2008-844, Southern New Hampshire Medical Center v. Anthony Hayes

The defendant, Anthony Hayes, appeals: (1) an order of the

and Melissa S. Penson on the brief, and Ms. Penson orally), for the defendant. Smith-Weiss, Shepard & Durmer, P.C., of Nashua (Robert M. Shepard

A. Biron on the brief, and Mr. Fontaine orally), for the plaintiff. Welts, White & Fontaine, P.C., of Nashua (Michael J. Fontaine and Lisa to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. SOUTHERN NEW HAMPSHIRE MEDICAL CENTER

No. 2008-844 editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hillsborough-southern judicial district Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as p. 2 Anthony received the marital properties subject to SNHMC’s attachment. During the pendency of these proceedings, Karen passed away. $1,200, her bank account with a balance of $0.00, and all of her debts.

that “the legal fact of marriage was not in dispute.” of hotels, motels, and other people’s houses.” liable, under the doctrine of necessaries, for Karen’s medical debts to SNHMC. any other medical debts or bills.” Karen received one automobile valued at Following a bench trial on the merits, the trial court found that Anthony was fact remained with respect to his liability for Karen’s medical expenses.

found that it would be unfair to require SNHMC to counter this defense, given testified that sometimes Karen was admitted to SNHMC after being “taken out

Specifically, “Karen [was] responsible for paying the debt to [SNHMC] as well as notice. summary judgment against Anthony, finding that genuine issues of material

affirmative defense, but that Anthony failed to properly raise it. The court years . . . when [the medical bills] were . . . incurred.” For example, Anthony that he and Karen “did not live as husband and wife for the past seven to eight indicate that she was living with Anthony, Anthony disputes this, asserting responsible for his or her own medical expenses not covered by insurance. upon this doctrine. Anthony objected, contending that he gave adequate stipulated agreement. Under the terms of the divorce, each party was owed to SNHMC. The trial court, however, denied SNHMC’s motion for were still married. The Hayeses were divorced in January 2007 pursuant to a Karen, finding “no issue of material fact” that she was liable for the balance The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of SNHMC against

The trial court granted SNHMC’s motion. It ruled that elopement is an

and Anthony’s marriage during this time. While Karen’s medical records adequate notice, pursuant to Superior Court Rule 28, that he intended to rely argued that elopement is an affirmative defense, and that Anthony failed to give When SNHMC placed an attachment on the properties, Karen and Anthony in any way referencing an alleged common law doctrine of elopement.” SNHMC introducing at trial any information, documentation or witnesses concerning or Prior to trial, SNHMC moved in limine to prohibit Anthony “from

$85,238.88. The record contains conflicting evidence about the status of Karen SNHMC for complications stemming from alcoholism, leaving a balance due of did not have health insurance, received emergency medical treatment at estate attachment on two unencumbered parcels owned jointly by the Hayeses. SNHMC filed suit against the Hayeses, and successfully sought a real

married in 1977. In July, August, October and November 2006, Karen, who The record supports the following facts. Anthony and Karen Hayes supporting his contention that SNHMC’s charges and services were p. 3 not comply with RSA 491:8-a (1997), and Anthony failed to present any facts is irrelevant to the validity of the judgment against Karen, Karen’s objection did

against Karen. Anthony lacks standing to contest the trial court’s summary judgment ruling against Karen and found Anthony liable under the necessaries doctrine; and (7)

necessary. SNHMC counters that the applicability of the necessaries doctrine

her debt to SNHMC; (6) the trial court correctly granted summary judgment

against Karen. personal knowledge of the services provided and whether they were medically purposes of this appeal that Anthony has standing to attack the judgment incompetent because the affiant was not a medical practitioner and lacked the affidavit supporting SNHMC’s motion for summary judgment was

pursuing Anthony, which it did; (5) Karen lacked sufficient resources to satisfy defense; (4) SNHMC was required only to first seek payment from Karen before error was harmless because Anthony could not factually support an elopement

necessaries doctrine, he is potentially liable for her debt. We assume for the the evidence was insufficient for such a ruling. Anthony also maintains that

