2008-331, IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF PAUL T. WILLIAMS

The appellant, Diane Williams Galebach, appeals

appellees. Wolowitz and Andrea L. Daly on the brief, and Mr. Wolowitz orally), for the to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton, P.A., of Portsmouth (David

Diane Williams Galebach, by brief and orally, pro se.

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF PAUL T. WILLIAMS

No. 2008-331 editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Merrimack County Probate Court Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as motion for limitations, stating:

p. 2 the final hearing.

which have been ongoing for several years.”

Vicinanzo and Pince as co-guardians over his person, and denied Galebach’s

addressed the issues raised by Mrs. Galebach during the course of

the petitioners, and several other family members. Having on [Galebach’s] personal issues with their family and their religious interests.” discovery nor the hearing could be used “as a forum to air out family disputes as well as Paul Williams, and to see the interaction between Paul, “inappropriate . . . oppressive and unduly burdensome . . . and largely focused

was present and represented by counsel, the probate court appointed

[C]ounsel for [Vicinanzo and Pince] and counsel for Paul Williams right to make decisions concerning four specific issues. . . . 2 motion, Mrs. Galebach asks the court to allow Paul to retain the

witnesses, and to introduce evidence on relevant issues, but that neither hearing to observe the credibility and demeanor of the petitioners moved to strike the discovery requests on the grounds that they were Galebach would be allowed to participate in the final hearing, to examine further delay a final resolution to the case.” Further, the court determined that Subsequent to the April 8, 2008 final guardianship hearing, at which Williams would be unable to attend the final hearing due to an out-of-state trip. of her earlier cross-petition. She also informed the probate court that she

Limitations on Guardianship filed by Mrs. Galebach. In her

The court had an opportunity during the course of the Pince, and served a notice of deposition on her father. Vicinanzo and Pince brother, served requests for interrogatories and production of documents on found that “the discovery sought is not reasonable and will serve only to She also filed a motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for her

motion for a limited guardianship over her brother, reiterating the statements

The purpose of this order is to address the Motion for

the need for a guardianship or the proper persons to serve in that capacity, and petition made a request for discovery before any guardianship was authorized.

Prior to the final guardianship hearing in April 2008, Galebach filed a

contemplates discovery by adverse parties, the parties before it did not dispute oppose the appointment of her sisters as co-guardians. Galebach’s cross- discovery. The probate court reasoned that while Probate Court Rule 36 She did not challenge, however, the need for a guardianship, nor did she Galebach’s motion to appoint a GAL, and granted the sisters’ motion to strike guardianship, requesting that her brother’s guardianship be limited in scope. Following a preliminary hearing in March 2008, the probate court denied

of an incapacitated person. Galebach filed a cross-petition for limited In November 2007, Vicinanzo and Pince filed a petition for guardianship had not challenged Galebach’s standing, we could raise the issue p. 3 her standing to appeal the guardianship order. Moreover, even if the appellees

567-A:1. Consequently, the appellees have not waived their right to challenge

court’s guardianship order, thereby giving her standing to appeal under RSA does not necessarily mean that she was “a person . . . aggrieved” by the probate in the probate court proceedings. That she was an interested person, however,

aggrieved person within the scope of RSA 567-A:1 (2007).

Given her status as an interested person, she had the right to participate fully

appeal, contending that she lacks standing to appeal because she is not an

so now. We disagree.

had the right to file her petition for a limited guardianship over her brother. question that Galebach was an “interested person” in these proceedings and the welfare of the person to be protected under this chapter.” We do not

New Hampshire Constitutions. Vicinanzo and Pince seek to dismiss Galebach’s

challenge her standing in the probate court, they have waived their right to do 3

464-A:2, XIII defines “Interested person” as “any adult who has an interest in guardianship order and RSA Ch. 464-A.

associational rights of speech and self-expression” under the United States and violating the ward’s “rights to due process, free exercise of religion, and guardianship; (2) denying discovery; (3) refusing to appoint a GAL; and (4) and discovery for his benefit.” She contends that because her sisters did not course of . . . seeking to preserve [her brother’s] rights and seeking due process [probate court],” and “made motions that were addressed on the merits, in the

See Libertarian Party of N.H., 158 N.H. 194, 195 (2008). verified petition for finding of incapacity and appointment of a guardian.” RSA DENIED, subject to Paul retaining all rights that he has under the sua sponte. physical limitations. The motion for limitations is therefore personal freedom and civil liberties consistent with his mental and

