2008-443, State of New Hampshire v. Brandon Bilodeau

refused to speak to the detectives and asked for an attorney. On January 9 detectives investigated the stabbing and sought to interview the defendant. He was accused of stabbing a fellow prisoner. The next day, two state police

the defendant, an inmate in the Secure Psychiatric Unit at the State Prison,

The following facts are supported by the record. On January 4, 2007,

the police. We affirm. Court (Mangones, J.) erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to assault by a prisoner. See RSA 642:9 (2007). He argues that the Superior HICKS, J. The defendant, Brandon Bilodeau, appeals his conviction of

orally, for the defendant. William J. Schultz, public defender, of Manchester, on the brief and

general, on the brief and orally), for the State. Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Nicholas Cort, assistant attorney to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

No. 2008-443 editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Merrimack Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as denied the defendant’s motion. p. 2 receiving five medications daily at the time of his confession. The trial court

for fourteen years and had no concerns about the defendant’s demeanor. his own accord.” The other detective testified that he had known the defendant

social personality disorder. To treat these conditions, the defendant was

every citizen due process of law.

he seemed fine to me . . . . I didn’t have any reason to believe he wasn’t there of

depression, suicidal ideation, hallucinations, mood disorders, and an anti-

be . . . compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself” and guarantees

The defendant then signed the statement. the defendant’s statement on the waiver form, and read it to the defendant. end of the fifteen-minute interview, one of the detectives wrote a summary of

defendant “knew what he wanted to say, how he wanted to say it. You know, voluntary. State v. Rezk, 150 N.H. 483, 486 (2004). Whether a statement is that he spoke “pretty articulate[ly].” Specifically, one detective testified that the the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was the prison. The detectives testified that the defendant appeared “lucid” and that upon admittance to the Secure Psychiatric Unit, he suffered from Id. For a statement to be admissible at trial,

Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that “[n]o subject shall the New Hampshire Constitution. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15. Part I, characterizes in his brief as “[m]inimal.” and, therefore, their admission at trial violated his due process rights under On appeal, the defendant contends that his statements were involuntary stabbed a fellow prisoner in the back with a sharpened toothbrush. Near the

interview the defendant. The detectives read the defendant his the defendant’s mental health either from the defendant or the medical staff at Process Clause of the New Hampshire Constitution. He presented evidence Miranda rights, and that his statements were involuntary under the Due arguing that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his The defendant moved to suppress the oral and written statements, going on.” One officer responded to the note – a response that the defendant

signed a form waiving his rights. Subsequently, he confessed that he had

that the defendant wished to speak with them. They returned to the prison to At no point before or during this interview did the detectives inquire as to

I don’t know if I should seek outside legal counsel. Please let me know what is incident . . . ? No one has answered any requests in regards to this matter and charges against him. The second slip read, “What is the current status of the The defendant stated he understood them and wanted to waive them. He then from a standard form. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).

On March 19, 2007, prison officials called the detectives to advise them

about the status of the investigation and whether the State planned to pursue and January 12, 2007, the defendant sent “inmate request slips” inquiring of law, render a confession involuntary.” acknowledged that the defendant was housed in the psychiatric treatment unit p. 3 based upon the totality of the circumstances. In its analysis, the trial court

its effect.” (quotation omitted)). Mental illness, however, “does not, as a matter beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s statements were voluntary

significant in determining whether any given police conduct was overbearing in communications with prison authorities, found that the State had proved tactics. medical files provided by the defendant, and reading the defendant’s The trial court, after listening to the testimony of the officers, reviewing

ability to resist police coercion. omitted). developmental condition if it impairs his capacity for self-determination or his rational intellect and a free will.” In re Wesley B., 145 N.H. at 431 (quotation totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s statements were the product of a (quotation omitted). The trial court still must determine “whether, given the with the police.” Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405 establish that the defendant had “any ability to exercise meaningful discretion also contends that the State did not “verify a rational thought process” or 400-01 (1992) (“[P]roof of a deranged or deficient mental state may be highly

Id. at 431 (quotation omitted); see State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390,

have a heightened vulnerability to what otherwise would be acceptable police defendant may not be able to “make a meaningful choice” to confess or may

Under the Due Process Clause, we consider a person’s mental or

mind incapable of conscious choice.”