if the trial court erred by treating elopement as an affirmative defense, that

standing to challenge the judgment against Karen because, under the address these contentions in his brief, at oral argument he argued that he has the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment against Karen because may not seek relief for the benefit of another.” Although Anthony did not reasonably necessary, were material, disputed issues of fact. He argues that has suffered no legal injury that an appeal whether SNHMC’s charges and the medical services provided to Karen were to this Court will protect and he

interrogatory responses and pleadings did not provide adequate notice; (3) even counters that: (1) elopement is an affirmative defense; (2) Anthony’s court erred when it granted summary judgment against Karen. SNHMC

appeal and “as of this time, no estate has been opened,” and that “Mr. Hayes married for the purposes of liability under the necessaries doctrine, and judgment against Karen. He contends that whether he and Karen were Anthony lacks standing to appeal the summary judgment against Karen. Anthony argues that the trial court erroneously granted summary

jointly owned the two pieces of property attached by SNHMC; and (5) the trial

Specifically, SNHMC contends that only Karen’s estate would have standing to

We first address, as a preliminary matter, SNHMC’s argument that

I. Summary Judgment: Karen Hayes

Anthony; (4) Karen had sufficient resources to satisfy her debt because Karen

find that Karen had inadequate funds before seeking reimbursement from Medical Center v. Holbrook, 140 N.H. 187, 190 (1995), SNHMC was required to defense; (2) even if it is, he provided sufficient notice; (3) pursuant to Cheshire On appeal, Anthony argues that: (1) elopement is not an affirmative supporting her allegations that the hospital’s charges were not reasonable.

p. 4 to any facts in the record, or to present the trial court with an affidavit, that there is a genuine issue for trial.” RSA 491:8-a, IV. Karen failed to refer answers to interrogatories, or admissions, must set forth specific facts showing

pleadings, but [her] response, by affidavits or by reference to depositions,

summary judgment cannot “rest upon mere allegations or denials of [the] entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The party opposing a motion for there were any disputed issues of material fact, or that SNHMC was not

matters stated herein.” payments or [Medicaid] payments.”

of summary judgment against Karen. Moreover, Karen failed to allege that

the books and records of [SNHMC]” and had “personal knowledge of the consider billing rates or cash payments as opposed to insurance the fact that [SNHMC] is allegedly a non-profit organization and needs to case are reasonable, the court needs to consider other issues, such as

liability under the necessaries doctrine was irrelevant to the trial court’s grant We agree that whether the Hayeses were married for the purposes of

contradicting SNHMC’s motion. Karen neither referred to anything in the record nor filed an affidavit

from its Credit and Collection Manager who stated that she was “familiar with the services provided. In support of its motion, SNHMC attached an affidavit that it provided medical care to her and that, as a result, she owed SNHMC for In determining whether or not the charges rendered by [SNHMC] in this

reasonable or necessary.” She also asserted: and/or supplies were properly administered to [her] or that they were In her objection, Karen denied “that medical and health care services material fact,

the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”

In its motion for summary judgment against Karen, SNHMC contended in a motion to reconsider. and that its affidavit was incompetent because he first raised those arguments at 234. the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo.” Everitt, 159 N.H. Smith v. HCA Health Services of N.H., 159 N.H. 158, 160 (2009). “We review the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm.”

i.e., facts that would affect the outcome of the litigation, and if

159 N.H. 232, 234 (2009). “If this review does not reveal any genuine issues of

the affidavits and other evidence, and inferences properly drawn from them, in “When reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we consider

arguments that its charges were not reasonable because of its billing practices unreasonable. SNHMC also argues that Anthony failed to preserve his p. 5 5

justice as the confiscation of his estate.”

control over their property or financial affairs.

husband was entitled to her “society.”

husband was “the sole owner of the family wealth,” and the wife was “viewed as Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 188 (quoting Drew’s Appeal, p. 5 57 N.H. at 183). The lunatics.’”

and against his will, would be as flagrant a violation of the principles of parties” if they failed to provide their wives “with such necessaries.” a marriage contract; and to divest him of that right without his default, “A man has as good a right to his wife, as to the property acquired under rights of married women to “contract, sue, or be sued individually” or exercise

return for his responsibility for his wife’s support and liability for her torts, a necessary to secure wife’s personal protection or safety). wife were considered one legal entity. Id.; Steiner, p. 5 588 N.Y.S.2d at 892. In demonstrate that SNHMC was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. became the property of her husband,” as, in the eyes of the law, a husband and 353 (1930)). “[U]pon marriage a woman forfeited her legal existence and

Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 189 (quoting Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 3 p. 5 52,

“‘were absolutely void, -- not merely voidable, like those of infants and medical practitioner. Steiner, p. 5 588 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (App. Div. 1992). A married woman’s contracts v. Kieft, 578 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Mich. 1998); Medical Business Associates v. husbands for “essential goods and services provided to [their wives] by third North Ottawa Community Hosp.

