NCES that, prior to its amendment, the statute was intended to grant tax class of property composed of pollution control facilities. Therefore, we agree pollution control facilities, we acknowledged that the statute exempted the acknowledging that the legislature sought to encourage the construction of Appeal of Town of Hampton Falls, 126 N.H. 805, 808-09 (1985). Thus, by such facilities. See, e.g., Appeal of City of Berlin, 131 N.H. 285, 289 (1988); theory that the purpose of the statute was to encourage industry to construct 72:12-a, we upheld tax exemptions for various pollution control facilities on the by the statute is pollution control facilities. Under the prior version of RSA Within the limits of this discretion, as to the selection of proper As noted, NCES contends that the relevant class of property delineated latitude of discretion must be left to the legislature on the subject. determined is a task of much difficulty, and a very considerable sense that it may be deemed to be just. Id. between the taxable and non-taxable property that is a reasonable one, in the legislature’s taxing power so long as the legislature relies upon a distinction Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). Finally, an exemption is proper under the selection made.” selection of the subjects of taxation, provided just reasons exist for the

proportionality within each class.”

each individual’s just and equal proportion of a tax shall be It has long been our opinion that to establish the rules by which

equivalent of a reasonable or rational basis. Id. at 687. We have stated that:

Id. (quotation omitted). In this context, just reasons are the

“Strictly speaking, the rule of equality and proportionality does not apply to the

in taxes levied upon classes of property, so long as there is uniformity and “Together, part II, articles 5 and 6 permit the disproportionality inherent whether a pollution control facility thereon is entitled to claim the exemption. p. 5 legislature that the use of land as a landfill, or as something else, determines control facilities generally would be to ignore the distinction made by the

pollution control facilities. To conclude that the relevant class is pollution then, we must also disagree with NCES’ contention that the relevant class is all with the use of land upon which the pollution control facilities sit. Logically with all pollution control facilities in the abstract. It is, instead, concerned

exempt. Accordingly, we do not agree that the amended statute is concerned

pollution control facilities that determines whether a pollution control facility is unless associated with a landfill. Thus, it is the use of the land served by the is to treat pollution, a pollution control facility is entitled to the exemption,

an application was intended by the legislature. divorced from the context of the land they serve. We do not believe that such pollution. RSA 72:12-a, I. Therefore, under the statute, as long as its purpose statute calls for an evaluation of pollution control facilities in the abstract, themselves is that they have the purpose to treat any source of air or water

landfills. This argument, however, is premised upon the conclusion that the facilities themselves. In fact, the only criterion relative to the facilities depending upon their location, the State may not tax them differently when at effectiveness, or virtually any other criteria relative to the pollution control exempt from tax, pollution control facilities because of their size, shape, does not apply to landfills and their ancillary facilities. It does not tax, or language of the statute states that the exemption for pollution control facilities statute. Appeal of Town of Hampton Falls, 126 N.H. at 808. The plain We construe RSA 72:12-a to give full effect to the legislative intent of the

according to NCES, the pollution control facilities themselves do not differ different whether installed at a landfill or at another location. Because, on classification by ownership. of property is still all pollution control facilities, and such facilities are no public – that reference does not, in itself, violate the constitutional prohibition First, NCES contends that under RSA 72:12-a, as amended, the relevant class classifying those elsewhere as exempt, is unconstitutional for two reasons. contends that classifying pollution control facilities at landfills as taxable, while With these considerations in mind, we turn to NCES’ arguments. NCES

distinctive classes. Starr, 148 N.H. at 74. taxable properties is a proper one, in that it is sufficiently inclusive to create group, but with whether the distinction drawn between the taxable and nonstate, we are not concerned with the number of properties within a particular points out that at present there are only two privately-owned landfills in the

explicitly refers to a group by a type of ownership – private, as opposed to RSA 72:23 (Supp. 2007); RSA 53-B:7 (2003). Accordingly, while RSA 72:12-a the property,

p. 6 no difference in the devices installed; they are identical. However, the use of for the purpose of assisting a disabled person, would not be exempt. There is However, the value of an identical device installed in a different home, but not 6 purpose of aiding that person, the person may exempt the value of the device.

used as a landfill, or for some other purpose, determines whether they are

ramp or other device is installed in the home of a disabled person for the control facilities here, like the meals served in assist them with their disability. RSA 72:37-a (2003). Thus, if a handrail, their residential property, within certain limitations, when those improvements control facilities may not, by themselves, differ, their installation on a parcel entitled to exempt from property taxation the value of improvements made to The same logic is at work in RSA 72:12-a. While particular pollution

determines whether the exemption is available.