combined with subtle police coercion made his statements involuntary. He (quotation omitted). Here, the defendant argues that his psychiatric condition the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id. circumstances.” Rezk, 150 N.H. at 487 (quotation omitted). We analyze “both a determination of voluntariness in light of “the totality of all surrounding The Due Process Clause of the State Constitution requires that we make

omitted).

confession cannot be “the product of a will overborne by police tactics, or of a determined.” In re Wesley B., 145 N.H. 428, 430 (2000) (quotation omitted). A Damiano, 124 N.H. at 747. The decision to confess “must be freely selfand unconstrained choice.” Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405 (quotation omitted); is “whether the actions of an individual are the product of an essentially free applied. State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747 (1984). The focus of the inquiry No single definition of voluntariness exists that can be mechanically

most favorable to the State is to the contrary. Rezk, 150 N.H. at 486. determination unless the manifest weight of the evidence viewed in the light Hammond, 144 N.H. 401, 404 (1999). We will not reverse the trial court’s voluntary is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. State v. choice whether to invoke them.

p. 4 defendant understood his basic legal rights and could make a meaningful

“Understanding these rights are you willing to answer questions?”

before the March 17, 2007 interview at issue, these actions indicate that the interview, the detectives read the defendant his practice when the officers know of a defendant’s mental condition.

determined.” lasted only fifteen minutes and the defendant confessed immediately. times during that period), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968 (2003). The interview involuntary because defendant isolated for fifteen days and interviewed nine next to the questions, “Do you understand each of these rights?” and Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584-85 (5th Cir.) (holding confession inordinate nor oppressive. Cf. State v. Spencer, 149 N.H. 622, 629 (2003); Dumas, 145 N.H. 301, 303 (2000). The length of the interview was neither “should seek outside legal counsel.” While admittedly occurring two months interviewed the defendant in the attorney conference room. At the start of the Cf. State v. and January 12 inquiring about the ongoing investigation, even asking if he mean to verify that a defendant understands them, although this may be good speak to us.” The defendant also sent two “inmate request slips” on January 9 officers do not have to engage a defendant in a discussion of what those rights consider. See State v. Rodney Portigue, 125 N.H. 352, 364 (1984). Police voluntariness of a later confession, it is one factor that a trial court can also evidence that the defendant’s decision to confess was “freely self- While compliance with Miranda does not conclusively establish the

from a standard form which he signed. The defendant wrote “yes” on the form

request, went to the Secure Housing Unit where the defendant was held, and that he wished to speak with the detectives. The detectives responded to this wanted to talk to an attorney but at some point in the future he may want to only occurred after the defendant sent a message through prison personnel

Wesley B., 145 N.H. at 430 (quotation omitted). The interview

The events surrounding the defendant’s interview on March 19, 2007,

light most favorable to the State. finding was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence when viewed in the

waive his rights.” the ability “to consider his legal rights and his options, including whether to “was well able to sufficiently process information and make choices” and had testified that the defendant chose not to speak with him, stating that “he Miranda rights when the officers sought to interview him. One of the detectives January 5, 2007, one day after the alleged stabbing, the defendant invoked his capacity for self-determination and that his will was not overborne. See id. On evidence that the defendant’s mental condition did not critically impair his

Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court’s

psychiatric condition. Nevertheless, the trial court found that the defendant at the time of the alleged crime and that he received medication for his p. 5 5

Supreme Court’s decision in

the understanding that the holding is not inconsistent with the United States DUGGAN, J., concurring specially. I concur in the majority opinion with them. While that response may have been “minimal,” BRODERICK, C.J., dissented. implied promises in order to obtain the statement from the defendant. DALIANIS, J., concurred; DUGGAN, J., concurred specially; defendant’s intoxication). At no point did the two detectives make any direct or

because there was “nothing coercive, deceptive, or overbearing in the police’s evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. conducted in a cold parking lot by an officer who was a friend, partially that the trial court’s finding was contrary to the manifest weight of the voluntariness, construed in the light most favorable to the State, we cannot say In sum, based upon our review of the trial court’s determination of articulate[ly],” whereas the juvenile in promise of leniency). Rezk, 1 p. 5 50 N.H. at 491 (confession involuntary where induced by specific charges in January 2007 and received only a “[m]inimal” response to one of Cf.

