2009-519, June Favazza v. David Braley & a.

The appellant/landlord, June Favazza, appeals an order of

the brief and orally), for the appellees. Seufert Professional Association, of Franklin (Christopher J. Seufert on

Darrin R. Brown, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the appellant. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. JUNE FAVAZZA

No. 2009-519 editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Belknap Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as we look to the legislative history of RSA 526:1. p. 2 RSA 526:1 when the case originated in the district court. court. Because there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the statute, first tried in the superior court, or could have been first tried in the district

result.

that a party cannot petition for a new trial in the superior court pursuant to phrase “any case” does not specify whether the original case must have been

granted, and this appeal followed.

at 703. the legislature would not pass an act that would lead to an absurd or illogical See Prof’l Firefighters, 159 N.H.

legislative history, landlord-tenant matters originally tried in district court. We disagree, and hold ordinary meanings to the words used. further hearing would be equitable.” This section is ambiguous because the through accident, mistake or misfortune justice has not been done and a RSA 526:1 provides that “[a] new trial may be granted in any case when

lose his job if he testified. The tenant’s motion to dismiss the petition was Works, 160 N.H. __, __ (decided March 25, 2010). with a forged lease agreement, and Ellis threatened a witness that he would context of the overall statutory scheme. See Appeal of Pennichuck Water issues during the district court proceedings, the tenant presented the court Simpson, 153 N.H. at 475. We interpret statutory provisions in the

699, 703 (2010), and examine the statute’s overall objective and presume that

(2006). When statutory language is ambiguous, however, we will consider superior court is authorized to grant a new trial in all cases, including Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471, 475 language found in the statute, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and considered as a whole. Id. When construing its meaning, we first examine the arbiters of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute N.H. 437, 438 (2009). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Zorn v. Demetri, 158 To resolve this issue we must construe RSA 526:1. “The interpretation of chapter 526, arguing that the tenant and Ellis perjured themselves on material

Relying upon the language of RSA 526:1, the landlord argues the amount of $41,000. 540-A:3, III (2007). The trial court entered a judgment for the tenant in the

petitioned the Belknap County Superior Court for a new trial pursuant to RSA Hampshire Supreme Court, she failed to file the appeal. Instead, she denied. Although she then filed a notice of intent to appeal to the New The landlord filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court

belongings from January 4, 2009, until February 14, 2009, in violation of RSA landlord of his intent to move out, and that the landlord “distrained” his jurisdiction. As we held in

p. 3 matters brought pursuant to RSA 540-A:2. district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court over his tenancy or attempt to circumvent lawful procedures for eviction.” The

RSA 526:5 would transfer the matter to the superior court despite its lack of

questions of law to the supreme court.

that “[n]o landlord shall willfully violate a tenant’s right to quiet enjoyment of

court; otherwise, when the probate or district court has exclusive jurisdiction, superior court. Thus, the original case must have been heard in the superior case of conflicting statutory provisions, the specific statute controls over the in conjunction with RSA 526:2, the word “court” in RSA 526:5 refers to the in the district court. When the legislature created the district courts in 1963, See RSA 540-A:4, V. Thus, RSA enacted, the legislature could not have intended it to apply to cases originating trial in the district court, a party in an RSA chapter 540-A case may appeal intended to mean literally “any case,” but, rather, “any case See RSA 540-A:4, I. Following a

having no jurisdiction of the cause when returned there.” originally tried in the superior court. statutory scheme set forth in RSA chapter 540-A (2007). RSA 540-A:2 provides trial of a landlord-tenant dispute in the district court ignores the specific landlord’s argument that the superior court may grant a new trial following the

See Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 510 (1985). The

In addition, it is a well settled rule of statutory construction that in the court, and shall be tried as if no judgment had been rendered therein.” Read

matter). Because there were no district courts in the state when RS 192:2 was in superior court.” 273. This demonstrates that the phrase “any case” in RSA 526:1 was not

