2008-277, APPEAL OF ROBERT BELAIR

The petitioner, Robert Belair (claimant), appeals a decision of

Elizabeth M. Murphy on the brief, and Mr. Kfoury orally), for the respondents. Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A., of Manchester (Paul R. Kfoury, Jr. and to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

Friedenthal on the brief, and Mr. Vanacore orally), for the petitioner. Vanacore Law Office, of Concord (John G. Vanacore and Natalie J.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes No. 2008-277 Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Compensation Appeals Board Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

the applicable statutes of limitations.” The claimant now appeals to this court. weekly benefits and medical benefits on the grounds that they are barred by

stronger painkillers and a muscle relaxant.

141 N.H. 534, 537-38 (1996) (quotation and brackets omitted). give the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose.” request for hearing. On appeal, the board upheld “dismiss[al of] the claims for Appeal of Lalime, doubts in statutory construction in favor of the injured employee in order to compensation statute, “[w]e construe [it] liberally, resolving all reasonable In addition, where resolution of the appeal requires us to interpret the workers’ Disability, . . . Causual [limitations, respondents moved to dismiss the case as barred by the applicable statutes of “has the burden of demonstrating that the board’s decision was erroneous.” Id. unreasonable.” Appeal of Fay, 150 N.H. 3 p. 2 21, 324 (2003). The appealing party unless, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, we find it to be unjust or “We will not disturb the board’s decision absent an error of law, or

experienced a nervous breakdown in 1995, and was currently starting to take

benefits denied more than eighteen months prior to the August 30, p. 2 2006 officer granted the motion with respect to indemnity benefits and any medical

years . . . . see RSA p. 2 281-A:42-d, :48 (1999), and by laches. A DOL hearing “requesting that this matter be scheduled on the issues of . . . Extent of

The claimant again requested a hearing on August 30, p. 2 2006. The

apparently without stating a specific duration or expiration date therefor.

that he could accomplish the following: explained that he has suffered from depression since at least December 1994, functioning are often impossible due to my physical and mental state” and He stated that “linear progressive thought and accomplishment and

Thus far I have only finished up to 1997 and this took over 1½

interpreted as being the cut off date.” He further specified that he was 3) Finish preparing my history of my injury up to the present day. therefore requested “a hearing now and prior to 1/14/98 which might be p. 2 2) I need time to get a new lawyer to represent my case. . . . . that I must request it within 4 years of the date of the last WC payment.” He. . . . 1) Complete all scheduled and referred Doctors appointments.

By letter dated June p. 2 2, 1998, the claimant requested a continuance so

hearing was scheduled for June p. 2 22, 1998.

would like to protect my right to a Workers’ Comp. hearing and I understand In a letter to the DOL dated January 13, 1998, the claimant wrote: “I need not address the equitable doctrine of laches.

p. 3 continuance. The board ruled:

could have brought his claim forward for a hearing, the Tribunal

a finding that the filing of the request for a hearing tolled the statute of

was required to renew his request for a hearing following the grant of a

statute of limitations closed the period during which the claimant this case let the years pass by and the clock ran out. Because the substantiated with competent medical evidence. The claimant in respondents, on the other hand, argue that “[t]here is no authority supporting statute of limitation which was applicable to filing the original request.” The continuance[] or any procedural action which triggers the restart of the original

construed RSA 281-A:48 as also limiting the time within which the claimant 3 14, 1994, and the board so found. Nevertheless, the board appears to have for a hearing fell within four years of the last payment of benefits on January

to the time limitation for any legal disability that is not

earlier.” any time limitation for requesting a hearing following the granting of a

undue influence, or coercion.

year limitations period. We agree. The claimant’s January 13, 1998 request

it forward in a timely manner. The statute contains no exceptions

injury where the last disability payment was made more than four years The claimant argues that “[t]here is no authority suggesting that there is

mistake as to the nature or extent of the injury or disability, fraud, the case may be, upon the ground of a change in conditions, because he satisfied the statute by filing his petition for review within the four compensation under such award or pursuant to RSA 281-A:40, as

It was [the claimant’s] claim and he carried the burden of bringing

barring the reinstatement of disability benefits for the recurrence of an old

The claimant contends that RSA 281-A:48, I, does not bar his claim anniversary of the date of such denial or the last payment of

Appeal of Anheuser-Busch Co., 156 N.H. 677, 679 (2008).