police knew the defendant was intoxicated but did not take advantage of the

see Chapman, 13 p. 5 5 N.H. at 400-01 (confession voluntary where the

evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State. omitted) (statement voluntary of a defendant suffering from depression, overbearing in the police’s conduct.” Hammond, 144 N.H. at 40 p. 5 5 (quotation minimal information he desired.” There was “nothing coercive, deceptive or also testified that the defendant appeared “lucid” and spoke “pretty defendant argues, “forc[e] the defendant to speak with the officers to get the

the fact that he sent two inmate request slips inquiring about the possibility of combined with his mental condition, overbore his will. The defendant points to The defendant argues that the detectives used “subtle coercion” that,

that the superior court’s finding was contrary to the manifest weight of the trouble paying attention.” Id. at 431. Here, unlike in Wesley B., we cannot say

“[H]ow bad did I f . . . that guy up?” after the interview. The detectives here and freely. A corrections officer also testified that the defendant asked him, the face of continued police questioning. Id. at 432. He confessed immediately at 432. Unlike in Wesley B., the defendant here did not deny the stabbing in B., the juvenile’s “will was overborne” rendering his confession involuntary. Id. presence of legal counsel or a guardian. Wesley B., 14 p. 5 5 N.H. at 431. In Wesley average intelligence” who was questioned for over two hours without the admitting the inculpatory statement of an eleven-year-old boy with “low This case differs from Wesley B., where we held the trial court erred in choice, then the statements are inadmissible at trial.

adopt a stricter standard because “[t]hey may indeed differ as to the overborne by police tactics, or of a mind incapable of a conscious satisfies the federal constitutional requirements, but that the states are free to

unconstrained choice. If the statements are the product of a will The United States Supreme Court has held that the preponderance standard statements were made voluntarily. State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 147 (1977). “preponderance of the evidence” standard to determine whether a defendant’s Federal Constitution. Over thirty years ago, we expressly rejected the

Our State Constitution provides greater protection in this area than the

fairness. Id. at 74 p. 6 6-47 (citations and quotation omitted).

individual.” individual’s involuntary statements to obtain a conviction against that actions of an individual are the product of an essentially free and must be made. However, the nucleus of the inquiry is whether the civil and political institutions.” range of situations in which the determination of voluntariness No single definition of voluntariness is sufficient to cover the pt. I, art. 15. Part I, Article 15 guarantees every citizen due process of the law. incapable of making a free choice. that the State should not take advantage of an individual who is the lack of rational choice of the accused, and society’s conclusion process rights under Part I, Article 15, we look to the dictates of fundamental be admitted into evidence are the unreliability of the confession, The factors underlying the belief that such statements should not

Id.

involvement of a State actor,” “Such fundamental principles are implicated when the State uses an

the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our according to the laws of the land, but also that its actions be consistent with N.H. 217, 220 (1987). “Due process requires not only that the State act be . . . compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself.” N.H. CONST.

See State v. Winslow, 140 N.H. 319, 321 (1995); State v. Denney, 130

defendant’s confession was voluntary, I respectfully dissent. In determining whether the State’s actions violated the defendant’s due

see State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. p. 6 687, 691 (1994). State action is required in order to trigger the protections of Part I, Article 15,

constitutional guarantees of due process may not be violated without the State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 74 p. 6 6 (1984). Because “a defendant’s

The New Hampshire Constitution provides in part that “[n]o subject shall

evidence presented, that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the BRODERICK, C.J., dissenting. Because I disagree, based upon the to be decided by a balance of probabilities.

p. 7 impairment to the analysis of whether his statement was voluntary, we stated:

deceptive or overbearing in its effect. the risk of error too great to permit a determination of admissibility

developmentally impaired juvenile. Regarding the significance of the juvenile’s

to be excluded. under the totality of the circumstances, any official conduct was coercive, the police save by his own testimony. The stakes are too high and accused. He has no means of combating the evidence produced by greatest secrecy in which the cards can be stacked against the

of a defendant in a custodial setting on the voluntariness of his confession

whether the trial court erred in admitting the inculpatory statement of a (1992). Subsequently, in In re Wesley B., 145 N.H. 428 (2000), we considered

amount to a determination that it is no more serious for an Article 15, it is to be considered “highly significant” in determining whether, that danger. The adoption of the preponderance standard would dispositive of an inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession under Part I, proof of a defendant’s deficient mental condition, standing alone, is not in the psychological atmosphere of police custody and in the State v. Chapman, we stated that although

We have had few occasions to consider the effect of the mental condition

Id. at 147.

preponderance test does not provide a sufficient safeguard against

basically amounts to conviction. Confessions are usually obtained A confession is a special type of evidence. Its acceptance

