2009-075, BRENTWOOD VOLUNTEER FIREMAN'S ASSOCIATION v. DANIEL E. MUSSO, SR.

deed to him described the parcel as

approximately one acre in size, which he eventually purchased in 1995. The

operated a motor vehicle repair business on a parcel of land in Brentwood,

. . . Westerly by said road and Easterly by land of G. Russell Rowe, lying on the Easterly side of [Crawley Falls Road] . . . and bounded

The record supports the following facts. Since 1992, the respondent has

Volunteer Fireman’s Association. We affirm. temporary and permanent injunctions filed by the petitioner, Brentwood the Superior Court (Nadeau, J.) granting the petition to quiet title and for DALIANIS, J. The respondent, Daniel E. Musso, Sr., appeals an order of

Michael E. Chubrich, of Portsmouth, by brief, for the respondent.

Craig N. Salomon, of North Hampton, by brief, for the petitioner. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. BRENTWOOD VOLUNTEER FIREMAN'S ASSOCIATION

No. 2009-075 editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Rockingham Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as sufficiently and demonstrate that he preserved it for our review. p. 2 Article 15 of the State Constitution because he has failed to brief this argument

river.”

decision deprived him of his property without due process in violation of Part I,

Exeter River together with the Mill Privileges and all right in the dam across the Southwesterly by land of the heirs of Joseph Sandborn and Northerly by said side of the Exeter River,” bounded “Easterly by [Crawley Falls Road], possessed was lost by adverse possession or abandonment. rejected this claim, ruling that any mill privilege the respondent may have included a mill privilege, he owned the disputed property. The trial court

unless it is erroneous as a matter of law or unsupported by the evidence. Id. and the petition so alleged. Id. We will uphold the trial court’s determination in turn. We do not address the respondent’s assertion that the trial court’s duly recorded interest in the property, unless those parties claimed no interest judgment quieting title to disputed property in the absence of parties with a Hersh v. Plonski, 156 N.H. 511, 514 (2007). A trial court may not render as against all other parties whose rights may be affected by the court’s decree. In an action to quiet title, the burden is on each party to prove good title

N.H. 248, 250 (2004). land “on the westerly side of . . . Crawley Falls Road[ ] and on the southerly Omega Entm’t, 156 N.H. 282, 287 (2007); Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 unregistered motor vehicles. The respondent argued that because his deed See Appeal of

storage. This land is the subject of the instant litigation.

that the petitioner owned the disputed property. We address these arguments argues that the trial court erred when it found, based upon a certain exhibit, On appeal, the respondent contends that this ruling was error. He also privilege on both sides of said River.

petitioner. A deed to the disputed parcel describes it as a triangular tract of

using it to store firewood, various pieces of equipment and registered and respondent’s claim that he owned the disputed parcel and to enjoin him from land located across Crawley Falls Road for additional customer parking and The petitioner brought the present petition to defend against the

flowage connected therewith, and all land connected with said situated thereon, and also the mill dam and the right of the privilege at said Falls, together with all the mills and machinery

The disputed parcel is located within a larger parcel owned by the

Also since 1992, the respondent has, with the petitioner’s permission, used

Exeter River at Crawley’s Falls, so-called, being the middle dam or the same being the mill yard and mill privilege situated on the had good title to the property. p. 3 contends that the deeds failed to satisfy the petitioner’s burden to prove that it

previously owned the disputed parcel and dissolved in 1988. The respondent

and to whom he has paid damages.” mill, and giving notice of such intention to those whose lands he has flowed, mill, accompanied with correspondent acts, such as removing the dam and applicable provision of New York law, which controls the question of who owns The respondent argues that the petitioner “made no effort to prove the

construction of “two ‘little sheds’” was insufficient to constitute the requisite from the shareholders of Delaware Holding Co., Inc., a corporation that from Stuart S. Wilson, Jr. and attached 2007 quitclaim deeds to the petitioner the petitioner had record title to the disputed property based upon an affidavit necessary, and customarily used with the mill.” The respondent next asserts that the trial court erred when it found that

owner of a mill site expressly declares that he no longer intends “to keep up the when it found that the respondent’s mill privilege was abandoned. respondent does not dispute on appeal, we hold that the trial court did not err respondent’s property since at least 1934. In light of this finding, which the Id. The trial court found that no mill activity has taken place on the of time; and unless rebutted by clear and satisfactory proof, it is conclusive.” long ago. years, is strong prima facie evidence of a non-user for an unreasonable length petitioner’s “desultory occasional use of the Disputed Area” and its § 498, at 572. “[T]he entire and continued disuse of such mill site for twenty an unreasonable length of time,” will also result in loss of a mill privilege. Id.

the deed, “such deeds have been held to convey so much land as was

§§ 496-99, at 571-72 (5th ed. 1854). Abandonment may be found when the through abandonment. See J. Angell, A Treatise on the Law of Watercourses Contrary to the respondent’s assertions, a mill privilege may be lost

court aptly found, any mill privilege he could have possessed was abandoned impossible to exercise [those] . . . rights or . . . privileges,” and that the respondent included the right to the disputed property because, as the trial extinguished only by adverse possession or by adverse use that makes it 218, 224 (1839). We need not address whether the mill privilege granted to the possession. He contends that “[m]ill rights and mill privileges can be lost or Maddox v. Goddard, 15 Me.

(1839). When a mill privilege is conveyed without any exact bounds set forth in and on which it and its appendages stand.” Moore v. Fletcher, 16 Me. 63, 65 The term “mill privilege” means “the land and water used with the mill,

any mill privilege he may have had was lost by abandonment or adverse The respondent first argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that remaining arguments are without merit and do not warrant further discussion. p. 4 assets to its shareholders in accordance with New York law. The respondent’s New Hampshire precluded the company from dissolving and from passing its

contention that the failure of Delaware Holding Company, Inc. to register in

Hampshire for the purposes of RSA chapter 293-A. We, therefore, reject his dissolution, in and of itself, constitutes “transacting business” in New cited any authority, and we are not aware of any, to support his assertion that

authority to transact business in New Hampshire. The respondent has not

[its] shareholders, subject to the payment of corporate debts.” 16A W. Fletcher, established that “[a]fter dissolution, the property of [a] corporation passes to trial to educate the court about the applicable law. Moreover, it is well forth the procedure by which a foreign corporation may apply for a certificate of

BRODERICK, C.J.