Galebach argues that the probate court erred in: (1) refusing to limit the

appeal, Galebach states that she “participated as an [i]nterested [person] in the

RSA 464-A:4, I, provides that “[a]ny . . . interested person . . . may file a

and that they will allow their brother the greatest amount of

and give value to . . . Williams’s rights.” Terming herself an “Interested Party,”

In response to the contention that she lacks standing to pursue this

guardians well understand their obligations as Paul’s guardians Person Order issued this date. The court is convinced that the beyond the findings and orders contained in the Guardian over the

On appeal, Galebach contends that the probate court failed “to protect

presented, the court is not going to limit the guardians’ powers considered the issues raised in the motion in light of the evidence p. 4 A:1, to be “related” for the purpose of our statutory analysis. the supreme court.” Consequently, we consider RSA 464-A:4, I, and RSA 567therefrom to the supreme court on questions of law in accordance with rules of

conclude that person’s interest in a matter before the court may appeal

decree, order, appointment, grant or denial of a judge of probate which may appeal a probate court’s guardianship order: “A person who is aggrieved by a under RSA chapter 567-A (2007). RSA 567-A:1 governs who has standing to

464-A:47 mandates that appeals from guardianship orders are to this court

subject matter will be construed in the same sense. Conversely, overall purpose and to avoid an absurd or unjust result.” phrase within the context of a guardianship over an adult. In

verified petition for finding of incapacity and appointment of a guardian.” RSA

predecessor statute to RSA 567-A:1, but in connection with the guardianship of Brown, 77 N.H. 105 (1913), we addressed the nearly identically worded phrases in a provision that were used in a prior act pertaining to the same Hutchins v. We will, however, construe all parts of the statute together to effectuate its subject matter. Therefore, unless the context indicates otherwise, words or phrase under different circumstances, we have not previously examined the enacts a provision, it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same aggrieved.” While we have previously adopted varied constructions of the guardianship and provides that “[a]ny . . . interested person . . . may file a RSA chapter 567-A does not further define the phrase “a person . . .

scheme and not in isolation.” provisions[, and] we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory presume that the legislature does not enact unnecessary and duplicative

will not look beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent. meanings to words used. If the language used is clear and unambiguous, we be meaningful, and that we generally assume that whenever the legislature examine its language, and where possible, ascribe the plain and ordinary As earlier noted, RSA 464-A:4, I, governs standing to file a petition for

brackets omitted; emphasis added). N.H. Div. of Personnel, 158 N.H. 338, 345 (2009) (quotations, citations, and and whenever possible, every word of a statute should be given effect. We also legislature intended something different.” State Employees Assoc. of N.H. v. legislature uses different language in related statutes, we assume that the

Finally, “[w]e acknowledge that the legislature’s choice of language is deemed to the words of the statute. When construing the statute’s meaning, we first Id. at ___ (quotations and citations omitted).

“[t]he legislature is not presumed to waste words or enact redundant provisions Exeter, 159 N.H. ___, ___ (decided July 31, 2009) (quotation omitted). Further,

“We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in

to that question turns on our interpretation of the relevant statutes. jurisdiction, which may be addressed at any time. Id. In this case, the answer Whether a party has standing presents a question of subject matter p. 5 464-A include “promot[ing] and protect[ing] the well-being of the

suffering from an infringement or denial of legal rights.”

overall purpose. RSA 464-A:1 makes clear that the purposes of RSA chapter

equivalent, however, to a denial of her legal rights. right to legal counsel. The legislature’s overriding concern for the protection of 464-A:6, I, provides that a proposed ward has an “absolute and unconditional” clearly upon Williams, and not Galebach. Consistent with that focus, RSA ward.” (Emphases added.) As such, the focus of the statutory protections is and substantive safeguards for civil liberties and property rights of a proposed pertinent definition of “aggrieved” is “having a grievance; specif[ically] : in involuntarily imposed protective proceedings” and “provid[ing] procedural first look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “aggrieved.” The proposed ward 567-A:1, within the interplay of that statute and RSA chapter 464-A, we must Additionally, we look to the guardianship statute in order to effectuate its cannot be maintained. that any legal interest or right of his is affected, and the appeal

guardianship. The court’s denial of her requested limitations is not statutory right to file her petition in the probate court for a limited 464-A:4, I, was not at issue in Galebach was an “interested person” under RSA chapter 464-A, and had the International Dictionary 41 (unabridged ed. 2002). It is not disputed that

thereby. . . .