Phinney, 117 N.H. at 146-47 (citations omitted). We emphasized that:

involuntary confession will be admitted against him. The ever were. There is always the danger that a defendant’s confessions which are involuntary are as compelling now as they now as it was then and the policy considerations for excluding The danger of admitting involuntary confessions is as great determining the voluntariness of confessions . . . . Supreme Court] that the reasonable doubt standard be used in As early as 1845, it was suggested [by the New Hampshire

statements were made voluntarily, we explained: requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s In rejecting the federal standard and holding that our State Constitution

U.S. 477, 4 p. 8 89 (1972). appropriate restriction of the values they find at stake.” Lego v. Twomey, 404 a free will.

2006, he suffered from severe depression, suicidal ideation, auditory and visual overbearing in its effect, admitted to the Secure Psychiatric Unit (SPU) of the state prison in August defendant’s statements were the product of a rational intellect and deficits. applied to one who is mentally impaired. defendant free of impairment may not be constitutionally tolerable when Circumstances which may pass constitutional muster when applied to a

“highly significant” in determining whether any official conduct was The record before us demonstrates that when the defendant was determine whether, given the totality of the circumstances, the and adopted by the court, to address the juvenile’s language and attention render a confession involuntary. Rather, the trial court still must doubt that the confession was voluntary. choice. However, mental illness does not, as a matter of law, mother, legal counsel, guardian ad litem or psychological evaluator. an inquiry into the effect of mental illness on a particular defendant. abilities.” Id. at 431. The totality of the circumstances test necessarily involves “measured by the nature of the interview within the context of [the defendant’s] 145 N.H. at 430. Furthermore, whether a police interview was coercive is impaired.” must also be factored into a court’s determination of voluntariness,” Wesley B.,

Pursuant to our case law, therefore, an individual’s mental impairment is

it was inconsistent with the procedures later suggested by the psychologist, Id. at 433. Accordingly, we held that the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable who, because of a mental condition, cannot make a meaningful interview, demonstrated that the juvenile’s “will was overborne.” Id. at 432. interviewed by the police for close to two hours without the presence of his educational level, educational impairments, and the length of his solitary totality of the surrounding circumstances, including the juvenile’s age,

Id. at 431 (quotation and brackets omitted). An examination of the

also whether the juvenile’s capacity for self-determination was critically required to address not simply whether the minor’s will was overborne, but the relevant factors in conducting its review of voluntariness” because it “was

See id. We concluded that “the trial court did not properly weigh all

432. Although the officer’s questioning was not verbally hostile or threatening,

of voluntariness. The due process clause of the State Constitution The juvenile, an eleven-year-old of low average intelligence, was that impairment must also be factored into a court’s determination Id. at 430-31 (quotation omitted).

that impairs that person’s ability to comprehend his or her choices, If a person suffers from a mental or developmental condition information.” p. 9 response, although the defendant’s brief characterizes it as providing “minimal bureau. There is no evidence in the record concerning the specifics of the

was made by Sergeant Dinsmoor of the department of corrections investigation

legal counsel. Please let me know what is going on.” At some point a response requests in regards to this matter and I don’t know if I should seek outside status of the incident that brought me to SHU? No one has answered any

medications he was taking at that time. medical staff regarding the defendant’s mental illness diagnosis or any

them “to find out what was going on.” 9 officers. The defendant maintains in his brief that he wanted to speak with defendant sent a second inmate request slip asking: “What is the current staff relayed a request from him that he wanted to speak with the investigating

prior to the interview. Detective Puckett testified that he did not seek any information from the SPU

point in the future he may want to speak to us.” to speak to him, indicating that “he wanted to talk to an attorney but at some in an isolation tank.” According to Detective Puckett, the defendant chose not

The defendant did not receive a reply to this request. On January 12, the the SHU to interview the defendant in the “attorney visit room,” after prison outside charges were being pursued. Please let me know what is going on.” in SHU now five days . . . . No one’s seen me since SPU, and then I was told conditions. The latter medication had been doubled in dosage just three days SPU, where the alleged assault occurred, is a psychiatric treatment unit, him very well,” having only met him once before. Although he knew that the the interview, the defendant “seemed good,” although he “didn’t really know At the suppression hearing, Detective Puckett testified that on the day of

alleged assault, when he went to the SPU where the defendant was “being held

On March 19, 2007, Detective Puckett and Sergeant Dinsmoor went to

“What is the current status of this alleged investigation for assault? I’ve been including medications to treat depression, anxiety, and certain psychiatric the Secure Housing Unit (SHU). He was receiving numerous medications daily which he confessed to an alleged assault, the defendant was incarcerated in “poor.” At the time of the interview with police on March 19, 2007, during

he began investigating the incident on January 5, 2007, the day after the

Three days later, the defendant sent an inmate request slip asking:

family relations, judgment, thinking or mood. His judgment was labeled communication, or major impairment in several areas such as work, school, Assessment Functioning Scale score indicated impairment in reality testing or At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Puckett testified that