This doctrine originated as a result of draconian legal restrictions on the

expenses not necessaries unless husband’s conduct rendered expenses however, failed to identify any facts supporting Karen’s claim, and failed to N.H. 82, 83 (1870); see Morrison v. Holt, 42 N.H. 478, 480 (1861) (legal such necessary furniture as is suitable to her condition.” Ray v. Adden, p. 5 50 drink, washing, physic, instruction, and a suitable place of residence, with 140 N.H. at 189 (quotation omitted). Necessaries included “necessary food, the business department of the hospital, and not by a doctor or a Holbrook,

The ancient common law doctrine of necessaries imposed liability on

The motion thus challenged the competency of the affidavit. The motion,

to the Defendant. The Affidavit was signed by an employee that works in Judgment, along with a copy of an invoice for services that were rendered [SNHMC] submitted an Affidavit in support of its Motion For Summary

supporting SNHMC’s motion for summary judgment: In her motion to reconsider, Karen raised a new challenge to the affidavit p. 6 6

longer fits contemporary society,”

as an individual person or legal entity.” of dominance by a husband and submission by a wife who had little standing

world of ideas.’” and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the

doctrine of necessaries has been characterized as “an anachronism that no gender-neutral obligation of spousal support.” Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 189. The have an “unrestricted right to contract,” and RSA 54 p. 6 6-A:2 (2007) “imposes a doctrine. Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d 88, 90 (N.C. 1996). Undoubtedly, married women today home but chose to reside with the adulterer, “eloped” for the purposes of the Forsyth Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.

partnership of equality, an evolution from the nineteenth century relationship U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975)). “The modern marital relationship is viewed by law as a

Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421

“In modern America, ‘no longer is the female destined solely for the home

beyond his control. Id.; see Rumney, 7 N.H. at 580. whether the wife had left her husband, committed adultery and also remained

Cogswell, 3 N.H. at 42. Key to the determination of “elopement” was drove the wife out of the marital home.

husband to live with an adulterer, or was removed forcibly from the marital N.H. 41, 42 (1824); see Rumney, 7 N.H. at 580. A wife who voluntarily left her wife “eloped” would not be liable for her necessaries. Cogswell v. Tibbetts, 3 Allen, 29 N.H. at 73; Rumney, 7 N.H. at 578. For example, a husband whose question were necessaries “according to the husband’s situation in life.” certain circumstances. See, e.g., Tebbets v. Hapgood, 34 N.H. 420, 421 (1857); Husbands could avoid liability under the necessaries doctrine under

for his wife’s necessaries. Pidgin v. Cram, 8 N.H. 350, 351 (183 p. 6 6). if the husband and wife separated by consent, a husband could still be liable & Co. v. Aldrich, 29 N.H. 63, 73 (1854); Rumney, 7 N.H. at 578. However, even

evicting her without reason, or committing some other kind of misconduct that the necessaries doctrine if he caused the separation by abandoning his wife, (1899). If the couple separated, the husband could nonetheless be liable under Rumney v. Keyes, 7 N.H. 571, 580 (1835); see Ott v. Hentall, 70 N.H. 231, 232

to provide his wife with necessaries, and that the articles or services in prima facie case that husband and wife were married, that the husband failed husband for goods or services provided to his wife, a creditor had to set forth a N.H. at 189 (citation and quotation omitted). To obtain compensation from a husband was obligated to provide her with such necessaries.” Holbrook, 140 “[b]ecause the wife could not contract for food, clothing, or medical needs, her Kieft, 578 N.W.2d at 270 (quotation omitted). It reflected the sad reality that, common-law mechanism by which the duty of support could be enforced.” victimization which coverture would otherwise have permitted” by “providing a Accordingly, the law of necessaries “attempted to obviate some of the

Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471, 474 (N.C. 1987) (quotation omitted). little more than a chattel in the eyes of the law.” N.C. Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. a defense to the doctrine of necessaries. p. 7 intention to rely upon that defense. We conclude that “elopement” is no longer

Karen “eloped,” finding that Anthony had failed to give adequate notice of his

and (4) payment for the necessaries has not been made.

is an affirmative defense, and barred Anthony from presenting evidence that to the law of necessaries. As stated above, the trial court ruled that elopement

married women were severely restricted in their ability to contract, sue, or be As noted above, the necessaries doctrine developed during a time when not turn away patients who require treatment. Cf. Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d at 91. application of this doctrine, as, unlike other creditors, medical providers may to the receiving spouse at the time the [services or goods] were provided,

We next consider whether elopement is an affirmative or general defense

A. Elopement

forced to respond to patients who require immediate, emergency care). Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Wis. 1982) (noting that hospitals are often

providers are uniquely situated and, therefore, uniquely likely to seek the spouse, (3) the person against whom the action is brought was married for the purposes of the necessaries doctrine, hospitals and other medical (2) [they] were necessary for the health and well-being of the receiving doctrine. show that (1) [services or goods] were provided to the receiving spouse, See, e.g., Ott, 70 N.H. at 232; Rumney, 7 N.H. at 580. We note that, This approach comports with our own common law on the necessaries Regional Medical Center v. Evans, 454 S.E.2d 343, 345 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995). Medical Center v. Kagawa, 967 P.2d 686, 693 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998); Trident 4233643, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2007) (unpublished opinion); see Queen’s Wesley Long Nursing Center, Inc. v. Harper, No. COA06-1706, 2007 WL

of [services or goods] provided to the other spouse, the . . . provider must In order to establish a prima facie case against one spouse for the value

follows: some courts have outlined a prima facie case under the law of necessaries as When considering the application of the doctrine in the modern day,

REV. 933, 939 (1998); Kieft, 578 N.W.2d at 270. Challenge of Connor v. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center?, 50 FLA. L. Doctrine of Necessaries Necessary in Florida: Should the Legislature Accept the doctrine to apply to both husbands and wives. See, e.g., Simons, Note, Is the Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 190, and many courts have similarly extended the extended it to apply to all married individuals, regardless of gender, see 1011, 1019 (Md. 1981). In New Hampshire, however, the doctrine endures: we 596 So. 2d 578, 580 (Ala. 1992); Condore v. Prince George’s Cty, 425 A.2d omitted), and some courts have abolished it. See, e.g., Emanuel v. McGriff, living apart, and whether they share their living expenses and debt.

p. 8 a non-debtor spouse liable for the medical expenses of the other. that spouses are no longer sharing assets or debts, it makes little sense to hold

whether the parties were separated, when they separated, whether they are 8

the facts existing in the particular case in which it is rendered”). financially supporting each other). If a marriage has broken down to the extent

purposes of liability under” the necessaries doctrine. elopement exception “has no place in the common law.” no longer viable for the purposes of the necessaries doctrine might include debts. Accordingly, factors to consider in determining whether the marriage is on a mutual expectation that the spouses will share assets, expenses, and 838. But see Kagawa, 967 P.2d at 699-700 (non-debtor spouse liable for

prong of the liability under necessaries doctrine “must necessarily be largely governed by necessaries doctrine include whether the parties are separated and have been Mercado, 481 A.2d at 837 (factors to consider in determining liability under

The non-debtor spouse’s liability under the necessaries doctrine depends provided to the other.”

necessaries remain applicable). Rather, we conclude that, under the third 195 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Neb. 1972) (noting that each decision with respect to 837. This is a fact-specific, and case-specific, inquiry. See Nichol v. Clema,

itself provide the basis for liability to a creditor supplying a spouse with to the necessaries doctrine are incompatible with current mores and laws Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). “[P]roof of an undissolved marriage does not in Ct. 2003); National Account Systems, Inc. v. Mercado, 481 A.2d 835, 837 (N.J. the necessaries doctrine. See Roach v. Mamakos, 764 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (Sup. demonstrate that the parties are “married” for the purposes of liability under case, the hospital – must show more than the legal fact of marriage to and, thereby, making either spouse responsible for the necessary services prima facie case that we have outlined above, the creditor – in this common law necessaries doctrine to impose liability on a gender-neutral basis antiquated and obsolete notions concerning women by modernizing the 1993) (reasoning that common law defenses to application of doctrine of at 91. But see Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 9-10 (Ind.