In considering whether Galebach is “a person . . . aggrieved” under RSA

determining Galebach’s standing to appeal, it is not dispositive. establishing a legal right to the appointment, it does not appear Laws 1978, ch. 370. Consequently, while Hutchins may prove to be helpful in statute concerning the guardianship of an adult until sixty-five years later, see

ch. 178 (1901). The “interested person” language of RSA 464-A:2, XIII and RSA at that time contained no corresponding language concerning standing, see PS (1934) (same). Significantly, the statute governing the guardianship of a minor Id. at 106-07 (quotation omitted); see Leonard v. Fahey, 87 N.H. 170, 172 decision unless he has some private right which is affected

minor nephews, we stated: representative capacity, and as he has not alleged any facts any property interest of the appellant in a personal or . . . As the [appointment of the guardian] does not relate to

. . . .

Generally, it may be said that one cannot be aggrieved by a

probate court’s appointment of an estate’s administrator as guardian of his two a minor. In affirming the superior court’s dismissal of an uncle’s appeal of the for the proposed ward. p. 6 not from any denial of her own rights, but from the denial of protections sought

decision.

Supreme Court Rule 32-A, Williams’ counsel had the responsibility to pursue

would not have been granted. Her status as an aggrieved person would flow,

level to those persons actually aggrieved by a probate court’s guardianship

court, were adequately protected by his absolute right to counsel. Pursuant to

appeal. In either circumstance, the protections she sought for her brother ward, we believe that the legislature intended a more limited standing at the appellate

Williams’ rights, including his right to appeal any legal error by the probate

would be “a person . . . aggrieved” under RSA 567-A:1 and have standing to the guardianship or granted lesser protections than what she had sought, she concern for safeguarding the civil liberties and property rights of the proposed legislature’s use of a different phrase reasonably signals a different meaning, a limited guardianship over her brother. Had the probate court either denied more limited phrase — “a person who is aggrieved.” Assuming that the guardianship decision under RSA 567-A:1, the legislature used a different,

greater protections than necessary. As provided for by RSA 464-A:6, I, see RSA 464-A:1, an involuntarily imposed guardianship might impose

guardianship petition was granted in full or not. Given the legislature’s its intended limits. Here, Galebach, as an interested person, filed a petition for the imposition of a guardianship as an aggrieved person, whether a protected under the guardianship statute — the proposed ward — could appeal However, with regard to standing to pursue an appeal from a probate court’s Further, we do not question that the person whose interests are

legislature intended something different” (quotation omitted)).

in the welfare of the proposed adult ward, we turn our attention to examining is aggrieved” to mean something more limited than any adult with an interest generous standing to any adult with an interest in the proposed ward’s welfare. Having concluded that the legislature intended the phrase “a person who to promote the broadest possible protection for a proposed ward by granting I, could file a petition for a guardianship over an incapacitated person, it did so legislature uses different language in related statutes, we assume that the

See State Employees Assoc. of N.H., 158 N.H. at 345 (“where the

suffered a legal injury against which the law was designed to protect).

been or will be directly affected. RSA chapter 464-A or RSA 567-A:1 provide protection, or that her rights have court’s orders have caused Galebach to suffer a legal injury for which either

. . . interested person, or any individual in his or her own behalf,” RSA 464-A:4, We believe that when the legislature expressly authorized that “[a]ny

(in evaluating whether a party has standing, we focus on whether the party has

of the statute. In the present case, we see nothing to indicate that the probate the proposed ward’s rights must, therefore, be paramount in our construction counsel, p. 7 could have acted in a representative capacity for her brother, as either his

restrictions on the ward’s liberties than those requested in the petition. guardianship were not granted, or if the probate court had imposed fewer

represented in the probate court by counsel. Even assuming that Galebach

that by guaranteeing counsel for the proposed ward in such proceedings.

