2009-002, PETITION OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE (STATE v. JAMES MILNER)

respondent’s license was not reinstated.

2008)). Although the court-ordered period of license revocation expired, the 1993, 1995, 1996) (repealed 2006; current version at RSA 265-A:2 (Supp. for which his driver’s license was revoked. See RSA 265:82 (1993) (amended In 1991, the respondent was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI)

for resentencing. sentence mandated by RSA 263:64, IV. We vacate the sentence and remand that the trial court erred because it did not impose the minimum seven-day jail revoked. See RSA 263:64 (Supp. 2008) (amended 2008). The State asserts respondent, James Milner, for driving a motor vehicle while his license was the sentence imposed by the Exeter District Court (Cullen, J.) upon the DALIANIS, J. In this petition for a writ of certiorari, the State challenges

James Milner, pro se, filed no brief.

to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: attorney general, on the brief), for the petitioner. Orville B. Fitch, II, acting attorney general (Diana E. Fenton, assistant

No. 2009-002 editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Exeter District Court Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as suspension or revocation of his or her license . . . for a violation of

p. 2 Pursuant to RSA 263:64, IV:

to drive a motor vehicle . . . in this state during the period of

while the person’s driver’s license or privilege to drive is suspended or revoked.”

whole.

legislature did not enact superfluous or redundant words.

beyond it for further indications of legislative intent. Any person who violates this section by driving or attempting

have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.

Under RSA 263:64, I, “[n]o person shall drive a motor vehicle in this state

legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a Sch. Dist. v. Town of Seabrook, 148 N.H. 519, 525-26 (2002).

510. We must give effect to all words in a statute, and presume that the to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. at unsustainable exercise of discretion or has acted arbitrarily or capriciously. interpretation. We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation Newport, 151 N.H. 508, 509 (2004). We construe all parts of a statute together trial court to do so. Resolving this issue requires that we engage in statutory Franklin v. Town of When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we do not look IV. The State contends that the plain language of RSA 263:64, IV required the

from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might and ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. We interpret legislative intent Id. When examining the language of the statute, we ascribe the plain

would result in substantial injustice. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the

Petition of State of N.H. (State v. Johanson), 156 N.H. 148, 151 (2007).

declined to impose the minimum seven-day sentence required by RSA 263:64, The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court erred when it

order at issue in this case. Id. certiorari is the only avenue by which the State may appeal the sentencing

exercise our power to grant the writ sparingly and only where to do otherwise Petition of State of N.H. (State v. Marcoux), 154 N.H. 118, 121 (2006). We

determine whether another tribunal has acted illegally in respect to the absence of a right to appeal, and only at the discretion of the court, to Review on certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, usually available only in

sentence required by RSA 263:64, IV. the State’s urging, the trial court declined to impose the minimum seven-day was found guilty of this offense and fined $750 with $250 suspended. Despite his license to drive was revoked. See RSA 263:64. Following a bench trial, he In 2008, the respondent was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while revocations and suspensions do p. 3 “until the reissuance of the license,” for the purposes of RSA 263:64, IV,

RSA 259:107, which provides that the period of suspension shall continue

license . . . shall remain in effect until a license . . . has been reissued,” and Notwithstanding RSA 259:90, which provides that “[t]he revocation of any suspension or revocation” refers only to the specific period imposed by a court.

explains that the “period of suspension or revocation” imposed by revocations and suspensions. The State argues that the second sentence RSA 263:64, V clarifies that RSA 263:64, IV refers only to court-imposed

interpretation, the first sentence states that for the purposes of RSA 263:64, Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV). license has been restored or reissued. Thus, together, the two sentences clarify clear that for other purposes, revocations and suspensions continue until a restored or reissued. Under this interpretation, the second sentence makes

or privilege to drive. administratively-imposed revocations and suspensions, the first sentence of designated and until the restoration of the person’s driver’s license suspension or revocation” shall include the period specifically

There is another way, however, to construe RSA 263:64, V. Under this not pertain to suspensions or revocations imposed by the Director of the New 259:90, :107. 263:64, IV pertains only to court-ordered suspensions or revocations; it does together as follows. The first sentence of RSA 263:64, V provides that RSA court or the DMV continues until the offender’s license is restored. Accord RSA

court.

the terms “revocation” and “suspension” to refer to both court-imposed and circumstances). Although RSA 259:90 (2004) and RSA 259:107 (2004) define revocation imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction. “Period of (granting DMV authority to suspend or revoke licenses under certain

The State argues that the two sentences of RSA 263:64, V should be read

mandatory sentence of imprisonment shall be suspended by the months of the conviction . . . . No portion of the minimum not less than 7 consecutive 24-hour periods to be served within 6 for purposes of paragraph IV only shall mean only suspension or “period of suspension or revocation” as used in paragraph IV and and the definition of “suspension” in RSA 259:107, the phrase Notwithstanding the definition of “revocation” in RSA 259:90

RSA 263:64, V provides:

misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a period RSA 265-A:2, I, . . . [or] RSA 265:82, . . . shall be guilty of a of the current law.

p. 4 at the discretion of the court. day period, he would be subject to the usual misdemeanor penalty

until the driving privilege is restored. This is contrary to the intent

applies only to driving during the period of revocation

driving privilege restored and was picked up subsequent to the 60-

interpreting the phrase “during the period of revocation” to mean the legislative intent of the last change. Some judges are

attached amendment which spells out that the mandatory penalty In an attempt to clarify this issue once more, I offer the only if he drove during that 60-day period. If he failed to have his

the period of revocation. have had inquiries from attorneys all over the state asking about or the privilege has been restored.” Apparently our efforts to clarify did not succeed, because I

revoked for 60 days would be subject to [a] mandatory sentence used in RSA 263:64, IV did For example, a person whose license is suspended or

that the mandatory 7-day sentence applied only to driving during penalty for driving after revocation. The intent was to make clear driver’s license “shall remain in effect until a new license . . . has been issued difficulties in the interpretation of RSA 263:64, IV concerning the During the last session we passed a bill to correct some license was restored. amendment explained: contained only what is now its first sentence. See id. As the sponsor of the See Laws 1987, 396:3. When it was first enacted in 1987, RSA 263:64, V

263:64, V to make clear that the phrase “period of suspension or revocation” as In 1987, soon after Callahan was decided, the legislature enacted RSA

we relied, in part, upon RSA 259:90, which provided that the revocation of a

revocation period to which RSA 263:64 referred continued until an offender’s Callahan, 126 N.H. 161, 163-64 (1985). In Callahan, we ruled that the sentence of RSA 263:64, V was enacted in response to our decision in State v. history. See Appeal of Ann Miles Builder, 150 N.H. 315, 318 (2003). The first Because we find both interpretations reasonable, we consult legislative

license is restored. RSA 263:64, V. the court-ordered suspension or revocation expires and before the person’s purposes of RSA 263:64, IV alone, the phrase does not include the period after that, while the phrase has a different meaning for other purposes, for the complete everything and you get your license back.

p. 5 impose the mandatory seven-day sentence set forth in RSA 263:64, IV.

revoked for DWI, you should be revoked for DWI until you

Committee, as well as the law enforcement, feel that if you are offense for operating after suspension and the [Study] for DWI. At 91 days, you are subject to a violation level

of RSA 263:64, IV, and was subject to the mandatory seven-day sentence set restored, he was driving during the “period of . . . revocation” for the purposes in this case, because the respondent drove while his license had not yet been

BRODERICK, C.J.