2006-814, STATE OF NH v. MICHAEL J. LABRANCHE, JR.

The defendant, Michael J. Labranche, Jr., appeals his first

and orally, for the defendant. James T. Brooks, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief

attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (N. William Delker, senior assistant

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2006-814 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Merrimack Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

mental illness.”

evidence outweighs the opinion.

returned a guilty verdict. defect, and that such caused him to act as he has been charged.” The jury

whether the behavior or actions . . . are a product of that mental disorder or due process under the New Hampshire Constitution. rise[s] to the level of a mental illness,” “the features of that illness, and then testimony “rendered the trial fundamentally unfair,” which violated his right to opinion are not sound, or if you find that other whether the defendant has “a mental disorder,” whether “that mental disorder the product of [the defendant’s] mental illness” and that the admission of this permitting the State’s expert psychiatrist to testify that the homicide was not The defendant now appeals, arguing that “the trial court erred in

questions of fact whether the Defendant suffered from a mental disease or The court further instructed: “It’s up to you, the jury, to determine as

you find that the reasons given in support of the

further explained that in an insanity case such as this, he offers his opinion on an expert. You are free to ignore the expert’s opinion if

in the case. But you are not bound by the opinion of understanding the evidence and in deciding the facts The opinion of an expert may assist you in

At the close of the evidence, the court instructed the jury:

a “broader understanding of the body and the brain and brain function.” He illness.” Dr. Drukteinis testified that because he has a medical degree, he has parked Nova. He was arrested for the murder of Jane Labranche. was his opinion that the defendant’s “actions were not the product of a mental Nova. Later that day, police found the defendant in Concord sitting in his Drukteinis, testified that while the defendant “did have a psychotic disorder,” it the defendant was seen leaving the house and driving away in his Chevrolet At the nonbifurcated trial, the State’s expert psychiatrist, Dr. Albert

the motion. product of [the defendant’s] mental illness or mental defect.” The court denied “on the question of whether or not the death of Jane Labranche was the submitted a motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s expert psychiatrist to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. See RSA 6 p. 2 28:2 (2007). He Before trial, the defendant provided notice to the court that he intended

later died from multiple stab wounds. After Jane was seen lying by the road, son, the defendant, who stabbed her and that he was still in the house. Jane p. 3 3

the triers in their search for the truth. Drukteinis used very basic factual considerations to knowledge of the matter in question will probably aid and crime. Moreover, as trial counsel observed, [Dr.] the characteristics of the link between mental illness standard gives the expert predominance in defining Nothing about New Hampshire’s jury-defined insanity

The defendant argues:

or otherwise.” see also State v. St. Laurent, 1 p. 3 38 N.H. 492, 495 (1994). experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion Brown v. Cathay Island, Inc., 125 N.H. 112, 116 (1984) (quotations omitted); determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

to common observation, but whether the witness’ nor whether it is a matter of daily occurrence and open whether the issue to which it relates is for the jury, admissibility of opinion evidence is not to inquire The test generally employed to determine the

that illness. knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to suffered from a mental illness and that the crime charged was a product of Rule 702 provides: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized

. . . have no more expertise than jurors.” juror” and involves “a moral component, an inquiry as to which psychiatrists for the truth.” He argues that this issue is “not outside the ken of an average Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 because it “did not aid the jury in its search case. conduct was the product of a mental illness was inadmissible pursuant to New that the ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his The defendant argues that Dr. Drukteinis’ testimony on whether his

Id. These are questions of fact for the jury. Id.

(1985). A defendant asserting an insanity defense must establish that he affirmative defense in New Hampshire. State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 448 time he acts is not criminally responsible for his conduct.” Insanity is an RSA 628:2, I, provides, in pertinent part, “A person who is insane at the

Id.

that the trial court’s decision was not sustainable, the defendant must show Milliken v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 15 p. 4 4 N.H. 662, 665 (2006). To show review its decision under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. The trial court retains the discretion to admit expert testimony and we reasons.