i.e., in the service of a disabled or non-disabled person,

pollution control facility is or is not part of a landfill. Thus, while the pollution being taxed or exempted. Here, the classification is based upon whether a arbitrary distinction having nothing to do with the kind or use of the property the classification of other properties. For example, persons with disabilities are subject of classification. Instead, the classification was based upon an We note that the legislature has made similar decisions with respect to

land upon which they are placed. because the exemption of the facilities expressly depends upon the use of the control facilities here should be evaluated without reference to the land, Accordingly, we do not agree that Cagan’s supports the claim that the pollution find unlike in Cagan’s, the distinction in taxation is related to the use of property. is no difference between them sufficient to justify differing tax treatment. We Cagan’s, may be the same, contends that because the pollution control facilities are identical items, there

to distinguish between the sales,”

related to the meals or the deliverers, either of which was a potentially proper relevant to those delivering the meals. Id. Thus, the classification was not merely upon the way they were served, and not because of any distinction The statute in Cagan’s either taxed or exempted identical meals based

Cagan’s distinguishable.

sales of these identical items differently. Based upon this logic, NCES

242. We concluded that because there was no difference in “service sufficient between a taxed and untaxed meal was whether the meal was “served.” Id. at without reference to the land. In Cagan’s, the only criterion for distinguishing supports its claim that the pollution control facilities should be evaluated machines, but not upon identical items sold in supermarkets, id. at 241, unconstitutional a tax laid upon prepared meals dispensed by vending Revenue Administration, 126 N.H. 239 (1985), where we declared NCES argues that Cagan’s, Inc. v. New Hampshire Department of upon land use, and, therefore, does not classify owners for differing taxation.

p. 7 a, as amended, classifies pollution control facilities as taxable or exempt based separately from the land they serve. facilities, generally, are the relevant class, or that they might be considered with NCES’ contentions that under the amended statute pollution control

purposes of the statute, who owns the property. We conclude that RSA 72:12that landfill in the same manner as NCES. As such, it is irrelevant, for should NCES sell its landfill, the new owner would be subject to taxation on control facilities taxable when appended to land used as a landfill, we disagree

owners of property. exempt. Thus, the statute differentiates between uses of property and not concluded that because the end product of all electricity generating plants is only Seabrook Station would have been subject to the tax. Id. at 345-46. We tax purposes. Furthermore, as pointed out by the State at oral argument, of 500,000 kilowatts or more would be constitutional. Id. at 345. At that time, or non-taxable based upon its use, and because it has declared pollution statute that would impose a tax upon electric generating plants with a capacity exempted. Because the legislature has authority to classify property as taxable based. There, the legislature sought our opinion on whether a proposed instance, determines whether the value of the pollution control facility may be (1978), in support of its contention that the classification here is ownership NCES points to our decision in Opinion of the Justices, 118 N.H. 343

land used as a landfill, they are taxed; if on land not used as a landfill, they are

in the state. Thus, it is not owners, but land uses, that have been classified for pollution control facilities installed at any other non-landfill properties it owns concedes in its brief that NCES, a landfill owner, may obtain exemptions for the pollution control facility sits, and the use of that land, that, in the first unavailable to those persons or entities who own landfills. In fact, the State Moreover, RSA 72:12-a, as amended, does not state that its exemption is

upon which they are located, and by the use of that land. If they reside on pollution control facilities are deemed either taxable or exempt by the land taxable or non-taxable does not depend upon who owns them. Instead, the here. Under RSA 72:12-a, as amended, whether pollution control facilities are differing taxation, see Smith, 141 N.H. at 686, we conclude it has not done so for differing treatment. While the legislature may not classify owners for such result. For these reasons, we conclude that it is the land upon which a depending upon their location is tantamount to classifying owners or taxpayers installed as aids to the disabled. We do not believe the legislature intended any Second, NCES argues that treating pollution control facilities differently which they sit, would be to require a similar evaluation with respect to devices

facilities may be considered as a class of property separate from the land upon eligible for the exemption. To accept NCES’ position that the pollution control therefore, valid under the constitution.

p. 8 constitute a distinctive class, and that it does so based upon land use and is, facilities, and other properties, which are – which is sufficiently inclusive to purposes – landfills, which are not entitled to exemption for pollution control 8

which reasonably promote some proper object of public welfare or interest,

we conclude that RSA 72:12-a creates a classification of property for tax differently; it is a distinction premised upon land use. For the above reasons, themselves. It is not, therefore, a seemingly neutral way to tax owners Opinion of the Justices (School Financing), 142 N.H. 892, 900 (1998), for its which those facilities sit, not based upon the pollution control facilities amended, we must now determine whether the legislature has just reasons Having determined the relevant classes created by RSA 72:12-a, as