RSA 281-A:48, I. “We have interpreted this language as a statute of limitations Eligibility for Compensation,” provides, in part: concluded was barred by RSA 281-A:48. That section, entitled “Review of

filing a petition with the commissioner not later than the fourth an award of compensation made pursuant to RSA 281-A:40 by July 1, 1965, may petition the commissioner to review a denial or Any party at interest with regard to an injury occurring after

time-barred. We first address his claim for indemnity benefits, which the board The claimant contends that the board erred in ruling that his claims are last longer than a legislatively imposed statute of limitations.”

p. 4 legislature or the [DOL] in creating its regulations that a continuance would

anything more. resolved.” The claimant did just that. There is no statutory requirement for continuances, “[i]t is logical to assume that it was never the intention of the They nevertheless contend that because RSA 281-A:43, I(a) discourages that sets out a specific deadline for requesting that a hearing be scheduled.”

hearing and the questions in dispute which the applicant expects to be

regulation which requires that a hearing be re-requested after a continuance or legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include.” legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the

that the petition for a hearing “shall set forth the reasons for requesting the a requirement. They point out that RSA 281-A:43, I(a) (Supp. 2008) requires him from work.” The respondents, however, provide no legal authority for such concede that “[t]here is no specific workers’ compensation procedural rule or

not speculate as to what the legislature intended; rather, “[w]e interpret

restriction upon the claimant. satisfied, RSA 281-A:48, I, is no longer relevant and imposes no further part: Id. at ___, 959 A.2d at 191 (quotation omitted). RSA 281-A:43, I(a) provides, in

change in condition” or any “documentation that a medical doctor had removed request for a hearing “within the appropriate time frame.” The respondents need to toll it. Under our well-settled rules of statutory construction, however, we will

filing charges stops the running of the statute of limitations). Having been

with his request for hearing any “medical evidence supporting a finding of a The respondents also contend that the claimant had a duty to renew his I, was satisfied. The statute of limitations stopped running and there was no claimant’s January 13, 1998 request for a hearing satisfied the statute. 191 (2008) (stating court will not add words to statute). Accordingly, the

Cf. Appeal of Town of Rindge, 158 N.H. ___, ___, 959 A.2d 188,

against defendant because, under plain language of that statute, the act of

that he was totally disabled.” They assert that the claimant failed to submit the claimant filed his request for hearing on January 13, 1998, RSA 281-A:48, request as a preservation tactic without medical evidence supporting a finding letter was not a valid request for a hearing “because the claimant filed the The respondents next contend that the claimant’s January 13, 1998

statute of limitations in RSA 603:1 after formal charges have been brought

See State v. Nadler, 151 N.H. 244, 246 (2004) (no need to toll

The respondents fundamentally misapply the doctrine of tolling. When

we agree with the claimant. limitations indefinitely on this issue.” Having reviewed the applicable statutes, statute.

p. 5 hearing within a certain period of time, and we will not read one into the question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced.” RSA 281-A:43-I(a); provide that “any party” may petition the labor commissioner for a hearing.