appeal in this case. Vicinanzo, Pince, and Galebach would have the right to appeal if the

argument, we disagree. Pursuant to RSA 464-A:6, Williams was fully representation for her brother, as inferred by Vicinanzo and Pince at oral 7 To the extent that Galebach intended her argument to refer to providing legal

that imposed greater protections than necessary. The legislature provided for

is aggrieved” under RSA 567-A:1 and does not have standing to pursue an right to appeal the imposition of the guardianship or the specific protections; certain limitations on the guardianship over her brother, is not “a person who brother or the proposed guardians, but who unsuccessfully petitioned to place

discovery requests . . . in a representative capacity for [her brother’s] rights.”

appointed, we underscore that she acted as neither in this case. . . . may be represented by any citizen of good character.”), or as a GAL if proposed ward would be aggrieved by a guardianship that he did not want or see RSA 311:1 (2005) (“A party in any cause or proceeding right of appeal would rest with the proposed ward — here, Williams — as the that person either opposes or seeks to limit a guardianship. In either case, the was represented by counsel, and not Galebach. Here, only Williams has the than she requested, the right of appeal in this case rests with her brother, who RSA 464-A:4, I, who did not contest either the need for a guardianship over her she contends that the probate court imposed greater protections on her brother

reply brief, she adds that she “filed three substantive motions and served three “acted in a representative capacity” for her brother in the probate court. In her In her brief, Galebach argues that she is a person aggrieved because she

same is not true with regard to an interested person’s ability to appeal when

pursuant to the statutory scheme, the appellant, an interested person under limited guardianship, nor opposed her sisters as the co-guardians. Although 464-A, and we need not define its exact parameters here. We simply hold that who is aggrieved” — within the context of an appeal pursuant to RSA chapter We have not previously defined the phrase in RSA 567-A:1 — “a person

person to petition for the appointment of a guardian under RSA 464-A:4, I, the

In her cross-petition, Galebach neither challenged Williams’ need for a

Thus, while we conclude that there is broad standing for any interested

even if counsel determined that such an appeal would be frivolous. an appeal of the probate court’s guardianship decision if Williams so desired, person legally aggrieved. p. 8 pecuniary nature or resting upon a personal right, he is not a arising therefrom is natural and proper; but not being of a

guardian. While Galebach’s reliance upon DeGrandpre’s treatise, with its

friendship. His interest in the [appointment of the guardian]

standing to appeal the probate court appointment of the administrator as

interested in their welfare, but his interest is that of affection and

dismiss. appealed to the superior court, which granted the administrator’s motion to the rights affected are held in a representative capacity,” Hutchins had no representative capacity of a private right and, thus, no unsuccessfully petitioned for his own appointment as guardian. Hutchins from the appointment of an administrator in this state,” Id. at 107-08. from a decree disallowing the will,” and “[a] foreign administrator may appeal has an interest in his representative capacity sufficient to maintain an appeal

by a decision unless he has some private right which is affected thereby.”

predecessor statute to RSA 567-A:1, to maintain an appeal. The plaintiff, as the uncle of the minors, is properly deeply

noted by DeGrandpre in his treatise), “[i]n short, there is a right of appeal when decedent’s two minor sons. Hutchins, the minors’ paternal uncle, had id. at 107. Further (as

at 106 (quotation omitted). We noted further that “an executor named in a will argument. Id. Specifically, we stated: “Generally, it may be said that one cannot be aggrieved DeGrandpre cites to Id. at 108. grounds that Hutchins had no right, under the nearly identically worded

Hutchins, 77 N.H. at 105-06. We affirmed the superior court on the

appointment of the administrator of a decedent’s estate, as guardian of the As previously mentioned, Hutchins v. Brown involved a probate court’s following passage: proceeding.” In support of her contention, Galebach first relies upon the right” of her brother “in a representative capacity as his closest relative in the DeGrandpre’s statement, we do not view the case as supportive of Galebach’s

3(a), at 120 (3d ed. 2001). In support of the statement in his treatise, 10 C. DeGrandpre, New Hampshire Practice, Probate Law and Procedure § 13-

right may be held in a representative capacity. is affected by the decision of the probate court, and this private A person is aggrieved when he has some private right which

is a person aggrieved with standing to appeal because she holds a “private We also disagree with Galebach’s contention that, as Williams’ sister, she p. 9 Galebach.

were held to be valid. In the instant case, none of those factors applies to equitable interest in the decedent’s estate. words, a will contestant must generally have some direct legal or are heirs. entitled to a distributive share in the testator’s estate. In other

interest in the estate, and that interest would be impaired if the will in question decedent’s estate under the statute of distribution, they had a direct pecuniary they were accorded standing because, as persons who would take the lineal descendants of an ancestor,” make it clear that petitioners must possess is such that if he prevails in the contest he will be distribution, and RSA 21:20, which defines “issue” as all “lawful statute of distribution. RSA 561:1, which provides for intestate

appeal.

