2008-432, STATE OF NH v. DONNA HAYDEN

license was restored. offender order, the defendant could not drive until she was decertified and her and her registration was suspended indefinitely. Pursuant to the habitual

Supp. 2008). Her driver’s license was suspended for a minimum of one year driving after revocation, subsequent offense. See RSA 263:64, VI (2004 & violation-level offenses and one conviction for a class B misdemeanor for a habitual offender. The certification was based upon seven convictions for Following a hearing on January 16, 2007, the defendant was certified as

driving while certified as a habitual offender. We affirm. the Superior Court (Lewis, J.) denying her motion to dismiss a felony charge of BRODERICK, C.J. The defendant, Donna Hayden, appeals an order of

brief and orally, for the defendant. Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the

attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State. Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, senior assistant

to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Opinion Issued: April 17, 2009

No. 2008-432 editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Rockingham Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as clear on its face.

p. 2 argues that it refers only to class A misdemeanors.

We do not consider legislative history to construe a statute that is statute in the context of the overall scheme and not in isolation. the legislature did not see fit to include. Further, we interpret a

misdemeanor” in RSA 262:23, III does not designate a class, the defendant to class shall be construed as class A misdemeanors. Because the phrase “any misdemeanor” and provides that references to misdemeanors not designated as

consider what the legislature might have said or add language that

administrative home confinement. This appeal followed.

defendant, RSA 625:9, IV(a) controls the interpretation of the phrase “any that if a person’s certification is at all based on ‘ (Quotation omitted.) The court also ruled that “RSA 262:23, III plainly provides interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. We considered as a whole. When examining the language of a statute,

fourteen days to be served stand-committed and the remainder to be served on

certification based upon a class B misdemeanor conviction. According to the

legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute State v. Bernard, 158 N.H. 43, 44 (2008) (citations omitted).

262:23, I.” found her guilty, sentencing her to the house of corrections for twelve months, misdemeanors or felonies. The trial court denied the motion and subsequently was not based upon any convictions for driving while intoxicated, class A misdemeanor” in RSA 262:23, III as encompassing a habitual offender defendant argues that the trial court erred in interpreting the phrase “any while certified as a habitual offender pursuant to RSA 262:23, III. The designate any misdemeanor, without specification of the classification, so as to

matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo. In

be exempted from the felony-level classification generally provided by RSA vehicle conviction pursuant to RSA title XXI,’ then that person is not entitled to

defendant could be charged with, and convicted of, the felony offense of driving The trial court ruled that “RSA 262:23, III does not purport to actually

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that she could not properly be felony offense of driving while certified as a habitual offender. RSA 262:23, I. effect. RSA 262:23 (2004 & Supp. 2008). In June, she was indicted for the The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the

arrested for driving a motor vehicle while the habitual offender order was in Less than two months later, on March 8, 2007, the defendant was one year or less.

p. 3 shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor and may be sentenced to date of the certification; provided, however, that any such person as a habitual offender is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. As we explained in motor vehicle convictions pursuant to RSA title XXI.” any jurisdiction within the United States and Canada, since the driving under the influence of drugs or liquor] or any misdemeanor or felony

conviction, a person who is convicted of driving a motor vehicle while certified convicted of any such offense, or any reasonably similar offense in while under the influence or any misdemeanor or felony motor vehicle under paragraph III, depends upon whether the defendant has a conviction [for habitual offender certification was not based upon a conviction for driving

misdemeanor” as used in RSA 262:23, III to mean “any class A RSA 625:9, IV(a)(2) (2007) requires us to interpret the phrase “any

title XXI [motor vehicle offenses], and that person has not been year under paragraph I of the statute, or to a sentence of one year or less 3 a mandatory prison sentence. However, pursuant to paragraph III, if the lenient, sentencing scheme for such defendants.”

The defendant argues that the statutory rule of construction in

omitted).

misdemeanor or felony motor vehicle conviction pursuant to RSA “whether a defendant is subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of one [driving under the influence of drugs or liquor] or any vehicle while certified as a habitual offender is guilty of a felony and subject to certification was not based on any conviction under RSA 265-A:2, I Id. at 230. Accordingly, mandatory sentence provisions of paragraph I, and provides an alternate, more describes a class of defendants who shall not be subject to the minimum exception to an otherwise applicable rule. Id. at 229. “Paragraph III then language “notwithstanding paragraph I,” indicates that it sets forth an State v. LeBaron, 148 N.H. 226 (2002), paragraph III, by beginning with the

than 5 years. sentenced . . . to imprisonment for not less than one year nor more

Pursuant to paragraph I, a person who is convicted of driving a motor mandatory provisions of paragraph I if, and only if, that person’s

such operation is in effect, he or she p. 3 shall be guilty of a felony and

259:39 [habitual offender] shall not be subject to the minimum Notwithstanding paragraph I, any person who qualifies under RSA

RSA 262:23, III provides in pertinent part:

of this state while an order of the director or the court prohibiting of this chapter is convicted of driving a motor vehicle on the ways If any person found to be an habitual offender under the provisions

RSA 262:23, I, provides in pertinent part: p. 4 4

both class A and class B misdemeanors.

DALIANIS, DUGGAN and HICKS, JJ., concurred. of one year; or maximum penalty, exclusive of fine, is imprisonment not in excess Affirmed. sentencing factor. of driving after certification as a habitual offender; rather, it is used to define a scheme, the phrase “any misdemeanor” motor vehicle conviction encompasses misdemeanor. Dictionary 97 (1976)). We hold that, viewed in the context of the statutory Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New International that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” United States v. 581, 58 p. 4 4 (2004). “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, III is not ambiguous. See Duke/Fluor Daniel v. Hawkeye Funding, 150 N.H. statute. While perhaps not as artfully drafted as it might have been, RSA 262:23,

of driving after certification as a habitual offender have already been classified. this code and any crime defined outside of this code for which the LeBaron, 1 p. 4 48 N.H. at 230. The crimes that form the basis

phrase “any misdemeanor” in RSA 262:23, III is not used to classify the crime

See State v. Bruce, 1 p. 4 47 N.H. 37, 43 (2001). However, the

designated only as “a misdemeanor,” such crime will be classified a class A Pursuant to RSA 625:9, when it is necessary to classify a crime

a misdemeanor, without specification of the classification. (2) Any crime designated within or outside this code as every offense, whether defined within this code or by any other

(1) Any crime so designated by statute within or outside (a) A class A misdemeanor is: B misdemeanors when committed by an individual. . . . IV. Misdemeanors are either class A misdemeanors or class . . . . violation. II. Every offense is either a felony, misdemeanor or

I. The provisions of this section govern the classification of

Crimes,” provides in part: misdemeanor.” We disagree. RSA 625:9, titled “Classification of