2008-198, IN RE ALEX C.

The juvenile, Alex C., appeals the Jaffrey-Peterborough

and orally, for the juvenile. Paul Borchardt, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief

general, orally), for the State. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: attorney general, on the brief, and Thomas E. Bocian, assistant attorney Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Stephen D. Fuller, senior assistant

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. IN RE ALEX C.

No. 2008-198 editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Jaffrey-Peterborough District Court Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as followed.

p. 2 The juvenile filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. This appeal would be found chargeable as a delinquent, no matter what his mental state.” juvenile “was fairly warned that if he voluntarily committed the act charged, he

Because there was no mutual consent in this case, the trial court found the

art. 15;

state, unless it is entered into by mutual consent, and then it is a violation.” not reach the federal issues.

claims, citing federal opinions for guidance only.

art. 15; complaint must inform a defendant of the offense with which he is charged with sufficient specificity. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV; N.H. CONST. pt. I, document. criminal complaint inform a defendant of the offense with which he is charged see RSA 601:4 (2001). To meet this constitutional standard, a plainly, substantially and formally, described to him . . . .” N.H. CONST. pt. I, shall be held to answer for any crime, or offense, until the same is fully and Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution provides that “[n]o subject

say: “Simple assault is a misdemeanor . . . based on any conscious mental question of constitutional law and statutory interpretation, our review is See id. at 237. mental state is significant to the nature of the offense.” It went on, however, to 226, 232-33 (1983). Because the juvenile prevails on his state claims, we need The order stated that “[t]here are undoubtedly some offenses where the alleged the delinquency petition for failure to allege a See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 133 N.H. 1, 3 (1990) (mem. opinion). We first address the state constitutional see State v. Lamarche, 157 N.H. 337, 341 (2008); State v. Lachapelle,

but took under advisement the juvenile’s motion concerning the charging Both the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions require that a

306, 309 (2006). novo. State v. Abram, 156 N.H. 646, 651 (2008); State v. Horner, 153 N.H.

document, he contends, is constitutionally insufficient. Because this is a

juvenile had committed simple assault, and denying his motion to dismiss. On appeal, the juvenile argues that the trial court erred in not dismissing

inconsistent. The trial court found that the testimony was largely consistent,

juvenile moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition failed to allege a

cause unpriviledge [

The trial court later issued an adjudicatory order, finding that the

and that the testimony concerning the facts of the incident had been

dried sticks in the arm and face.” At the close of the State’s evidence, the

A juvenile delinquency petition was filed, alleging that the juvenile “did

confrontation, M.W. met his father on his way home, who called the police. marks on his face and back, one of which was bleeding. Following the defendant does not object.

p. 3 State move to amend the petition.

amended to cure defects if the State proceeds using the correct standard and a

“purposely or knowingly.” Because the argue that it had proven that he acted purposely or knowingly, nor did the a

until the close of the case to object. Indeed, a complaint can be constructively

juvenile raised a timely objection to the defective petition, and the State did not misdemeanor simple assault resulting from unprivileged contact. For a person constitutionally deficient. The State argues, however, that the failure to allege also if committed by an adult . . . .” Here, the juvenile was charged with Appeal of Smithfield Dodge, 145 N.H. 23, 27 (2000). Here, however, the

juvenile delinquency petition. The State also argues that the juvenile waived his objection by waiting

Lachapelle, 133 N.H. at 3. sufficient notice. See Lamarche, 157 N.H. at 341; Davis, 149 N.H. at 704; document failing to allege all the elements of an offense cannot provide This argument also fails because of the well-settled rule that a charging mens rea did not deprive the juvenile of constitutionally adequate notice.

Because the petition here did not allege a mental state, it is which would be a felony or misdemeanor under the criminal code of this state

alleged elements of offense). We hold that RSA 169-B:2, IV requires the same for a N.H. 698, 704-05 (2003) (holding charging document sufficient where stated requisite mental state to be sufficient as to an adult. See State v. Davis, 149 an element of the offense, a charging document would need to allege the

person who has committed an offense before reaching the age of 17 years mens rea, RSA 169-B:2, IV (Supp. 2008) defines “delinquent” as: “[A] of the offense with sufficient allegations to identify the offense in fact. Although RSA 169-B:6, II does not state that a petition must include an

offense charged so as to prepare an adequate defense. failure to allege a mens rea, the juvenile here was sufficiently on notice of the mens rea. Alternatively, the State argues that notwithstanding the petition’s

petition to set out the date, time, manner and place of alleged conduct as well mens rea. It relies upon RSA 169-B:6, II (Supp. 2008), which requires a The State argues that juvenile delinquency petitions need not state a

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974).

which the defendant is being charged; the complaint must include the elements Lachapelle, 133 N.H. at 3. It is not enough merely to state the crime with time protect him from being put in jeopardy once again for the same offense. with sufficient specificity to enable him to prepare for trial and at the same p. 4 4

rather that he acted “voluntarily.” Because voluntariness is not a sufficient

trial court never found that the juvenile acted purposely or knowingly, but

that the harmless error doctrine applies in this case, BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS and HICKS, JJ., concurred.

constitutionally defective charging document. Reversed and remanded.

trial court’s finding did not cure the defective petition. a mens rea to support a conviction of simple assault, see RSA 631:2-a, I(a), the prejudiced.”). Rather, the State argued that a juvenile petition does not require

error analysis to constitutional errors), the error here was not harmless. The Recuenco, 5 p. 4 48 U.S. 212, 218-19 (2006) (discussing application of harmless

Finally, the State argues that any error was harmless. Even assuming

even constructively, it was error to enter a finding of delinquency upon a voluntary behavior was sufficient. Because the petition was never amended, mens rea. The trial court apparently agreed, and found that the juvenile’s

different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not permit a complaint to be amended at any time before finding if no additional or