Given that the “historical purposes underlying the [elopement] exception

at 190.

comport with the modern status of marriage. We have “rejected such and committed adultery. See Cogswell, 3 N.H. at 42. Such a defense does not that the debtor spouse left the non-debtor spouse, escaped his or her control To defend on the grounds of elopement, the non-debtor spouse had to prove 578 N.W.2d at 269; Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d at 90; Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 892. sued, or to exercise control over their property, services, or earnings. See Kieft, satisfy the debt to SNHMC.

p. 9 Hayes[’] legal position,” citing the language in

before pursuing Anthony, SNHMC demonstrated that Karen’s estate could not

his assets. The trial court stated that it did “not necessarily agree with . . . Mr.

requiring SNHMC to prove that Karen lacks the resources to pay her debts defendant’s legal position” and determined that, even under a standard “[f]or the purposes of its analysis . . . accept[ed] [without] deciding the

demonstrate that Karen could not pay for her medical services before pursuing court for a new trial on the merits.

the extent [his or her spouse’s] estate[ ] [is] “does not necessarily restrict a finding of liability.” However, the trial court, reasoned that the Holbrook “language is directed at collection efforts” and Anthony relies primarily upon services before pursuing collection from the other spouse.” The trial court medical provider must “first seek payment from the spouse who received its

necessary medical expenses incurred by his or her spouse unless the resources The defendant argued before the trial court that SNHMC was required to “elopement” is not an affirmative defense, we reverse and remand to the trial 12 (1996) (emphasis added). liability under the necessaries doctrine. Because we hold today that medical services provided.” St. Joseph Hosp. of Nashua v. Rizzo, 141 N.H. 9, burden to demonstrate that the parties were “married” for the purposes of unable to pay for the necessary doctrine of necessaries renders the non-debtor spouse “liable to the hospital to “the other spouse is secondarily liable.” Id. at 188. We have held that the his wife could not satisfy her debt before seeking reimbursement from him. receives the necessary goods or services is primarily liable for payment,” and Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 187 (emphasis added). Accordingly, “the spouse who

Under the doctrine of necessaries, “a husband or wife is not liable for

from the other spouse.” Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 190. payment from the spouse who received its services before pursuing collection language in Holbrook which states that “a medical provider must first seek impose liability on the non-debtor spouse – in this case, SNHMC – retains the it must only seek payment from Karen before pursuing Anthony, relying upon

We next consider Anthony’s argument that SNHMC must determine that

B. Liability of Non-Debtor Spouse

the application of the necessaries doctrine; rather, the third party seeking to For the reasons described above, “elopement” is no longer a defense to

dissolved”). “duty of spousal support continues at least until the marriage relationship is necessaries until divorce finalized); Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 9 (holding that p. 10 10 does not withstand scrutiny under the compelling interest standard,” protection. Thus,

questions about its continued applicability in the modern world. the doctrine, which are evident in the court’s discussion of its origins, raise

neglectful husbands.” anachronistic assumptions about marital relations and female dependence, Holbrook ’s revision of the doctrine may be viewed as simply the doctrine was to assure that dependent wives received support from common law necessaries doctrine violated constitutional guarantees of equal the specific question before us was whether the gender distinctions in the Thus, while the holding in Holbrook may appear broad, it bears recalling that traditional analysis for determining whether to abolish existing precedent. should be abolished or revised,” id. at 190, we undertook none of the changes in the legal status of women. More specifically, Although we purported to “determine whether the [necessaries] doctrine raised by either party. I write separately, however, because anachronisms in individuals equally, regardless of gender.” Id. 190. We then “expand[ed] the common law doctrine to apply to all married

“[t]he traditional formulation of the necessaries doctrine, predicated on their husbands controlled their financial affairs. . . . The primary purpose of “dissipated the marital disabilities of women,” id. at 189, we concluded that Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 188. After chronicling the legal advances that violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. the question whether the doctrine, as it then existed in our common law,

called upon to reexamine the necessaries doctrine in light of subsequent In Cheshire Medical Center v. Holbrook, 140 N.H. 187 (1995), we were because the issue of abolishing the common law necessaries doctrine was not 1328 (Vt. 1996).