the same rate and by the same mode of valuation. State ad valorem tax on all electric generating plants must be at pollution control facilities relies upon a difference in the use of the land upon absence of a just reason for so doing, it is clearly established that a valid reason, could not. Here, the distinction between taxed and untaxed of imposing an ad valorem State tax on their properties. In the but the mere volume of the fungible end product, electricity, in the absence of a nuclear plant or coal-fired plant, could, potentially, justify differing treatment, fuel they used. That is, the use of the generating plant property, i.e., as a legislature could tax electricity generating plants differently based upon the information sufficient to give a definitive ruling, we concluded that the Opinion of the Justices, 118 N.H. at 346. Thus, although we lacked

differing characteristics to be classified separately for the purpose electric generating plants fueled by nuclear energy possess enough here. necessary information, we cannot give an opinion as to whether and nuclear, are used to produce the end product. Absent certain It is true that different sources of energy, that is, water, coal, oil be constitutional. capacity would not be constitutional, we noted that: relevant here. Though we ruled that a tax imposed merely by an evaluation of We believe NCES overlooks the portion of Opinion of the Justices most

because legislature could conclude that larger facilities pose greater risk). terminals differently from smaller ones for tax purposes was permissible that although they handled identical materials, classifying larger capacity oil But see Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 749, 755-56 (1977) (ruling in reality, a classification of taxpayers, and, it contends, such is also the case the Justices was that the seemingly neutral classification of plant capacity was,

presented to justify classifying electric plants solely by size, the tax would not the same regardless of their size, and because no valid reason had been authority under Part II, Articles 5 and 6.

p. 9 the amendment to RSA 72:12-a does not violate the legislature’s taxing only a pretext for unconstitutional discrimination. amendment to RSA 72:12-a, while phrased as being in the public interest, is

for differing treatment. Accordingly, for the above reasons, we conclude that

Hampshire. Further, NCES argues that the rationale proposed for the

all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state test, under which legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if NCES’ right to equal protection is being violated, we apply the rational basis nor does it affect a fundamental right. Id. Thus, in order to determine whether classification of taxpayers. This classification does not involve a suspect class; NCES argues that RSA 72:12-a, as amended, creates an unconstitutional the use of landfills is a just reason relating to a proper object of public interest are different in fact to be treated in law as though they were the same. facilities and not pollution controls as a whole. We conclude that discouraging Id. treatment available to all other owners of pollution control facilities in New not demand that a statute apply equally to all persons or require things which Thus, it has chosen to remove an exemption for landfills and their ancillary so, RSA 72:12-a, as amended, denies owners of landfills the same tax City of Rochester, 151 N.H. 263, 270 (2004). Equal protection, however, does Hampshire Constitution. According to NCES, without a rational basis for doing Verizon New England v. 28, 2007). Thus, the equal protection guarantee is essentially a direction that Verizon New England v. City of Rochester, 156 N.H. ___, ___ (decided December against it by subjecting it to taxes not imposed upon others of the same class. Equal protection protects an entity from state action which discriminates

discourage the installation and use of pollution control facilities generally.

protection as guaranteed by Part I, Articles 1, 2, 10 and 12 of the New NCES next argues that RSA 72:12-a, as amended, violates equal

waste disposal. in RSA 149-M:3, and reaffirmed that landfills are the least preferred method of that giving incentives to landfills is contrary to the public interest as expressed Moreover, in adopting p. 9 the amendment to RSA 72:12-a, the legislature declared

previously stated that landfills are the least preferred method of waste disposal. does not wish to encourage landfills, does not mean that it wishes to their establishment and operation. However, merely because the legislature from landfills an exemption available to other properties, thus discouraging that landfills are a disfavored land use, the legislature has opted to remove

See Laws 2006, 282:3. In order to support its determination

use of landfills as a method of waste management. RSA 149-M:2, I (2005). See RSA 149-M:3 (2005). The legislature has also stated a desire to reduce the

control facilities elsewhere. We conclude that it does. The legislature has decision to tax pollution control facilities at landfills differently from pollution their place in the overall waste disposal plan. We disagree. p. 10 irrational to discriminate against them, while at the same time acknowledging

judiciary.

to a legitimate state interest.

evaluation process.

M lists landfills as part of the state’s “integrated waste management plan,” it is because the hierarchy of waste disposal methods outlined in RSA chapter 149discrimination in shabby respectability.” Further, NCES contends that the public interest – is “little more than an incantation contrived to cloak rank