them reached the age of thirty-five. a testamentary trust to be distributed to her grandchildren when the last of

“close blood relationship” with the decedent, as argued by p. 9 Galebach. Instead, held to be a valid will. Furthermore, the interest which the person petitioners in Estate of Kelly were accorded standing not because they had a Id. at 777-78 (quotations, citations, brackets, and ellipses omitted). The relationship or persons who would take the estate under the

probate court. We therefore hold that they have standing to pecuniary interests under the will are affected by the order of the We conclude that the petitioners are heirs, and that their decision in a will contest under RSA 567-A:1. The decedent had left $10,000 in

testator which will be impaired if the instrument in question is A:1] is one who has a direct pecuniary interest in the estate of the will. The term heir applies to those who take by reason of blood interest in the estate are heirs, creditors or legatees under a prior Generally, persons who have a direct legal or equitable

grandchildren of the decedent, had standing to appeal the probate court’s

upon

The general rule is that an aggrieved person under [RSA 567-

stated:

RSA chapter 464-A, the first issue raised was whether the petitioners, Estate of Kelly is misplaced. In Estate of Kelly, which did not concern representative capacity standing requirement. We believe that her reliance that her “close blood relationship” to Williams, as his sister, satisfies the Citing In re Estate of Kelly, 130 N.H. 773 (1988), Galebach next argues

the executor of Williams’ estate, that is not the case here. reference to Hutchins v. Brown, might have merit in a will contest if she were direct or pecuniary interest in the estate as such.

p. 10 official or public duty to do so even though they may not have any

guardian continue to exist, other parties who may be allowed to appeal providing they have an burden is on the guardian to prove that the grounds for the appointment of the definition is neither complete nor comprehensive since there are guardianship hearing and with the ward’s rights protected by counsel, the if the instrument in question is held to be a valid will. This general

considered an aggrieved person under the governing statute . . . . connection with the administration of the estate cannot be

nearly identically worded predecessor statute to RSA 567-A:1 and stated:

the termination hearing, conducted in a manner similar to that of the the estate of the alleged testator which will be defeated or impaired

probate court ruled, had not carried the burden of proof. legatee under a prior will, and having no official or public duty in

decision that she was not a proper party to contest the will, we relied on the

policy in favor of securing the orderly and expeditious settlement of statutes allowing appeals, presumably because there is a public The probate appeal statute is more restrictive than other

designed to protect the ward by removing limitations on the ward’s rights. At similar to RSA 567:1 is one who has a direct pecuniary interest in A:4, RSA 464-A:40 provides for broad standing to commence proceedings time, file a motion for the termination of the guardianship.” As with RSA 464- petition, the right of appeal lies with the guardian — the person who, the . . . The contestant not being an heir or a creditor, or a

legacy. In dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal and affirming the superior court’s had received a legacy under the will; the allowance of the will confirmed her of incompetency, undue influence, and fraud. The plaintiff was not an heir but

The general rule is that an aggrieved person under statutes

either the “ward or any person interested in the ward’s welfare may, at any own rights have not been directly affected. If the probate court grants the against which RSA chapter 464-A was designed to protect, and that person’s lie with the person interested, as that person has not suffered a legal injury

decedent, sought to set aside the probate of the decedent’s will on the grounds Green v. Foster, 104 N.H. 287 (1962), the plaintiff, a sister-in-law of the We also believe our holding today is consistent with our related cases. In

concerning the termination of a guardianship. Pursuant to RSA 464-A:40, requested, is, we believe, consistent with that section of RSA chapter 464-A appeal a probate court’s grant of a guardianship with greater protections than the petition for termination, the right of appeal lies with the ward. It does not

scope of a proposed guardianship, but does not necessarily have standing to That an “interested person” has standing to bring a petition to limit the understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.” p. 11 acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be construed and

and long-standing.

has decided issues that are not squarely before us.

