2008-402, DANIEL ZORN & a. v. GEORGE DEMETRI & a.

The plaintiffs, Daniel and Cynthia Zorn, appeal an

the defendants. Tarbell & Brodich P.A., of Concord (Eaton W. Tarbell, III on the brief), for

the brief), for the plaintiffs. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: Law Office of Dennis C. Hogan, PLLC, of Nashua (Dennis C. Hogan on

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. v.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2008-402 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Nashua District Court Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as housing, for other than vacation or recreational purposes.

p. 2 housing park regulated by RSA 205-A and in manufactured

housing, for other than vacation or recreational purposes. housing park as regulated by RSA 205-A and in manufactured not see fit to include. premises owned by another, including space in a manufactured what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did III. “Tenant” means any person who rents or leases residential

scheme. a “landlord” for the purposes of this subdivision . . . .

another person a rental unit, including space in a manufactured

interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider . . . .

in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory owner-occupied building of 5 units or less shall not be considered us to better discern the legislature’s intent and to interpret statutory language other rental property or who rents or leases rental units in an isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. This enables person who rents or leases a single-family residence and owns no

I. “Landlord” means a person . . . who rents or leases to

construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. We RSA 540-A:5 includes the following definitions:

Id.

absurd or unjust result. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an

suit alleging, whole. We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the month’s rent, the plaintiffs paid $10,000 as a security deposit. which we review de novo. Correia v. Town of Alton, 157 N.H. 716, 718 (2008). 152 N.H. 695, 701 (2005). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, lacking in evidential support or tainted by error of law. Greenhalgh v. Presstek, We will sustain the trial court’s findings and conclusions unless they are

security deposits did not apply to them. The plaintiffs appeal that ruling. landlords as defined in RSA 540-A:5, I, the statutory provisions governing security deposits. The trial court ruled that because the defendants were not

inter alia, violations of RSA 540-A:6 (2007), which governs

After the plaintiffs vacated the single-family home in 2007, they brought

Hollis to the plaintiffs at a monthly rent of $2,500. In addition to the first In November 2006, the defendants rented the single-family home in commercial venture.

p. 3 regardless of whether their primary purpose for renting it was to operate a phrases found therein. legislation . . . and not simply . . . examine isolated words or

“residential” component of the leasehold is incidental.

plain meaning would include a structure in which the tenants resided 3 tenants argued that “residential premises” is undefined in the statute, and its and ordinary meaning, we must keep in mind the intent of the premises” as used in the definition of “rental unit” applied to the tavern. The

held that the statute did not encompass commercial leases where the commercial property containing only modest living quarters. Accordingly, we

accomplish. Therefore, while we give undefined language its plain commercial venture. The issue turned on whether the term “residential remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to Id. at 398-99.

construe the term “residential premises” so broadly as to include a large Atwood rented. We disagree., 142 N.H. at 398 (quotation and brackets omitted). We refused to

not a “rental unit,” since that term is defined as each separate part of any

in RSA 540-A:5 included a tavern in which the tenants resided and operated a [I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed

In considering the tenants’ argument, we began by noting:

vacation home is “rental property” by virtue of the fact that it is property that is

not leased for residential purposes; accordingly, the trial court ruled that it is

396 (1997). There, we were asked to determine whether the term “rental unit” then the defendants are “landlords” as defined by the statute. We considered an analogous argument in Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H.

plain meaning of the term “rental property” is broader – they argue that the is held out for rental by the landlord. residential contiguous living, sleeping, kitchen and bathroom facilities, which premises. The plaintiffs do not dispute this, but contend that the premises which has full facilities for habitation, including

The trial court found that the Maine home is a vacation property and was

If the defendants’ vacation home in Maine constitutes other “rental property,” plaintiffs – the issue is whether the defendants own any other “rental property.” (Emphasis added.) The defendants rented a single-family residence to the

IV. “Rental unit” means each separate part of any residential with our construction, it is free to amend the statute as it sees fit.

p. 4 best conforms to the legislative intent. Of course, if the legislature disagrees construction of “rental property” is consistent with this statutory scheme and person who rents only one single-family residence. We believe that our

intent to govern the rental of only residential premises with an exemption for a

both exempt activities to lose the exemption. The statute as a whole evinces an

conclude that the legislature did not intend for a person who participates in with the statutory restrictions. Based upon our review of the entire statute, we and a person who rents for vacation purposes should not be required to comply

as DALIANIS, DUGGAN and HICKS, JJ., concurred.

Fuller, 158 N.H. ___, ___ (decided January 16, 2009).

statutory restrictions on security deposits. RSA 540-A:5, I.

another for vacation or recreational purposes. RSA 540-A:5, I, III. In addition, statutory restrictions on security deposits to apply to a person who rents to clear from the definition of “landlord” that the legislature did not intend the property subject to the statutory restrictions on security deposits. The of the apparent legislative intent, the term “rental property” refers to other We conclude that read in the context of the statutory scheme and in light

that a person who rents one single-family residence only is not subject to the commercial leases. Atwood, 142 N.H. at 399. Finally, the legislature indicated Atwood indicates, the legislature did not intend the statute to encompass

the intent of the legislation and not simply examine an isolated phrase. It is Similarly, in construing the term “rental property” we must keep in mind