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2007-822, STATE of NH v. EVELYN BERNARD
become flooded. Chief Chaput instructed his officers to enforce a mandatory Department declared a state of emergency in portions of Allenstown that had at approximately 2:41 p.m., Chief Everett Chaput of the Allenstown Fire
emergency.
of the Hooksett District Court (
The following allegations are undisputed on appeal. On April 16, 2007,
See RSA 154:9 (2002). We reverse and remand.
defendant, Evelyn Bernard, for failure to obey a command at the scene of an
LaPointe, J.) dismissing a complaint against the
DALIANIS, J.
Pursuant to RSA 606:10 (2001), the State appeals an order
MEMORANDUM OPINION
defendant. Peter J. Leahy, of Concord, by memorandum of law and orally, for the
general, on the brief and orally), for the State. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Nicholas Cort, assistant attorney
Opinion Issued: November 6, 2008 Argued: September 11, 2008
EVELYN BERNARD
page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. v.
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2007-822 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Hooksett District Court Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00
well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as from injury or remove persons interfering with duties.
emergency, the fire officer in charge shall have . . . the authority 2
to arrest her. the scene of “a fire, emergency, or service call” is a violation. RSA 154:9.
complaint, and denied reconsideration.
vicinity of such scene for the purpose of protecting such persons
state fire marshal is responding to . . . a fire, service call, or other
defendant that she would be arrested if she refused to cooperate, she told him face. “Refusing or neglecting to obey the commands of . . . the fire department” at
ground that a flood is not an emergency. The trial court dismissed the language that the legislature did not see fit to include. . . . [t]o order any persons to leave any building or place in the at the scene of an emergency. Before trial, the State filed a motion meaning to the words used.
statute considered as a whole. While any duly constituted fire department recognized by the
RSA 154:7, II(b) (2002) provides:
indicated that she did not want to leave. When Officer DeFeudis informed the State v. Njogu, 156 N.H. 551, 552 (2007). We do not consider legislative history to construe a statute that is clear on its defendant to leave her home by boat. She became confrontational and they would not leave their residence. Officer DeFeudis then instructed the interpret a statute in the context of the overall scheme and not in isolation. Id. the applicable statutes. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the Id. Further, we as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add
Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute
154:9, alleging that the defendant had failed to obey a fire official’s command examining the language of a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary
State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 84 (2008). When
are the final arbiter of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the Brown, 155 N.H. 590, 591 (2007). In matters of statutory interpretation, we We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo. State v.
Fortin informed him that the defendant and her husband had indicated that requesting that the trial court find that a flood constitutes an emergency under
in limine Joseph DeFeudis to assist them in evacuating the defendant and her husband.
On September 11, 2007, the State filed a complaint, pursuant to RSA
When Officer DeFeudis arrived, Fire Officers Vincent Lembo and Ryan
lived. At around 7:15 p.m., the fire department called Allenstown Police Officer evacuation of the area, including the residential area in which the defendant 3
any
exception into a statute that the legislature did not see fit to include. Instead, the legislature chose to use broad language, and we will not read an
authority to a fire officer “[t]o order chapter 154 (2002 & Supp. 2008). However, RSA 154:7, II(b) specifically grants during a flood. The defendant asks us to read the same language into RSA
departments as it did with peace officers in RSA 644:2, it could have done so.
BRODERICK, C.J., and DUGGAN, GALWAY and HICKS, JJ., concurred. peace officer may not lawfully order a person to leave his or her own home
Reversed and remanded.
Langill, 157 N.H. at 84. seldom exactly foreseen.” See
(Emphasis added.) Had the legislature intended to limit the authority of fire
any persons to leave any building.”
The defendant points out that, under RSA 644:2, IV, V(a)( 3) (2007), a
(unabridged ed. 2002). A flood meets this definition.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 741
distressing event or condition that can often be anticipated or prepared for but state that calls for immediate action,” “a pressing need” or “a usu[ally] emergency is “an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting The plain meaning of the phrase “other emergency” includes floods. An
vehicle accidents. Id. fire.” RSA 154:7, I(c) (emphasis added). The only exception involves propelled emergency which does not directly involve the extinguishment of an actual The legislature defines “other emergency” to include “other real