Testing placed him in the “severe range of hopelessness.” His Global hallucinations, mood disorders, and an anti-social personality disorder. court’s determination.

p. 10 essentially free and unconstrained choice.

enforcement concerning this matter were voluntarily and freely made.” 10 ordinary,” the trial court concluded that the “defendant’s statements to law light most favorable to the State.”

could interfere with his abilities. comprehend his or her choices, such impairment must be factored into the

circumstances to assess whether the confession was the product of an

the State Prison and that the defendant’s demeanor has not been out of the the details of the interrogation are considered. The court . . . look[s] at the unless it is “contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, as viewed in the Chapman, 135 N.H. at 400-01. “Both the characteristics of the accused and determining whether any given police conduct was overbearing in its effect.

treatment unit. He did not ask the SPU medical staff what the defendant’s clearly erroneous. person suffers from a mental condition which impairs that person’s ability to paranoid delusions. He testified that he knew that the SPU is a psychiatric See Wesley B., 145 N.H. at 430. If a defendant was “provided with his such as Inmate Request Slips.” In addition, the trial court noted that the We determine voluntariness by looking at the totality of the surrounding

(quotation omitted).

as being lucid during the interview,” that one of the officers “had noted that he voluntariness of a confession, we will not reverse the trial court’s decision the investigating law enforcement officials,” that the defendant “was described Id. When the underlying subject of the suppression motion is the 1009 (2003). Our review of the court’s legal conclusions, however, is de novo.

the trial court’s factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are auditory hallucinations or that he was suffering from visual hallucinations and When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept

took place between the defendant and the investigators” and “other evidence

that there “was no overbearing or other impropriety in terms of the conduct of whether he should speak with the investigating officials.” Based upon the fact and had had time between the alleged incident and the interview to “reflect on

on the day of the interview, the defendant appeared “lucid.” Sergeant population, but not when he was in the SPU. According to Sergeant Dinsmoor, information and make choices.” This evidence included “the interchanges that presented with evidence that the defendant was well able to sufficiently process The trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress states that it “was

past fourteen years, when the defendant had been in the general prison Sergeant Dinsmoor testified that he had known the defendant for the given.

p. 11 further concerns whether his will was overborne and his confession voluntarily

defendant’s statement was voluntary.

investigation, and the brief nature of the interview at which he confessed raise solitary confinement, that he was provided with little information about the thereby impaired. In addition, the fact that the defendant was housed in acceptable police tactics.” 11 health, the State has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the

doubt that statements were voluntary).

medical evidence that the defendant’s capacity for self-determination was not what is being said to him, but also on his heightened vulnerability to otherwise

from a medical professional familiar with the status of the defendant’s mental defendant “seemed good” and was “lucid.” In the absence of credible evidence suppression hearing was provided by laypersons who concluded that the the police officers, trial court found that State had proved beyond a reasonable

more difficult for him to decide whether or not to confess); condition, the State bears the burden at the suppression hearing to offer the time of the confession, put the State on notice of the defendant’s mental should not only be on whether the individual has the ability to understand Accordingly, I would hold that in the presence of objective facts which, at of the defendant. . . . The focus in cases involving mentally ill . . . defendants review of the interrogation techniques used, but also the mental characteristics

essentially free and unconstrained choice to confess. The only testimony at the N.H. at 747 (after listening to testimony of the psychiatrist, the defendant, and understanding the meaning and effect of waiving his rights); Damiano, 124 that despite defendant’s borderline intelligence, he was capable of N.H. 301, 303 (2000) (trial court relied upon State’s expert’s opinion to find