really the product of the mental disorder or alternative

the ultimate issue of whether the defendant possessed the requisite surrounding the case, . . . whether that behavior was and then from all the facts and circumstances

present at the time of the behavior which is at issue,

defendant attempted to introduce the testimony of an expert psychologist “on not guilty by reason of insanity. St. Laurent, 138 N.H. at p. 4 493. At trial, the argument. In is the diagnosis, and whether that disorder was St. Laurent, the defendant was charged with assault and pled The defendant cites our decision in St. Laurent in support of his

psychiatrist’s expert opinion on this matter may be of aid to a jury. Regardless of whether this issue includes a “moral component,” a

even if all it does is put those facts in context.” p. 4 4 J. McLaughlin, it will . . . assist the trier of fact to understand the facts already in the record, basis upon which to exclude his testimony. “[E]xpert testimony is admissible if

made, might aid the jury.”). whether the individual has a mental disorder and what

opinion upon at trial that he used his knowledge and background in psychiatry to offer an Federal Evidence § 702.03[1] (2007) (footnote omitted). Dr. Drukteinis testified

likely aided the jury to understand the complexities of mental illness and the background and experience in treating mental illness. His medical opinion considerations” in stating his opinion, we do not believe this constitutes a valid While Dr. Drukteinis may have emphasized “very basic factual

the officer’s testimony, due to his superior knowledge and the investigation he inapplicable here, as it could reasonably be found by the Presiding Justice that and therefore should not be introduced. This familiar principle is sound but within the ken of the average juror. about which the jury know as much as a witness, an opinion cannot help them to questions posed by the police. Such issues are Grossman’s, 107 N.H. 159, 161 (1966) (“[I]n matters of common knowledge whether, upon his arrest, he responded appropriately

testimony will aid the jury. Dr. Drukteinis, as a psychiatrist, has a medical The question for the trial court, however, is whether the proffered

(Citations omitted.)

tried to hide the crime, whether he fled the scene, and draw his conclusion, including whether [the defendant] p. 5 5

process under the New Hampshire Constitution.” However, p

issue.” analyses and are not bound by their decisions. In addition, we note that the conduct.”). With due respect to those courts, we are not persuaded by their Waterville Estates Assoc., 1 p. 5 56 N.H. __, __, 934 A.2d 511, 516 (2007). argument, and we therefore decline to address this argument. Buchholz v. to due process, without more, is not a substitute for valid constitutional

testimony “rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, violating [his] right to due The defendant also argues that the admission of Dr. Drukteinis’

Criminal Insanity, 69 Yale L.J. 367, 390-93 (1960). in its application. See Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine of Durham rule, while similar to our approach regarding insanity, is not identical

“assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in mental illness was held inadmissible. A.2d at 268 (“[T]he expert should not give his opinion as to the cause of the regarding the issue of whether the defendant’s conduct was a product of a testimony is inadmissible. Washington, 390 F.2d at 4 p. 5 56; see also Durgin, 311 ‘product’ has no clinical significance for psychiatrists,” and therefore their the Durham rule, the D.C. Circuit in Washington held that “[t]he term (superseded by statute); State v. Flick, 425 A.2d 167, 171 (Me. 1981). Under States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) Hampshire’s insanity doctrine, but ultimately abandoned the test. See United United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), which is similar to New 1973). Both jurisdictions at one point employed the Durham rule, Durham v. F.2d 444, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1967); State v. Durgin, 311 A.2d 266, 267 (Me.

defendant’s actions were the product of a mental illness. As we stated above, District of Columbia and the Maine Supreme Court, where expert testimony does not address the issue of intent, but rather the issue of whether the The defendant cites cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the

opinion and was free to reject it. jury made clear, the jury, as the fact finder, was not bound by Dr. Drukteinis’ the jury would need assistance”). Moreover, as the court’s instruction to the testimony on “the defendant’s mental and cognitive deficits, an area in which (distinguishing inadmissible expert testimony on intent from admissible expert N.H. R. Ev. 702; cf. State v. Gourlay, 148 N.H. 7 p. 5 5, 82 (2002)

to this case. The expert testimony to which the defendant objects in this case We disagree with the defendant, however, that St. Laurent is applicable

deciding the issue of intent without expert assistance.” Id. at 49 p. 5 5. not aid the jury in its search for truth” because “[t]he jury is capable of for the crimes charged.” Id. at 494. We concluded that such testimony “will p. 6 6

mental illness. Drukteinis on the issue of whether the defendant’s actions were a product of a

concurred. BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, DUGGAN and GALWAY, JJ.,

unsustainable exercise of discretion in admitting the testimony of Dr. Accordingly, we can not say that the trial court engaged in an