centuries ago when married women had no property or contractual rights and The necessaries doctrine “originated in English common law over three

HICKS, J., concurring specially. I concur in the judgment of the majority

J., concurred specially. BRODERICK, C.J., and DALIANIS and CONBOY, JJ., concurred; HICKS,

necessaries if the debtor spouse is unable to pay for his or her necessaries. out above, that the non-debtor spouse is liable for his or her spouse’s her debt to SNHMC. On remand, the trial court should apply the standard set applied the correct standard when it determined that Karen could not satisfy We clarify our holding in Holbrook by confirming that the trial court we stated in

p. 11 “robbed . . . [of its] justification.”

significant application or justification. purported purpose — to be an effective support mechanism for neglected come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of abandoned doctrine; and (4) whether facts have so changed, or

ownership and contractual capacity are the raison d’être for the doctrine. As

necessaries is “no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine” that has been

her husband to her contracts for necessaries disappears.

‘necessaries.’” doctrine had substantial limitations, the doctrine never accomplished its Court of Vermont noted in Lorrain, “because the husband’s liability under the developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of The doctrine also defies practical workability. See id. As the Supreme

married women under the common law; those restrictions on property Alonzi, 156 N.H. at 660 (quotation omitted).

necessaries doctrine no longer exist”). Viewed in this light, the doctrine of contractual rights as men, “the circumstances that led to the emergence of the A.2d at 1329 (noting that since women now have the same property and

underlying legal disability of the wife, the common law justification for binding

Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 189 (citation omitted). Without the results.” or medical needs, her husband was obligated to provide her with such Holbrook, “Because the wife could not contract for food, clothing, overruling; (3) whether related principles of law have so far

The necessaries doctrine arose out of the legal disabilities imposed upon

law doctrine of necessaries. Id. (quotation omitted). Most, if not all, of these factors apply to the common

becomes a mere exercise of judicial will with arbitrary and unpredictable governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of practical workability; (2) whether the rule is subject to a kind of (1) whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying

including: reveals that it has long outlived its relevance and should be abandoned. In determining whether to overrule prior case law, we consider several factors, the traditional factors for determining whether to abrogate precedent, however, enforcement was for that very reason doomed.” Id. at 660 (quotation omitted). precedent when “the ruling has come to be seen so clearly as error that its

Id. at 659-60 (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, we will abandon

stare decisis demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law, for when Northeast Generation Servs. Co., 156 N.H. 656, 659 (2008). “The doctrine of We do not lightly overrule longstanding precedent. See Alonzi v.

considered expansion of the doctrine. An examination of the doctrine under the abolition of gender distinctions that violated equal protection, rather than a p. 12 12

abolished.

presenting the issue come before us, the necessaries doctrine should be

rights.”

modern[, gender-neutral] doctrine seems to result in in fulfilling its original purpose. There is, in fact, some indication that “the underlying problems with the doctrine or rendered the doctrine more effective

stark contradiction to its genesis. For the foregoing reasons, should a case creditors’ rights, not spousal support rights,” Lorrain, 675 A.2d at 1329, in to extend credit, creditors give little weight to a married woman’s support 1780. As the Lorrain court noted, “In truth, extension of the doctrine serves needy spouses.” Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, supra at lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling” it. less available credit for

then extant equal protection concerns, it is doubtful that it solved any of the our gender-neutral revision of the doctrine in Holbrook may have alleviated common law doctrine of necessaries is no longer viable. Furthermore, while Consideration of the foregoing factors leads to the conclusion that the

Lorrain, 675 A.2d at 1329.

at 660 (quotation omitted). In fact, “studies indicate that in deciding whether

Finally, there appears to be little reliance upon the doctrine “that would

context of the narrow support problem it was intended to alleviate”). support” and finding “no persuasive evidence that the doctrine is useful in the necessaries doctrine “is generally an ineffective means of providing spousal Necessaries, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1767, 1799 (1984) (concluding that the wives.” Lorrain, 675 A.2d at 1329; see Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of