the language; but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have

court.” Our construction of the phrase “person . . . aggrieved” is well-settled

resolved by applying RSA 21:2 (2000), and because, in my view, the majority

N.H. 94, 99 (2007) (to be a “person[ ] aggrieved” under RSA 677:15 (2008), “a phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of

supreme court on questions of law in accordance with rules of the supreme court decree appointing administrator). that person’s interest in a matter before the court may appeal therefrom to the reaches. I write separately, however, because I believe that this appeal is order, appointment, grant or denial of a judge of probate which may conclude RSA 567-A:1 (2007) provides: “A person who is aggrieved by a decree,

we need not address her other arguments. RSA 21:2 governs our statutory interpretation. It provides: “Words and

purpose of bringing suit, defendant railroad not entitled to appeal probate DALIANIS, J., concurring specially. I concur in the result the majority which is affected thereby.”); DUGGAN and HICKS, JJ., concurred; DALIANIS, J., concurred specially.

had not sufficient interest to give him a legal right to do.”); Appeal dismissed.

Having determined that Galebach lacks standing to appeal in this case, be considered as so aggrieved as to entitle him to appeal”);

(in wrongful death action brought by estate’s administrator, appointed for sole

cannot be legally aggrieved by a decision unless he has some private right Tuftonborough will is allowed., 72 N.H. 63, 64 (1903) (“Generally, it may be said that one interest, private or public, which will be adversely affected if the Bennett v. remarkable if a person were made liable to punishment for not doing what he entitled to appeal probate court’s disallowance of the will: “It would be quite N.H. 407, 412 (1857) (executor named in decedent’s last will and testament

probate court: “every person, whose rights may be affected by the decree, may real estate, entitled to appeal allowance of administrator’s accounting by Bryant v. Allen, 6 N.H. 116, 118 (1833) (plaintiff, with interest in decedent’s Green, 104 N.H. at 288-89 (quotation, citations, and ellipsis omitted); see also

against will contests except by those who can show a direct estates. The probate appeal statute . . . also expresses a policy a guardianship, a provision that is p. 12 majority also construes RSA 464-A:40 (2004), which governs the termination of

restrictions on the ward’s liberties than those requested in the petition.” The

guardianship were not granted, or if the probate court imposed fewer majority rules that the ward’s siblings “would have the right to appeal if the whether a guardianship petition was granted in full or not.” Additionally, the

ward -- could appeal the imposition of a guardianship as an aggrieved person,

whose interests are protected under the guardianship statute -- the proposed

appeal.” Similarly, the majority states: “[W]e do not question that the person she would be ‘a person . . . aggrieved’ under RSA 567-A:1 and have standing to [appellant’s] petition or granted lesser protections than what she had sought,

standing to pursue this appeal.

Tierney, 150 N.H. 513, 519 (2004) (Nadeau, J., dissenting). . . . decides actual cases, not hypothetical ones.” In the Matter of Jacobson & are not before us, I believe we should not yet opine upon them. “This court instance, the majority states: “Had the probate court either denied the not at issue in this appeal. As these issues

a “person . . . aggrieved” within the meaning of RSA 567-A:1, and, thus, lacks

In my opinion, the majority addresses issues that are not before us. For

fact” (quotation omitted)), decision, person must show that “he has suffered or will suffer an injury in the guardianship proceedings concerning her brother. Accordingly, she is not Galebach, has failed to demonstrate that she has a direct, definite interest in present case, I agree with the majority that the appellant, Diane Williams Applying this well-settled definition of “person . . . aggrieved” to the

551, 554 (2007). words it chooses and to use those words advisedly.” State v. Njogu, 156 N.H. (citations omitted)). “[T]he legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the distinction between ‘persons directly affected,’ and ‘persons aggrieved.’” Corp. v. City of Dover, 119 N.H. 541, 543 (1979) (“There is no significant

decision and, thus, to have standing under RSA 541:3 (2007) to appeal that N.H. 148, 154 (to be a person “directly affected” by an administrative agency affected thereby” (quotation and brackets omitted)); cf. Appeal of Richards, 134 guardian for minor child, person must have “some private right which is under predecessor to RSA 567-A:1, in the context of proceeding to appoint Hutchins v. Brown, 77 N.H. 105, 106 (1913) (to be a “person . . . aggrieved” “direct pecuniary interest” in the testator’s estate (quotation omitted)); under RSA 567-A:1, in the context of a will contest, a person must have a In re Estate of Kelly, 130 N.H. 773, 777 (1988) (to be a “person . . . aggrieved” litigant must have a direct definite interest in the outcome of the proceedings”);