2007-150, IN RE JUVENILE 2007-150

The juvenile appeals the denial by the Colebrook Family

for the juvenile. James T. Brooks, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief, to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: brief), for the State. Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Thomas E. Bocian, attorney, on the

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2007-150 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Colebrook Family Division Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as language in RSA 169-B:16, V (Supp. 2004).

p. 2 arraignment. We have previously construed similar, though not identical,

requires that the adjudicatory hearing be completed within thirty days of concur. We, therefore, must determine whether the language in RSA 169-B:14 counsel agreed, we will assume without deciding that the juvenile did not

meaning of the phrase “to hold” is “to conduct” or “preside at.” Id. We period not to exceed 14 calendar days.” adjudicatory hearing if the minor is released.”). We determined that the plain juvenile had waived the time limit. time limits may be permitted, upon a showing of good cause, for an additional the adjudicatory hearing if the minor is detained and within 30 days of the within 30 days of arraignment for minors not detained. An extension of these at 707 (“The court shall hold a hearing on final disposition within 21 days of

fourteen-day continuance was based upon several factors and that defense Although the transcript of the August 8, 2006 hearing indicates that the

and, further, that even if the statute required completion within thirty days, the the thirty-day time period but not necessarily be completed within that time within 21 days of arraignment for minors detained pending such hearing and that RSA 169-B:14, II required that an adjudicatory hearing must begin within RSA 169-B:14, II provides: “The adjudicatory hearing shall be held the trial court had lost jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, finding justified an extension of the hearing, Id. lead to reasonable results and effectuate the legislative purpose of the statute. juvenile did not waive his right to a timely adjudication; and (3) no good cause construe them so that they do not contradict each other, and so that they will passed between his arraignment and the trial court’s findings of true; (2) the interpreting two or more statutes that deal with similar subject matter, we said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. When the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. 188, 191 (2007). We interpret legislative intent from statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Fisher 2004-469, 151 N.H. 706, 707 (2005). When examining the language of the We review a trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo. In re Juvenile

that because the adjudicatory hearing was not completed within thirty days, see RSA 169-B:14, II.

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because: (1) more than fifty days had On appeal, the juvenile argues that the trial court erred in denying his

On December 1, 2006, the juvenile filed a motion to dismiss, arguing

2006, the trial court entered a finding of true. recessed; it resumed on August 22, 2006. In an order dated September 6, p. 3 3

motion to dismiss.

record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the juvenile’s later. The trial court issued its order fifteen days thereafter. Based upon this subpoenaed witnesses failed to appear. The hearing reconvened fourteen days

BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS and HICKS, JJ., concurred.

provided in delinquency proceedings. arguments. In either case, the juvenile may not receive the full benefit intended to be Given our conclusion, we need not address the juvenile’s remaining only limit the evidence that can be presented but may also open itself to abuse. absence of a legislative mandate, we decline to impose a structure that may not outset the amount of time required for testimony by each witness. In the evidence. It may not be possible in every case to accurately estimate at the

arraignment. The prosecutor requested a continuance when one of his In this case, the adjudicatory hearing began within thirty days of

Purpose).

reason to reach a different conclusion. is written in the active voice and one is written in the passive voice, we see no interpretation. We disagree. Where the two sentences differ only because one criminal trials, the hearing may require more than one day to present all of the State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 52-54 (1985). In delinquency proceedings, as in we based our analysis upon the date upon which trial commenced. See, e.g., have examined the scope of the right to a speedy trial in criminal proceedings, frame. speedy trial. In re Russell C., 120 N.H. 260, 266 (1980). In cases where we limit set forth in RSA 169-B:14 is analogous to an adult offender’s right to a support this conclusion. As we have previously noted, the mandatory time Our case law and the purpose of the juvenile delinquency statutes

“shall be held,” is sufficiently distinct from “hold” to require a different In this case, the juvenile argues that the language in RSA 169-B:14, II,

Id. within twenty-one days but not that it complete the hearing within that time concluded that RSA 169-B:16, V required that the trial court conduct a hearing