Legislature intended that an action should be made returnable to a court district courts in the state, and all new trials were granted in cases that were Sheafe, “it would hardly seem probable that the

new trial is granted the action shall be brought forward on the docket of the where the judgment was rendered.” RSA 526:5 further provides that when “a applicable where superior court did not have original jurisdiction over subject petitions for new trial “may be presented to the superior court in the county of RSA chapter 526. Pennichuck, 160 N.H. at __. RSA 526:2 provides that This conclusion is further supported by an examination of the remainder

was codified in RS 192:2. When RS 192:2 was first enacted, there were no courts. continuously existed in our laws, in one form or another, since 1842, when it was not expanded to allow the superior court to review decisions of the district originated in the district court. The right to petition for a new trial has it to cases that originated in the district courts. Thus, the scope of RSA 526:1 see RSA ch. 502-A (1997 & Supp. 2009), it did not amend RSA 526:1 to apply

272-73 (1854) (act providing for new trials to be granted in superior court not

not intended to permit new trials in the superior court when the case The legislative history of RSA 526:1 supports our conclusion that it was be required to review each petition. p. 4 motions for new trial would likely not be meritorious, the superior court would tribunal that was sympathetic to their argument. Although many such 526:1. This would encourage litigants to “forum shop” until they found a

supreme court and then move for a new trial in the superior court under RSA

which “shall hear the matter superior court to review its own judgments but not those of other courts. however, appeals of such proceedings “may be taken to the superior court,” neglect of a child. RSA 169-C:4, I; 169-C:3, IX. Pursuant to RSA 169-C:28, I, and all manner of turpitude,” disgruntled litigants could first appeal to the

in the probate court. We did not, however, decide in

e.g., State v. Looney, 154 N.H. 801, 802 (2007); State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265,

contrast, it is our well-established practice that RSA chapter 526 allows the The superior court’s jurisdiction was neither challenged nor appealed. By court has exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings alleging the abuse or chapter 526 authorized the superior court to review a probate court’s decision. court noted, the facts were “contested, hotly, to include claims of lying, forgery decisions. It is easy to imagine that cases like this one, where, as the trial Sylvain whether RSA the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial in the superior court following a trial Finally, we note that in Sylvain v. Estate of Sylvain, 117 N.H. 546 (1977),

declared, may appeal therefrom to obtain a court’s decisions by the superior court. provide limited exceptions to the general rule prohibiting review of the district

superior court has the authority to conduct the overall statutory scheme, which delineates specific situations in which the cases tried in the district, family, and probate courts. This is inconsistent with Similarly, RSA chapter 169-C (2002 & Supp. 2009) provides that the district superior courts unprecedented review of district, probate, and family court The landlord’s interpretation of RSA 526:1 would confer upon the

by a district court of a class A misdemeanor, at the time the sentence is chapter 526 is ambiguous, these statutes demonstrate a legislative intent to

case” as granting the superior court the authority to grant a new trial in all questions of law arising therefrom to the supreme court.” RSA 599:1. the superior court shall sentence the defendant, and the defendant may appeal court.” “If, after a jury trial in the superior court, the defendant is found guilty,

For example, pursuant to RSA 599:1 (Supp. 2009), “[a] person convicted

court.

The landlord’s argument would require us to interpret the phase “any

governs subsequent review, and, thus, controls. Plantier, 126 N.H. at p. 5 510. chapter 526 conflicts with RSA chapter 540-A, RSA chapter 540-A specifically chapter 540-A has a specific mechanism for review. To the extent that RSA 5

BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS, HICKS and CONBOY, JJ., concurred.

be a novel departure from the current appellate system in place in this state. 128 N.H. 366, 368 (1986). Thus, to agree with the landlord in this case would 282 (2002), cert. denied, p. 5 538 U.S. 1014 (2003); Hodgdon v. Weeks Mem. Hosp.,