(psychologist testified that juvenile’s impairments rendered it substantially

that an analysis of the totality of the circumstances must include not only a

State provided no evidence concerning their effect on his ability to make an in the SPU, and evidence of the administration of multiple medications, the Despite evidence of mental illness such that the defendant was confined

to determine whether the police exerted such an influence on the defendant

Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 271, 287 (1999). “The courts have recognized Doctrine in Cases of Mentally Retarded and Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants, 4 Amendment Miranda Waiver and Fourteenth Amendment Voluntariness measure and is always changing in intensity.” St. Florian, Note, Fifth “Mental illness . . . is a complex psychological condition that is difficult to

the defendant, and the legal significance of how the defendant reacted, in order factual circumstances surrounding the confession, the psychological impact on defendant’s requests were largely ignored.

p. 12 fifteen minutes, engages in an allegedly adequate discourse over the waiver of investigation and whether he should invoke his right to counsel, the police officers, without the presence of counsel and yet, in the span of just who has spent over two months in solitary confinement is confronted by two

overbearing in its effect. 12

notwithstanding attempts to obtain basic information about the status of the counsel, apparently was answered with “minimal information.” Thus, nature of the confession in this case where a mentally ill, medicated inmate

disorders, thereby increasing the likelihood that the conduct of the officials was exacerbating his underlying conditions of depression, anxiety and psychiatric that spending over two months in solitary confinement had the effect of should speak with the investigating officials.” However, it is equally plausible and the interview “allowe[d] [the] defendant time to reflect on whether he that the passage of over two months between the time of the alleged incident about the investigation, specifically asking if he should seek outside legal police were coming on March 19 to speak with him. The trial court reasoned However, the brevity of the interview calls into question the true voluntary conditions may have had upon the mental health of this defendant. There is no evidence in the record whether the defendant was aware that the lasted fifteen minutes in support of its position that it was not coercive. in the record concerning the conditions in the SHU and what effect those The State points to the fact that the interview with the defendant only

information about the investigation, it was not answered. A second inquiry interview the defendant waived his rights and confessed to the alleged assault. solitary confinement for twenty-three hours each day. Yet, there is no evidence two months after the alleged incident, at which time during a fifteen-minute the status of the pending investigation resulted in a visit from the police over The defendant’s subsequent request to speak with prison officials about defendant’s will, his confession would have to be suppressed).

to do so. Although the defendant sent an inmate request slip seeking speak with an attorney, there is no evidence in the record that he was allowed span of approximately two-and-a-half months, the defendant was held in Despite the fact that the defendant initially stated that he wanted to the day after the alleged assault, and March 19, the date of the confession, a tank. At oral argument before us, it was represented that between January 5, and recognized that if court found these conditions to have overborne the defendant’s living conditions of confinement, viewed living quarters at prison Decker, 138 N.H. 432, 436 (1994) (trial court heard testimony about defendant of factual circumstances surrounding the confession); State v. Aubuchont, 147 N.H. at 146 (court must consider psychological impact on

defendant concerning the alleged assault, he was being held in an isolation Detective Puckett testified that when he first went to speak with the was overwhelming beyond a reasonable doubt.

p. 13 the confession, I disagree that the alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt victim’s testimony, the State relied upon the defendant’s confession. Without in the dayroom and no blood was found on the defendant. Aside from the

realized he was bleeding from multiple puncture wounds. No blood was found

investigation.” depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which on his back and started pounding him. When he returned to his room, he watching television in the dayroom with other inmates, the defendant jumped secured.” State cannot meet its burden in this case. The victim testified that while

reasonable doubt and, accordingly, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction. confession. that the admission of the confession at trial was not harmless error beyond a would reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress his Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964). I would hold

criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the

Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). “[A] system of

determinations of guilt are based upon “evidence independently and freely evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. I would hold that the our system is accusatorial, not inquisitional. Under an accusatorial system, An underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law is that

not overborne and that his confession was voluntarily given. Accordingly, I

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the alternative The State suggests that even if admission of the confession was error, the

State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s will was favorable to the State. The evidence does not permit a conclusion that the contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence when viewed in the light most capacity for self-determination, I conclude that the trial court’s decision is addressing whether the defendant’s mental health critically impaired his circumstances, as well as the State’s failure to submit sufficient evidence Considering the facts of the interview in light of all of the surrounding

N.H. 733, 739 (2001). in assessing what transpired during the interrogation.” State v. Farrell, 145 speculation, avoid unwanted claims of coercion, and generally assist all parties recognized that “videotaping custodial interrogation may lessen the inherent a written confession prepared by the police officers. I further note that we have his rights, is sufficiently presented with the charges against him and approves