Estate of Kennett v. State, 115 N.H. 50, 53 (1975). The wisdom,

and practicality of each tax to be imposed free from interference by the In exercising its power of taxation, the legislature decides the wisdom equal protection, as the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related

entitled to the exemption in RSA 72:12-a, subject to the application and

legislature’s discretion in acting for the welfare of the state. amendment to RSA 72:12-a – that tax exemptions for landfills are contrary to that the statute at issue advances a public purpose and is properly within the As noted, however, NCES argues that the rationale supporting the

land, a legitimate basis for differing tax treatment. public benefit, we conclude that RSA 72:12-a, as amended, does not violate facilities. Such a classification is based upon a difference in the use of the otherwise benefit a disfavored use of property. Because RSA 72:12-a confers a control facilities in the state are also treated equally because they are all construct pollution control facilities and by denying an exemption that would singled out for discriminatory treatment. All other properties with pollution statute confers a public benefit by both providing incentives for industry to benefit conferred by the exemption may render it constitutional. that RSA 72:12-a does not apply to them, and no landfill or landfill owner is Id. Here, the Bethlehem properties in the class of landfills are treated the same throughout the state, in, 154 N.H. at 324. Thus, where a tax exemption is at issue, a public

not require absolute equality of burden in the case of tax exemptions, provided Additionally, similar to Part II, Articles 5, and 6, equal protection does

RSA 72:12-a is between landfills and other properties with pollution control

pollution control devices is treated equally. We conclude that they are. All landfills is treated equally, and whether the class of other properties with protection, we must determine whether under RSA 72:12-a, the class of similarly situated to it. More to the point, to satisfy the demands of equal Thus, the relevant consideration is whether NCES is treated similarly to those

As we have stated above, the classification created by the amendment to

justification. Id. prove that the classification is arbitrary or without some reasonable interest. Id. Because NCES is challenging the legislation, it has the burden to desirability of the legislation is not for us to decide.

p. 11 undermines the established waste management plan, the wisdom or

depends on legislative edict.”

support NCES’ position.

NCES contends that such treatment is irrational in that it potentially facilities, and does not single out NCES for discriminatory treatment. While reasonable rationale for altering the taxation of landfills and their ancillary exemption from taxation is statutory. The existence and extent of exemptions

Alternatively, the State argues that the language of the statute does not sovereign immunity prevent NCES from receiving the relief it seeks. the State on this issue. The State, in turn, contends that principles of therefore, the superior court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of statute considered as a whole. E. Coast Conf. of the Evangelical Covenant are the final arbiters of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the thus making disposal there more expensive and, as a result, less desirable, is a not barred, NCES does not prevail. In matters of statutory interpretation, we “It is elemental that determination of the rights of plaintiff to an

Town of Pelham, 148 N.H. 365, 366 (2002). construed to give full effect to the legislative intent of the statute. Pennelli v. statutes, we are guided by the well-settled principle that a tax exemption is language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. In construing tax as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add meaning to the words used. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute When examining the language of the statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary made by DES after the amendment’s effective date are precluded, and, Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. at 319. language of the statute, NCES argues that only exemption determinations the effective date of the amendment remain in effect. Based solely upon the M:3. To reduce the availability of tax exemptions for the operation of landfills, exemption determinations it obtained for its pollution control facilities prior to immunity, we do not address that argument because even if we assume it is to be used only when all other waste disposal options are exhausted. RSA 149- While the State contends that NCES’ argument is barred by sovereign determined that landfills, while part of the overall waste management plan, are

Finally, NCES contends that despite the amendment to RSA 72:12-a, the

solid waste in landfills. RSA 149-M:2 (2005). Moreover, the legislature has 72:12-a, as amended, violates equal protection. N.H. at 863. We are not persuaded that NCES has demonstrated that RSA

The legislature has declared that it has “concern” about the disposal of

(1980). Nor may we substitute our judgment for that of the legislature. Id. decide. Smith Insurance, Inc. v. Grievance Committee, p. 12 120 N.H. 856, 863 effectiveness, and economic desirability of such a statute is not for us to 12

provide an exemption to which it is not entitled under the statute. landfills, to hold that a landfill may continue to claim an exemption would be to

applies. Because the statute granting the exemption does not apply to

be claimed for landfills because the statute granting the exemption no longer does not apply to landfills. RSA 72: p. 12 12-a, I. Thus, the exemption may no longer of the amendment, the exemption provided by RSA 72:12-a, by its plain terms,

BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, DUGGAN and HICKS, JJ., concurred.

landfills, regardless of when any exemption determinations had been obtained. assessed on or after April 1, 2007, for pollution control facilities located at RSA 72: p. 12 12-a to landfills do not survive the amendment. As of the effective date and that the statute extinguished any right to claim an exemption for taxes 72:12-a violates neither the legislature’s taxing authority nor equal protection, For the reasons stated, we conclude that the 2006 amendment to RSA

effect to this intent, we conclude that the exemptions previously granted under their establishment and operation. Consistent with the principle of giving full to remove an exemption from landfills and ancillary facilities to discourage omitted). As we have stated, the intent of the amendment to RSA 72: p. 12 12-a was Church of America v. Town of Swanzey, 146 N.H. 658, 661 (2001) (quotations