that issue. its ruling on the statute of limitations, and we decline to address it in the first RSA 281-A:48’s statute of limitations and we reverse the board’s decision on

imposes no duty upon the claimant to renew his request for a continued rights. The doctrine of laches is not a mere matter of time, but is principally a

authorities they cite do not support that claim. Rather, the cited authorities

As previously noted, the board did not address the laches issue in light of erred in ruling that the claimant’s claim for indemnity benefits is barred by of Laconia, 150 N.H. 91, 93 (2003) (quotations and citation omitted). require a continuance. Appeal of City commissioner’s finding that a compelling need exists so as to “impos[ing] a deadline which did not exist.” We agree. RSA 281-A:43, I(a) equitable doctrine that bars litigation when a potential plaintiff has slept on his request a new date for a continued hearing,” the board acted unreasonably by from seeking indemnity benefits under the doctrine of laches. “Laches is an has been granted” and “[t]here is no rule setting whose responsibility it is to regularly falls to the party who requested the continuance,” yet the only limitations issue, it reached the correct result because the claimant is barred The respondents argue that even if the board erred on the statute of

the hearing to a date certain”).

a hearing themselves. We conclude, for the foregoing reasons, that the board wanted to resolve the claim in a more timely fashion, they could have requested

silent with regard to any deadline for setting a hearing date once a continuance The respondents assert that “[t]he burden to re-request a hearing

that once a hearing is held, “[t]he person conducting the hearing may recess the hearing to a date certain, it did not do so. Cf. RSA 281-A:43, I(a) (providing

See Id. at ___, 959 A.2d at 191. While the DOL could have continued

file such a petition shall bar any right to a continuance. such continuance at least 7 days prior to the hearing. Failure to continuance shall file with the department a written petition for The claimant argues that where the Workers’ Compensation Law “is

281-A:43, I(a). Whether discouraged or not, continuances are clearly permitted under RSA

continuance be necessary, the parties requesting such Continuances of any hearing are discouraged; however, should a claims. p. 6 time-barred for the same reasons stated above for indemnity benefits.

hearing are time-barred, and we affirm the board’s ruling with respect to such satisfied the statute of limitations and his claims for those benefits are not 1998, and eighteen months prior to the claimant’s August 30, 2006 request for to previous bills. Claims for medical benefits denied between January 13,

prior to the claimant’s January 13, 1998 request for hearing, we agree that he limitations.” With respect to medical benefits denied within eighteen months that would relate future medical bills back to a claim timely filed with respect payment of medical bills . . . [the claimant] satisfied the applicable statute[] of

barred.” The claimant has offered no plausible construction of RSA 281-A:42-d “[b]y filing a timely request for review . . . within the 18-month limitation on must be filed within eighteen months of denial by the carrier or they “shall be plain language of RSA 281-A:42-d provides that claims for medical benefits

the insurer were time-barred under RSA 281-A:42-d. The claimant argues that medical bills submitted by the claimant between 1998 and 2002 and denied by denials that were subsequently filed in 1998 and 2002” and we agree. The RSA 281-A:42, I(b).” RSA 281-A:42-d. The board ruled that claims related to

BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, DU GGAN and GALWAY, JJ., concurred.

request for a hearing did not toll the statute of limitations on prospective Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded. the claim has been denied by the insurance carrier or self-insurer pursuant to

The respondents argue, however, that “[t]he claimant’s January 1998 under RSA 281-A:43 within 18 months after the claimant receives notice that

address this issue before the board.

by time depends on the equitable doctrine of laches.”);

under this chapter shall be barred unless the claimant petitions for a hearing “Compensation for disability, rehabilitation, medical benefits, or death benefits We now turn to the issue of medical benefits. RSA 281-A:42-d provides:

compensation case brought under prior statute). On remand, the parties may Lumber Co., 121 N.H. 420, 422 (1981) (applying estoppel in workers’

limitations apply to an administrative proceeding, whether an action is barred Appeal of Naswa Motor Inn, 144 N.H. 89, 91 (1999) (“Where no statutory time relations board’s dismissal of a petition for modification on laches grounds); cf. Appeal of City of Laconia, 150 N.H. at 95 (affirming public employee labor have not addressed the precise issue of laches with respect to the board. But the board has the power to rule upon equitable claims such as laches. We omitted). We note that at oral argument, a question was raised as to whether the trier of fact.” Bogardus v. Zinkevicz, 134 N.H. 527, 530 (1991) (quotations instance, particularly where application of the doctrine is “a question of fact for